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This thesis brings five articles together written between 2005 and 2010, 
more or less one written every year. The title “Side effects of modernisation -  
Modernisation as a challenge to the enforcement system of EU competition 
law and EU law in general” formulates the subject of all the different articles. 
 
The term modernisation is well known and often used in competition circles. 
However, it is used to identify a variety of different trends. It is also, being a 
neutral and general term, not at all self-evident outside of competition law 
what it actually means.  Therefore, at the outset, a short explanation of the 
concepts of modernisation and side effects in the title seems helpful. This 
introduction also describes the personal motivation, the sources of 
inspiration and the background of this book well as the methodological 
approach that is closely related thereto.  
 
The term modernisation is meant to cover a complex of different 
developments that took place in EU competition law over the last years. 
Modernisation has a substantive component and a more procedural and 
institutional component. Both are addressed in this book, in particular from 
the perspective of the enforcement of the law.1 In the end, one of the result of 
bringing these articles together has been that together they clearly show how 
both aspects of modernisation are related. This shall be highlighted in the 
conclusions and final remarks in chapter 7.  
 
Substantive modernisation is a process that started somewhere at the end of 
the ‘90’s and, in short, the term is used to refer to the introduction of a more 
economic approach in competition law, more in particular the cartel 
prohibition of Article 101 TFEU and, to a lesser extent, Article 102 TFEU. In 
one area after the other, substantive EU rules were reformed, going from the 
rules on vertical agreements to the rules on horizontal agreements and 
followed, much later, by the announcement of new policy orientations for 
abuse of dominance. More attention for economic analysis and the market 
circumstances in a case, implying more cooperation between lawyers and 
economists, was the subject at at the heart of these reforms. The other side 
1  This means that when it comes to the substantive component of modernisation, 
the analysis does not concern the reforms from a substantive perspective (for 
example new provisions of the law, new policy for certain agreements, new 
concepts in the legal assessment of behaviour) but shall deal in various ways with 
the impact that these reforms have had on the legal system as a whole and on the 
enforcement system in particular. Enforcement is defined as the application of the 
law in individual cases in a particular procedural and institutional framework, in 
such as a way that rights can be invoked and are guaranteed, and that duties and 
obligations are fulfilled.  
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of the story was having less hard rules and per se prohibitions and more 
self-assessment by companies.2   
 
The other development that is covered by the term modernisation is the 
process of decentralisation, which was mainly initiated by Regulation 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 of the Council (joined as appendice). This 
aspect of modernisation, namely the decentralisation in EU competition law 
refers, in particular, to the increased involvement of national judges and 
national competition authorities in the enforcement of EU competition law 
(and not only possibly their own national law). Where the judges are 
concerned, the great novelty was the introduction of the legal exception of 
Article 101 (3) TFEU and the abolishment of the notification system at the 
Commission. Where the competition authorities are concerned, they were 
given a clear role to play as the enforcers of EU law in their own national 
jurisdictions.3 
 
Very early on when the project for this book surfaced, the term “side effects” 
came to mind. It aims at developments that are not the core content, nor the 
purpose as such of modernisation as defined above, but that appeared as 
ancillary or side effects. To explain why the term side effects seemed to fit 
with all the different contributions and the collection thereof, reference is 
made to certain elements in the medical definition of the term. Side effects of 
a medical treatment are mostly unintended, sometimes perceived in a 
negative way, and they are usually difficult to predict and to treat. They are 
also very individually determined. If not treated adequately, they can become 
worse than the disease that the main treatment had set out to cure. Side 
effects are effects on other aspects of health than the one that is targeted 
with the treatment. To measure whether or not it is worthwhile to endure 
side effects, and to explain where they come from, it is necessary to take a 
more global perspective (the general health and living conditions of a person) 
as opposed to looking only at the specific problem the cure wants to treat. All 
these elements seemed to fit well to the subject and approach in this 
collection of articles.  
 
Certain side effects on the system of enforcement of EU competition law are 
provoked by, or closely related to important recent substantive and 
procedural developments in competition law. Some of these side effects are 
singled out in these articles because, from an individual perspective, they 
seemed particularly interesting and sometimes worrying or problematic.4  
2  References to specific reforms can be found throughout the different chapters.  
3  Again, throughout the different chapters, more detailed references can be found to 
the new provisions and the rights and duties of judges and authorities in this new 
modernised context.  
4  Chapter 3 on interstate trade is somewhat of an exception to the extent that I was 
asked for a contribution to a book with a predetermined subject whereas all the 
other articles where the result of a particular personal interest. However, chapter 3 
does seem to be in coherence with the others when it comes to the approach and 
the common themes that shall be discussed further in chapter 7. The most 
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These last remarks on the choice of the term “side effects” might also explain 
why the different pieces do not contain much detailed and technical 
examination of particular aspects of modernisation. This thesis is motivated 
by the willingness to explore more theoretical ways to observe and study 
competition law, drawing on the interest and experience as a more all round 
EU lawyer, and combined with a great interest in procedure and due process 
in general.5 
 
The tile also presents modernisation as a challenge, both to the enforcement 
system of EU competition law as well as to the enforcement of EU law more 
in general. The term challenge is meant in a positive way: the side effects of 
modernisation that are identified should make us reflect thoroughly on an 
number of aspects of the enforcement system, allowing us to improve it as 
we go along. The reference to EU law in general is inspired by the fact that 
many issues described in the articles can be useful to study for lawyers not 
active in competition law and certain developments might also have 
repercussions well beyond competition law.  
 
Translated in terms of approach and methodology, all articles attempt to 
take a broader perspective: competition law is part of the legal system of the 
European Union, Union law, and the law of Member States. Competition law 
should and cannot be isolated from developments elsewhere in the law. Also, 
both in practice and in academic reflections the underlying question is often: 
Is, and if so why, should competition law be different than any other area of 
law? And also, do inherent characteristics of competition law justify 
differences when it comes to the enforcement of the law?6 This critical, 
almost sceptical, attitude towards the “world of competition law” is certainly 
a factor of influence. Perhaps taking more of a panoramic view on 
competition law can also contribute to its development, rather than always 
concentrating on the latest technical development. Also, modernised 
competition law does not only require lawyers to be open to what economics 
have to offer. Especially when it comes to enforcing the law and the many 
open legal questions that currently exist in that respect, profound knowledge 
and reflection from a broader legal perspective can also be useful: 
important reason is that the research question underlying the article, is inspired 
by the general methodological approach to look at competition law in a broader EU 
law context. The study of the interstate clause is especially interesting in that 
respect because it is a concept present in all areas of internal market law.  
5  The opportunity for detailed examination of the law in all its ins and outs exists on 
a daily basis in the practice of the law and in other writings. Although competition 
law was part of daily work since the beginning in 1993, in practice, at least until 
2007, I have always had the benefit of dealing with other areas of EU law. Since 
2007 the focus of work and interest is very much on procedure in a broad sense.  
6  These questions are mentioned here because they explain the personal motivation, 
the way the law is practiced and studied, the choice of subjects and the common 
approach. They are not to be seen as a central research question for which this 
thesis formulates an answer. The particularity of this thesis being a collection of 
articles which were not all written with a pre-existing intention to bundle them, 
makes it difficult to formulate a single research question retroactively.  
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competition law is a fairly young discipline and its procedural framework is 
under construction.7 The question if and how competition law is similar or 
different than other areas of the law also helps to keep an open mind and to 
avoid overspecialization and tunnel vision.  
 
The research is certainly influenced as well by increasing cooperation with 
non-lawyers and a more multidisciplinary context, both in practice as well as 
in the academic setting. A “law and economics” context can have a variety of 
beneficial effects, many of which have been extensively described and 
studied over the last years. A perhaps less obvious effect of the confrontation 
of law and economics in practice and academic work, is the doubt about the 
role and significance of the law as a whole and the self-evidence of legal 
concepts and principles that we use so easily on a daily basis (see below: 
proof, effectiveness). In my case, the confrontation of law and economics 
contributed to a growing interest, not primarily for doing multidisciplinary 
work myself but, on the contrary, for research touching on the basics of our 
legal systems (see below: objectives of a legal system, judicial protection). In 
other words, for typically legal issues. In that respect this thesis is also 
forward-looking: it can hopefully serve as a basis for exploring some 
intriguing, more theoretical, issues further in the near future: the role of 
procedure, the relationship between substantive law and procedural law, the 
way the legal system adapts itself to non-legal considerations, lawmaking as 
opposed to policy in the European Union.  
 
Every one of the articles is reproduced in this thesis in the form in which it 
was published.8 Chapter 6 is an exception because it has not yet been 
published at the time this manuscript was completed. 
7  One obvious example is given here from experience: most competition lawyers have 
some familiarity with human rights, at least are aware of the right to a fair trial 
and the rights of defense. However, the straightforward application of human 
rights case-law depends on the pre-existing question whether human rights 
protection can indeed be invoked in the area of competition law and how. The 
procedural framework is in fact a mixture of e.g. human rights, principles of good 
administration, general principles of law common to most member states, certain 
quasi-criminal features, and typically EU institutional and substantive elements. 
When difficulties arise in the enforcement of the law in a case this often implies, in 
my personal view, the question as to which are the right sources of law to draw 
inspiration from. Equally in academic reflection, and when constructing further 
the enforcement system, it seems valid to sometimes take a panoramic approach 
on competition law and its enforcement before focusing again on a specific legal 
issue.  
8  This implies for example that the numbering of the treaties is not adapted to the 
Lisbon Treaty in chapters 2 until 5. A table of equivalence is added in appendice at 
the end of this book. Given the fact that each article was a stand-alone project, it 
also means that in the introductory part of each one of them, the same elements 
are often described as the relevant context and there might be some repetition 
involved. However, the choice was made to simply reproduce the articles as they 
were written because it seems the best way to show the evolution over time. Also, it 
is important to note that the idea to bring a number of articles together in a thesis, 
did not yet exist when the first one (chapter 2) was written. The idea appeared 
INTRODUCTION 
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The first article (written and published in 2005) concerns judicial protection 
and modernisation of competition law and combines my interest for the 
subject of judicial protection and in particular, access to court for 
individuals, with the area I worked in most in practice, competition law. This 
article entitled “Judicial protection after Modernisation of Competition law” is 
chapter 2. The research question at the basis of this article was whether the 
system put into place by Regulation 1/2003 could result in an increase in 
the lack of judicial protection for individuals as a side effect of the 
modernisation and decentralisation it wished to achieve.  
 
The second article (written and published in 2006) was originally published 
in Dutch in a book on the changing role of the interstate trade concept. My 
article entitled “Intrastate equals interstate” (translation) covers the 
perspective of competition law and aims to examine if and how the concept 
of interstate trade plays a role in this area of Union law. It therefore also 
touches on the relationship between competition law and European Union 
law in general, in particular here the law of the internal market. This article 
is chapter 3 below. It addresses a specific legal requirement in the 
application of competition law and also questions how this will be affected by 
modernisation.  
 
The third article (written and presented as a paper in 2007, published in 
2008) deals with proof, a subject of growing importance in competition law. 
The approach was one inspired by the interaction with economists, both in 
practice as well as in the Tilburg Law and Economics Center. This article 
proposes a pragmatic view on issues of proof and is entitled “Sense and 
nonsense of rules on proof in cartel cases: How to reconcile a more economics 
based approach to competition law with more attention for rules on proof”; it 
forms Chapter 4. Growing interest for a typically legal issue such as proof, is 
considered a side effect of modernisation.  
 
The next article is a project which took the longest to develop, although the 
first drafts date back to 2005-2006. The first version was finished end of 
2008 and published in April 2009 as a TILEC discussion paper. It was also 
presented in a substantially revised version as a paper at a conference in 
Bonn in May 2010 and it was published as an article in August 2010. It 
builds on the changes that competition law has undergone through the 
modernisation process and the uncertainty this has caused about the 
objectives that EU competition law and policy wishes to protect. The article 
“Should we know what we are protecting? Yes we should!” is chapter 5. The 
subtitle is A plea for a solid and comprehensive debate about the objectives of 
EU competition law and policy. It expresses a feeling of confusion at the 
around the time the third article (chapter 4 on proof) was being written and the 
fourth one (chapter 5 on objectives) was already underway. Therefore there was no 
a priori choice of a general theme to be expressed in different articles. The 
coherence and the common ideas are to a large extent a spontaneous process. 
Chapter 7 expresses and structures these common ideas.  
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normative foundations of modernised competition law and policy. This 
confusion is also qualified as a side effect of modernisation.    
 
Chapter 6 contains the last article (written mostly in 2009, to be submitted 
for publication in 2010) which again combines the research interests of 
judicial protection, procedural law and competition enforcement. It is 
entitled “Decentralisation of competition law: sacrificing procedural 
autonomy?” The subtitle is Autonomy versus effectiveness: a well known 
conflict in EU law revisited and its impact on the question of future 
harmonisation in the area of enforcement of competition law. The article was 
finalized in March 2010. It pinpoints the trend towards increasing 
convergence of national procedural law and wonders what place there still is 
for the EU law concepts of effectiveness and procedural autonomy in that 
respect.   
 
In Chapter 7, the conclusions of each article are recalled and summarized 
and, where appropriate, certain aspects are briefly updated. The purpose is 
not to provide for a full fletched update of the (older) articles but to show 
more clearly the continuity between the different pieces and to highlight 
some common themes by way of conclusion.   
 
Although self-standing articles, there are a number of recurring common 
themes that appear throughout them. Four of these themes shall be 
discussed further by way of conclusions in chapter 7, they are:  
 
(1) The relationship between competition law and the internal market 
(2) Substantive modernisation as a challenge to the enforcement system 
(3) Modernisation from an organizational perspective: the complicated 
relationship between decentralisation, convergence and consistency 







Judicial protection after modernisation of competition 
law* 
The entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 has far-reaching implications for 
the enforcement of the EC competition rules. However, it does not deal with 
access to justice or the judicial protection of companies involved in 
competition cases. This article argues that the current legal framework in EC 
competition law lacks attention for some important issues of judicial 
protection. Certain characteristics of the modernised and decentralised 
system of competition law enforcement in the post 1 May 2004 era, add to 
pre-existing problems in that respect. Generally speaking the lack of judicial 
protection under the pre-modernisation system was mainly a result of the 
strict rules on the admissibility of direct actions under Article 230 EC Treaty, 
which left some decisions or acts of the Commission outside the scope of 
judicial review. In that respect, the most important reasons for concern in 
the new system are the number of (formal) individual decisions taken by the 
Commission, the further increase of soft law instruments and the creation of 
a number of new types of decisions by the Commission and within the 
network of competition authorities. This article focuses particularly on 
access to courts as one of the most fundamental elements of the right to 
effective judicial protection. The subject seems all the more relevant in light 
of recent developments in other areas of Community law highlighting the 
growing importance of the principle of adequate judicial protection in the 
Community legal order. The author calls upon the Community courts to 









When reference is made here to legal protection or judicial protection this 
shall mean the possibility for private parties to challenge a decision of the 
Commission, which concerns them, in a court of law. This shall be any 
decision which involves the application of the competition rules laid down in 
the EC Treaty.10 The right to effective legal protection is part of the 
Community legal order. Access to a court is the most important component 
*  This article was published in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2005, 32 (4), p. 
339-368. It was finalized on 1 July 2005.
10  Individuals should be able to enforce all rights they derive directly from 
Community law: ECJ Case 222/84, Johnston [1986] ECR 1651 [18]. Merger control 
decisions are not the focus of attention here even though the case-law in this area 
shall be referred to where it is considered relevant.  
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of this general principle. Every individual who considers himself wronged by 
a measure which deprives him of a right or an advantage under Community 
law must have access to a remedy against that measure and be able to 
obtain complete judicial protection.11 
 
The requirement of judicial protection is part of the rights protected under 
Article 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.12 Article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also expresses 
the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. 13 The Court has referred 
to the fact that the principle is common to the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States.  
 
According to many authors, there is a (special) need for full jurisdiction in 
competition cases because the Community acts (Commission decisions) can 
result in the imposition of considerable fines thus qualifying as “decisions” 
within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR.14 Such full jurisdictional control 
means review not only of the possible sanction that was imposed but also of 
all the facts and of their legal assessment.  
 
Access to a judge therefore on the centralised Community level means access 
to the Community Courts. In order to compare the levels of judicial 
protection before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, the 
following questions shall be addressed: do parties have a right to a 
(motivated) decision and is the decision open to appeal in front of a court? If 
access to a court can be established, the standard of review adopted by the 
11  See Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Case C-97/91, Borelli [1992] ECR I-
6313, par. 31. See H. Schermers and D. Waelbroeck, Judicial protection in the 
European Union (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 46 and following. 
This has been emphasized at numerous occasions in relation to the national 
courts’ duties under Article 10 EC; see also M. Brealey and M. Hoskins, Remedies 
in EC law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) 99-107. 
12  One of the standard cases of the Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg is Golder v 
United Kingdom (Appl no 4451/70) (1975) Series A no 18: the Court held that the 
detailed fair trial guarantees under Article 6 would be useless if it were impossible 
to start court proceedings in the first place; see also J. Jacobs and R. White, 
European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2002)151-155. 
13  Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/1; the 
Charter has now been integrated into the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe (Constitutional Treaty) [2004] OJ C 310. 
14  D. Waelbroeck and D. Fosselard, ‘Should the Decision Making Power in EC 
Antitrust Procedures be left to an Independent Judge? The impact of the European 
Convention of Human Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures’ (1994) 14 Yearbook of 
European Law 111 and following; Schermers and Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in 
the EU (above n 2) 48-49; K. Lenaerts and J. Vanhamme, ‘Procedural rights of 
private parties in the Community administrative process’ (1997) 34 Common 
Market Law Review 531, 555. 
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courts and the scope of the appeal are also relevant to determine the level of 
judicial protection, which is why this issue is also briefly addressed.15 
 
1.2 The increasing importance of the right to effective judicial 
protection 
 
Before examining the level of judicial protection in the light of recent changes 
in competition law, some developments in case-law and legislation outside 
the field of competition law shall first be very briefly described so far as they 
relate to effective judicial protection. 
 
1.2.1  Case law on Article 230 EC Treaty  
 
Recent case-law in Luxembourg has again drawn attention to the much 
discussed admissibility criteria of Article 230 EC Treaty. The fourth 
paragraph of Article 230 EC Treaty confers the right on individuals to lodge a 
direct appeal against acts of Community institutions provided certain 
admissibility criteria are met. Such a direct appeal is possible against acts 
addressed to a particular individual or against acts which, although in the 
form of a regulation or addressed to another person, in fact directly and 
individually concern him. One of the most controversial subjects in the past 
(outside of competition law) was the strict test applied for the interpretation 
of ‘individual concern’ in relation to acts of a general nature.16  
 
In its judgement in the Jégo-Quéré case of 3 May 2002, the Court of First 
Instance stated that it was time to review existing case-law on the possibility 
of private parties attacking Community measures of a general nature.17 The 
Court of First Instance proposed a new criterion for analysing ‘individual 
concern’. The reasoning of the CFI was largely based on the principle of 
effective judicial review based on the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Court referred to the Opinion of the Advocate General in UPA 
who also called for a reform of the case-law in this area.18  The judgement in 
Jégo-Quéré appeared to offer new opportunities to potential applicants, but 
the sense of victory did not last long.19 In its judgement of 25 July 2002, 
15  See J. Jans, R. de Lange, S. Prechal and R. Widdershoven, Inleiding tot het 
Europees bestuursrecht, 2nd edition (Nijmegen: Ars Aequi, 2002) 81 for additional 
elements. 
16  See: A. Arnull, ‘Private applicants and the action for annulment since Codorniu’ 
(2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 7 and the overview in the Opinion of 
Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-50/00P, UPA [2002] ECR I-6677. Jacobs refers 
to what was identified as a serious gap in the system of judicial remedies of 
Community law. 
17  CFI Case T-177/01, Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA/Commission [2002] ECR II-2365. 
18  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs (above n 16); the new criterion Jacobs 
proposed for “individual concern” was different: see par. 60 of the Opinion. 
19  Paragraph 51 of the judgement. the CFI stated that an individual should be 
considered as “individually concerned by a Community measure of general 
application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his legal 
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Union de Pequenos Agricultores, the Court of Justice refused to depart from 
the settled case-law to allow more actions by private parties to be brought 
under Article 230 EC.20 More specifically, the Court seemed to indicate that 
a more flexible interpretation of “individual concern”, in cases where there is 
no effective judicial review for parties, goes further than the text of the EC 
Treaty allows.21 The judgement contains a striking paragraph concluding 
that it is not unlikely that a reform of the existing system of remedies is 
necessary, but it is up to the Member States to take the initiative in that 
respect.22  
 
Commentary on this small revolution initiated by the CFI and promptly 
questioned by the ECJ, has been varied: some regretted that the ECJ did not 
take the opportunity to open up locus standi for individuals23 and others 
argued that there is no gap in judicial protection under Community law and 
no need to lament the rejection of a re-interpretation of Article 230. This last 
line of the argument places great emphasis on the important duties the 
national judges have to ensure judicial protection.24 
 
These developments show that this general principle has become such an 
important part of the Community legal order that even the Court (carefully) 
questioned the instruments that the Treaties currently offer individuals for 
challenging acts of the institutions.25 The thorough analysis made by 
position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights 
or by imposing obligations on him”. 
20  ECJ Case C-50/00P, Union de Pequenos Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677. 
21  See for first comments on the judgement: S. Prechal and L. Parret, ‘Zaak C-50/00 
P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores t. Raad van de Europese Unie’ (2003) 1 Sociaal-
Economische Wetgeving 35.  
22  Par. 45. The judgement was confirmed in the judgement of 1 April 2004 in the 
appeal against the CFI’s judgement in ECJ Case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quéré [2004] 
ECR I-03425. The differences of opinion expressed by the Community judges came 
to the attention of the Convention working on a Constitution for the European 
Union. On this aspect of “Constitutional dialogue”: D. Hanf, ‘Talking with “the 
pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of 
Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice’ (2003) 10 Maastricht Journal of 
European & Comparative Law 265. 
23  Amongst the most disappointed: F. Ragolle, ‘Access to justice for private applicants 
in the Community legal order: recent Revolutions’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 
90; A. Arnull, ‘April shower for Jégo-Quéré’ (2004) 29 European Law Review (2004) 
287. 
24  See J. Temple Lang, ‘Actions for Declarations that Community Regulations are 
invalid: the duties of National Courts under Article 10 EC’ (2003) 28 European Law 
Review 102 and X. Groussot, ‘The EC System of Legal Remedies and Effective 
Judicial Protection: does the system really need reform?’ (2003) 30 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 221; P. Nihoul, ‘Le recours des particuliers contre les actes 
Communautaires de portée générale’ (2002) 96 J.T. Droit Européen 38.  
25  It should be said that the Court had already raised the issue in 1995 in a paper for 
the IGC before the Treaty of Amsterdam. For remarkable comments on this subject 
from the President of the CFI, see B. Vesterdorf, ‘The Community Court system ten 
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Advocate General Jacobs in UPA and the many comments in literature 
questioning whether the Community judicial system is in line with the right 
to effective judicial protection, also provide a basis for the analysis made in 
this article.   
 
1.2.2  Other developments  
 
The growing importance of the principle of judicial protection in the 
Community legal order is demonstrated also by a number of other 
developments over the last years. Reference is made first to direct and 
indirect harmonisation of national procedural law to ensure effective 
enforcement of rights derived from Community law. 26,27 As a result, the 
principle of procedural autonomy of Member States is slowly eroding. This 
follows not only from new legislation but also from the case law. Judges 
should set aside domestic legislation, administrative practice or the 
established case-law of the national jurisdictions, if this is necessary to 
ensure that the rights that private parties derive from Community law can be 
enforced.28 The right to effective judicial protection for individuals has been 
at the heart of the reasoning of the ECJ in these cases.29  The same 
standards do not seem to apply however to remedies in a national context on 
the one hand and remedies before the Community Courts on the other.30 
years from now and beyond: challenges and possibilities’ (2003) 28 European Law 
Review 303. 
26  Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review 
procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts [1989] OJ L 
395/33. 
 E-commerce Directive: Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, 
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’) [2000] OJ L 178/1. 
 Consumer guarantees Directive: Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of 
consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12 and Directive 
98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on 
injunctions for the protection of consumers interests [1998] OJ L 166/ 51. 
27  There is also growing direct harmonisation by way of regulations which is more 
well-known: one of the most important recent examples being Council Regulation 
(EC) 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between courts of the Member 
States in taking evidence in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L 174/1. 
28  ECJ Case C-129/00, Commission/Italy [2003] ECR I-14637; See J. McKendrick, 
‘Modifying Procedural Autonomy: Better Protection for Community Rights’ (2000) 8 
European Review of Private Law (2000) 565.  
29  See for example ECJ Commission/Italy (above n 28); ECJ case C-453/00, Kühne & 
Heinz, [2004] ECR I-00837.  
30  Reference is made to the reluctance of the ECJ to open up Article 230 EC 
described above. In general on remedies at a national level see: J. Lonbay and A 
Biondi (ed.) Remedies for Breach of EC Law, (Chichester, Wiley, 1997); W. Van 
Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’ 37 Common Market Law Review 
(2000), 501; T. Eilmansberger ‘The relationship between rights and remedies in EC 
law”: in search of the missing link’ (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1199. 
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The incorporation of fundamental human rights into the Community legal 
order has been another important factor in the development of the right to 
effective judicial protection. The Treaty on the European Union and now the 
Constitutional Treaty contain references to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 31 The rights laid down in the convention are recognised as 
general principles of law that are part of the Community legal system.32 The 
case-law of the European Court for Human Rights, which has fleshed out the 
right to an effective remedy, also forms part of the Community legal order.33 
In the meantime this case-law is also evolving. An interesting example is the 
judgement in the Posti case where the analysis of the ECHR demonstrates 
that Article 6(1) requires not just the availability of a judicial remedy but also 
requires that in practice the remedies can be considered adequate.34 
 
There are also some new provisions relating to the judicial system in the 
Constitutional Treaty.35 In the provisions dealing with the Court of Justice, 
the Constitutional Treaty now consolidates the principle that Member States 
must provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the 
areas covered by Union law.36 The necessary legal instruments must exist for 
effective enforcement. This obligation therefore now has an explicit 
constitutional status.  
 
Finally, the Constitutional Treaty contains a modified article on the 
admissibility of direct actions by individuals against Community acts.37 The 
text of the new provision is as follows:  
 
´Any natural or legal person may, …, institute proceedings against an act 
addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to 
him or her, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or 
her and does not entail implementing measures.´  
 
The current text of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC Treaty can be 
recalled:  
 
´Any natural or legal person may…institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision, although in the form of a 
31  Articles II-107, II-111 and 112 of the Constitutional Treaty (above n 13). 
32  Articles I-7 and II-47 of the Constitutional Treaty (above n 13).  
33  See ECJ Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères [2002] ECR 9011.  
34  Posti and Rahko v Finland (Appl no 27824/95) ECHR Reports 2002 VI. 
35  Constitutional Treaty (above n 13). 
36  Article I-29. 
37  Article III-365 of the Constitution. See Groussot (above n 24). Apparently, one of 
the proposals discussed in the working groups was an explicit reference to Article 
230(4) in Article 47 of the Charter which states the right to effective judicial 
protection. See also Memorandum by Prof. T. Tridimas on these discussions and 
his proposal for improving access to court,  
 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/lolselect/ldeucom/47/47we20.ht
m.  
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regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and 
individual concern to the former.´ 38 
 
Notwithstanding the questions of interpretation that can be expected with 
regards to this new provision (if of course it ever enters into force), the 
amendment of the provision providing a legal basis for direct appeals by 
individuals also demonstrates the growing importance of the individual’s 
right to judicial review. The creation of a possible appeal of individuals 
against an act of a general nature can be seen as quite an important step 
considering the legal systems in the Member States. 
 
2.  Modernisation of competition law  
 
Modernisation, brought about by Regulation 1/2003, has been the subject of 
numerous comments in legal literature. Particular reference is made here 
also to one of the previous editions of Legal Issues, which contains several 
outstanding contributions about this subject.  
 
In many, if not most cases, market related issues are now at the heart of the 
decision of a competition authority applying Articles 81 and 82 and the 
merger rules.39 This means that, to a large extent, market analysis 
determines the outcome of a case. Market analysis does not merely involve 
establishing facts but applying a number of legal concepts such as the 
relevant market, an appreciable restriction of competition and market power. 
Therefore, if parties wish to obtain annulment of a decision, they should be 
able to obtain full review by a court of the market analysis contained in the 
contested decision.  
 
In this article Regulation 1/2003 is viewed from a specific angle, namely the 
impact it will have on the existing level of judicial protection for individual 
companies at the EC level. The Regulation and its accompanying Notices 
raise a number of issues from the point of view of judicial protection.  
 
2.1 Commission (individual) decisions 
 
Now that national authorities and judges can give full application to Article 
81 EC, the Commission has declared that it wants to focus on the major 
pan-European cases, hardcore cartels and/or those cases that are suitable 
for setting an example on grounds of policy.4041, There will no longer be any 
38  The phrase “and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to him or her 
and does not entail implementing measures” clearly refers to regulations such as 
those referred to in the Jégo-Quéré and UPA cases. 
39  Meaning qualifying facts as being compatible or not with the rules. 
40  See also Commission Policy Document on proactive competition policy: 
Commission (EC) ‘A Proactive Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe’ 




exemption decisions but there are various types of decisions the Commission 
can of course still take in individual cases.42  
 
Within this category, there are formal decisions based directly on Regulation 
1/2003 and other decisions. Article 7 Regulation 1/2003 provides that the 
Commission may require that undertakings end an infringement of Article 
81 or 82. This is of course not new. However, it continues by stating that the 
Commission may impose on undertakings behavioural or structural 
remedies, which are proportionate to the infringement and necessary to 
bring the infringement to an end. Article 9 also gives a new competence to 
the Commission: if commitments are offered by parties to meet concerns 
raised by the Commission during the procedure, the Commission may by 
decision make those binding on the undertakings. Such a decision shall 
then conclude that there are no longer legal grounds for action by the 
Commission.43 
 
The Commission can also adopt a “finding of inapplicability” if required by 
the Community public interest.44 The main purpose of this provision appears 
to have been to limit the concerns of legal security that were often expressed 
with regard to the abolition of the notification system. It is said that 
undertakings will not have a right to such a decision but the Commission 
might decide to adopt one where it would clarify the law and ensure its 
consistent application throughout the Community.45  
 
The list of possible Commission decisions addressed to individuals should 
also include the so-called guidance letters.46 Guidance letters are not 
regulated in Regulation 1/2003 itself but by a separate notice.47 Parties can 
address a memorandum to the Commission setting out why they require 
guidance and why their case raises a novel point of law. The conditions set 
41  I. Atanasiu and C. Ehlermann, ‘The modernisation of EC antitrust law: 
consequences for the future role and function of the EC Courts’ (2002) 23 
European Competition Law Review 72. For more general comments and a critical 
assessment of modernisation see A. Riley, ‘EC Antitrust Modernisation: the 
Commission does very nicely, thank you’, in two parts, (2003) 24 European 
Competition Law Review 604 and 657. 
42  Will there be more or less individual Commission decisions under the new system? 
Opinions on this issue are not unequivocal in literature: see Ehlermann and 
Atanasiu (above n 41), they assume that there will be more decisions. 
43  See comments: R. Whish, Competition Law, 5th edn (London: Lexis Nexis UK, 
2003) 257. 
44  Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003/EC on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
45  Recital 14. 
46  Recital 38 of Regulation 1/2003. From the beginning of the modernisation plans 
the Commission had promised that undertakings would still have a limited 
possibility to get informal guidance. 
 Have these guidance letters now replaced entirely the system of comfort letters? 
47  Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters) 
[2004] OJ C101/78. 
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out in the Notice relate to the importance of the case (in terms of financial 
interests of the parties) and the absence of pending court procedures on the 
same issues. 
 
Presumably, these guidance letters will now replace the practice of comfort 
letters previously used by the Commission to informally end cases and let its 
views be known. The conditions for guidance letters are strict, however; the 
question is whether at some point new informal versions of the above-
mentioned individual decisions shall turn up again. Comfort letters were a 
source of criticism, because of their unsatisfactory legal status so there will 
be some reticence. This issue has not been debated much either in the 
Commission documents prior to Regulation 1/2003 or in literature. 
 
2.2   Use of soft law 
 
Regulation 1/2003 is accompanied by six notices that are essential to the 
new modernised system.48 These notices clearly contain much more than a 
simple consolidation of existing practice and case-law. In some areas, they 
introduce new concepts and new conditions for the application of Article 81 
EC.49 In other instances, they introduce new rules of a more procedural 
nature.50 Soft law is adopted unilaterally by the Commission and, although 
on the basis of (older) established case law, it is not (formally) binding upon 
courts, it is of major importance in individual cases notwithstanding the lack 
of appeal.51 The soft law created by the Commission in this area also has a 
harmonising effect because its rules frequently serve as a source of 
inspiration for the application of national competition law. This increases its 
48  Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities 
[2004] OJ C101/43; Commission Notice on the co-operation between the 
Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 
81 and 82 EC [2004] OJ C 101/54; Commission Notice on the handling of 
complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] 
OJ C 101/65; Commission Notice on informal guidance (above n 47); Commission 
Notice - Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 
of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/81; Commission Notice - Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97. 
49  This is the case for the Notice on Article 81 (3) EC which in fact not only gives new 
elements for the application of the conditions in Article 81 (3) but also contains a 
very important part on Article 81 (1) and the way it should be applied, which is 
more than a mere consolidation of current practice and case-law; for comments 
see L. Hancher and P. Lugard, ‘ Honey, I Shrunk the Article! A critical assessment 
of the Commission’s Notice on Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty’ (2004) 25 European 
Competition Law Review 410. 
50  Co-operation in the network, with national judges; the possibility for individuals to 
obtain so-called guidance letters; see for a thorough study and criticism on the 
increased use of soft law: L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, its 
relationship to Legislation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005). 
51  A judge could indirectly challenge the validity of soft law through a preliminary 
question and a party to national proceedings should be able to invoke the 
exception of illegality against soft law instruments. For an example of an exception 
of illegality (Article 241), see CFI Case T-23/99 LRAF [2002] ECR II-1705. 
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importance for daily competition practice even more. The term “soft law” 
indeed applies to the type of act but not to its contents.  
 
2.3  Inter-network decisions52 
 
There are a number of “inter-network” decisions that the Commission can 
take on the basis of Regulation 1/2003: the decision to transmit documents 
(Article 11.2), the decision to request a NCA to transmit documents relating 
to pending case (Article 11.4), the decision to take over a case previously 
dealt with by a NCA (Article 11.6), the decision to exchange information 
(Article 12), the decision to suspend a case being dealt with at another level, 
and the decision to reject a complaint on the ground that a NCA is already 
dealing with the case or has dealt with it (Article 13). The possibilities for 
parties to challenge these decisions shall be discussed below. 
 
2.4.  Amicus curiae system 
 
Then there is finally the special category of “amicus curiae” cases. Article 15 
of Regulation 1/2003 provides for a novel route of intervention by the 
Commission in cases pending before the national courts. Different scenarios 
are possible: the Commission can be asked by the court to provide 
information via a position or opinion on questions concerning the application 
of the competition rules; the Commission, acting on its own initiative, may 
submit written observations to the courts of the Member States and if 
permitted by the court, oral observations are also possible.53 
 
3.     Right to a decision before and after54 
 
The question of whether a party has a right to obtain a decision on behalf of 
the Commission is obviously an essential prerequisite to the possibility to 
exercise one’s right of judicial review. 
 
3.1  Applicants 
 
It is difficult to determine whether an applicant had a right to a decision 
after having notified an agreement for exemption or negative clearance under 
52  Needless to say the term “decision” is used here in the widest possible sense, not 
referring to a decision as defined in the Treaty. Only new decisions are dealt with 
here: the existing infringement decision and the rejection of a complaint are not 
mentioned in this part. 
53  The last paragraph of Article 15 provides that the NCA or Commission may request 
the relevant court of the Member States to transmit or insure the transmission to 
them of any documents necessary for the assessment of the case in preparation of 
the observations mentioned. See also the Notice on co-operation with national 
courts (above n 48). 
54  The term “decision” used here refers to an act closing an investigation by the 
Commission, which can be the subject of an appeal in a court of law, in other 
words a “decision” within the meaning of Article 230 EC.  
JUDICIAL PROTECTION AFTER MODERNISATION OF COMPETITION LAW 
17 
the “old” system. Article 4 of Regulation 17 did not contain an obligation for 
the Commission to take a decision, only an obligation for parties to notify in 
order to obtain an exemption.55 Some have argued that such a right must 
exist because notifications of new agreements do not benefit from provisional 
validity, and it would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty if parties 
could be held to wait indefinitely for a Commission decision.56 The case-law 
has confirmed on numerous occasions that the Commission has certain 
discretionary powers. However, the case-law usually cited in support of this 
margin of discretion relates to complaint cases and thus might not be 
conclusive.57 The Court of Justice had ruled that the rejection of a request 
for an exemption must be adequately motivated58 but there is no clear-cut 
case to say that applicants had a right to a decision when they applied for an 
exemption or a negative clearance.  
 
In a system where there are no longer any formal notifications, the question 
of the right to a decision now only concerns companies requesting the 
Commission to look at their case in the absence of a formal request. This 
might be to obtain a decision on the non-applicability of the provisions laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82.59However, it appears from the above that there 
was no clearly defined right to a decision under the “old system” when a 
notification was made. It seems very unlikely therefore that a right to obtain 
a negative clearance of declaration of non-application will exist under 
Regulation 1/2003. 
 
The question of a right to a decision might also occur in case informal 
guidance is requested. The Notice on guidance letters contains an implicit 
statement by the Commission that parties shall have no right for the 
Commission to act upon a request for such a letter.60 It goes without saying 
that such a statement is not binding and could be overruled by the 
Community Courts. However, it does not seem likely that the courts would 
rule in favour of a right to guidance because this might lead to, in effect, 
reinstating a notification procedure.61  
55  Commission Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in 
applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty [1993] OJ C 39/6. 
56  Commentaire Mégret, Le droit de la CEE, Tome 4 Concurrence. 2nd edn (Bruxelles: 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1997) 448 and J. Temple Lang, ‘Community 
Antitrust law – Compliance and enforcement’ (1981) Common Market Law Review 
335. 
57  For example CFI Case T-24/90, Automec v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223. 
58  For example ECJ Case 19 and 20/74, Kali & Salz [1975] ECR 499. 
59  This is the new possibility in Article 10. There is no longer a form required for this: 
it is not set up as a procedure initiated by a notification but rather as a possibility 
the Commission has to look at an individual case that is important for policy 
reasons. Nevertheless there is little reason to see why this might not happen after 
a request from a company. 
60  Commission Notice on informal guidance (above n 47). Paragraph 17 states that 
the Commission shall inform parties if a guidance letter is not issued. 
61  A remaining issue here is whether the practice of comfort letters shall be 
completely replaced by these guidance letters or not. 
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It is argued here that the Commission should be obliged to motivate the 
rejection of such a request in a similar way as the Courts have required for 
the rejection of complainant in the past (see below). There is no other forum 
to challenge the Commission’s refusal than before the Community courts 
and the existence of a decision is a prerequisite for an appeal. A parallel 
approach to the case-law described giving complainants a right to a 
motivated rejection seems entirely justifiable.62 
 
All in all, there are fewer cases in which the Commission can be asked to 
take an individual decision now. Perhaps the lack of a right to a decision at 
the Community level will also be compensated by the possibilities of 
ensuring judicial protection at the national level. Nevertheless, the only 
instrument that exists for the moment to obtain legal security in complicated 
cases is the procedure for guidance letters. It certainly cannot be taken for 




In relation to complaints, the Courts have frequently stated that the 
Commission can set priorities with a view to the Community interest. It can 
consider the importance of the infringement to the common market and the 
likelihood of establishing the infringement but the Commission may also 
take account of other factors, such as the economical significance of the 
case.64 Complainants only have a right to a motivated rejection of their 
complaint: the Commission is required to substantiate its arguments why 
the complaint is rejected because there is no Community interest.65 There is 
therefore no right for complainants to a formal infringement decision 
although the Courts are willing to carry out extensive judicial review to 
examine whether a rejection is adequately motivated.66  
62  One could imagine that in the context of national litigation parties are required to 
demonstrate that they did everything in their means to assess their complex 
agreements: would they then have to refer to the fact that they tried to obtain a 
guidance letter from the Commission? The refusal of that guidance shall have an 
impact on that litigation and the wording shall be decisive. If the national judge is 
in doubt about the wording of the letter, would preliminary questions be possible? 
The judge could suspend proceedings in a similar way as described in the Notice 
on co-operation with national judges. 
63  Many competition authorities have an enforcement system very similar to the new 
Regulation 1/2003 system and have decided to also abolish exemptions. The 
possibility to obtain informal guidance shall differ from Member State to Member 
State. Furthermore, important as the role of national courts may be for private 
enforcement, parties seeking legal certainty shall not have often (if ever) access to 
“preventive” judicial review. There are also still many obstacles to private 
enforcement: see Riley (above n 41). 
64  C. Kerse and N. Khan, EC Antitrust procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) 90 
and following.  
65  CFI Case T-37/92, BEUC/Commission [1994] ECR II-285, ECJ Case C-119/97 P, 
UFEX [1999] ECR I-1341. 
66  Kerse and Khan (above n 64) and C. Kerse, ‘The complaint in Competition Cases: a 
Progress Report’ (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review 213 and following. 
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The possibility for complainants to take their case to a national court 
justifies in part the discretionary powers granted to the Commission.67 In its 
efforts to decentralise the application of competition rules, the Commission 
has strongly encouraged bringing cases at a national level.68 It has taken 
quite a clear view in this: “there is not normally a sufficient Community 
interest in examining a case where the plaintiff is able to secure adequate 
protection of his rights before the national courts. In these circumstances the 
complaint will normally be filed.” The CFI has taken a less radical view. If a 
case involving the complainant is pending before a national court, this is a 
factor that the Commission can take into account. However, the fact that a 
case could be brought before a national court is not reason alone to reject a 
complaint.69 Given the further decentralisation that took place recently this 
is interesting case-law to bear in mind. A form has now been drafted for 
complaints and the Commission has published a Notice, which aims to 
promote complaints.70  The Notice repeats the established principle that 
complainants have no right to a decision.71  
 
3.3  Right to a decision after modernisation? 
 
The existence of private enforcement at a national level does not justify the 
lack of a right to a decision for applicants. This is especially true for the 
decisions which the Commission can take on the basis of Regulation 1/2003 
and which cannot be replaced by a national judgement or decision. 
Applicants of formal or informal decisions should have a right to a decision. 
An indirect argument can be found in par. 75 of the CFI judgement in 
Automec II. The Court first reiterates that complainants have no right to 
obtain a decision regarding the existence or otherwise of the infringement. It 
then continues: “It follows that the Commission cannot be required to give a 
decision in that connection unless the subject-matter of the complaint falls 
within its exclusive purview, as in the case of the withdrawal of an 
exemption granted under Article 85 (3) of the Treaty.” Does the Court mean 
that there is a right to a decision when a case falls within the scope of the 
exclusive competence of the Commission?72Such an interpretation, which 
seems desirable, would impose a right to a decision in various situations 
under the new system. 
 
67  See also par. 17 of the new Commission Notice on handling complaints (above n 
48). 
68  See both 1993 Commission Notice on co-operation with national courts (above n 
55) as well as 1997 Commission Notice on co-operation with national competition 
authorities [1997] OJ C 313/3.  
69  CFI, Automec v Commission (above n 57). 
70  See above n 48. 
71  Par.27-28, 4-45. It is noted that the Notice seems to indicate that the requirement 
of a legitimate interest shall be increasingly important and might therefore 
constitute an additional obstacle, par. 33-40. 
72  See above n 69. 
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Parallel to the case-law on complaints, applicants should have at least a 
right that the Commission “defines its position” which is not the same as a 
formal decision). There is currently no legal basis for that right, nor is there 
clear jurisprudence in that respect. However, if such a right does not exist, 
the complainants are in a better position than the companies concerned 
(applicants) since they have been given the right, by legislation and by the 
Courts, to a motivated rejection of their complaint.73 
 
Finally, a separate question might also be whether companies that are 
subject of an investigation based on a compliant should have a right to the 
rejection of such a complaint by the Commission. According to the case-law 
mentioned above, the answer seems also to be negative even though in 
practice a complaint can cause great economic and reputational damage. In 
(national) damage proceedings the absence of a clear decision confirming 
there has or has not been an infringement can be an obstacle. 
 
4.  Admissibility under Article 230 EC: appeal possible before 
and after?74 
 
In terms of judicial protection, the condition that an act must be 
challengeable to be open to review under Article 230 EC Treaty and, in some 
cases, the requirement that parties have a real interest to bring a case were 
the most debated issues.75 
 
The Courts have always taken a non-formalistic approach. To be 
challengeable, an act must be of a binding character, it must produce legal 
effects and be definitive.76 The contents of the act shall be examined.77 An 
illustrative example of this approach is a case where an oral statement was 
considered appealable by the CFI.78  Regardless of this seemingly liberal 
approach by the Courts, several types of decisions of the Commission in 
competition cases have nevertheless been considered non-appealable in the 
past. 
 
73  CFI Case T-28/90, Asia Motor France [1992] ECR II-2285. 
74  Article 232 is not addressed here. 
75  T. Hartley, The foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 356 
and following; and P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU law, Text, Cases and Materials. 
3th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 333-337 on the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights in Competition proceedings and on review of legality, 506-507. 
76  See ECJ in PVC cases correcting the CFI on this point: ECJ Case C-137/92 P, PVC 
[1994] ECR I- 2555 [47-52] and also CFI Case T- 70 and 71/92, Florimex [1997] 
ECR II-693.  
77  This approach is not specific to competition cases but common to all cases on the 
admissibilty of individual appeals, see Schermers and Waelbroeck (above n 11) 
317. On “legal effects”: 336 and following.  
78  CFI Case T-3/93, Air France [1994] ECR II-121.  
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4.1  Addressees 
 
As far as the addressees of a formal Commission decision are concerned, the 
following types of decisions occurred under Regulation 17: an infringement 
decision on the basis of Article 81 and 82 EC Treaty79, a negative clearance 
on the same basis80, a decision granting an exemption from Article 81 (1)81 a 
decision to revoke the benefit of an exemption82 or an interim order.83 In the 
case of addressees, problems of admissibility of an action before the CFI 
could arise in the case of an appeal against a negative clearance or an 
exemption or in case they wish to attack a particular part of the infringement 
decision and not only the operative part.  Do parties have sufficient interest 
in bringing such a case?  
 
The admissibility of an application against a negative clearance could be a 
problem: the CFI has considered such an act unchallengeable because it 
gives satisfaction to the companies concerned. The Court found that by its 
nature, a negative clearance is not capable of altering the legal position of 
parties.84 Therefore an appeal against the reasoning of such a clearance 
might not be admissible.  
 
An exemption decision by definition implied that the prohibition of Article 81 
(1) EC applies; a party might have an interest in contesting that there is an 
appreciable restriction of competition or in contesting the market definition 
that is the basis for the Commission’s finding that it has a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 82 EC. In principle, it is possible to bring an 
action against a part of an act without bringing the other parts in dispute.85 
An unfavourable provision in the operative part of the decision can be 
annulled.86  Grounds of a decision can be annulled if they are a necessary 
support for the operative part of the decision. However, the requirement of 
79  Article 3 Regulation 17. 
80  Article 2 Regulation 17. 
81  Article 81 (3) and Article 4 Regulation 17. An appeal can lead to annulment of the 
entire exemption; see CFI Case T-374/94, European Night Services [1998] ECR II-
3141. 
82  Article 8 Regulation 17: the regulation only mentioned revocation of an individual 
exemption; however the benefit of a block exemption was revoked in some cases, 
see ECJ Case C-279/98 P, Langnese [1998] ECR I-5609. Some of the block 
exemption regulations grant this possibility to the Commission, see for vertical 
agreements, Article 6 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 
December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices [1999] OJ L 336/21.  
83  See also L. Ritter, W. Braun and F. Rawlinson, European Competition Law: a 
practitioners guide. 2nd edn (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 910-911. 
84  CFI Case T-138/89, Nederlandse bankiersvereniging and Nederlandse Vereniging 
van Banken v. Commission of the European Communities (Dutch Banks) [1992] ECR 
II-2181. 
85  Schermers and Waelbroeck (above n 11) 346. 
86  ECJ Case 17/74, Transmarine Ocean Paint [1974] ECR 1063. 
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“sufficient interest” makes the case-law in this area somewhat 
unpredictable.  
 
There seems little doubt that formal decisions based on Regulation 1/2003 
shall be appealable acts by companies to whom they are addressed under 
Article 230 EC in the same way as before under Regulation 17. Article III-
365 of the Constitution constitutes a status quo for applicants. 
 
An interesting question is whether there might be an admissibility issue if an 
addressee challenges only the remedies imposed on it or the wording of the 
commitments that the Commission makes binding in its decision. These are 
new questions to the extent that neither remedies nor commitments were 
dealt with formally under Regulation 17, the predecessor of Regulation 
1/2003, although clearly the practice existed.87 The courts also have 
experience with remedies in the area of merger control.88 
 
4.2  Third parties 
 
First, the right to appeal by third parties against decisions addressed to 
another company or association for violation of EC competition law: 
according to the case law, the effects of an exemption decision are similar to 
a rejection of a complaint for the complainant and a direct appeal against 
such a decision must fulfil the conditions of Article 230 EC.89 If there was a 
legitimate interest in filing a complaint but this was not actually done, the 
admissibility of an action proves more problematic.90 Finally, a negative 
clearance decision might be detrimental to the rights of third parties but it is 
not always obvious that locus standi exists because the Courts require a 
sufficient legitimate interest.91 
 
The case of a rejection of a complaint is clearer. It is established case-law 
that a final rejection of a complaint can be challenged before the CFI by a 
complainant. However, the judicial review is limited to the question whether 
the Commission adequately stated its reasons for not pursuing the case. The 
distinction with the right to an actual infringement decision remains;92 the 
requirements for a rejection of a complaint cannot be the same as those for a 
87  See Woodpulp case: ECJ Case C-89/85, Woodpulp [1993] ECR I-1307: the 
commitments  are a corollary of an act of the Commission against which an action 
should be possible. 
88  See case-law discussed below (Coca Cola and Lagardère). 
89  CFI Case T-17/93 Matra Hachette [1994] ECR II-595. 
90  CFI Case T-114/92 Bureau Européen des Médias de l’Industrie Musicale (BEMIM) v. 
Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR II-00147. 
91  CFI Dutch Banks (above n 75), in that case however the applicants’ interest was 
seen to be uncertain. If the applicant did not actively participate in the proceedings 
but can demonstrated that he was not aware thereof or badly informed, the appeal 
might be admissible: the CFI decided this in a merger case, CFI Cases T-96/92 
and T-12/93, Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Générale des Grandes 
Sources and others v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR II-2479.  
92  CFI Case T-87/92, Kruidvat [1996] ECR II-1931.  
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formal decision; even though in some cases the scrutiny by the Court (also of 
the market analysis) is quite detailed.93  
 
A decisive element in the case-law allowing complainants locus standi 
against individual decisions (not addressed to them) in competition cases 
was the fact that they were often involved in the procedure before the 
Commission.94The question is then whether the abolition of the notification 
procedure shall have any impact on their position. If they introduce a 
complaint on the basis of Article 7, 2nd paragraph of Regulation 1/2003 and 
the relevant Notice, they can claim to have a procedural position. If the 
Commission would have merely heard them as an interested  party in an 
informal way, it shall be less obvious because, in the absence of a (formal) 
complaint or an investigation ex officio, the Commission shall not be under 
an obligation to hear interested parties. Again here the new provision in the 
Constitution does not seem to alter the position of complainants in the 
future.95 It seems advisable that interested parties make sure they have 
clearly manifested themselves in an early stage of a Commission 
investigation to have a stronger case at the Courts in terms of admissibility. 
 
4.3 Informal individual decisions96 
 
Now we turn again to the informal decisions that have always been part of 
the practice of the Commission and that shall continue to exist, be it in some 
new shapes and sizes. 
 
Competition cases were often closed with different types of informal 
decisions: negative clearance comfort letter, the statement that the 
agreement is covered by a block exemption or Notice, the agreement is 
contrary to 81 (1) EC but seems eligible for an exemption 81 (3) EC, 
discomfort letter: no decision intended but likely infringement (usually 
reference to national competition law).97  
 
The two last types mentioned, could be highly unsatisfactory for parties. 
Even though it is established case-law that the letters are not binding as 
93  For example CFI Case T-65/96, Kisk Glass & Co. Ltd v Commission of the European 
Communities [2000] ECR II-1885; CFI case T- 197/97 and 198/97, Weyl Beef 
Products BV, Exportslachterij Chris Hogeslag BV and Groninger Vleeshandel BV v 
Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-303. 
94  These cases were also referred to as quasi-judicial determination cases where the 
ECJ was more willing to accept standing under Article 230 (4) EC. 
95  The requirements of “direct and individual concern” still exists, unless we would 
consider that a Commission decision on the basis of Articles 7 or 10 of Regulation 
1/2003 would constitute a “regulatory act” (new category of standing, see above 
under 37) in which case only direct concern needs to be demonstrated.  
96  I concentrate here on decisions that contain a substantive decision and less on 
decisions of a more procedural nature such as for example the refusal to grant 
access to file.  
97  Kerse, EC Antitrust procedure (above n 64) 238 and following. 
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decisions on the courts98, they can serve as bad precedents in private 
litigation. Moreover, the Commission can change its mind afterwards.99  The 
Courts seemed to (implicitly) suggest some kind of higher value when the 
Commission published its intentions in the OJ but it is not clear whether it 
would help parties much in arguing locus standi.100 
 
To be challengeable, an act must be of a binding character, it must produce 
legal effects and be definitive. In IBM it was formulated as follows: “any 
measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the 
interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal 
position is an act or decision which may be the object of an action under 
Article 230”.101 On this basis an appeal against an Article 19(3) Notice has 
been rejected by the CFI.102  
 
There do not seem to be many precedents of direct appeals against comfort 
letters by addressees. A major obstacle is the fact that comfort letters could 
be qualified as a “provisional” position taken by the Commission at a given 
moment in time. Acts of the Commission that are of a mere procedural, 
provisional or preliminary nature, are not considered appealable.103 It can be 
expected that this reasoning is (shall be) again the argument to refuse access 
to courts with regards to several types of (new) informal decisions after 
modernisation.  
 
Yet the “provisional” character of comfort letters was clearly different from 
the category of preparatory acts such as a statement of objections, against 
which the Courts have also refused locus standi.104 In the case of a 
98  D. Stevens, ‘The “Comfort letter”: Old Problems, New Developments’ (1994)15 
European Competition Law Review 81. 
99  Some comfort letters were preceded by an Article 19 (3) publication; the 
Commission announced this as an effort to increase their legal value; Comp. Rep. 
1991. This was done mainly after the criticism following the judgements in the 
Perfume cases, see Kerse (above n 64). 
100  ECJ Case 253/78 and I-3/79, Guerlain [1980] ECR 2327 and CFI Langnese (above 
n 78). 
101  ECJ Case 60/81, IBM [1981] ECR 2639; also Automec I: CFI Case T- 64/89, 
Automec [1990] ECR II-367. 
102  CFI Case T-74/92, Ladbroke [1995] ECR II-115. 
103  Lenaerts and Arts mention the following as being relevant factors to determine 
whether an appeal against “procedural” decisions should be possible: is it a 
“decision which is independent of the final decision” and would “an appeal against 
the final decision award adequate protection”. Likewise, a decision not to treat 
certain documents as confidential is appealable but a decision refusing to comply 
with a request for disclosure of a document from a file, is not. In the last case the 
possible unlawfulness of the decision can be attacked in an application against the 
final decision, see K. Lenaerts and D. Arts, Procedural Law of the European Union 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) 148.  
104  A statement of objections is not appealable; the same attitude was taken with 
regards the opening of an investigation, minutes made during an inspection, 
refusal to grant access to the file, the announcement of the reopening of a 
competition procedure, see for others Schermers and Waelbroeck (above n 2) 353.  
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statement of objections a definitive decision will still follow and that decision 
shall be a possible subject of appeal; in the case of comfort letters and other 
informal (final) decisions, the whole purpose is to avoid a formal decision.105 
Secondly, in practice, they have the same effects as the closing of a case, 
which casts doubts on their provisional nature.106 Finally, they are 
provisional because the Commission might reach a different conclusion at a 
later stage or on the basis of new facts. However, that particular argument 
does not seem valid either because the same is true for the application of a 
block exemption or the benefit of an individual decision, which can be 
withdrawn. 
 
An important case that takes a more liberal approach, is the Stork case.107 
The Court found it important that in cases of decisions drawn up in a 
procedure involving several stages, measures which definitively determine a 
position of the institution upon the conclusion of that procedure, should be 
open to challenge. Interesting here was the fact that the letters mentioned 
that the case could be reopened if new points or facts of law would appear, 
but this was not considered convincing enough by the Court to refuse 
admissibility.108  
 
Informal decisions of the Commission should be open to appeal if they 
contain an assessment of the factual and legal position of a party in such a 
way that this has consequences not only for the parties but possibly for third 
parties’ rights. The starting point is the IBM criterion mentioned above. The 
more modern case-law which skips the requirement “challengeable act” 
under 230 (4) and goes straight to “direct and individual concern” can just 
as well be used. It would be consistent with the general trend in the case-law 
on Article 230 EC that no longer considers the type of act important to 
determine the admissibility of the appeal. 
 
Unfortunately many valuable arguments have also been rejected in this 
respect by the Courts. In the Coca Cola judgement of 22 March 2000, the 
applicant sought annulment of a merger decision of the Commission in 
105  There are some indications that an appeal might be possible if a comfort letter is 
reasoned in the same way as a decision: Commission (EC) 25th report on 
competition policy COM (1996) 126 final, reference to ATR/Alenia/Aerospace,128.  
106  If the effects are similar to an exemption because the letter explains that the 
conditions of Article 81 (3) EC are fulfilled, the CFI has accepted the case in 
Koelman: CFI Case T-575/93, Koelman [1996] ECR II-1. 
107  CFI Case T-241/97, Stork Amsterdam bv/Commission [2000] ECR II-309. The CFI 
ruled that a comfort letter definitively rejecting a complaint and closing the file 
may be a subject of an action, since it has the content and the effect of a decision, 
in as such as it closes the investigation, contains an assessment of the agreements 
in question and prevents the applicants from requiring the reopening of the 
investigation unless they put forward new evidence. 
108  The Commission Notice on informal guidance (above n 47) gives the Commission 




which a notified operation was approved.109 Many arguments were brought 
forward to show that the decision has important and lasting consequences 
for the company involved, but the CFI rejected them all. It is difficult to 
reconcile the approach in that case with the judgement in Lagardère Canal+ 
in which the CFI demonstrated greater willingness to review the 
Commission’s position.110 In both cases, many arguments were put forward 
on the basis of the parties’ right to effective judicial review. These cases 
demonstrate that the case-law on the admissibility of direct appeals against 
decisions of the Commission is not always coherent. 
 
4.4 The right to appeal new informal individual decisions 
 
The Notice on informal guidance implies that guidance letters shall not be 
decisions of the Commission within the meaning of the present Article 249 
EC.111 That statement is obviously not enough to “protect” these letters from 
review by the Court of First Instance. A priori there is no reason for these 
informal decisions, or any new types that might be taken, to be treated 
differently than other existing types of decisions such as comfort letters in 
the pre-modernisation days. 
 
The main issue is arguing the effects on the economical and legal position of 
parties.112 These effects shall clearly often exist. If a comfort letter (before) or 
a guidance letter (after) has similar effects as a decision, it should be a 
possible subject of appeal under 230 (4) EC. A clear indication could be 
when a letter is reasoned in a similar way as a decision. Furthermore, the 
CFI has accepted a public statement (letters) by the Commission on a merger 
as a decision.113 An important consideration of the Court was that the 
Commission has apparently taken and announced a decision on the 
application of the EC rules on merger control, after having analysed its 
competence with regards to the operation.114 
 
If access to the Community courts is not granted, no other access to a judge 
will exist for parties to challenge the findings of the Commission.115 There is 
a striking difference in this respect between the current text of Article 230 
EC on the one hand and Article III-365 of the Constitutional on the other 
109  CFI Case T-125/97 and 127/97, Coca Cola [2000] ECR II-1733. 
110  CFI Case T-251/00, Lagardère Canal+ [2002] ECR I-4825. 
111  Par. 25. 
112  See the formula that the CFI had proposed in the Jégo Quéré case (cited above in 
note 17) for  appeals against acts of a general nature: a party shall be 
individually concerned if the measure affects his legal position, in a manner that is 
both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights of by imposing obligations on 
him (par. 51). 
113  CFI, Air France (above n 78). 
114  The consequence being that the authorities of the Member States are competent 
and can apply their own laws. For the parties concerned the announcement 
implies they did not have to notify the Commission. Competitors might see an 
immediate change in their marker position. 
115  The latter within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. 
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hand. The reference to decisions has disappeared: an appeal is possible 
against acts addressed to a person or acts that are of direct or individual 
concern to him. From the perspective of the right to effective judicial review, 
it would therefore not be appropriate to limit this to the acts enumerated in 
Article I-33 of the Constitution. The intention of the legislator was to 
consolidate the existing case-law whereby the effects on the legal position of 
parties is what constitutes the nature of the act. 
 
4.5  Inter-Network decisions 
 
A recent article examined the new EU network of competition authorities in 
the light of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of 
Fundamental rights of the EU. The issue of access to court was not 
discussed, but surprisingly the focus was only on a right to a fair hearing 
and other guarantees protecting defendants in criminal proceedings.116 
 
The network of competition authorities is meant to provide a flexible and 
efficient way for the allocation of cases at the correct level. The introduction 
of formal procedures and obstacles could possibly make the system less 
efficient. However these worthy objectives do not justify a lack of involvement 
of the judiciary in the functioning of the network. The growing importance of 
the right to effective judicial protection should have an impact on the 
network, at least as far as the Commission’s decisions are concerned. When 
the Commission operates within the network, it does so in the legal 
framework of Community law (the EC Treaty, Regulation 1/2003 and 
procedural regulations such as 773/2004), and as a Community institution 
it is only subject to judicial control by the Court of First Instance and the 
Court of Justice.  
 
The Commission as well as national competition authorities have made 
several statements that inter-network decisions are merely of a procedural 
nature.117  However, even on the basis of existing case law, the possibility of 
access to courts cannot be disregarded that easily. It is not impossible for 
example to demonstrate that a decision of the Commission to refer a case to 
a national competition authority is liable to affect the rights of parties. An 
important precedent for this can be found in the Philips case.  
 
In this 2003 judgement, the Court of First Instance accepted the 
admissibility of an appeal against the decision of the Commission to refer a 
116  The general conclusion in the article that the structure and the functioning of the 
EU network of competition authorities does not appear to be incompatible with the 
requirements of the European Convention on human rights and of the Charter of 
fundamental rights of the EU, seems to be drawn too readily; W. Wils, The EU 
Network of Competition Authorities, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, paper presented at the EUI in 2002: 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2002.shtml (papers).  
117  See for example par. 31 of the Notice on cooperation: decisions of allocation are a 
mere division of labour.  
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merger to a national competition authority. The reasoning of the Court of 
First Instance is interesting and relevant for this subject. The CFI first 
examines the existence of direct effect and formulates the following criterion: 
“it must be examined whether the referral decision is capable of directly and 
automatically affecting the applicant’s legal position or whether these effects 
will arise from the decision adopted by the national competition authorities.”118 
The Court states that the direct effect must be examined in the light of the 
purpose of the measure. The purpose of referral under the merger regulation 
rules is to transfer responsibility. The lack of actual effect on the competitive 
position of parties on the relevant market does not exclude direct effect. The 
effect of the referral is to exclude the application of the EC merger rules (both 
lawfulness and procedural rights) and to subject the concentration to 
exclusive review by national competition authorities ruling under their 
national law. This last element may lead some to reject this judgement 
because under Regulation 1/2003 a competition authority or court can (and 
sometimes must) judge a case on the basis of the EC provisions and not 
(only) national law. However, there are a number of reasons why it is 
believed this judgement is nevertheless a valuable precedent.  
 
First of all, national competition law is not necessarily similar to EC law from 
a procedural point of view; therefore the review cannot entirely be 
“considered comparable as regards its scope and effects.”119 More 
importantly two arguments of the CFI apply entirely to the situation within 
the network: by terminating the procedure under Regulation 1/2003, a 
referral deprives parties of the procedural rights they have at a Community 
level120 and the referral precludes parties from relying on the judicial 
protection which they enjoy under the Treaty, more specifically the 
opportunity to bring a subsequent action before the CFI under Article 230 
EC.121  The CFI does not mention the judgements in Jégo or UPA discussed 
above, presumably because they were about the condition “individual 
concern” whereas the arguments in Philips relate to “direct concern”. 
Nevertheless it must be said there is some tension between the cases 
mentioned.122  
 
There seems to be an additional argument for the admissibility of appeals 
against referral decisions on the basis of Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003. 
The Notice on co-operation describes the rules of allocation of cases within 
the network. It appears from these rules that authorities, including the 
Commission, have to establish, e.g. a material link between the possible 
118  CFI Case T-119/02, Philips [2003] ECR 1433. 
119  Par. 283. 
120  Regulation 1/2003 (above n 44) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 
7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ L 123/18. 
121  Par. 285. 
122  See especially par. 290 and 297 of Philips where the link with the availability of 
national remedies is made; in UPA the Court said that this should not be a factor 
of importance when evaluating individual concern.  
JUDICIAL PROTECTION AFTER MODERNISATION OF COMPETITION LAW 
29 
infringements on the one hand and the territory on the other hand. This 
involves an evaluation of the effect on trade between Member States, an 
assessment of the activities of parties, the definition of the relevant market, 
the value and the location of evidence etc. It must be clear that, at least 
potentially, a referral decision shall contain or be based on a position on 
these issues that can have legal effects for the parties concerned.123   
 
Other types of inter-network decisions that can be taken by the Commission 
in the network were identified above: should they be treated differently in the 
light of effective judicial review? First of all, there is the issue of exchange of 
information: reference is made both to the transmission of documents under 
Article 11 as well as the exchange of information under Article 12 Regulation 
1/2003. Admittedly, such decisions by the Commission might be considered 
even more as referrals, as merely of a procedural nature. However, if the 
exchange of information leads to a transfer of responsibility and an 
investigation opened by the Commission is subsequently closed at the 
Community level, the reasoning from the Philips judgement described above, 
might apply. The same can be said about the decisions on the basis of Article 
13 of Regulation 1/2003 where the Commission can close a case because a 
national competition authority is already dealing with it. Another situation 
that should justify judicial review to guarantee the protection of parties 
would be a dispute about the confidential nature of information.124  
 
4.6  Amicus curiae interventions 
 
Before the national judge a debate can take place about the content of the 
Commission’s written submissions in the framework of the new amicus 
curiae system based on Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003. The Commission 
seems to assume that these submissions shall be merely factual elements 
that the national courts can take into account, like the opinions that were 
already granted under the old Notice on co-operation between the 
Commission and the courts. In fact, the problems from a point of view of 
judicial protection are very similar here as those arising from the use of soft 
law (see below). It does not seem acceptable that these submissions would be 
immune from any form of judicial review, especially if they play a decisive 
role in the resolution of the dispute.   
 
4.7  Soft law? 
 
Will the increased use of soft law have an impact on procedural rights of 
parties?  The increase of soft law can raise questions mainly at a national 
level: these policy documents often containing new rules and concepts are 
123  This “test” is in line with the approach taken by Advocate General Jacobs in ECJ 
UPA (above n 16). 
124  The Notice on co-operation in the network recalls that the terms professional 
secrecy and confidentiality are Community law concepts (above n 39), at par. 28. 
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formally not binding but of great importance in national litigation.125 At a 
centralised level, it seemed very unlikely that an individual direct appeal 
against an instrument of soft law was possible under the (old) text of Article 
230 EC Treaty.126 It remains to be seen how the new text of the Constitution 
shall be interpreted in the future because it contains an interesting new 
possibility to act against regulatory acts. It shall perhaps be difficult for 
parties to argue that they have an interest in obtaining standing to challenge 
notices, guidelines and similar documents.127 There is however an issue of 
judicial protection here because these instruments of soft law often contain 
very detailed rules that, even though theoretically only being “an 
interpretation” by the Commission, cannot be actually called into question in 
a national context.128 The only possibility to challenge these instruments of 
soft law would be an exception of illegality on the basis of Article 241 EC or 
the possibility of preliminary questions by the national court: this requires 
the pre-existence of a dispute in court.129  
 
5.  The Courts approach to judicial review 
 
5.1  Standard of review 
 
Assuming an applicant has locus standi, the level of judicial protection is 
also determined by the standard of review adopted by the judiciary. Much 
depends on the level of self-restraint adopted by the courts.130  
 
It is relevant to make a distinction between decisions involving sanctions and 
other decisions. Where sanctions are involved, Article 229 EC Treaty 
provides for full review by the courts. Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 sets 
out the principle of unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions where the 
Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. The Court of 
Justice may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed. 
 
125  In practice national judges are reluctant to set aside soft law instruments but the 
case-law of the Court of Justice is nevertheless very clear. 
126  I exclude individual “soft law” like comfort letters and refer only to notices and 
guidelines of a more general nature. 
127  Parties must prove a vested and continued interest in the annulment of the 
contested measure see CFI Kruidvat (above n 92) and CFI Dutch Banks (above n 
84). 
128  The new provision in Article II-365 might inspire some however to argue that these 
acts of the Commission are “regulatory acts”. This would then mean only direct 
concern has to be demonstrated.  
129  In this respect the ECJ’s recent judgement in the PVC case is of great interest, 
(above n 76): It seems to acknowledge the possibility of an exception of illegality 
and it is also very clear on the obligation for the Commission to respect its own 
Notices. 
130  M. Siragusa, “Judicial review of competition decisions under EC law” – a lecture by 
Mario Siragusa of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton given at the Competition 
Commission on 21 September 2004; Lenaerts and Vanhamme, Procedural rights of 
private parties (above n 14) 559.  
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In other cases, Article 230 EC implies that review is limited to the legality of 
the decisions. There is no clear definition in EC law of the standard of review 
to be adopted by the Community Courts in general; neither is there a 
definition specific to competition law. The same can be said for the other key 
concepts of burden and the standard of proof for the Commission or the 
complainant. The Courts have developed their own case-law which, in the 
area of competition, shows slightly different approaches towards the scope of 
judicial review according to the subject matter of the appeal.  
 
There is a tendency for the Courts to leave discretion to the Commission 
when evaluating facts and economical considerations.131 In many 
judgements the Courts has considered that where there is a complex 
economic situation, Community institutions have a margin of appreciation or 
power of appraisal, not only as to measures to be taken but also to the 
assessment of the facts.132 In competition cases the Court seemed willing to 
leave fairly wide (discretionary?) powers to the Commission, particularly 
where exemptions on the basis of Article 81 (3) EC are concerned and in the 
review of the legality of Commission decisions rejecting complaints for 
alleged breaches of competition rules. Very often in these last situations the 
Courts limited themselves to examining whether the decision is based on a 
materially incorrect appreciation of the facts or contains a manifest error of 
assessment.133 The Court of First Instance, mostly supported by the Court, 
seems more willing to review in depth the assessment of facts under Article 
81 (1) EC in direct appeals against Commission decisions.  
 
There seems to be noticeable distinction therefore between, on the one hand, 
the comprehensive judicial review the Courts have often carried out under 
Article 81(1) EC Treaty134 and the more limited judicial review that can be 
found in other cases mainly applications of Article 81 (3).135 One of the 
131  Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty might have been a source of inspiration: in addition 
to similar conditions as in Article 173 EEC, the article stated “the Court may not, 
however, examine the evaluation of a situation, resulting from economic facts or 
circumstances…, save where the Commission is alleged to have misused its powers 
or to have manifestly failed to observe the provisions of the Treaty…” Ehlermann 
denies the existence of such self-restraint, ‘Community Competition Procedures’ 
in: Lord Slyn of Hadley and S Pappas (eds), Procedural Aspects of EC Competition 
Law (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1995) 9, but 
explicitly refers to it in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (above n 41). Similarly K. 
Lenaerts and D. Gerard also argue that there is no longer a “self-imposed limited 
control”, ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement: Judges in the 
Frontline’ (2004) 27 World Competition: law and economics review 313 [340]. 
132  Schermers & Waelbroeck, on the difference between “margin of appreciation” and 
“discretionary powers”, see D. Bailey, ‘Scope of Judicial review under Article 81’ 
(2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1327; also Jacobs, F, Court of Justice 
Review in Competition cases, (New York, Fordham University, 1987) 541. 
133  Ehlermann and Atanasiu (above n 41). 
134  Meaning they will review a decision to the maximum extent possible under Article 
230 and in case of fines, under Article 229, see Bailey (above n 125) 1333.  
135  Limited judicial review meaning the CFI will confine its review to whether the 
lawfulness of the decision is vitiated by error of law or fact, procedural impropriety, 
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reasons that had been identified by the Courts for limiting the scope of 
judicial review important in this context relates to the complex economic 
analysis inherent to many competition cases. Other reasons worthwhile 
mentioning are the procedural rules before the Community courts and the 
institutional balance. Many Commission decisions determine the law and set 
standards that are really policy decisions. The Courts will be reluctant to 
replace the Commission’s view on such issues with their own. The 
jurisprudence on non-compete obligations is a good example.136 
 
It must be said that even in judgements that might qualify as comprehensive 
judicial review, the Courts will generally not actually assess the facts again 
nor evaluate the actual value of the evidence brought by parties. Therefore 
judicial review in some competition cases, even by the CFI, can most likely 
not be considered as full and unlimited judicial review within the meaning of 
the ECHR.137  
 
Recent case-law has shown again that the CFI is willing to review in great 
detail the assessment of the Commission whether or not a concentration is 
compatible with the common market.138 The Court of Justice has endorsed 
this approach in the recent judgements upon appeal.139 Finally there is a 
slow and gradual trend towards less deference towards economic appraisal 
through an appraisal of the Commission’s (adequate) statement of 
reasons.140 The recent case-law of the Community courts indicates that the 
Commission will have to investigate the facts of every case very thoroughly 
and must attain a sufficient standard of proof. This is also why some have 
predicted an increase in workload for the Community courts: more cases will 
be brought and the depth of analysis by the Courts shall increase.141 
 
defective reasoning or a manifest error of assessment, see Bailey (above n 132) 
1333. 
136  See ECJ Case 42/84, Remia [1985] ECR 2545; why four years and not three; why 
for that matter de minimis at 5% and not 8%? These are the type of policy choices 
by the Commission that the Courts shall not interfere with; the same can be said 
most likely for all the thresholds that modernised competition law contains. See 
also Jacobs (above n 132) 572.  
137  Schermers and Waelbroeck (above n 2) 48; Waelbroeck and Fosselard (above n 14). 
138  CFI Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval [2002] ECR II-4381; CFI Case T-342/99 Airtours 
[2002] ECR II-2585; CFI Case T-310/01 Schneider [2002] ECR II-4071. For 
comments on the standard of proof, see D. Bailey, ‘Standard of Proof in EC Merger 
proceedings: a common law perspective’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law Review 
845. 
139  ECJ Cases C-12/03 & C-13/03, Commission of the European Communities v Tetra 
Laval BV [2005] ECR 987, 1113.  
140  For example: CFI Cases T-374, 375, 384 and 388/94, European Night Services 
[1998] ECR II-3141. 
141  Ehlermann and Atanasiu (above n 14). 
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5.2  The impact of modernisation? 
                                                                                                                                          
The self-restraint operated by the Community courts with regard to 
Commission decisions was often present in appeals against exemption 
decisions. This category of appeals is now part of history. In which cases 
shall the CFI still play a role, and how should the Courts define their role 
after modernisation? 
 
The rights of complainants seem not to have changed. The CFI shall still be 
able to examine the rejection of complaints by the Commission. It would not 
be a good idea for the Community courts to render the admissibility or the 
review of such cases more difficult in the post- modernisation area. The 
existence of the national alternatives should not lead to any restrictions at a 
Community level. A recent study carried out for the Commission has shown 
that there are astonishingly little cases before the national courts. Reference 
is also made to the Air France judgement where the CFI stated that the 
possible existence of remedies before the national courts cannot preclude the 
possibility of contesting the legality of a decision adopted by a Community 
institution directly before the Community judicature under Article 230 
EC.142    
 
The self-imposed restraint of the Courts in the presence of complex economic 
considerations is no longer, if ever it was, appropriate, and it does injustice 
to the great competence developed by the CFI in competition cases. Where 
Article 81(3) is concerned, national judges are now required to apply the 
conditions for an exception, and the Commission’s Notice describes the 
conditions to be applied in such a way that the exercise seems void of policy 
considerations. There is no reason why the Community courts should not be 
able to deal with economic considerations just as the national judges do. 
 
Secondly, as argued on a number of occasions above, the only way 
individuals can currently obtain review of Commissions decisions is by the 
Community courts. Effective judicial protection would be denied if factual 
and economical considerations cannot be subject of the review.143  
 
Further, the fact that the Commission has a power of appraisal and has the 
institutional task of designing the Community’s competition policy does not 
automatically imply that judicial review should not be comprehensive. In 
cases where policy considerations obviously play a role there might be some 
argument to defend a more marginal approach. However, this is not the case 
for the majority of appeals. Going back to appeals against the rejection of a 
complaint, review by the Courts should verify whether the Commission has 
142  CFI Case Air France (above n 78). In a way the ECJ said the same in UPA and Jégo 
by denying that the alternative remedies at a national level should be relevant in a 
given case to determine whether the direct appeal is admissible. 
143  As defended by Tiili and Vanhamme this is best done through comprehensive 
review instead of the alternative route of the adequate statement of reasoning 
which leads to a less satisfactory result for applicants.  
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carefully examined the complaint and taken into account all facts and 
economic considerations notwithstanding the principle that the complainant 
does not have a right to an infringement decision which, as defended above, 
seems justified by the existence of the national route for complainants.144 
 
For complainants, enforcement is possible on both the national level and 
Community level; this is much less the case for parties to an agreement. In 
their case, lack of a right to a decision and subsequently locus standi is 
more problematic from the viewpoint of the right to effective judicial review 
and the related principle of legal certainty. It is submitted that both the 
principle of effective judicial protection now generally recognised as a key 
element of the Community legal order, as well as the modernisation of 
competition law, justify that comprehensive judicial review becomes the rule 
against individual decisions taken in the framework of Regulation 1/2003 
and limited or marginal review the exception.145 
Finally, there is another specific characteristic of the centralised enforcement 
system that supports the argument that comprehensive judicial review 
should be the rule. It relates to the fact that the Commission has both the 
investigative as well as the decision making powers.146 This reinforces the 
need for full review by a court of law after the decision has been taken.   
 
5.3  The Role of the Community Courts after Modernisation: 
Concluding Remarks 
 
It is likely that the Courts shall in any case play an important role through 
the preliminary rulings procedure: national courts can refer any question 
dealing with the interpretation of competition rules 147 and the validity of 
144  However, this alternative is far from very much promoted a guarantee that 
adequate judicial protection shall be obtained; see Riley (above n 41) for a very 
pessimistic view, p. 607 and following. 
145  The same thesis is defended, be it on some other grounds, in the excellent paper 
by V.Tiili and J. Vanhamme, ‘The power of appraisal of the Commission vis à vis 
the powers of judicial review of the Communities Court of First Instance and Court 
of Justice’ 22 Fordham International Law Journal (1999) 885. Ehlermann and 
Atanasiu also call for a “normal standard of review” (above n 41). 
146  It has been raised that this is a separate problem with regards to the ECHR; see D. 
Waelbroeck and D. Fosselard (above n 14). Interestingly enough in another article 
‘The combination of the investigative and prosecutorial function and the 
adjudicative function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: a legal and economic analysis’ 
(2004) 27 World Competition: Law and Economics Review 201, W. Wils argues that 
possible problems arising from the Commissions double function under the 
European Convention are reduced because of the existence in the EC system of 
judicial review by the Community Courts. The point that is made here is precisely 
that in many cases such review does not exist because of the lack of a right to a 
decision and the admissibility criteria under Article 230 EC.  
147  This includes both interpretation of concepts of EC competition law as well as (by 
renvoi) questions of national competition law based there on, see ECJ Case C-
7/97, Oscar Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791. B. Vesterdorf expects preliminary 
references to increase due to Regulation 1/2003 and enlargement (above n 16) 
317. K. Lenaerts and D. Gerard, ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law 
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Community measures. It has been defended above that national judges 
should not hesitate to challenge the validity of, e.g. soft law or amicus curiae 
intervention and, if necessary, put questions to the ECJ. 
 
In general, however, the modernised system seems to give a less prominent 
role to the Community courts in terms of judicial review because more cases 
are expected to take place at a national level. The individual’s right to an 
effective remedy on the basis of Community law, is assumedly fulfilled 
independently of the level at which he can obtain judicial relief. For those 
individuals for whom alternative judicial review on a national level is really 
possible, there does not seem to be a problem.148 However, judicial review of 
Commission decisions is never possible at a national level. 
 
The discussion recalls the debate that took place following Advocate General 
Jacobs Opinion in UPA and the CFI’s judgement in Jégo that followed, briefly 
described above. The question both the Advocate General and the CFI 
struggled with was whether the existence of indirect means to challenge acts 
of the Community by way of preliminary questions (Article 234 EC), an 
exception of illegality (Article 241 EC) or an action for damages (Article 235 
and 288), was enough to ensure effective judicial remedies for individuals. If 
national procedures involving an indirect challenge of a decision of the 
Commission are effective, then one might accept the Community courts to 
step back. For individual decisions and inter-network decisions, such 
indirect challenges are not sufficient. 
 
It was defended above that locus standi should exist for direct appeals 
against a number of existing decisions where it is presently still difficult to 
bring an appeal and secondly locus standi should exist for a number of new 
decisions under Regulation 1/2003. A “test” for admissibility was proposed. 
Moreover, a case was made for systematic comprehensive review by the CFI.  
 
A possible criticism might be that this will increase the workload of the 
Courts and that the existing procedural framework has not been suitably 
adapted. Although this might be a valid argument, there are three reasons 
why it should not be decisive. Firstly, every individual has the right to 
effective judicial protection. The natural consequence of the importance of 
this principle elsewhere in Community law should lead to respect being 
accorded to it also in the area of competition law. The Courts should be 
encouraged to apply the same standards to themselves as those they apply 
to the national judge when he is responsible for providing for remedies for 
Enforcement’ (above n 122), on Community courts at p. 338. Because of 
enlargement and decentralisation more referrals can be expected. See on 
competence of NCA’s: ECJ Case C-53/03, Syfait e.a [2005] ECJ I-04609. 
148  In UPA the ECJ rejected the relevance of the existence of national remedies 
because this would imply an examination of the system of a given Member State in 
each case. This is a plausible argument. However here we refer to the possibility of 
national review in terms of the competence of national judges as opposed to 
Community Courts, leaving aside the actual chances of obtaining relief. 
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breach of EC law at the national level. Secondly, there is room for creativity 
in the procedural framework in which the Courts now operate.149 Reference 
is made to the changes already made by the Treaty of Nice and to the future 
Constitutional Treaty. Use might be made of the specialised tribunals; an 
adapted fast track procedure seems appropriate for appeals against 
decisions within the network and in the amicus curiae system. Use of 
witnesses and experts might be increased. Thirdly, a thorough review of the 
enforcement system at a Commission level might be considered because of 
the growing criticism that the Commission both investigates and sanctions. 
Such a reform would compensate to a certain extent the current limited role 
that the Community judges play. 
 
In the absence of legislative initiatives, we might expect answers from the 
Courts to these new questions in the near future, particularly in relation to 
issues of admissibility of direct appeals. There is a basis in the existing case-
law to allow for more of a role for the Courts than the Commission so far 
leads us to believe in its Notices and public statements. Whilst competition 
law was undergoing modernisation in recent years,  there have been several 
developments outside this area that reinforce the importance of every 
individual’s right to an adequate level of judicial protection. case-law in the 
competition law area has always been somewhat more lenient towards locus 
standi than in other areas of Community law because of the seriousness of 
the sanctions involved and it should continue to do so. 
 
It would be an exaggeration to state that the level of judicial protection for 
individuals at the centralised level of enforcement has dramatically 
decreased. A fair assessment is that some existing problems have not been 
solved, and some new questions have been raised. It will be up to the 
Community courts again to attempt to find some answers. 
 
 





Intrastate equals interstate*  
 
The particularities of the role of the interstate requirement in 
competition law  
 
Both Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty require practices to affect trade between 
Member States to fall within the scope of the prohibitions that they contain. 
In other areas of EC law, such as for example free movement of goods or 
services, the Treaty also only applies is there is “interstate effect”. The 
purpose of this article is to highlight the particularities of the interstate 
requirement in competition law and to reflect on its further evolution taking 
into account the modernisation package of 2004 which included Commission 
guidelines on the effect on trade between Member States.  
 
First, the concept is defined by reference to the case-law. Then the 
interpretation of the interstate clause as a condition for the application of the 
competition rules is discussed. Reference is made to the link with free 
movement, the extensive interpretation of the concept and some specific 
developments in the case-law. The role of the requirement is then briefly 
addressed. In a second part of the article, Reg. 1/2003 and modernisation 
(decentralisation) are brought into the picture and the Commissions 
guidelines are described in some more detail. By way of conclusion, attention 
is drawn to the fact that the requirement of interstate effect has never 
stopped competition law to apply to, what in other areas of EC law would be 
called, internal situations.  
 
1.  Introduction150 
 
The purpose of this article is to highlight the particularities of the interstate 
criterion in the specific area of competition law and to reflect on its further 
development.   
 
It is often said elsewhere in Community law that the requirement of 
interstate trade is fading or becoming less important.151 By this it is usually 
meant that the Community judges have gradually expanded the application 
of Community law to internal situations. As a consequence, more national 
* This article is the translation of a chapter entitled ‘Europees mededingingsrecht: 
intrastaat is gelijk aan interstaat’, in: E. Manunza and L. Senden (eds.), De EU: de 
interstatelijkheid voorbij? (Nijmegen: Wolf Publishers, 2006). The article was closed 
on 1 March 2006. 
150  This article is a translation from Dutch.  
151  The changing role of the interstate clause in other areas of Community law was the 
subject of other chapters in the book in which this contribution was published. It 
is relevant to keep in mind what the general theme of the book was, when reading 
this particular chapter.  
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rules are being screened for their compatibility with Community law, even if 
this is not strictly necessary for the accomplishment of the internal market. 
This widens the impact of Community law. In turn, the consequence might 
be loss of autonomy for Member States, both where substantial law is 
concerned as well as in the area of procedures (procedural autonomy).  
 
It can surely be said also in competition law that the impact of Community 
law has increased significantly. However, the situation is not quite the same. 
Is the interstate trade clause still relevant? The answer is probably 
affirmative, mostly due to developments that are specific to competition law. 
However, the role of the interstate criterion is different.  
 
Competition law does not deal with state regulation but with prohibitions 
that are directly applicable to companies. We are not in a situation where a 
citizen or a company is in conflict with its own or another Member State. 
Concept such as U-turn or reversed discrimination, are not relevant here. 
The scenarios are very different. This can be illustrated by a hypothetical 
example.  
 
A company A from the United States might find itself before a judge in Italy 
in a conflict concerning the validity of a non-compete clause in an agreement 
concluded with the Greek company C. The contract might concern the sale of 
pharmaceuticals on the Italian and Greek market. If the judge considers that 
clause to be restrictive of competition, the clause might be null and void on 
the basis of the cartel prohibition laid down in Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
The fact that two parties are involved that are not resident in Italy, is totally 
irrelevant. In this particular dispute two companies are involved in 
commercial litigation. The judge will have to establish whether the contract 
has effects on competition within the common market and whether the trade 
between Member States is affected. However international this dispute may 
seem, it is possible that Community law does not apply. On the contrary, it 
is also possible that such a clause in a contract between for example two 
Dutch companies, falls within the scope of application of Article 81 EC 
Treaty. 
 
The condition “may affect trade between Member States” is mentioned both 
in the cartel prohibition of Article 81 of the EC Treaty as well as the 
prohibition of abuse of a dominant position in Article 82 EC Treaty. The 
purpose here is not to provide an overview of the different types of 
agreements and behaviour in relation to the condition of interstate trade. 
Rather, the purpose is to examine how the concept has developed and which 
has been the impact of the entering into force of Regulation 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002. This contribution therefore does not include an exhaustive 
discussion of the concept of interstate trade but rather aims to provide some 
thoughts and comments in the light of recent developments.  
 
First, the condition of interstate trade shall briefly be defined and described 
on the basis of practice of the European Commission and the jurisprudence 
INTRASTATE EQUALS INTERSTATE
39 
of the Court of First instance and the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. This shall include the practice with regards to agreements and 
behaviour limited to a Member State. The entry into force of Regulation 
1/2003 shall then be examined from the perspective of interstate effect. This 
will obviously also include a description of the Notice of the Commission in 
which the concept has been explained. Finally, a related concept (the 
Community interest) is introduced and some conclusive remarks shall be 
made.  
 
2.  General context 
 
2.1    Definition of interstate trade 
 
Article 81 (agreements) en 82 (abuse) EC Treaty both contain the condition 
that the behaviour of companies has to “affect trade between Member 
States”. It is a condition for the application of both prohibitions but it is also 
a criterion to determine competences. 
 
In the absence of real “travaux préparatoires”, it is assumed that the 
condition was included to leave sufficient margin for Member States to 
regulate the economy within their Member State in an independent way. 
However, it shall appear hereinafter that the Court of Justice has not let 
itself be restricted by that to enlarge the scope of application of both 
prohibitions. Since the very beginning, the link was made to the common 
market. It is interesting for example to refer to the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Dutch law approving the EEC Treaty:  
 
“With these words the Treaty has aimed to draw a line between cartels 
and dominant positions which affect the functioning of a common market, 
and those which only have a local significance and are therefore 
uninteresting from a Community point of view”.152 
 
There are also a number of linguistic peculiarities to be mentioned. First of 
all, the term “affect trade between Member States”.  
 
The different linguistic versions of the Treaty have slightly different wording. 
In some languages (such as in Dutch) a negative word is added (ongunstig) 
giving rise to questions in the case law. Is every affectation on trade between 
Member States sufficient or does it have to be a negative one? The Court of 
Justice ended this debate quite soon by referring to the objectives of the 
provisions. According to the Court the essence is whether:  
 
“The concept of “agreements…which may affect trade between member 
states” is intended to define, in the law governing cartels, the boundary 
152  Cited in Mulder & Mok, Kartelrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 1962) 215. It is also 
explained there that the origin of the condition of effect on interstate trade can be 
found in U.S. antitrust law.  
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between the areas respectively governed by Community law and national 
law. In this connexion what is particularly important is whether the 
agreement is capable of constituting a threat, either direct or indirect, 
actual or potential, to freedom of trade between Member States in a 
manner which may harm the attainment of the objectives of a single 
market between state”.153 
 
In another famous case, also still cited as a standard in this area, it is 
formulated as follows:  
 
“It must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the 
basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in 
question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on 
the pattern of trade between member states. The influence thus foreseeable 
must give rise to a fear that the realization of a single market between 
Member States might be impeded. In this respect, it is necessary to 
consider in particular whether the agreement is capable of bringing about a 
partitioning of the market in certain products between member states.”.154  
 
This means that in principle, an increase in interstate trade can also be 
taken into account, not only a negative impact.  
 
Furthermore, the wording of Articles 81 and 82 EC also mentions “may 
affect”. This means that in competition law it has been clear from the start 
that potential affectation was also envisaged. It has also become apparent 
from the standard phrases cited above, that the Court has used an 
interpretation very similar to the formula used in free movement: any direct 
or indirect, actual or potential obstacle to trade, can be taken into account.  
 
In these general remarks about the definition of interstate trade, it is 
appropriate to say something also about the term “trade”.  
 
In the context of Community law it is not surprising that it is an 
autonomous concept and, according to the Court, a very broad one. Trade 
does not only cover goods but also services and loss of profits to another 
Member State.155 The concept basically covers any cross-border economic 
activity. “Between Member States” implies that there must be an impact on 
cross-border economic activities between at least two Member States: this 
153  ECJ Cases 54/64 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR (1966) 571.  
154  ECJ Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH 
(M.B.U.) [1966] 416. See also W van Gerven, Kartelrecht: Europese Gemeenschap 
(Deventer: Tjeenk Willink, 1997) 86.  
155  ECJ Case 172/80, Gerhard Züchner v Bayerische Vereinsbank AG [1981] ECR 
2021. Other examples: R. Burnley, ‘Interstate revisited: the jurisdictional criterion 
for articles 81 and 82’, (2002) 23 European Competition Law Review 217.  
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can be part of one Member State and not necessarily the whole territory.156 
Finally, the question of interstate trade is clearly a different from the one 
concerning the definition of the relevant market. Even if the relevant market 
is national or even regional, there can be an effect on trade between Member 
States.157 
 
2.2  Appreciability  
 
The extensive interpretation of the condition of interstate trade since the 
beginning of European competition law, allowed the Commission to bring 
nearly all agreements under Article 81 EC Treaty. A possible correction came 
in the judgement Völk/Vervaecke in which the Court determined that 
agreements can escape the application of Article 81 EC Treaty if they have 
only an insignificant influence on interstate trade.158 Since then it is 
acknowledged that Article 81 EC Treaty contains a condition of 
appreciability.  
 
In the meanwhile, the Commission was overcome by notifications of 
agreements under the regime of Regulation 17 and welcomed the Courts 
judgement. The Commission based its de minimis policy on this 
judgement.159 It has to be said in the following notices and case-law that 
there has always been a certain confusion surrounding appreciability: does it 
apply to the restriction of competition itself or to the trade between Member 
States? In the de minimis Notice of 2001, the Commission implicitly 
recognizes that there has been some unclarity surrounding this concept and 
makes the distinction more clear.160 This is now confirmed in the Notice on 
interstate trade of 2004 which shall be discussed under 3.3.161 It is now 
generally recognised that the condition of appreciability applies both to the 
restriction of competition as well as to the trade between Member States.  
 
156  CFI Case T-213/95, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK) and Federatie 
van Nederlandse Kraanbedrijven (FNK) v Commission of the European Communities 
[1997] ECR II-1739.  
157  Commission Notice laying down guidelines on the effect on trade concept 
contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/7, point 22 and 
chapter 3.2.  
158  ECJ Case 5/69 Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295.  
159  The first Notice dates back to 1970 : Commission Notice of 2 June 1970 [1970] 
OJ/1; the current Notice is Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance 
which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81 (1) of the Treaty (de 
minimis) [2001] OJ C 368/7.  
160  Ibid.  
161  Commission Notice laying down guidelines on the effect on trade (above n 157).  
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3.  Further interpretation of the interstate condition in 
practice and jurisprudence 
 
3.1  Relation with free movement  
 
Since the Consten & Grundig judgement of the Court, in each case the 
overall legal and factual elements of the case have to be taken into account 
to determine whether an agreement or behaviour can directly or indirectly, 
effectively or potentially, have an influence on the trade between Member 
States.  
 
It is good to note that this definition was laid down by the Court even before 
the famous similar ruling in Dassonville with regards to the free movement 
of goods.162  
 
Did the Court find the inspiration in Consten & Grundig when clarifying this 
concept of “measures of having equivalent effect”? In any case, this shows 
how Community competition rules as well as the rules on free movement of 
goods are fundamentally instrumental to the same higher goal which is the 
common market.163  
 
In the meantime, the focus in competition law has been more fighting 
restrictions of competition as such, rather than accomplishing the common 
market. This is perhaps a difference with the jurisprudence and the area of 
free movement where the Court seems to have particular attention for those 
areas where the Community legislator as well as the Member States failed to 
eliminate obstacles to free movement.164 
 
3.2  Extensive interpretation 
 
It appears from the short description above that the condition of interstate 
trade was never a major obstacle for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of 
162  ECJ Case 8/74, Dassonville [1974] ECR 837: “all trading rules enacted by Member 
States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to effective restrictions” (rec. 5).  
163  On the convergence between rules on free movement and rules on competition, K. 
Mortelmans, ‘Towards convergence in the application of the rules on free 
movement and on competition’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 613. Also J. 
Faull, ‘Effect on trade between Member States and Community: Member State 
jurisdiction’ (Fordham Corporate Law Institute) New York [1990] 485. The internal 
markt has not lost its significance as an important principle of interpretation, see 
Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, case 205/03 P, 10 November 2005, 
rec. 51.  
164  See recent articles by R. Wezenbeek, ‘Consumer and competition policy: the 
Commission’s perspective and the example of transport’ (2006) 17 European 
Business Law Review 73; H. Vedder, ‘Competition law and consumer protection: 
how Competition can be used to Protect Consumers Even better – or Not’ (2006) 17 
European Business Law Review 83.  
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the EC Treaty in specific cases. It has to be said that the Commission did not 
particularly give much attention to this condition when dealing with 
individual cases.165  
 
The Court of Justice had also stated that the effect on trade between 
Member States is usually the consequence of several factors which might not 
each individually be decisive.166 With regards to interstate trade the burden 
of proof was not important: proof had to be delivered that agreements as a 
whole, could possibly appreciably influence the trade between Member 
States.167  
 
The extensive interpretation of this condition was sometimes criticised, even 
by implying that the Commission as well as the Court of Justice exceeded 
their competences. However, all in all there was little opposition to the 
flexible attitude of the Commission, supported therein by the Courts.168 
 
It is not required either that every single part of an agreement, including 
every single restriction of competition, affects commerce. If the agreement as 
a whole has an interstate effect, Community law shall apply to the whole 
agreement, including those elements of the agreement which do not as such 
affect trade between Member States.169 
 
The wide interpretation which is applied, makes it easy to apply the cartel 
prohibition just as well as the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position to 
cases where interstate effect is not so obvious. Agreements between an 
undertaking from a Member State and an undertaking from a third country 
can for instance have as a result that the trade between Member States is 
affected.170 In the case of vertical agreements, the theory of cumulative effect 
was developed. In some cases, on the basis of that theory, an agreement 
shall have to be looked at in the context of a network of similar agreements 
of which it is a part. It is only when looking at the network of similar 
165  For comments see R. Burnley, (above n 155); W. van Gerven, (above n 154); J Faull 
(above n 163). In this lastly mentioned article the author states: “Many 
commentators conclude that it is hard to find something which may not affect 
trade between Member States”. 
166  ECJ case C-250/92, Gottrup-Klim [1994] ECR I-5641; also ECJ Joined Cases C-
215/96 & C-216/96, Bagnasco [1999] ECR I-135, rec. 47.  
167  Court of Justice 21 January 1999, Bagnasco, cited in previous note. According to 
Faull: “The reasonably foreseeable effect on the reasonably foreseeable 
development of trade”, (above n 163).  
168  Criticism increased also after the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and 
the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity, see in this perspective P. Bos, 
‘Towards a Clear Distribution of Competence between EC and National 
Competition Authorities’ (1995) 16 European Competition Law Review 410. 
169  ECJ Case 193/83, Windsurfing [1986] ECR I-611; ECJ case C-266/97 P Vereniging 
van Groothandelaren in Bloemkwekerijen [2000] ECR I-2135.  
170  ECJ Case 51/75, EMI/CBS [1976] ECR I-811; J. Faull and A. Nikpay, The EC law 
of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 100.  
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agreements that the effect on interstate trade shall be evaluated. Brewery 
contracts are classical examples in this respect.171  
 
3.3  Two approaches  
 
A distinction is often made between two approaches that can be found in the 
case-law concerning the condition of interstate trade. Both eventually find 
their justification in the accomplishment of the internal market.172 
 
The first method to establish whether the condition is met, is based on 
effective or potential changing streams of trade. This approach is usually 
taken and follows from the standard case-law of the Court described above.  
 
A second way to look at interstate trade has less to do with the impact on the 
trade within the common market but more with the effects on the structure 
of competition on the market. Most examples of this approach are to be 
found in applications of Article 82 EC Treaty. In the case United Brands, the 
Court said the following:  
 
“…it is immaterial whether this behaviour relates to trade between Member 
States once it has been shown that such elimination will have 
repercussions on the patterns of competition in the common market “.173  
 
The so-called structural criterion was also applied by the Commission in 
some cartel cases.174 This structural approach was partly the basis for the 
readiness of the application of 81 and 82 EC to internal or national 
situations.175 This is addressed in the following section.  
 
3.4  Internal situation?  
 
In this context it is necessary to examine those cases where only one 
Member State seems to be involved, at least at first sight. We could refer to 
these cases as so-called internal situations. Where competition law is 
concerned, it is necessary to specify that it is not the place of establishment 
of companies that is relevant but the internal situation refers to a case where 
the effects of possible infringing behaviour are only felt in one particular 
Member State.  
 
171  ECJ Case 23/67, Brasserie de Haecht [1976] ECR 512; ECJ Case C-234/89, 
Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG [1991] ECR I-935.  
172  R Wesseling, ‘Subsidiarity in Community Antitrust law: setting the right agenda’ 
(1997) 22 European Law Review 35; also J. Faull (above n 163).  
173  ECJ case 27/76, United Brands [1978] ECR 207.  
174  For example Commission Decision 91/299/EEC of 19 December 1990 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty [1991] OJ L 152/21. 
175  Not always without criticism, see Opinion of Advocate General Mischo case 246/86 
SC Belasco [1989] ECR I-2117.  
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On the condition of “effect on trade between Member States”, Verloren van 
Themaat wrote already in the early days of competition law: “It is clear that 
many cartels will fall under this prohibition whilst having only participating 
companies from one Member State. It is crystal clear that this will be the case 
for import and export cartels. Undoubtfully cartel agreements taking place in 
economic sectors where export is a substantial part of business, will almost 
always fulfill this condition” (own translation).176  
 
According to established case-law, agreements that cover a whole Member 
State shall, “by their very nature”, imply “the reinforcement of national 
thresholds”. Usually the members of a national cartel shall try to restrict 
competition coming from other Member States.177 A seemingly national cartel 
shall fall within the scope of application of Article 81 EC Treaty, if it can be 
demonstrated that there is a market outside this particular Member State for 
the given products or services and that foreign competitors are interested in 
importing or exporting. This so called “threshold” criterion is applied in 
several types of situations by the Commission and by the Courts.178 
 
In other words, the extensive interpretation of the condition of interstate 
trade from the beginning of EC competition law and policy, made it easy for 
the provisions to be applied in internal situations. This meant not only that 
the Commission could in such cases enforce the prohibition, but also that 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty could be invoked easily in a dispute between 
two national parties before a national judge. The alternative approach of the 
“effect on the structure of competition” was obviously also a facilitating 
factor to apply EC prohibitions in internal situations because it makes it 
even less necessary to prove impact on trade.  
 
3.5  Turning point?  
 
In the Dutch Banks case and in Bagnasco, the Commission, and later on the 
Court of Justice, seem to be somewhat more reticent and the question arose 
whether this was to be seen as a change in the interpretation of the 
interstate trade condition.179  
 
Both cases concern the financial sector and in both cases the conclusion 
was that the particular agreements between the banks did not have, or 
hardly had, a significant influence on the trade between Member States. In 
the Dutch case the national system of transfers was at stake: in that system 
e.g. uniform fees were agreed between banks. In the second case, an Italian 
judge asked questions about a number of uniform conditions of banks 
176  Cited by Mulder and Mok (above n 152) [ 216] 
177  ECJ Case 61/80, Coöperatieve Stremsel en Kleurselfabriek [1967] ECR 851; ECJ 
Case 246/86, Belasco [1989] ECR I-2117.  
178  ECJ, LTM (above n 154); see Van Gerven (above n 154). 
179  Commission Decision of 19 July 1989 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty [1989] OJ L 253, p. 1; ECJ, Bagnasco (above n 166).  
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regarding the unilateral right of banks to change the interest rates on client 
accounts. 
 
It is not quite clear why in these two cases the conclusion was finally 
reached that there was not sufficient effect on interstate trade. This goes 
particularly for the Dutch case. It would have been very easy to construct 
another reasoning arriving to the contrary conclusion. In the light of other 
decisions and case-law in the following years however, it can not be said that 
there was a persistent change. Rather, the both cases seem to be exceptions: 
in most cases it is quite easily to assume that there is effect on interstate 
trade.  
 
However, the seemingly automatic way in which the jurisprudence accepted 
affectation of interstate trade in internal situations, might be under 
pressure. There is no longer a per se approach in the presence of national 
cartels. In each case it shall have to be demonstrated that the condition is 
fulfilled. The extensive definitions remain applicable but there seems to be a 
cautious trend which is also expressed in the recent guidelines of the 
Commission discussed hereinafter. The Commission and national judges 
have to be sure that in national cases there is substantial evidence of 
interstate effect. This will be discussed below.180 
 
4.  The meaning of the effect on trade criterion 
 
It is often said in competition law that the effect on trade criterion has a 
double meaning. It is said to be both a competence clause as well as a 
substantive condition for the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty.  
 
First of all, it is an autonomous criterion of competence which determines 
the application of Community competition law. The Court had already stated 
this in Consten and Grundig.181  
 
It also says so explicitly and clearly in Hugin:  
 
“The interpretation and application of the condition relating to effects on 
trade between Member States contained in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty 
must be based on the purpose of that condition which is to define, in the 
context of the law governing competition, the boundary between the areas 
respectively covered by Community law and the law of the member states. 
Thus Community law covers any agreement or any practice which is 
capable of constituting a threat to freedom of trade between Member States 
in a manner which might harm the attainment of the objectives of a single 
market between the member states, in particular by partitioning markets or 
by affecting the structure of competition within the common market. On the 
180  In that sense: Faull and Nikpay (above n 170).  
181  ECJ, Consten Grundig (above n 153). 
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other hand, conduct the effects of which are confined to the territory of a 
single member state is governed by the national legal order.”182 
 
Furthermore, the criterion also determines the scope of application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty: only agreements or behaviour having a 
minimum of cross-border effects shall fall within reach of the provisions. If 
the conditions of application are not met, enforcement is out of the question 
at whichever level (national or Community).  
 
The distinction between both dimensions seems somewhat artificial. It has to 
be said that the meaning of the concept of interstate trade has certainly 
evolved over the last years, especially as a criterion for competence. Focus is 
now entirely on the demarcation of Community competition law and national 
competition law. At the time of the older case-law of the Courts, there were 
hardly any systems of national competition law in force, except in Germany 
where the Consten Grundig case occurred. Until the nineties, the absence of 
interstate effect meant therefore also the absence of national competition law 
and therefore a lack of sanctions for agreements or behaviour that were 
restrictive of competition.  
 
A point that should be made in particular in this contribution about 
interstate trade and competition law is that the term “criterion of 
competence” is not appropriate. Competence rather refers to whom shall 
enforce the particular case. However, in the case of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty, the question is rather which law shall be implied. The English term 
“jurisdictional criterion” seems more appropriate.  
 
There is no system of exclusive jurisdiction in competition law. This has to 
do with the system of parallel competences: an infringement of European 
competition rules can be sanctioned both at a national level (judge or 
authority), or at an EC level by the Commission. In the absence of effect on 
interstate trade, possibly national competition law shall be applied. In the 
presence of effect on interstate trade, it is not determined who can or should 
enforce.  
 
5.  Regulation 1/2003 and the new system of decentralised 
application 
 
5.1  Spontaneous harmonisation  
 
It is well known that the introduction of national systems of competition law 
was accelerated in the nineties. All Member States now have some system of 
national competition law. In fact, they are all very similar. The Commission 
has obviously played a role in this development: in the new Member States 
182  ECJ Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v 
Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 1869.  
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that joined the European Union in these last years, the introduction of an 
adequate system of national competition law was strongly stimulated.  
 
Remarkable in that context is that the broad interpretation of the interstate 
criterion played a decisive role in these developments. The Netherlands is a 
good example: the Commission attacked a number of typically national 
cartels with the European provisions and could do so on the basis of the 
extensive interpretation in the case-law on interstate trade.183 This allowed 
the Commission to act in cases where the territory of one Member State was 
affected. The decisions of the Commission clearly show that there was a lack 
of market supervision and perhaps also a lack of political will to sanction 
cartel behaviour in the particular Member State. The harsh European policy 
clearly also contributed to the enactment of the Dutch Competition Act 
which entered into force quite late compared to other Member States. 
  
Apart from stimulating competition legislation in existing Member States, the 
introduction of such legislation was also part of negotiations with new 
Member States. EC competition law obviously formed part of the “acquis 
communautaire”. However, in practice, the introduction of a national set of 
competition rules, as well as the establishment of a national competition 
authority, were also the result of these negotiations. Therefore, since the 
date of accession all new Member States had national competition legislation 
based on the EC model. 
 
The “interference” of Europe here seems different than in other areas of law 
where the law is harmonised in the classical way, through directives. In 
principle, it is still the case that a Member State has the obligation to 
implement directives and achieve a certain result but can choose the way in 
which that result is achieved. The actual wording of substantive rules, the 
form of the legislation, as well as the procedures for enforcement, are the 
area of the autonomy of the Member States.  
 
In competition law it has to be noted that a remarkable spontaneous 
harmonisation has occurred, especially where substantive rules are 
concerned. All Member States chose a system with directly applicable 
prohibitions usually formulated in an identical way as in the EC Treaty.184 
Not only the result but also the instruments were based on the European 
model in the absence of any formal harmonisation measure. As we will 
discuss afterwards, Regulation 1/2003 is the provisional highlight of this 
183  See before under 3.4. The most famous case is the SPO case, CFI Case T-29/92, 
Vereniging van samenwerkende prijsregelende organisaties in de bouwnijverheid 
[1995] ECR 289.  
184  About the convergence of national systems: Mortelmans (above n 163). It would 
lead too far to discuss this in the present article but there is without doubt also a 
movement of harmonisation taking place in relation to procedural competition law. 
This is related not only to the modernisation of EC competition law, but also to the 




harmonisation movement. Even though the regulation is not as such to be 
qualified as harmonisation, it does show important similar features and/or 
in any case has harmonising effects in practice.185 
 
5.2  Regulation 1/2003 and interstate trade 
 
5.2.1  General overview 
 
The introduction of Regulation 1/2003 contains a reference to the 
contribution that European competition law made to spreading the 
competition culture in the Community. This reference undoubtedly means 
the introduction of competition enforcement in all Member States as it was 
discussed in the preceding paragraph. It is interesting to note also the 
explicit declaration that the regulation does not go further than necessary to 
achieve its goal, namely an efficient application of Community competition 
rules. This statement is accompanied by a reference to the subsidiarity 
principle as well as the principle of proportionality.186 
 
It is commonly known that Regulation 1/2003 has established a new 
procedural framework within which EC competition rules shall be applied in 
the following years. Regulation 1/2003 has replaced Regulation 17 of 1962 
and it entered into force on 1 May 2004.187 
 
For the purpose of this contribution, Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 is 
especially important.188 This article aims to regulate the relationship between 
national competition legislation and Community rules to “create a level 
playing field for agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices within the internal market”.189 In a way, this statement 
acknowledges the objective of harmonisation of Regulation 1/2003. It would 
lead too far in this contribution to discuss all the provisions that 
demonstrate this objective but the different components of Article 3 as such 
are particularly noteworthy in that regard. This article is discussed further 
below.  
 
185  In the case of actual harmonisation, this would obviously have had to have an 
effect on the legal basis chosen in the Treaty. The term “harmonisation” is not 
used here in the strict meaning of Articles 94 and 95 EC Treaty; see P. Slot and G. 
Straetmans, ‘Harmonisatie van wetgeving in de EG’ (2003) 3 Tijdschrift voor 
Privaatrecht 691.  
186  Rec. 34 of the preamble.  
187  Council Regulation (EEC) No 17 (First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty) [1959-62] OJ Spec Ed 87. 
188  Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
189  Rec. 8 of the preamble of Reg. 1. Article 83 under e) of the EC Treaty provides 
explicitly for the possibility for the Council to regulate the relationship between 
national legislation and articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty.  
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5.2.2  Parallel application 
 
First of all, Article 3 contains an obligation for competition authorities and 
judges of Member States. In a given case they have the obligation to apply 
both the European cartel prohibition as well as its national equivalent as 
soon as trade between Member States is affected. A similar obligation exists 
for the application of the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position.190 
 
This is quite a unique provision: it would have been perfectly possible, and 
more within the logic of Community law, to determine that in such a case 
Community competition law has priority (primacy) on national law. As soon 
as there is interstate effect, national law would then have to make place for 
Community law.  
 
This is also the way it was originally intended in the Commission proposal 
for the regulation, but apparently this was not acceptable for a number of 
Member States having a pre-existing strong competition authority.191 It is 
questionable what the value of this parallel application is, especially in the 
light of further obligations imposed by Article 3 on Member States such as 
the prohibition of contradictory decisions. The parallel obligation of national 
and European competition law has as a result that the substantive 
evaluation of commercial behaviour shall hardly be different according to the 
rules that are applied. Intrastate is equal to interstate.  
 
5.2.3  No contradictory results 
 
Article 3 § 2 ensures similar application of national and European 
competition rules, in any case where the cartel prohibition is applicable. The 
application of the national prohibition cannot result in the prohibition of an 
agreement if one of the conditions of application of article 81 EC Treaty is 
not met. In other words: when there is not a restriction on competition (in 
accordance with the policy of the Commission and the jurisprudence) or 
because the conditions for a legal exception (Article 81 paragraph 3 EC 
Treaty) or any of the group exemptions are met. It has to be said that this 
clause seemingly only applies to cases where there is interstate effect. 
However, if it is read jointly with other obligations contained in the 
regulation, it is hard to deny that this is in fact quite a far-reaching factual 
190  Article 3 § 1: “Where the competition authorities of the Member States or national 
courts apply national competition law to agreements,…, within the meaning of Article 
81 of the EC Treaty which may affect trade between Member States within the 
meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Article 81 EC Treaty to these 
agreements, …” The article then continues with a similar obligation for Article 82 
EC.  
191  Commission (EC) ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending 
Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) 
No 3975/87 ("Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty") COM 
(2000) 0582 final 284.  
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harmonisation of competition law.192 The Commission itself interestingly 
refers to it as being the “rule of convergence”.193  
 
Also, the explanatory remarks in the introduction of the regulation are far 
more widely formulated than the provision itself: a reference to interstate 
trade is not made. On the contrary, the introduction emphasises that the 
application of national competition law may not lead to another result as the 
application of the European provisions: the (identically formulated) 
provisions contain autonomous concepts that are interpreted by the 
Community judiciary and that therefore have to be applied in an uniform 
way throughout the Member States.194 
 
An interesting question in this regard is whether the duty of loyal co-
operation laid down in Article 10 of the EC Treaty obliges Member States to 
deal with an individual case in a similar way as the Commission would do it, 
even if there is no effect on interstate trade. Is such an obligation necessary 
for the sake of coherence of the competition policy?195 
 
5.2.4  Exceptions  
 
The situation is slightly different for so-called unilateral behaviour. Member 
States are not precluded under Regulation 1/2003 from adopting and 
applying on their territories stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction 
unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. This can be seen as a 
reference to the concept of abusive economical dependence as it exists in 
some legal systems. Strictly speaking, the provision also implies that 
national application of competition law to abusive dominance can deviate 
192  Reference can be made to the control the Commission carries out on the beginning 
of investigations and on the decisions that national authorities prepare to take on 
the basis of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, also the possibilty to take over a case, 
Article 11 Reg. 1/2003. Furthermore there is the insistence on the uniform 
application of Community competition law. In that context the remark is made 
that the obligation for the national judge to refrain from taking contradictory 
decisions does not mention the effect on trade between member states. It is 
probable therefore that a judge interpret this obligation to apply in any case where 
a prohibition is applied.  
193  Commission Notice on the cooperation within the network of competition 
authorities [2004] OJ C 101/43, 3.  
194  Rec. 8 of the preamble. An opening that might still exist could be seen in the lack 
of reference to the concept of restriction of competition as an autonomous concept: 
there might still be some room here for individual policy but this seems merely 
theoretical. This has in turn brought up the question whether national judges and 
national authorities should have the possibility to put preliminary questions to the 
ECJ (Article 234 EC) in national cases.  
195  The question is left unanswered in this contribution but the argument seems to 
require a very extensive interpretation of Article 10. In that sense J. Temple Lang 
‘The duties of cooperation of national authorities and Court under Article 10 EC: 
two more reflections’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 84; J. Temple Lang, ‘The 
implications of the Commissions leniency policy for national competition 
authorities’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 430.  
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from the Community policy. However, this might be more of a theoretical 
possibility given the supervision at the Commission has on the basis of 
provisions, the obligation of uniform application and also the explicit 
intention of most national legislators to follow the European model. 
 
Article 3 § 3 of Regulation 1/2003 contains two other exceptions to the rules 
above that shall not be discussed further here. There is an exception for 
merger control as well as legislation serving another purpose than the 
purpose of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty. This last provision refers to fair 
trading practices legislation such as it exists in some of the jurisdictions.196 
 
5.3  The Commission guidelines of 2004 
 
5.3.1 Providing guidance 
 
A number of guidelines were published after the entering into force of 
regulation 1/2003. These accompanying measures partly implement the 
regulation, partly summarizes the state of the law, but also partly indicate a 
new direction for EC competition policy. The guidelines on the effect on trade 
concept in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty contain all these different 
components.197 
 
There was certainly a need for these guidelines, especially for national judges 
and authorities. Little guidance could be found in the precedents and older 
Commission decisions. The effect on trade condition was rarely motivated in 
a sufficient way. The Community courts have never really criticised the 
Commission for that.  
 
Both at a national level as well as at a (central) EC level the need is now 
greater to specify in ever particular case whether there is effect on trade or 
not. At a national level this mostly has to do with the obligations contained 
in Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003, as  briefly discussed before. The regulation 
obliges its national authorities and judges to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC 
Treaty as soon as there is effect on trade. One could say of course that this 
obligation already existed before on the basis of the direct applicability of 
both articles. The many other obligations however imposed on the national 
authorities are new.198 
 
At the European level, the Commission shall have to motivate in a more 
accurate way why it feels an agreement or a behaviour has effect on trade. 
This is to do with the general tendency in recent case-law which show the 
Community judges to be stricter with regards to burden of proof and 
196  Rec. 9 of the preamble.  
197  Guidelines of the Commission (above n 157).  
198  See note 193 and the critical analysis of the regulation by A. Riley, ‘EC Antitrust 
modernisation: the Commission does very nicely-thank you! Part Two: between the 
idea and the reality, decentralisation under Reg.1/2003’ (2003) 24 European 
Competition Law Review 657.  
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motivation and reasoning of Commission decisions. The Court of First 
Instance seems to have initiated this trend but it is confirmed certainly by 
recent cases at the Court of Justice.199 
 
Another reason why careful establishment of effect on trade is necessary, 
has to do with the principle of the “best placed authority” which is at the 
basis of the network of competition authorities created by Regulation 
1/2003.  
 
The different documents on modernisation (regulation and the guidelines) 
clearly show the intention of the Commission to limit its efforts and 
resources to major cases and to let other cases be dealt with largely at a 
national level. The basic principle for allocation within the network is that 
the case should be dealt with by the authority which is best placed to do so. 
This principle is explained in a separate Notice.200 The Commission shall 
have to justify therefore why it wishes to deal with certain cases on its own, 
and part of that motivation shall have to be why the Commission considers 
there to be effect on trade.  
 
5.3.2 The description of the effect on trade concept 
 
The guidelines of the Commission contain a subtle mix of established case-
law and new elements and examples. The discussion of the concept of effect 
on trade between Member States in Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty is 
composed of three elements in the guidelines: the concept of “trade between 
Member States”, definition of “may affect” and the concept of “appreciable 
effect”. 
 
Where the possibility to influence trade is concerned, the guidelines lay 
down a number of objective elements that, as such, do not have to be 
decisive but can be so in different combinations: the nature of the agreement 
or behaviour, the nature of the product and the position and importance of 
the undertakings concerned.201  
 
Also, the importance of the broader legal and factual context of an agreement 
is mentioned: this has to do especially with the possible obstacles or barriers 
to entry on national markets.  
 
The Commission gives great attention to the fact that trade may be affected 
also indirectly or potentially.202 It follows from the guidelines that the 
threshold is certainly not higher to possibly exclude national situations.  
199  ECJ Joined Cases C-12/03 & C-13/03, Tetra Laval [2005] ECR 987, 1113; T. 
Ottervanger and I. Veldhuis, ‘Europese Commissie/Tetra Laval’ (2005) 04/05 
Markt & Mededinging 152.  
200  Commission Notice (above n 193).  
201  Rec. 28 and following of the guidelines on cooperation (above n 193).  
202  Rec. 36-43 of the Notice. 
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The guidelines also determine, in line with Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003, 
that the burden of proof for the effect on trade lies with the authority (in case 
of public enforcement) or the claimant (in case of private enforcement).203 
 
5.3.3 A more quantitative approach?  
 
The most novel aspect in the guidelines is undoubtedly the discussion of the 
term “appreciability”, especially the quantitative elements in that concept.  
Agreements and behaviour shall fall outside the scope of application of 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty when they affect the market only in an 
insignificant way, having regard to the weak position of the undertakings 
concerned on the market for the products in question. The appreciability of 
effect on trade can be appraised in particular by reference to the position 
and the importance of a relevant undertaking on the market for the products 
concerned.204 
 
- negative presumption 
 
The Commission recognises that it is impossible to lay down quantitative 
rules for all types of agreements, which would allow determining whether 
trade between Member States has been affected appreciably. However, 
according to the Commission, it is possible to explain when trade is normally 
not capable of being appreciably affected.  
 
Reference is first made to the PME policy laid down in the de Minimis 
Notice.205 Then the “no appreciable effect on trade “ rule (NAAT-rule) is 
introduced. According to the guidelines this rule shall function as an 
irrebuttable negative presumption. The consequences of its application for 
companies are important. The Commission refers to the fact that the 
negative presumption can have as a result that even hardcore restrictions 
stay outside the scope of Community law.206 The Commission shall not open 
proceedings and companies shall not be sanctioned if they assumed, in good 
faith, that an agreement was covered by the presumption. 
 
It is always necessary to examine on a case to case basis, but in principle 
trade shall not be affected appreciably if the joint market share of parties on 
the relevant market is not more than 5% and, for horizontal agreements, the 
203  Rec. 43 of the Notice. 
204  Rec. 44-45 of the Notice.  
205  Rec. 50 of the Notice and also the Notice on de Minimis (above n 159). 
206  Correct application would imply that a hard core restriction such as for example a 
price agreement, would not fall under Article 81 EC Treaty for lack of interstate 
effect. On the basis of the principles laid down in Reg.1/2003 discussed above, it 
should then still be possible to apply national competition law. However, this 
possibility seems to be limited substantially by Article 3 § 2 Reg. 1/2003. The 
interplay of EC and national law that is construed here by the regulation and the 
notices is not exactly easy as is illustrated by a judgment of the Court of Appeal of 
Brussels which clearly did not understand its scope, Brussels Court of Appeal 
2004/MR/8, Judgment of 10 November 2005, not reported. 
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total Community turnover of the undertakings concerned does not exceed 40 
million Euro. The same presumption shall apply if this turnover threshold is 
not exceeded in the two following years by more than 10% or if the market 
share is not increased by more than 2%. 
 
- positive presumption 
 
There shall be a rebuttable positive presumption where an agreement, by its 
very nature, is capable of affecting trade between Member States (for 
example because it concerns import and export or covers several Member 
States). In such cases where there are already evident indications of 
interstate effect, an agreement shall be assumed to have an appreciable 
effect on trade between Member States if parties have a joint turnover of 40 
million Euros. In case of these agreements that already by their nature, 
affect trade between Member States, it can be assumed that they will have 
appreciable effect if the market share of 5% is exceeded.207  
 
In the guidelines the Commission therefore uses the concept of “capable of 
affecting trade between Member States by its very nature” or “normally 
having such effect”. This resembles a type of hardcore or per se approach. 
Horizontal cartels shall normally have interstate effect. Other types of 
horizontal co-operation and vertical agreements shall require further 
examination. Where abuses are concerned, a distinction exists between 
abuse by exclusion and by exploitation. In the first category the Commission 
shall, according to the guidelines, assume more readily that interstate effect 
exists.  
 
- internal situation?  
 
The following can be said where internal situations are concerned.  
 
It appears from the above that the competition law equivalent of the “internal 
situation” (expression used elsewhere in EU law), given the theory of effect, is 
the case where an agreement or behaviour only has effect on the territory of 
one particular Member State. On this point, the guidelines of the 
Commission do not seem to change anything. There are no indications that 
there will be more reticence to apply the EC provisions in such cases.  
 
Of course this would have been entirely possible: now that all Member States 
have national prohibitions, a more restrictive interpretation of interstate 
effect would certainly have been plausible. There do not seem to be any hard 
elements however in the guidelines that point to such a policy choice.  
 
The guidelines do emphasize the importance of a more detailed examination 
of a case when agreements or abuse precisely only seem to concern one 
207  An exception then again exists when the behaviour only concerns part of the 
territory of a member state.  
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Member State or part of it. But this is in line with the case-law (see above 
3.5). It also clearly appears from the discussion of the different types of 
agreements and behaviour in the guidelines.208  
 
All in all, many agreements and types of behaviour shall still meet the 
threshold of interstate effect because the wide definition in the case-law is 
not called into question by the Commission. This raises the question of the 
impact of modernisation on the concept of interstate effect.   
 
5.4  The consequences of modernisation for the meaning of interstate 
effect 
 
It has not become easier to evaluate whether there is an effect on trade 
between Member States since modernisation. It seems that the burden of 
proof is heavier for cases which “by their very nature” seem to have such 
effect.  
 
A rigorous application of the complicated guidelines of the Commission is 
certainly not a simple task. This is especially true if one wishes to apply in a 
correct way the quantitative elements which are mentioned to measure the 
appreciability of the interstate effect.  
 
The question is if this difficult task shall actually be carried out in practice. 
It would be understandable that the safe route is chosen, and that in many 
cases the conclusion that interstate effect exists, shall be easily drawn. This 
allows for less quantitative (economical) motivation of decisions. In that way, 
authorities and judges will play their roles of loyal entities within the new 
Community network even in cases where there is in fact merely an internal 
or national situation.209 
 
The choice has certainly not been made to restrict the influence of Articles 
81 and 82 EC Treaty when evaluating concrete market behaviour in the 
Member States. The condition of “effect on interstate trade” is still applied in 
a broad way. The guidelines of the Commission are formulated in such a way 
that they are in continuity with the established case-law.  
 
Moreover, the choice was not made to have an “or-or” situation (either 
national law or Community law) but an “and-and” situation. Regulation 
1/2003 has introduced the principle of parallel application of Article 81 EC 
Treaty and its national equivalents. This means the choice was not in favour 
of the introduction of a one-stop system such as in the case of merger 
control. In such a system Community law would only apply if it were 
208  Rec. 61 of the Notice.  
209  Recent example of a (too) “loyal” application by the NMa (Dutch competition 




necessary from the perspective of the common market.210 In such a 
reasoning,  the condition of “effect on trade between Member States” has no 
significance anymore in a unified market and it would only be relevant if 
there is a restriction of competition which is substantial enough to damage 
the internal market.211 However, at the present time, the condition of 
interstate effect is still very much a condition for the application of Articles 
81 and 82 EC Treaty.  
 
5.5  A related concept: “Community interest”? 
 
It seems interesting to briefly introduce another concept in this discussion, 
namely the “Community interest”. 
 
It is established case-law that the Commission can reject complaints on the 
basis of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty for lack of Community interest. In 
some cases, this is done by an explicit reference to the possibility of the 
complainant to search legal protection from the national judge. This was the 
case in the famous Automec jurisprudence.212 The Community judiciary has 
accepted that the Commission may set priorities.213 In evaluating the 
Community interest, the Commission has to consider the importance of the 
possible infringement for the common market on the one hand, and the 
probability of proof and the scope of investigation necessary, on the other 
hand.  
 
This jurisprudence is certainly one of the elements that led to the 
decentralisation of Community competition law and has to be seen together 
with the notices on co-operation between the Commission and national 
judges.214 In those notices the Commission strongly promotes enforcement 
210  Bos (above n 168); also Wesseling (above n 172); as well as Faull (above n 163). In 
merger control, the relevance is measured by a turnover threshold.  
211  See already as early as in the Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi in 1975, 
Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi case 73/74 [1975] ECR 1517 and 
following.  
212  ECJ Case T-24/90, Automec [1992] ECR 2223.  
213  The same can be said of the NMa (Dutch competition authority), see the judgment 
of the Court of Rotterdam, Court of Rotterdam Judgment of 3 december 2004 Role 
03/2084 LJN:AS3852. The NMa also justifies rejections of complaints by referring 
to the existence of judicial protection at the level of the civil judge, for example 
NMa Judgment of 29 June 2005 Superunie v Interpay case 2978/147.  
214  Commission Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in 
applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty of 1993 [1993] OJ C 39, 6, now 
replaced by the Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission 
and the courts of the EU Member States [2004] OJ (2004) C 101, 54. On the 
relatively unsuccessful first steps towards decentralisation: R. Wesseling, ‘The 
Commission Notice on decentralisation of EC Antitrust Law: In for a Penny, not for 
a Pound’ (1997) 18 European Competition Law Review 94.  
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through the national judge for companies suffering damages from a possible 
infringement on competition rules.215 
 
The question is whether there is a relationship between the condition of 
interstate effect on the one hand and Community interest on the other. In 
the traditional practice and jurisprudence such a relationship does not seem 
to exist: the fact that the Commission renounced from action at a centralised 
level was often linked to the possibility to obtain judicial protection 
elsewhere, not so much the absence of interstate effect.216  
 
The position taken here is that the concept of Community interest has (or 
should have) gained importance in the new modernised system after the 
entry into force of Regulation 1/2003.  
 
First of all, complainants can now not only go to the national judge but also 
to national competition authorities (if it was not already the case) who are 
fully competent to sanction infringements of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty. 
The Automec-case law (cited above) is still justified and there is no longer 
any doubt that complainants can obtain legal protection at a national level.  
 
Secondly, it was the explicit intention of the Commission to free resources 
for the big cases, therefore those where the Community interest is at stake.  
 
Finally, it seems obvious that the Community interest should play a role for 
the allocation of cases within the network, in any case between the 
Commission on the one hand and national authorities on the other. It has 
been rightfully pointed out in doctrine that the principle of subsidiarity 
should play a role in this allocation.217 As it was said before, Regulation 
1/2003 also refers explicitly to subsidiarity.  
 
6.  Some conclusive remarks 
 
6.1  Intra state equals inter state: the internal situation 
 
It was discussed above that the condition of “effect on trade between Member 
States” has, since the beginning, and without too much resistance from 
courts or Member States, been interpreted in a broad way. More precisely, 
the interpretation of that condition has without any doubt allowed the 
prohibitions of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty to apply in situations where the 
215  Stimulating private enforcement is (again) a priority of the Commission (EC) ‘On 
public-private partnerships and community law on public contracts and 
concessions’ (Green Paper) COM (2004) 327.  
216  It is difficult to evaluate this because rejections of complaints, just like many 
informal decisions the Commission took before, are not published.  
217  B. Rodger and S. Wylie, ‘Taking the Community interest line: Decentralisation and 
Subsidiarity in Competition Law Enforcement’ (1997) 8 European Competition Law 
Review 485.  
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effects of the behaviour are clearly only felt in one Member State of part 
thereof.  
 
For a good understanding: this does not mean that the condition of 
interstate trade no longer applies, on the contrary. The broad interpretation 
of the condition makes it easy to apply the prohibitions in a national case 
with little importance. It is defended in this contribution that this is not 
fundamentally different since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 and 
the guidelines of the Commission published in 2004. 
 
6.2  Intra state equals inter state: harmonised law and convergence of 
policies 
 
In the current state of competition law, after the entry into force of 
Regulation 1/2003, the position is that it is hardly relevant anymore for the 
legal evaluation of an agreement or behaviour whether there is interstate 
effect or not. The overall question whether there is a sanctionable restriction 
of competition or not, shall not be influenced by it.  
 
The somewhat bizar parallel application which is introduced by Article 3 § 1 
of Regulation 1/2003, shows how exceptional competition law is on this 
issue: not so much the opposition between Community law and incompatible 
national law is at stake. When there is interstate effect, it is as though one 
legal system reinforces the other.  
 
Even in the cases where it can be successfully argued that there is no 
interstate effect, the individual solution (is there an infringement or not) 
shall be the same because of the different mechanisms of convergence that 
are now part of the system. In this respect the prohibition of contradictory 
decisions is especially important.  
 
In other words, Community competition law can or should also increasingly 
be applied to internal situations because national law and Community law 
are barely distinguishable.  
 
It is difficult to deny that the Member States have lost all, if not much of 
their autonomy in competition policy, most likely in a more far-reaching way 
than elsewhere in Community law. However, this has not occurred through 
the gradual fading of interstate effect (the condition does not apply less) but 
more by the factual harmonisation of Community law. 
 
There is little room for Member States to develop their own competition 
policy. The creation of the network of authorities with the entry into force of 
Regulation 1/2003 does not only have an impact on the enforcement in 
individual cases, but also on the policy in a more general way.  
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6.3  A new role for interstate effect? 
 
It was also discussed above that the condition of interstate effect is decisive 
to determine whether national law and/or Community law is applicable. The 
boundary between Community and national law is not determined on the 
basis of the primacy of Community law or a “one stop shop principle” but on 
the basis of the principle of parallel application laid down in Article 3 of 
Regulation 1/2003. This is a unique characteristic of the modernised 
Community competition system. 
 
The position here is that the condition of interstate effect should, in the 
future, in combination with the principle of Community interest, function 
much more as a real jurisdictional criterion (in the sense of competence). It 
could have a more explicit significance when cases are allocated in the 
context of the network of competition authorities. The more effect on 
interstate trade, the more justified it is that the Commission itself intervenes 
in a particular case.  
 
It is useful and necessary to reflect further on the usefulness and 
interpretation of the condition of interstate effect along these lines. This 
should also be done from the perspective of the decentralisation of 
competition law. This might allow to eliminate the impression that not only 
the substance of competition law but also enforcement is, instead of being 




Chapter 4  
 
Sense and nonsense of rules on proof in cartel cases* 
 
How to reconcile a more economics-based approach to competition law 
with more attention for rules on proof? 
 
EC competition law has undergone major changes in the last years. A so-
called more economic approach has been introduced: for vertical restrictions 
safe harbours were created for undertakings with low market shares and 
only a limited number of hard-core restrictions are still considered 
detrimental for the economy. For horizontal agreements, the Commission 
adopted guidelines and new group exemptions allowing for more flexibility 
for certain types of agreements that can have pro-competitive effects. Where 
hard-core cartels are concerned, there is no question of introducing more 
flexibility at a policy level. On the contrary, due to procedural reforms, 
decentralisation and the successful introduction of leniency programs, the 
focus of the Commission and most national competition authorities is now 
on cartels and large fines are imposed. 
 
Even in hard-core cases there is some pressure on the competition 
authorities to have sufficient consideration for economic reality and impact 
on the market. This pressure is coming from the insights of economic 
doctrine, but also from the courts upon review. It is the result of a growing 
attention for issues of proof and evidence that we can observe in the last 
years in several areas of competition law. Community courts are requiring 
the Commission to substantiate adequately its findings of infringement of 
competition law by demonstrating adverse effect on the market place. Similar 
requirements are imposed by national courts when it comes to decisions by 
national competition authorities. This stricter approach towards proof is, at 
least partly, inspired by the seriousness of the sanctions that are imposed on 
companies. Increasingly high sanctions bring more attention for rights of 
defence and rules on proof and evidence.  
 
The impression could exist that there is a contradiction between on the one 
hand more economics and more flexibility, and on the other hand a more 
stricter approach when it comes to the procedural framework in which 
specific competition cases are dealt with. The paper addresses how to 
reconcile a more economics-based approach to competition law with 




* This article is based on a paper presented at the Max Planck Institute in Bonn at a 
workshop on the Law and Economics of Competition Policy on 5-7 December 2007, 
published as a TILEC Discussion Paper in January 2008, and published in a 
revised version in European Competition Journal, 2008, 4(1), p. 169-199. It was 
closed on 15 March 2008.  
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First, a short description is given of the general characteristics of rules on 
proof and their role in the legal system with special attention for general 
principles of law. Then the relevant specific characteristics of EC law and of 
cartel cases are described, as well as a number of recent developments that 
have their impact on proof. Thirdly, an attempt is made to define the 
practical features of workable rules on burden of proof and standard of proof 
and some proposals are made to develop a pragmatic approach that 
reconciles the different, seemingly contradictory trends in current 
competition law. This approach requires both economists and lawyers to 
deviate somewhat from their dogmas for the sake of efficient enforcement of 
competition law.   
 
1.   Rules on proof: overview and concepts 
 
1.1    Proof  
 
What is meant by proof? There are several aspects that are relevant.  
 
First is the subjective and active element, better expressed by “to prove” (in 
other languages, the words for “prove” and “proof”, are the same). A party 
undertaking an action to prove has as its goal “to convince” (persuasion); 
proving and convincing being inextricably related. Is there proof enough to 
convict? Has the infringement been proven?  
 
The second dimension is the objective element, wherein proof refers to the 
object or support that bears the proof (production). From this perspective, 
the term “proof” is substitutable with the term “evidence”: for example a 
document of some kind or a witness statement.  
 
It is generally presupposed that all proof or evidence is objective in that it 
cannot be disputed. However, this is not true in practice: both the 
truthfulness of evidence (especially but not only with non written evidence) 
and its value and interpretation are subjects of debate in any given case. In 
fact, in most legal disputes, this debate is the crucial one.  
 
Another misconception is that “proof” only relates to facts and that once 
these facts are established without doubt, the law can be applied. This is not 
the reality of legal disputes: the distinction between facts and law is not so 
clear cut, and proof, certainly in the active sense of the term, also relates to 
the law: the legal argument that is made must also convince and be 
corroborated by proof. A good example from competition law showing how 
difficult it is to distinguish facts from law is the definition of the relevant 
market. Determining what the relevant market is that shall be the basis for 
the competitive analysis in a cartel case, is not (merely) the observation of 
the facts (the market) but is applying a legal definition of what a relevant 
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market is, selecting certain facts and discarding others in view of applying 
the legal provisions.218  
 
To complete the picture, one might consider that there is a third dimension 
to proof, namely the result of the two aspects mentioned before: the actions 
on behalf of a party, that bring together certain elements of fact and law, 
thereby resulting in convincing the judge or authority.219 The result is proof 
that the law has (or has not) been infringed.  
 
1.2    Rules on proof 
 
Generally, rules on proof are considered to be part of procedural law, rather 
than substantive law. However, competition law illustrates how procedural 
law and substantive law interact and how blurred the distinction between 
procedural law and substantive law can be. The rules on proof may be 
perceived as procedural but no one contests that the existence of sufficient 
proof or not of a cartel, touches on the merits of the case.  
 
When reference is made to “rules on proof”, this covers a wide variety of 
issues and the different dimensions of the term “proof” mentioned above, are 
reflected. Only certain aspects are covered in this paper, but these are the 
most common subjects that are dealt with in rules on proof, or rules of 
evidence:220 
 Who has to prove (therefore convince)? When does the burden shift? 
 When is an infringement of the law considered proven, in other words, 
when does the conviction of the authority or court have legal 
consequences? 
 How active or passive can or does the authority or court have to be when 
dealing with proof?  
 If the court or authority is to have an active role, which measures can be 
taken? 
 Which types of proof can be accepted, what is their respective value 
(hierarchy)?  
218  In some cases this can lead to results that the companies concerned might find 
peculiar: they might experience competitive restraints for example for competitors 
that are legally not considered to be in the same market.  
219  N. Verheyden-Jeanmart, Droit de la preuve (Bruxelles: Larcier, 1991); P. Wéry, La 
preuve, Guide juridique de l’entreprise. Titre préliminaire, Livre 2 (Bruxelles: Kluwer, 
2003). For an interesting view on procedural law from a more general theoretical 
viewpoint of principles of law and the main elements of litigation: M. Bayles, 
Principles of law, A normative analysis (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing company, 
1987). 
220  In the US legal terminology, the term “rules of evidence” is more common. For 
discussion of the principles of civil and criminal law that rule evidence as well as 
the role of the judge in that process, S. Guinchard, Droit et pratique de la procedure 
civile (Paris: Dalloz Action, 2006); G. Stefani and G. Levasseur, Procédure pénale, 
(Paris: Dalloz, 2006); I. Dennis, The law of evidence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2007); M. Malek (ed), Phipson on evidence. 15th edn. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2000); F. Kuty and D. Mougenot (eds), La preuve (Liège: Anthemis, 2007).  
CHAPTER 4 
 64
 Can all proof be used in all circumstances? What is the consequence of 
the use of illegitimately found proof? How is confidential material 
protected?  
 How will a court in appeal deal with proof when reviewing a case?   
 
The first subject is commonly referred to as the burden of proof and the 
second one the standard of proof. These are the main focuses of this paper. 
The four other questions mentioned above are typically subjects where the 
legal tradition of the jurisdiction in question plays an important role and 
where great differences can occur from one jurisdiction to the other.  
 
For example, the role of the judge is to a large degree determined by the legal 
tradition and culture of a country. In some countries it is much more 
acceptable than in others that a judge plays an active role in terms of finding 
proof, on his own initiative and not bound by what the parties before him. 
Also, rules on proof often differ considerably depending on the area of law: 
typically, private and contractual law are governed by rules other than 
criminal law. Finally, the choice of the institutional “format” has an impact 
on the rules that govern procedure and also proof issues, including general 
principles of law. For example: if an authority is an administrative body, 
administrative law applies and certain guarantees for parties that apply only 
before courts221, do not.  
 
In most legal systems a distinction can be made between a system of free 
proof and a system of regulated proof. The distinction relates mostly to the 
types of proof that can be used and which probative value is attributed to 
different forms of proof. In a system of free proof generally, the probative 
value is not regulated and there are no restrictions on the types of proof or 
evidence that can be used. The only limits are the following principles which 
are generally the legal limits for the use of  certain proof in all systems of 
proof:   
 rules concerning illegitimately obtained proof  
 the protection of privacy and of the person 
 protection of the rights of defence. 
 
These limits stem from fundamental general principles of law: the principle 
of legality, the fundamental human right of the protection of the person, the 
right to a fair trial and the rights of defence following from that.222 
221  This argument has lead the Commission for a long time to deny the protection of 
certain fundamental rights such as the rights protecting immunity of homes but 
the case-law from the European Court of Human Rights has enlarged the scope of 
application of these rights primarily on the basis of the quasi-criminal nature of 
the sanctions that the Commission can inflict upon undertakings.  
222  J. Bourgeois and T. Baumé, Decentralisation of EC competition law enforcement 
and general principles of Community law [2004] Research papers College of Europe 
4, available at www.coleurope.be; more general: T. Tridimas, General principles of 
EC law (Oxford: OUP, 1999); K. Lenaerts and P. van Nuffel, Constitutional law of 
the EU, 2nd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) p. 711. 
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In a system of regulated proof, existing in different degrees, there is typically 
a formal hierarchy whereby the law recognises the superior value of some 
forms of proof and does not allow just any proof to be used.223  
 
One could qualify competition law, at least at the EC level, as a system of 
free proof. In principle, the courts have accepted that all imaginable types of 
evidence can be used by the Commission to prove an infringement of 
competition law. There is no formal hierarchy and there are no limits to the 
type of evidence the Commission can use, other than those following from 
the general principles of law mentioned above. The large degree of discretion 
that the Commission has in terms of collecting proof is mitigated by the 
standard of proof, as discussed below.     
 
EC competition law can not only be qualified as a system of free proof in 
terms of the type of evidence that can be used, but it can also be 
characterised generally by (an almost total) lack of rules on proof or 
evidence, as is EC law generally (see below). This means that there are few 
questions of admissibility of proof other than the three categories of limits 
mentioned above. In other areas of law, and more so in common law 
jurisdictions, there are fairly detailed rules, for example on the relevance and 
reliability of proof and evidence.    
 
Finally, it is clear that rules of proof are often decisive for the outcome of a 
case. This sometimes makes law enforcement incomprehensible to the 
general public and lawyers can seem out of touch with reality. The typical 
example from criminal law is the criminal against whom the evidence is 
indisputable but who is not punished because irregularities occurred during 
the investigation. Such cases should definitely be exceptional because they 
do not stimulate the social acceptance of justice. However, normally, in such 
cases lawyers feel that the result of the case is regrettable (in the individual 
case) but justified for the sake of the protection of the general principles that 
are fundamental to the legal system. There is a particular quote that seems 
useful here in this respect: “procedural rules prescribe a framework whose 
justification is not necessarily economic but within that framework economic 
logic may operate.”224 
 
223  For example, in family law and property law in some jurisdictions ownership can 
only be proven in a limited number of ways, for example by an act drawn up by a 
notary. 
224  R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law & Economics (Boston: Pearson Education Ltd., 2004) 
433. In the same chapter the examples to illustrate how the burden of proof and 
standard of proof work also offer a interesting perspective. Law & Economics 
literature seems all in all fairly limited when it comes to evidence. See J. Parker, 
‘Evidence: general economic analysis’, in B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest (eds) 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000), also 
available on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=1031736.  
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1.3    Burden of proof  
 
The burden of proof concerns the question of which party must prove what. 
At first sight this is a fairly obvious concept: it is either one party or the 
other. Questions arise mostly when it is appropriate that the burden of proof 
shifts from one party to the other during the course of proceedings. In this 
respect, the use of presumptions is important and relevant in the context of 
competition law. This shall be discussed further below.  
 
In principle, in most jurisdictions the rule “actori incumbit probatio” 
prevails: the claimant bears the burden of proof. In the context of public 
enforcement of criminal law but also in competition law this means that the 
authority bears the burden of proof of the infringement. In cases where an 
investigation is initiated by a complainant who is a competitor for example, 
this is not different: the more substantiated the complaint the better it is for 
the authority, but the authority is solely responsible for proving the 
infringement, the complainant not being a party to the procedure. 
 
1.4    Standard of proof  
 
The standard of proof can be defined as the level of certainty that proof must 
achieve and that has to be attained for a jurisdiction to establish whether or 
not the law has been infringed and/or measures have to be taken.  
 
It is generally assumed that in common law countries there are two 
standards of proof: “preponderance of evidence” in civil cases and “beyond 
reasonable doubt” in criminal cases. Another standard that has been often 
referred to in comments about EC competition law recently is the “balance of 
probabilities” which is equivalent to the preponderance of evidence.  
 
In most civil law countries the concept of standard of proof as such is not 
well known and certainly not defined by law. This is important in this 
context given that the vast majority of the Member States of the European 
Union can be considered as belonging to the civil law tradition.  
 
There is a strong correlation between the standard of proof and the standard 
of review. The latter is the scope of review that a court upon appeal exercises 
when dealing with an appeal against, for example, a decision of a 
competition authority. The two extreme forms are a full review (the court 
places itself in the position of the authority and entirely repeats the analysis 
of facts and law) and a marginal review. The latter is commonly perceived as 
the form of review in administrative law where the courts, upon appeal, leave 
a large margin of discretion to the public authorities. Although the focus in 
this paper is rather on the standard of proof, it is clear that standard of proof 
and standard of review are two aspects of a single control system. 
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2.   Rules on proof in EC cartel cases 
 
This paper is primarily focused on Article 81 of the EC Treaty, and cartels in 
particular. For the purpose of this paper the term “cartel” means any 
infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty or its national equivalents in the 
form of a horizontal agreement having as its object and/or effect the 
restriction of competition.225   
 
The paper also focuses on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty at 
the EC level. It highlights mainly the common features that workable rules 
on proof, and in particular the burden of proof, and the standard of proof 
should have in Article 81 EC cases, regardless of where the prohibition is 
enforced.  
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the present analysis is limited to the 
application of the prohibition of Article 81 (1) EC and the exception of Article 
81 (3) as such. Proof in the context of the sanctions that can be imposed 
when an infringement is established is another interesting subject, but is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
2.1  The specifics of EC law 
 
When discussing proof issues in competition law, the specific context of EC 
law should not be underestimated. As is well known, competition law as it is 
applied and enforced now throughout the Member States, is largely based on 
EC law. For most jurisdictions, competition law was a new area of law, and 
EC competition law was integrated into the legal system just like other areas 
of material law such as the free movement of goods, but with less difficulty 
because there was often less conflict between (the often non-existent) pre-
existing national law and EC law.   
 
When EC material law is applied in the Member States, this is done in the 
context of national procedures on the basis of the principle of procedural 
autonomy of the Member States. The treaties do not contain a body of 
procedural rules. EC law does not have rules on proof and evidence. Member 
States each have their own traditions of procedural law, and certainly rules 
on proof. As competition law developed and companies were sanctioned in 
an increasingly severe way, the European courts started to develop 
jurisprudence on procedure, drawing from different sources of law, each 
judge with a different background, with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) being an important source of inspiration.  
225  It has to be said that most of the article shall also be relevant for vertical 
agreements that fall within the scope of application of Article 81 EC but these 
agreements nowadays are rarely, if ever, the subject of decisions of competition 
authorities and therefore of litigation in review courts. However, vertical 
agreements are often the subject of private litigation, usually in the context of 
contractual disputes. The law governing issues of proof shall then be that 
applicable to such disputes in a particular jurisdiction.  
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Nevertheless, there has been a great impact on national procedural law in 
recent years for at least three reasons: spontaneous harmonisation occurred 
because of the substantial harmonisation of competition law and the 
decentralisation process instigated by Regulation 1/2003.226 This 
harmonisation affects the procedural rules that national authorities and 
courts apply when they apply EC competition law. However, given the fact 
that most national competition acts are also based on EC law, 
harmonisation naturally touches procedural competition law, regardless of 
whether Article 81 EC is applied alone or the two are applied together.   
 
Also, the EC courts’ case-law on equivalence and effectiveness has definitely 
had a certain unifying effect on procedural law.227 However, where proof is 
concerned, this should not be overestimated. Harmonisation of procedural 
law in competition cases has mainly taken place in the area of the rights of 
defence in the broad sense of the word, leading for example to the protection 
against self-incrimination, the right to have access to a file, as well as the 
protection of legal privilege. It is not surprising that spontaneous 
harmonisation of these aspects of the procedure could occur because it is 
based largely on rights that are grounded in general principles of law, laid 
down also in the ECHR. General principles of law in fact play a key role in 
the construction of a unified set of procedural rules for competition cases.  
 
Until recently, there was very little case-law on proof or evidence. This is 
changing now, as will be discussed below. It is important to keep in mind 
when studying the recent cases in relation to proof, that there is little 
common ground on which this jurisprudence can be based because legal 
traditions in the Member States show many differences in the actual rules 
on proof. One factor is the well-known difference between common law and 
civil law systems. The EC courts, when dealing with issues of proof, are in 
fact construing new law, in the absence of EC legislation. They have to 
attempt to draw common principles from the legal systems of the 27 Member 
States. In doing so, the Courts base their laws on the general principles of 
law common to all members states (eg the presumption of innocence). 
However, where the national laws differ greatly, the courts have to look for a 
sui generis set of rules, based on the specifics of competition law. 
 
The sui generis character of the jurisprudence and developments concerning 
proof at the EC level, should perhaps make us wary when trying to apply 
certain concepts such as “burden of proof” and “standard of proof”.228 We 
226  Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
227  For an overview: K. Lenaerts, D. Arts and I. Maselis, Procedural law of the EU 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), chap. 3. 
228  A. Sibony and E. Barbier de La Serre, ‘Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle 
en droit communautaire de la concurrence: pour un changement de perspective 
(2007) 43 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 205. Also from the French 
perspective but not opposing the use of these terms: H. Legal, ‘Standards of proof 
and standards of judicial review in EU competition law’, in B. Hawk (ed.) Annual 
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should at least realize that these concepts are not clearly defined and that 
they do not have the same meaning in all Member States, if they exist at all. 
In fact, the few EC judgments show that the Community courts themselves 
are clearly reluctant to use a number of the concepts used in doctrine, such 
as burden of proof and standard of proof.  
 
Keeping this in mind, it seems efficient to use those terms that are also 
widely known outside the legal community, even though they are certainly 
common law concepts. The majority of doctrine that has been studying these 
issues since the emergence of case-law about proof, has also generally used 
these concepts. Finally, and not unimportantly, the Community legislator 
and the Commission use both “burden of proof” as well as “standard of 
proof” in important competition texts such as Regulation 1/2003.  
 
2.2  The specifics of cartel cases 
 
2.2.1  Sources of law for proof in cartel cases 
 
Until fairly recently, not many legal provisions at the EC level dealt with 
rules on proof in competition matters, and none dealt with the burden of 
proof or the standard of proof. Regulation 17, which governed Commission 
investigations for more than 40 years, only contained provisions on the 
investigatory powers that the Commission could exercise, and regulated to 
some extent what proof could be used.229  
 
Regulation 1/2003 however, which Regulation 17 as of 1 May 2004, contains 
a clear rule on the burden of proof in Article 2: “In any national or 
Community proceedings for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate law Institute: International Antitrust and 
Policy (New York: Juris Publishing, 2006), p. 107-116. The answers the ECJ shall 
give to the questions put before it by the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven 
(the highest Dutch court in appeal cases against decisions of the Dutch 
competition authority) are potentially very important in this respect: Case C-8/08, 
T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone 
Libertel NV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2008] 
OJ C92, 11. The referring court clearly adresses the question of procedural 
autonomy and whether rules on proof should be similar when national courts and 
authorities apply EC antitrust rules.  
229  J. Joshua, ‘Proof in contested competition cases, a comparison with the rules of 
evidence in common law’ (1987) 12 European Law Review 315; A. Walker-Smith, 
‘Collusion, its detection and investigation’ 2 (1991) European Competion Law 
Review 71; M. Guerrin and G. Kyriazis, ‘Cartels: proof and procedural issues’ in B. 
Hawk (ed.), Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate law Institute: 
International Antitrust and Policy, (Huntington: Juris Publishing, 1993), p. 773; G. 
Van der Wal, and L. Parret, ‘Bewijs in het Europese mededingingsregime, een 
overzicht’ in S. Prechal and L. Hancher (eds.), Europees Bewijsrecht: een 
verkenning, (Deventer: Kluwer, 2001); more general: C. Kerse and M. Khan, EC 
Antitrust Procedure, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) and M. Siragusa and C. 
Rizza (ed.), EU Competition Law, volume III Cartel law, restrictive agreements and 
practices between competitors (Leuven: Claeys & Casteels, 2007).  
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Treaty, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81 (1) or of Article 82 
of the Treaty shall rest on the party or the authority alleging the 
infringement. The undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the 
benefit of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty shall bear the burden of proving that 
the conditions of that paragraph are fulfilled.” In other words, this is the rule 
“actori incumbit probatio” mentioned above.230  
 
It seems clear from the preamble of Regulation 1/2003 that the Community 
legislator is being careful not to interfere with national law: “This regulation 
neither affects national rules on the standard of proof nor obligations of 
competition authorities and courts of the Member States to ascertain the 
relevant facts of the case provided that such rules and obligations are 
compatible with general principles of Community law.”231  
 
Proof and evidence is an area where the case-law, due to the lack of 
legislative sources, has been the most important source of law. The case-law, 
even though limited in the number of subjects it has dealt with, has also 
typically been much inspired by the ECHR, other international treaties and 
(unwritten) general principles of law, most of them more or less common to 
the legal traditions of the Member States.  
 
What are these general principles of law that could be relevant when it 
comes to proof in cartel cases? At least two important principles could have 
an impact: the first is the protection of the rights of defence and the right to 
a fair trial; the second, the presumption of innocence and the principle of the 
benefit of doubt (in dubio pro reo) that follows from it.232 This last principle 
is a central element in the constructing of rules of proof in cartel cases and it 
will be revisited later.233   
 
Other principles that may play a role are those of equality and 
proportionality. Proportionality most frequently plays a role in the context of 
the determination of the sanctions, but it is entirely possible that 
proportionality should intervene, for example, in the burden of proof and the 
shift thereof. There is case-law of the Community courts stating that no 
greater burden should be imposed on individuals than is reasonably 
230  Furthermore, Regulation 1/2003 describes the investigation procedure of the 
Commission, including again rules related to the collection of proof during the 
investigation and inspections. As it was said before, this is not the focus of this 
article.  
231  Paragraph 5. 
232  The rights of defence shall mostly have an impact on the question what proof can 
be used. For the purpose of this article which shall focus more on burden of proof 
and standard of proof, the presumption of innocence shall be more important.  
233  It is less certain that this is also true for merger control. In any case, it would work 
differently. The benefit of the doubt would not require the authority to refrain from 
taking an (infringement) decision such as is the case for cartels but it would then 
arguably oblige the authority to approve the merger.  
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necessary to attain the policy aim intended.234 In the context of the 
investigation by the competition authority, regard should also be had for the 
right to good administration.235 
 
Regardless of the respect of the Community legislator for the procedural 
autonomy of Member States, it is very important from a legal perspective 
that the preamble of Regulation 1/2003 also subjects national rules on proof 
to the general principles of Community law. This means that both the 
Commission at the EC level and the national authorities and courts are 
subject to the same general principles of law; if necessary, the national 
authorities and courts should have to put aside their rules of proof should 
they feel they are not compatible with these principles. This underlines again 
the great importance of these general principles in the procedural framework 
of competition law as it exists today.  
 
2.2.2  Some essential characteristics of cartel cases  
 
There are a number of characteristics that differentiate cartel procedures 
from other legal procedures and also from other competition procedures 
(mergers and abuse cases).  
 
The type of legal analysis that needs to be carried out by authorities and 
judges is fundamentally different from that in abuse or merger cases. First of 
all, the time dimension of the analysis is very different. The analysis is 
generally focused on the past: only rarely are alleged cartels still ongoing at 
the time of the scrutiny. In abuse cases this is often not the case. For 
example, a refusal to supply leaves the complainant of the abuse without 
supplies. This situation usually continues until it is remedied by an order by 
the authority or judge or by the dominant undertaking voluntary complying 
with a decision that qualifies the certain behaviour as abusive. The situation 
is obviously even more different in merger cases. In that scenario the 
competition authority has to take a prospective (ex ante) approach, contrary 
to the ex post analysis in cartel cases.  
 
Furthermore, there is also a “proof paradox” in cartel cases. The paradox is 
that, certainly nowadays at the EC level and in jurisdictions with a mature 
system of enforcement, the most serious cartels that the authorities want to 
discover and end, are those that are usually the most difficult to find and 
prove. If the goal is to have effective competition law enforcement, this 
paradox should lead to a cautious approach towards rules on proof that can 
234  For example: ECJ case 9/73, Carl Schlüter v Hauptzollamt Lörrach [1973] ECR 
1135. 
235  This is not an exhaustive list of all general principles that can be relevant. The 
purpose in this article is to highlight however that general principles play an 
important role in the area of competition procedure and that this is increasingly 
so. Also, that there are interesting “side effects” of this trend such as the 
harmonising effect it has on the law in the Member States.  
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make it even more difficult for authorities, but there shall be a clear tension 
with the protection of the rights of parties which has to be resolved.  
  
The difficulty in discovering the most serious infringements of competition 
law is also one of the reasons why leniency has become such an essential 
part of current antitrust practice.  
 
It is a common feature of all leniency programmes that they require 
applicants to provide the authority with evidence of the cartel they claim to 
have been part of. In short, the importance of leniency programmes has a 
great impact on fact finding and evidence for two main reasons. The first is 
that an applicant for leniency has a great interest in “beefing up” the 
evidence: the more convincing it seems, the greater the reward will be. It 
goes without saying that the authority will verify all claims brought forward. 
Nevertheless, there is a risk that a certain amount of exaggeration takes 
place, for example when naming all the undertakings implicated in a cartel. 
Secondly, there might be more reliance on oral statements in leniency cases. 
This is causing the competition authorities to change the methods they use 
in dealing with proof.   
 
There are a number of other reasons why cartel cases should be treated 
uniquely, that are important when it comes to proof.  
 
The legal dispute is usually limited de facto to a number of the conditions of 
application of the cartel prohibition.236 In many cases the undertakings 
concerned recognise, at least in part, the existence of a cartel, certainly in 
the case of leniency.  
 
There are, then, two types of arguments that are becoming increasingly 
important in cartel cases: the first are arguments relating to the impact on 
the market (particularly the appreciability of the restriction and the effects 
on the market). These arguments are increasingly important because of the 
more economic approach discussed below. It must also be said that in 
hardcore cartel cases there is usually not much need for economic analysis 
because the agreements are considered to have the restriction of competition 
as their objective and therefore the effects on the market need not be proven. 
Nevertheless, the impression is that this line of case-law has only a limited 
shelf life.237 
 
The other category of arguments are those that concentrate on procedural 
aspects and individual accountability for the infringement, or even only on 
236  For example: in many cases the condition that the parties must be “undertakings” 
within the meaning of Article 81 EC or the existence of an agreement shall not be 
in dispute. 
237  See below about the increasing pressure on authorities to substantiate their claims 
and on the other hand the decreasing number of hard core restrictions that 
remain; CFI case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of 
the European Communities [2006] ECR II-02969. 
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the calculation of the fines and the existence of aggravating and attenuating 
circumstances.  
 
In other words, the questions of proof shall not always concern all the 
constituent elements of the cartel prohibition. It can be assumed that when 
facts or legal points are not in dispute, the Commission is discharged from 
its burden of proof in that respect.238   
 
3.    Recent developments having an impact on proof  
 
This article aims to highlight some developments in recent competition 
practice that bear great relevance for issues of proof. 
  
A so-called more economic approach has been introduced: for vertical 
restrictions, safe harbours were created for firms with a small market share 
and only a limited number of hardcore restrictions are still considered 
detrimental for the economy.239 The recent well-known judgment of the US 
Supreme Court in the Leegin case, is quite striking in this respect, and goes 
substantially further.240 The Supreme Court decided that it was time to 
abandon the per se rule for vertical resale price maintenance. This was one 
of the few remaining hardcore restrictions to which US antitrust law did not 
apply the rule of reason. Currently, under EC competition law, vertical resale 
price maintenance is blacklisted.241 Although it is uncertain at this stage 
whether this will have an impact on the EC policy towards vertical restraints, 
at the very least it will be a crucial element in the evaluation of the 
regulations on vertical agreements that are due to start in the near future. 
The result might be that the list of hard core restrictions in vertical 
agreements is limited further.  
 
For horizontal agreements, the Commission adopted guidelines allowing for 
more flexibility for certain types of agreements that can have pro-competitive 
effects, such as joint production and research and development 
agreements.242 The keyword is now “self-assessment”: companies are 
required to assess themselves on a case-by-case basis as to whether their 
agreements are compatible with Article 81 of the EC Treaty.  
 
238  See Sibony and Barbier de La Serre (above n 228).  
239  The reform of the policy towards vertical agreements led to a new group exemption, 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices [1999] OJ L 336, p. 21. The regulation has to be re-evaluated 
by 2010. Also: Commission notice on Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ 
C 291/1.  
240  Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 US 877 (2007); see first 
comments by P. Lugard, ‘Annotatie: Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc./PSKS, 
Inc’ (2007) 5/6 Markt & Mededinging 156. 
241  Article 4 of Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999 (above note 239). 
242  Commission Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 to horizontal co-operation 
agreements [2001] OJ C 3/2, p. 2. 
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Even in hardcore cartels243 there seems to be mounting pressure on the 
competition authorities to have sufficient consideration for economic reality 
and the impact on the market. This pressure is coming from the courts upon 
review: there are some signs of that at the EC level, mainly from the Court of 
First Instance but also tentatively from some national jurisdictions.244  
 
The pressure is the result of the growing attention to issues of proof and 
evidence that has been apparent over the previous last few years in several 
areas of competition law. Community courts are requiring the Commission 
to substantiate adequately its findings of infringement of competition law by 
demonstrating an adverse effect on the marketplace. Similar requirements 
are imposed by courts when it comes to justifying the sanctions that are 
imposed by authorities. This stricter approach towards proof is, at least 
partly, inspired by the seriousness of the sanctions that are imposed on 
companies. Sanctions require that rights of defence and rules on proof and 
evidence be respected.  
 
Specifically, at least two trends have been observed. The first took place 
mainly in merger cases where the CFI was strict on the Commission in terms 
of the market analysis that is necessary to evaluate whether or not certain 
effects on the market might reasonably be foreseen in the future to be the 
result of a merger. The Court requires accuracy, a convincing file and a well-
motivated decision that clarifies the information on which the market 
analysis is based.245 It has demonstrated a willingness to perform thorough 
reviews of Commission cases, causing some surprise. This recent case-law 
was the start of a discussion in doctrine on the standard of proof, which was 
until then barely discussed at all. There are clear indications that the Court 
sees little or no reason to conduct limited reviews in cases under Article 81 
or 82 EC, rather the contrary.246 
 
The second trend is somewhat similar but involves in Article 81 EC cases 
and goes a step further. In recent case-law the CFI seems to be challenging 
the quasi-automatic application of Article 81 EC to certain restrictive 
243  Generally the following list is mentioned: price fixing, production quota, market 
sharing and clients sharing; see also the introduction of the new Commission 
Leniency Notice, Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines 
in cartel cases [2006] OJ C 298/17.  
244  This is clear in the Netherlands: much commented judgment of College van Beroep 
voor het Bedrijfsleven (highest court in administrative affairs), Judgment of 7 
December 2005 G Star Secon Group, AWB 04/237 and 04/249. 
245  See famous judgments CFI case T-342/99, Airtours [2002] ECR II-2585; ECJ case 
C-13/03, Commission of the European Communities v Tetra Laval BV [2005] ECR 
987. According to some, the general wordings of the ECJ’s judgment in Tetra 
Laval, makes the considerations on proof in that judgment also applicable in other 
than merger cases, see H. Legal (above n 228). 
246  Interesting comments in CFI case T-170/06, Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission of 
the European Communities [2007] II-02601, para. 108; the CFI’s judgment in 
Microsoft could be considered an example of thorough review, case T-201/04, 
Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2007] II-03601.  
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practices such as measures against parallel trade.247 Until recently, such 
practices received a “per se” treatment by the Commission because they were 
seen as very detrimental from the viewpoint of the internal market.248 The 
Court now seems to be saying that it might be time for a new approach, and 
now requires the Commission to show, even in such cases, that negative 
effects on the market can be assumed and that the consumer can be 
harmed. In other words, again there is an emphasis on the burden of proof 
of the Commission and on the importance of achieving an adequate standard 
of proof on a case-to-case basis.249 
 
4.    Workable rules on proof  
 
As already stated, this paper focuses mainly on the burden of proof and the 
standard of proof. The purpose is to formulate some considerations and 
thoughts about proof issues, that should be useful for cases involving Article 
81 of the EC Treaty, regardless of where the cases are brought, because they 
are based on general principles of law that apply both at the Community 
level and at the level of the individual Member States.   
 
4.1  Burden of proof  
 
As said before, Article 2 Regulation 1/2003 contains the principle that the 
burden of proof of an infringement of Articles 81 or 82 EC rests upon the 
Commission or, in court proceedings, on the party alleging the infringement. 
When a party claims the benefit of the exception of Article 81 (3) it shall bear 
the burden of proof.  
 
This principle applies to the Commission when it applies Article 81 EC to a 
cartel and the correct application of the principle is the subject of judicial 
review by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice. As will be 
discussed further on, the rule is less simple in practice than it might appear.  
 
The rule on burden of proof laid down in Article 2 Regulation 1/2003 also 
applies to national proceedings in which Article 81 or 82 EC are applied, be 
it before a competition authority or in a court in civil proceedings. There is 
clearly no room for a different distribution of the burden of proof in national 
law. Contrary to the standard of proof, no reference is made to the national 
procedural autonomy in this respect. More so, one can assume that Article 2 
Regulation 1/2003 also regulates the burden of proof in proceedings where 
247  See GSK (above n 237).  
248  Many Art. 81 decisions of the Commission in the last years were still related to 
issues of parallel trade and restriction of import and export is still listed as one of 
the most serious infringements by the Commission. 
249  There are clear signs in national jurisdictions such as the Netherlands that courts 
are taking a similar approach, G Star Secon Group (above n 244). However, the 
author realizes this is still somewhat speculative because there has not been a 




only the national cartel prohibition shall be applied. In national cases where 
Article 81 or 82 EC is applied, the actual distribution of the burden of proof 
and the shift from one party to another, must respect the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness: the procedural framework cannot be such as 
to make it too difficult to invoke and enforce EC law provisions.250 
 
It is appropriate here to recall a specific feature of the burden of proof in 
cartel cases that was briefly mentioned before. The Commission is 
discharged from its burden of proof when certain relevant legal or factual 
elements are recognised by the party in question. This also implies that the 
same party cannot successfully attack the Commission’s infringement 
decision on inadequate proof for a point where there had previously been 
recognition on behalf of the concerned undertaking. The growing importance 
of leniency cases makes it important to bear this in mind.  
 
4.1.1 Legal burden and evidential burden 
 
A distinction is generally made between persuasive or legal burden of proof 
and the evidential burden of proof. Another term sometimes used is the 
“tactical” burden of proof.  
 
The party required to prove his case and to persuade the decision-maker, 
bears the burden of proof. This is the persuasive or legal burden of proof. 
The burden of persuasion can also be qualified as the risk of non-
persuasion. When the Commission is of the opinion that an undertaking has 
infringed Article 81 of the EC Treaty by entering into a price-fixing cartel, the 
Commission must prove that infringement. The evidential burden of proof is 
the need to bring sufficient evidence.251   
 
This is more than just a theoretical distinction, it helps to understand and 
define how the burden of proof works and should work in practice, and, 
more specifically, how the burden of proof can seemingly shift from one party 
to the other but actually stay with the same. This is clarified by using the 
distinction between legal burden of proof and evidential burden of proof. An 
example might clarify this distinction.  
 
Example:   
two competitors have made an agreement to work together to develop the 
technology for a new chip. They are the two major players in the market. 
The Commission considers that their R&D agreement is problematic and 
fulfils the conditions of Article 81 EC Treaty. The parties invoke the 
250  There is quite a lot of case-law on the burden of proof in national cases, outside of 
competition law: for example ECJ case C-242/95, GT-Link A/S v De Danske 
Statsbaner (DSB) [1997] ECR I-4449; for an overview of the impact of EC law on 
national procedural law and sanctions, Lenaerts, Arts and Maselis, Procedural law 
of the EU (above note 227). 
251  D. Bailey, ‘Standard of proof in EC merger proceedings: a common law perspective’ 
(2003) 40 Common Market Law Review (2003) 845. 
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exception of Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty, stating, amongst other 
things, that the agreements create major technological progress. They 
have the burden of proof for the conditions of the exception of Article 81 
(3). If plausible scientific evidence is presented about the consequences 
of their agreement, but the Commission is not convinced, the 
Commission will have to substantiate its argument. Even though the 
legal burden of proof is still with the undertakings concerned, the 
evidential burden of proof will have shifted. If the arguments of the 
parties are not accepted, they shall be subject of the appeal.  
 
4.1.2. Article 81 (1) EC Treaty  
 
The situation is in fact more complicated than the seemingly simple rule of 
Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 would indicate, for another reason.  In the 
current state of competition law, there are many types of cases where a 
balancing exercise is taking place under Article 81 (1) EC. Although the 
Community courts have refused to recognise that a rule of reason, similar to 
that in the US system, exists in EC law, there is a well-developed body of 
case-law in which, at the very least, a similar exercise occurs.  
 
First, there are cases where pros and cons of agreements are weighed and 
certain restrictions are left outside the scope of Article 81 (1) EC because 
non-economic considerations outweigh the restriction of competition. The 
case-law on sport and on restrictions in the market of professional services 
are the most well known.252  
 
Secondly, the so-called more economic approach has led to a policy where 
certain agreements are considered to stay outside the scope of application if 
the parties stay below a certain market share threshold.253 This also brings 
the use of presumptions into the picture.     
 
Therefore the rule that the Commission bears the burden of proof for the 
infringement (or the claimant in civil proceedings) oversimplifies the proof 
issues at stake.   
 
Example:  
Article 81 (1): legal and evidential burden of proof on Commission: 
(a) undertakings, (b) agreement or concerted practice, (c) appreciable 
(d) restriction of competition, (e) appreciable (f) effect on trade 
between Member States. 
Undertakings:  
252  For example ECJ case C-519/04, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v 
Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-06991 not yet published 
and ECJ case C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse 
Belastingadviseurs BV v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 
intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap [2002] ECR I- 1577.  
253  The Guidelines in horizontal agreements are a good example; see for example joint 
distribution agreements and joint production (above n 242). 
CHAPTER 4 
 78
Strategy One: contest individual conditions a, b, c, d, e and/or f  
And/or  
Strategy Two: acknowledge the restrictive nature of an agreement 
but claim the agreements escapes from the scope of application of 
Article 81 for one of the reasons mentioned above.254   
 
The undertakings must substantiate their claims, and have the evidential 
burden of proof. If they prove in Strategy One that one condition is not met, 
this is sufficient since the conditions are cumulative. If the arguments are 
contested, the evidential burden of proof shall shift again. However, at that 
point there is an important change: the party who has the legal burden of 
proof has been shown not to have sufficient proof. At such a point, the 
principle of in dubio pro reo (benefit of the doubt) can come into play, 
certainly in court proceedings.255 Doubt has been created: for the evidential 
burden to shift a second time to the undertakings shall require strong 
evidence from the Commission.   
 
If the undertaking prove in Strategy Two that, for example, the restrictions of 
the agreements are inherent to the justified non economic goal they pursue, 
the agreement shall fall outside the scope of Article 81 (1) and recourse to 
Article 81 (3) will no longer be necessary. It is understandable that, when the 
evidential burden of proof is upon the undertakings in this respect, more 
proof is required, because a restriction of competition is established yet it is 
not forbidden. This can be based on the general principle that exceptions to 
general prohibitions are interpreted restrictively.  
 
4.1.3 Article 81 (3) EC Treaty  
 
Where Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty is concerned, Article 2 Regulation 
1/2003 provides that the burden of proof rests upon the party claiming the 
benefit of the exception. Here the cumulative nature of the four conditions 
that the provision contains256, works the other way. The undertaking or 
association of undertakings brings proof for all four conditions. The 
254  It is not always so clear cut: staying below a market share threshold can also be 
the non fulfillment of the condition of the existence of an appreciable effect on 
competition.  
255  There is no doubt this principle applies in competition procedures, see ECJ case-
199/92 P, Hüls AG v Commission of the European Communities [1999] ECR I-4287 
as well as in front of national authorities and courts applying the EC provisions, 
ECJ case 5/88, Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft 
[1989] ECR 2609; being general principles of EC law as well as fundamental rights 
protected by international treaties, there is no question that Member States are 
bound.  
256  The four conditions are: (1) contribute to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting the technical or economical progress, (2) allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, (3) not imposing restriction which 
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives and (4) not have the 
possibility to eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the products 
in question. 
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evidential burden of proof then shifts if the Commission contests this proof. 
If it can show for only one condition that in fact the necessary proof is not 
available, this is sufficient. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the 
Commission will generally stand on all four conditions in an infringement 
decision, preferring to explain why the exception does not apply.257 In most 
cases the Commission will also argue that more than one condition is not 
fulfilled. The same tendency exists at the national level: authorities and 
courts prefer to be cautious and are, in any case, under a duty to adequately 
justify their decisions. However, strictly speaking, the non-fulfilment of one 
condition of Article 81 (3) is sufficient and the Commission must not 
examine in detail further arguments under Article 81 (3) as soon as one 
condition is not fulfilled.  
 
For Article 81 (3) an interesting question on the shift of the burden of proof 
is whether in general the attitude towards proof should also be severe 
because it constitutes an exception to a general rule such as was described 
above for the case-law under Article 81 (1) EC, which does not include 
certain agreements in the scope of application of the prohibition (see above). 
In other words: when the Commission casts doubt on the arguments of a 
party (for example, concerning the existence of an improvement in 
production), does this mean that a strict attitude is necessary when the 
evidential burden of proof is shifted back to the undertaking?  
 
On the basis of EC law and the structure of the EC Treaty, this seems 
plausible. However, it is submitted that it is doubtful. First, the Treaty itself 
has provided for the possibility of certain restrictive agreements being 
exempted because they present advantages, predominantly of an economic 
nature, that outweigh the restrictions of competition. This is important: the 
idea is that by nature these agreements have a neutral effect on competition 
in the market. Secondly, there is no justification for allowing the “benefit of 
the doubt” rule to apply in favour of the authority that is enforcing the law 
against the undertaking. In other words, the counter-arguments of the 
Commission should not make it more difficult for the undertaking to bring 
forward additional elements to prove why the conditions of Article 81 (3) EC 
are met. Even though the roles are reversed under Article 81 (3) EC, the 
undertaking is still in the position of the defendant and should have full 
respect of the rights or defence. 
 
4.1.4 Shifting the burden: some additional remarks  
 
Flexibility in terms of the shifting burden of proof is a good thing, but the 
difficulty in some cases is at what point the evidential burden is shifted. 
When is there enough “likeliness”, for the other party to have to show that it 
is “unlikely”? It helps to always keep in mind who bears the initial legal 
burden of proof, to determine at which point the evidential burden should 
257  A careful attitude of authorities and courts (in anticipation of review) when 
examining the conditions of Article 81 (3) EC is justified: the CFI was very critical 
on this point in GSK (above n 237).  
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shift. It also helps to keep in mind the structure of Article 81 EC and its 
logic. Furthermore, the examples above show that an indefinite number of 
shifts in the evidential burden of proof is unlikely and that after a party has 
successfully contested the arguments of the Commission bearing the legal 
burden of proof, the standard should change because doubt is created: 
reasons for a second change in the burden of proof shall not be assumed so 
readily.   
 
This shows the extent to which the burden of proof and the standard of proof 
are linked. It also shows how the authority or judge will inevitably have to 
make several decisions in terms of the burden of proof throughout the 
procedure of one single cartel case.  
 
The importance of general principles of law has become clear when 
discussing how the distribution of the burden of proof should work in 
practice. The presumption of innocence and the rights of defence protect the 
defendant undertakings and can sometimes lead to mitigating the burden of 
proof in their favour.  
 
However, it must be underlined that these principles do not put into 
question the distribution of the legal burden of proof. Nor does it mean that 
the burden of proof of undertakings when invoking the exception of Article 
81 (3) EC is more easily shifted back to the Commission or the national 
authority than in cases of an infringement of Article 81 (1) EC: this is a 
widespread misconception amongst lawyers who still tend to give less 
importance to proof under Article 81 (3) EC than under Article 81 (1) EC.258 
 
4.1.5 Presumptions  
 
In order to have a workable system of proof in competition law and certainly 
for cartels, it is necessary to work with (rebuttable) presumptions. It is 
submitted that the more economic approach in competition law has 
increased the importance of presumptions but has also changed their 
nature.  
 
258  Although it has to be said that this has partly to do with the fact that for many 
years the Commission hardly motivated its decisions when it came to the 
fulfilment of the conditions of Article 81 (3). But since the introduction of the legal 
exception by Regulation 1/2003, this exception shall be dealt with mostly in 
national proceedings and before national courts who might be more worried both 
about the burden of proof as well as by adequately motivating why an exception to 
a fundamental rule of the EC Treaty is accepted. Guidance on the interpretation of 
the cumulative conditions is given in the Commission Commission Notice laying 
down guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97. 
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 Thresholds  
 
The first type of presumption usually takes the form of thresholds expressed 
in the market share of turnover of the parties and works as follows: as long 
as a particular threshold is not met, it is assumed that there is no 
appreciable effect on competition in the common market. Such thresholds 
have existed since the first De Minimis Notice of the Commission in 1970 
that introduced the idea that Article 81 EC should not apply to agreements 
having only a negligible effect on competition.259 The use of thresholds has 
increased substantially in all areas of competition law, mainly as a result of 
the modernisation of competition law. A more economical approach includes 
creating more and more safe harbours under certain thresholds. It is 
assumed that under those thresholds of (usually) market share no adverse 
effect on competition is to be expected.  
 
From the point of view of proof, different types of threshold presumptions 
can be distinguished, mainly according to their legal basis. Such 
presumptions can be found mostly in group exemptions, and in Commission 
notices and guidelines. The degree of legal certainty is not equal in both 
cases.  
 
The first kind of presumption (mostly group exemptions) gives the highest 
degree of legal security to undertakings and lays the burden of proof entirely 
upon the authority because the undertakings no longer have to prove that 
their agreement fulfils the conditions of  Article 81 (3) EC. The example is the 
safe harbour for vertical agreements that stay below a market share 
threshold of 30 %. An agreement fulfilling the conditions of Regulation 
2790/1999 is exempted from Article 81 (1) EC; in principle neither the 
Commission nor a court could consider the agreements nevertheless 
infringes Article 81 (1) EC.260 The only element of proof that undertakings 
should have concerns the factual basis for the calculation of their market 
share; otherwise they can be sure to benefit from the exemption.261 
 
For the sake of clarity, it is important to emphasise that these presumptions 
do not work in two directions: in the case of the threshold for vertical 
agreements mentioned above, the agreements shall not be assumed to be 
259  Current de Minimis Notice [2001] OJ C 149/18. 
260  The only possibility is the exceptional situation where the benefit of the exemption 
can be revoked because in a certain territory the cumulative effect of similar 
agreements leads to an unacceptable restriction of competition. Such an action on 
behalf of the Commission or a national competition authority shall not have 
retroactive effect (Articles 6 and 7 Regulation 2790/1999). 
261  Some jurisdictions have non rebuttable presumptions for SME undertakings: as 
long as they stay under a certain market share threshold their agreements can 
never be considered contrary to the cartel prohibition, even if they contain hard 
core restrictions, see for example Article 7 of the Dutch Competition Act. This goes 
further then the safe harbour for vertical agreements which makes the exemption 
conditional to the absence of hard core restrictions.  
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illegal once the threshold is exceeded. Another example from the guidelines 
on horizontal agreements: it is generally assumed that joint purchase 
agreements will not fall under Article 81 (1) EC if parties stay under the 
market threshold of 15 % market share. This does not mean, of course, that 
when this threshold is exceeded an agreement is presumed to be restrictive 
under Article 81 (1) EC. In one sense, presumptions replace the evidential 
burden of proof that rests on a party, but as soon as they no longer apply, 
the normal distribution of the burden of proof is revived. However, the legal 
burden of proof does not shift.  
 
The use of thresholds is generally seen as a good instrument to allow 
competition law to take into account the economic reality whilst providing for 
some legal security for the undertakings. It clearly alleviates the burden of 
proof for companies: under Article 81 (1) EC many presumptions in group 
exemptions or guidelines now permit the undertaking to counter any 
argument of the authority or a claimant to substantiate why their 
agreements do not fulfil the conditions of application of Article 81 (1) EC, 
usually because it can be assumed they have no adverse effect on 
competition in the market. Where Article 81 (3) EC is concerned the use of 
presumptions with market shares will generally discharge the undertaking 
entirely of his burden of proof. 
 
Finally, the use of these presumptions based on thresholds has one major 
advantage where proof is concerned, which is again related to the recent 
developments in competition law: their use limits the number of cases in 
which the actual effect on competition in the market has to be measured and 
proven. This advantage should not be underestimated especially considering 
the growing pressure to pay sufficient attention to market analysis and to 
prove concrete effects in the market, as was briefly mentioned above.  
 
 Legal presumptions 
 
A second type of presumption can be found in case-law and concerns more 
the legal evaluation of the proof or evidence that is put forward. It is beyond 
the scope of this article to enumerate all the presumptions that seem to be 
established case-law so far,262 but some examples are given to illustrate 
again how important the use of presumptions is. The most important legal 
presumptions of this kind concern the constituent conditions of Article 81 (1) 
EC. They allow the authority to qualify factual elements into the concepts 
laid down in that provision (see the example under 4.1.1 above).  
 
The clearest example is perhaps the condition of the existence of an 
“agreement or concerted practice”.  
 
262  See Siragusa and Rizza (eds), chapter 1 and chapter 5 (above n 229) for some more 
examples.  
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Example: Companies A, B and C are suspected to have exchanged 
information during a meeting in Z at time Y with the purpose of coordinating 
their market behaviour.  
 
The authority will have to prove that, for example: 
 the meeting occurred between these persons at the given time and place; 
and 
 that information was exchanged and that there is some link between this 
exchange and the market behaviour of the parties.  
 
Where the first element is concerned, the authority will have to adduce 
positive evidence: one cannot ask the undertakings concerned to prove that 
they were not present.263  Where the second element is concerned, 
presumptions can come into play: it can be assumed that if companies 
exchange information then they will use this to determine their market 
behaviour.264 Therefore parallel behaviour may be assumed to be related to 
this exchange of information and thus be the result of collusion. The 
presumption has to be rebuttable: a plausible alternative explanation for the 
parallel behaviour by the undertakings has to be possible but in that case 
the burden of proof is shifted to the undertakings. Such an alternative 
explanation should have to be credible and convincing if the authorities had 
gathered a substantial amount of circumstantial evidence, but shall be 
possible by any means the party sees fit to use.  
 
Another important example of the use of presumptions relates to the 
individual accountability of undertakings to a cartel. In the example above, 
the authority is allowed to presume that A, B and C participated in the cartel 
once it is established that they were present at the meeting where 
information was exchanged. Each one of them could be considered 
individually responsible for its role in this cartel. If A now claims that even 
though he was there, he did not participate but, on the contrary, tried to 
convince the others not to exchange certain information, he will have to 
prove that this is the case. In other words, the evidential burden of proof 
shifts again. His burden of proof will require proving for example by whatever 
way that he explicitly distanced himself from the other participants during 
the meeting.265   
263  See ECJ case C-49/92 P, Commission of the European Communities v Anic 
Partecipazioni SpA [1999] ECR I-4125. This so called “Anic rule” is the subject of 
the preliminary questions in case C-8/08, (above n 228).  
264  T. Wessely, ‘Case note: Case C-49/92P, Commission v ANIC [1999] ECR I-4125; 
Case C-199/92P, Hüls v. Commission [1999] ECR I-4287; Case C-235/92P, 
Montecatini v. Commission [1999] ECR I-4539; Judgements of 8 April 1999 
(together: Polypropylene appeal cases’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review 739.  
265  The ECJ in Hüls (above n 255).  
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4.2  Standard of proof  
 
4.2.1  Definition: where do we stand?  
 
The standard of proof concerns the level of certainty the proof has to achieve. 
The standard of proof has to be attained by the party bearing the legal 
burden of proof.  
 
It appears from the legal framework described above that there are no rules 
on proof in EC law in general and that legislation in the area of competition 
law contains only the recently adopted general rule on the burden of proof. 
Also, it was mentioned that Regulation 1/2003 seems to deliberately leave 
the definition of the standard of proof at a national level to the law of the 
Member States. However, in reality, there is some quite useful case-law in 
which the relevant factors to determine the standard of proof can be found.  
 
As was said above, in the absence of legislation, the courts construe the 
rules on proof in competition cases on the basis of the inherent 
characteristics of EC law and the specifics of competition law, and in respect 
of general principles common to both the Community legal order and the 
national legal systems of the Member States. The standard of proof is the 
best example of this development which bears relevance for all cases in 
which competition law is applied, both at the EC and at the national level.  
 
The Community courts have made reference to what is called the “requisite 
legal standard”.266 On this basis the courts have been willing to annul 
important merger decisions by the Commission in recent years, but without 
quite saying what that standard is. 
 
Frustration has been expressed in legal doctrine after the famous merger 
cases in which the courts were very strict on the Commission.267 The 
criticisms were manifold, but one of the main points was that there was no 
clear choice for a particular standard of proof.268 The Courts indeed refused 
to use the concepts of standard of proof that are known in other legal 
disciplines, such as “beyond reasonable doubt” and “the balance of 
probabilities” (see above under section 1.4). It is likely that the lack of a 
common tradition in the different Member States, also describes above, plays 
a role in the courts reluctance. However, it seems quite clear that in merger 
cases, the standard resembles most the balance of probabilities. As 
266  The preamble of Regulation 1/2003 also mentions this “the requisite legal 
standard” without defining it. For a general overview: Siragusa and Rizza (ed.) 
(above n 229), chap 5. 
267  ECJ Airtours; ECJ Tetra Laval (above n 245). 
268  Y. Botteman, ‘Mergers, standard of proof and expert economic evidence’ (2006) 2 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 71; D. Bailey, ‘Standard of proof in EC 
merger proceedings: a common law perspective’ (2003) 40 Common Market Law 
Review (2003) 845; B. Louveaux and P. Gilbert, ‘The standard of proof under the 
Competition Act’ (2005) 3 European Competition Law Review (2005) 173.  
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expressed recently by Advocate General Kokott, “it is a prospective analysis 
which makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect with 
a view to ascertaining which of them is more likely”.269However, even in 
merger control, there is no single standard because in the first phase one 
might consider the standard of reasonable doubt to apply: only serious 
doubts about the compatibility with the common market can lead to not 
clearing the merger within the short time limits of the first phase.  
 
In the ECJ’s judgment in Tetra Laval (§39) the Court refers to the 
requirement that the evidence be “accurate, reliable and consistent” and also 
that it should contain “all the information which must be taken into account 
in order to assess a complex situation and whether evidence can 
substantiate the conclusions drawn from it”. According to some authors, this 
is drafted in such a general way that it can also apply outside of merger 
cases. Even without opening that debate, it is submitted that this important 
guideline on proof from the ECJ, is compatible with the standard of proof 
that is discussed below for cartel cases.  
 
This paper defends that, in any event, in Article 81 EC cases, there are 
enough guidelines in the case-law to form a basis for a workable standard of 
proof.  
 
In a particularly illustrative judgment in this matter, JFE Engineering, the 
CFI first reminds us of the key importance of the principle of the 
presumption of innocence, which means that if there is doubt, the benefit of 
that doubt should always be given to the undertakings accused. This might 
lead one to believe that the standard of proof resembles the criminal 
standard of “reasonable doubt”, but in fact the CFI then continues and refers 
to what has become the more or less standard way of the defining what 
standard proof should achieve in cartel cases. The Commission must 
produce: “sufficiently precise and consistent evidence to support the firm 
conviction that the alleged infringement took place”.270  
 
We should add: “and that the infringement can be attributed to the 
undertaking accused” to reflect the individual accountability of undertakings 
which can then, in turn, lead to sanctions.   
 
It appears that there are two components in this standard, reflecting the two 
dimensions of proof mentioned at the beginning of this paper (production 
and persuasion): 
 the value of the evidence (sufficiently precise and consistent); and 
 the capacity to convince the authority or judge (a firm conviction).  
 
269  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott case C-413/06, Bertelsmann AG and Sony 
Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers and Labels Association 
(Impala) [2008] ECR I-4951, para. 208 and following.  
270  CFI cases T-67 and 68/00 and T-71/00 and 78/00, JFE Engineering and others 
[2004] ECR II-2501. 
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As mentioned before, there are no restrictions on the type of evidence that 
the Commission can use and there is no hierarchy.271  
 
The lack of a set of (technical) rules on proof and the fact that we are in a 
system of free proof, imply that the relevance and the reliability of proof shall 
not be issues of admissibility of proof, unlike in other areas of the law. All 
types of proof can, potentially, be relevant, and the reliability of the proof 
shall be evaluated in the light of the firm conviction that the authority or 
judge has to reach. This can be a very difficult task when dealing with expert 
witnesses or reports, or when having to decide whether a certain type of 
economic analysis is, for example, generally accepted as state of the art or 
whether it is questionable. Cases where economists themselves can provide 
an unequivocal answer to such questions are rare.  
 
It is also established case-law that proof need not meet this standard for 
every element of the infringement but what counts is the overall assessment 
of the evidence. According to the CFI: “In most cases, the existence of an anti-
competitive practice or agreement must be inferred from a number of 
coincidences and indicia which, taken together, may, in the absence of another 
plausible explanation, constitute evidence of an infringement of the competition 
rules.”272  
 
In other words, indirect and circumstantial evidence may be used: its actual 
value shall be the contribution it can or cannot make to the firm conviction 
mentioned above. 
 
4.2.2  The X Factor 
 
There is a particularity to mention in relation to proof: the human factor, 
referred to here as the X factor. It is perhaps somewhat audacious to 
mention this explicitly in times when the impression has been created that 
competition law is a question of applying a set of pre-established rules to the 
market situation, with the help of advanced economic analysis. There are 
two dimensions to this X factor.  
 
The first dimension relates to the traditional abstraction that is made of the 
person of the decision-maker. The model is that the decision-maker, be it an 
official of an administrative body or a judge, is presupposed to be a “clean 
slate” upon which the conviction grows as he acquaints himself with the file 
271  However, it is clear of course that in practice certain types of evidence shall have 
more value than others: the “age” of the evidence shall also play a role: the obvious 
example is evidence dating from before the start of an investigation which shall 
usually be considered more valuable than evidence of a more recent date. As a 
general rule written evidence shall be higher regarded than oral evidence but this 
is a subject of rapid evolution.  
272  ECJ case C-105/04P, Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op 
Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission of the European Communities [2006] I-
08725. 
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and the proof that is collected. There is no reason in principle to suspect that 
any person in a decision-making position would let his personal views 
prevail, as impartiality is protected by general principle of law.273However, in 
terms of evaluating proof, it is not realistic to deny the personal dimension.  
This can be illustrated by referring to the famous example in doctrine about 
the lion in the park. If a party alleges that he has seen a lion in the city park, 
any person would be sceptical -more sceptical, at least, than if the party 
were to claim that he had seen a dog. Therefore, even though the standard of 
proof would obviously have to be the same, one can easily understand that 
the party in question would have to be more convincing in the case of the 
lion: the decision-maker would find it hard to believe that there really was a 
lion in the park.274 This can be applied to numerous subjects in competition 
law: for example, the substitution of one product by another for the 
definition of a relevant market or an alternative explanation for market 
behaviour. The personal knowledge and experience of the decision-maker 
and the relation to the particular market or conduct that is at stake can play 
a role. In the example given, perhaps the decision-maker knew that a lion 
had escaped from the park a day earlier. Analysing products that all 
consumers know (such as bread, milk or Microsoft Windows) will also not be 
as difficult as convincing a decision-maker about complex or intermediate 
products such as chemical products or microchips, unless, of course, the 
decision-maker has some particular knowledge in this area.  
 
These remarks about the personal dimension should not be misunderstood: 
the proposition is not at all that the X factor will make a difference in the 
end result of the decision, nor in the procedure as it is followed or the 
guarantees that parties will rightfully claim. Nor would it be justified to 
modulate the legal burden of proof or the standard of proof. However, the X 
factor should not be denied and can, in some cases, play a role in the 
mechanisms of proof (such as shifting the evidential burden), especially in 
the element of persuasion.  
 
The second dimension of the X factor might be referred to as the quest for 
justice. In competition law, as in any other area of law, the ultimate goal is 
or should be to reach fair decisions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
relate this objective to the more economic goals of competition policy and 
consumer protection. However, most lawyers will have no trouble 
273  If there is any suspicion of the risk of biased judgment, the legal system has to 
provide for mechanisms to protect the parties and ensure impartiality. The 
importance cannot be overestimated. A famous quote from R. Posner is that 
society has very little interest in the factual outcome of any one trial, as long as the 
fact-finding process is tolerably accurate and systematically unbiased. See the 
discussion of these issues by J. Parker, ‘Daubert’s debut: the Supreme Court, the 
economics of scientific evidence, and the adversarial system’ (1994-95) 4 Supreme 
Court Economic Review 1-56, also available as George Mason University Law and 
Economics Research Paper, also available on SSRN at 
 http://ssrn.com/abstractid=1069923.  
274  Also cited by Sibony and Barbier de La Serre (above n 228). 
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acknowledging that decisions should be fair and just, whilst at the same 
time admitting that it is impossible to define precisely what justice or 
fairness means. A quote from J. Joshua illustrates that this certainly plays a 
role in assessing proof in competition cases: “The object of any system of 
proof in adjucatory proceedings must be to reconcile the limitations inherent in 
the method devised with the search for the truth and to arrive at a fair 
decision.”275 This quote implicitly recognises that justice considerations 
might intervene within the normal course of the procedure and might have 
an impact on the final decision and possible sanction. It is submitted that 
this often happens in competition law through the application of two general 
principles of law: the first being the benefit of the doubt as already cited, and 
the second the principle of proportionality which is increasingly important in 
competition law.276 Another remarkable quote in this respect is from Judge 
H. Legal of the CFI; in commenting a recent CFI judgment (British Airways) 
and the judicial review exercised in that case, he observes “The Commission 
actually retains considerable leeway, as long as it approaches a competition 
case in a way that is unprejudiced, fair and scrupulous.”277 
 
4.2.3 Flexibility and differentiation  
 
It was argued above that the standard of proof that has now been expressed 
frequently by the Community courts is a sufficient basis for a workable 
system in cartel cases. It is recalled here: “sufficiently precise and consistent 
evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took 
place”.  
 
This standard allows a number of relevant factors to be taken into account, 
such as the gravity and nature of the infringement and the type of proof or 
evidence that is brought forward. If competition law is a system of free proof 
and all types of proof in principle are accepted, it makes sense to have a 
standard of proof that is sufficiently flexible to allow a global view of all the 
proof in the case. The fact that proof is more and more difficult to find 
should also play a role. These are the specifics of cartel cases mentioned 
above.  
 
The requirements of “sufficiently precise” and especially “consistent” should 
ensure that the value of the evidence is adequate. For example: if there are 
contradictory statements from representatives of the participating 
undertakings in the file, it is clear that supplementary evidence is necessary 
to corroborate either one or the other version. If not, it is possible that the 
275  Joshua (above n 229) [316]. 
276  The principle of proportionality shall often play in the phase of determining the 
sanction for a cartel: the sanction should be fair (and this proportionate) taking 
into account the size of the undertaking compared to others, its role etc. In 
leniency cases this is an issue of attention for the future because there can be 
some tension between proportionality and the reductions given on the basis of 
leniency programs.  
277  Legal (above n 228). 
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statements cannot be used as a proof, given that they are not consistent. 
“Precise” means that the evidence must concern all the relevant elements of 
the infringement: for example, the evidence must allow the duration of the 
infringement to be determined. The Commission cannot consider that once 
the existence of the agreement is proven, this is sufficient and then require 
the parties to prove that they have ended their agreement.278 
 
The flexibility in terms of the value of proof (production) is counterbalanced 
by the requirement that proof should lead to a “firm” conviction (persuasion). 
This should be seen together with the fundamental general principles of law 
that have been shown to play a key role in proof matters.  
 
The standard has been qualified as somewhere halfway between “reasonable 
doubt” and “the balance of probabilities”, resembling most the standard of 
“clear and convincing evidence”, but this paper contends that it is not useful 
to devote too much effort to qualifying it in that way because the standard is 
deliberately flexible to allow for it to work in both ways in practice. It then 
has the advantage of being applicable in all matters of competition law, 
whilst still being differentiable in practice on a case-to-case basis according 
to a number of factors.  
 
One of these factors is the seriousness of the infringement and the sanctions 
that the applicable law provides. This can be illustrated by a quote from the 
UK Competition Appeal Tribunal: “The more serious the allegations, the more 
cogent should be the evidence.. In particular this applies to cases involving the 
disqualification of directors which is now one of the possible consequences of 
a finding of an infringement of the Competition Act.”279 This is particularly 
relevant given the tendency in a growing number of countries to introduce 
criminal sanctions. There is little doubt that the standard should be 
differentiated in such cases: in other words, it should be higher. Where 
sanctions are concerned, it would certainly be preferable that sanctions not 
differ too much according to the jurisdiction which is applying the law. This 
would require harmonisation of procedure and sanctions throughout the EU, 
but discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
harmonisation is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
As was also mentioned above, in the discussion of the specifics of cartel 
cases, the analysis in such cases is usually different from that in abuse and 
merger cases. A strict and uniform standard of proof is not possible because 
of the difference between ex post and ex ante analyses. The standard that is 
defended here has the advantage of being sufficiently flexible for use in both 
types of situations but, again, should be differentiated.  
 
It also seems clear that the standard of proof should be differentiated 
according to whether the proof concerns facts or qualifying the facts to apply 
278  CFI “Steamless” tubes cases (above n 270). 




the law. Rather, it is the combination of the standard of proof and the 
standard of review that comes into the picture here. In competition cases, 
generally a certain discretionary power is left to the Commission when it 
comes to establishing the (economic) facts or more specifically the economic 
analysis of those facts. The standard of proof should be the same but the 
review is more marginal when it comes to the economic analysis of facts than 
when the court is looking into the legal qualification thereof. This difference 
is also justified by the respective roles of the administration and of the 
judiciary.280  
 
4.2.4 Duty to state reasons  
 
The duty to state reasons is laid down in Article 253 of the EC Treaty and 
can also be found in Article 41 of the Charter on Fundamental rights: the 
obligation for the administration to give reasons for its decisions. Where the 
courts and tribunals are concerned, there is no explicit legal basis in the 
treaties for the duty to motivate judgments at the EU level but there is 
clearly consensus about the fact that adequate reasoning is a fundamental 
part of the role of the judiciary. 
 
There are some interesting aspects of the duty to state reasons that deserve 
brief mention here.  
 
First, it seems useful to draw attention to the scope of this duty and its 
purpose, as defined by the Court of Justice:  
 
“the duty to state reasons does not merely take formal considerations into 
account but seeks to give an opportunity to the parties defending their 
rights, to the Court of exercising its supervisory functions and to Member 
States and to all interested nationals of ascertaining the circumstances in 
which the institution has applied the Treaty”.281   
 
This quote summarises well the importance of adequate reasoning in terms 
of the rights of the parties and judicial and democratic control. In 
280  Interesting on this point very recently the CFI case T-474/04, Pergan Hilfsstoffe für 
industrielle Prozesse GmbH v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR 
2007 II-04225, paras. 77-78. According to Advocate General Kokott, there seems 
to be a three step system: the court on review should verify the factual basis of the 
decision in detail, then give leeway for the economic analysis of those facts but 
exercise full review afterwards as to the legal consequences of that analysis, 
Conclusion above note 267. The author entirely agrees. See the interesting article 
by R. Wilsher, ‘Achieving better decision-making in competition enforcement cases: 
a public law perspective on the role of the executive and the courts’ (2007) 30 
World Competition 263.  
281  ECJ case 24/62, Germany/Commission [1963] ECR 137. 
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competition cases, where sanctions are imposed, this is particularly 
important.282 
 
Secondly, it is argued that the duty to state reasons is particularly relevant 
in cartel cases given the developments described in this article. According to 
the case-law adequate reasoning shall be of even more fundamental 
importance when the Commission has discretion or power of appraisal. This 
is because the courts on review have to be able to verify whether the factual 
and legal elements on which such a discretion can be based, are present in 
the particular case.283 This line of case-law seems very relevant here: upon 
analyzing the judgments in the merger cases mentioned above284 one realizes 
that the Courts have criticised not so much the choices the Commission 
made in terms of economic theory or market analysing but rather the lack of 
sufficient reasoning. In other words, whilst leaving the actual economic 
appraisal in complex competition cases to the authority, the courts feel that, 
in such cases, the Commission has a strong duty to construct a well 
reasoned decision.285  
 
In terms of proof in a case involving the application of Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty, for some factual elements little doubt exists as to their existence, and 
parties may even be in agreement. When it comes to the more economics 
based elements (relevant market, effect on the market, effect on interstate 
trade, impact on the market to taken into account for the fine, benefit 
obtained by participants etc..), however, the situation is more complex.  
 
Where the production of proof is concerned, there might not be much 
material available and if it is, often there will be contradictory 
interpretations, usually placing lawyers in a difficult position of evaluating 
economic evidence. Where persuasion is concerned, the authority or court 
that has to reach a “firm conviction” will often have to make choices based 
on the “likeliness” of certain market effects. This is more so in merger cases, 
but is also relevant in cartel cases because not only actual effects on the 
market but also potential effects have to be taken into account.286  For these 
reasons, it is argued here that the duty to state reasons is an essential 
requirement and that it deserves more attention than the focus on the 
definition of a standard of proof. Justice must be seen to be done: when 
choices are made, they have to be well motivated and this will increase their 
acceptability.  
282  A parallel is made with the case-law of the ECJ in which it was emphasized that 
the extent of the requirement to state reasons is influenced by the type of 
instrument which is used, see Lenaerts and van Nuffel (above n 222) [760]. 
283  ECJ case C-269/90, Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I- 5469.  
284  Airtours and ECJ Tetra Laval (above n 245). 
285  On the duty to state reasons, particularly interesting comments in the Conclusion 
of Advocate General Kokott, (above n 269), paras. 97 and following; also para. 174 
on the requirements for a decision in terms of description of the factual basis.  
286  This is true both for the appreciable effect on competition as well as for the effect 
on trade between Member States.  
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5.  So how to reconcile a more economics-based competition law 
with rules on proof? 
 
This paper attempts to answer this question on the basis of three main 
ideas, which summarise the above discussion. 
 
First, it is proposed that there is no contradiction between a system of 
economics-based competition law and a coherent set of rules on proof. In 
fact, the development towards a more economic approach was one of the 
factors that triggered the growing attention for rules of proof and modern 
competition law requires these rules more than ever.  
 
As shown above, as the economics of competition law have become more 
advanced and increasingly introduced into law enforcement, the evolution 
has tended towards a more and more case-to-case type of approach in 
competition law. There are fewer hardcore restrictions, and market analysis 
plays a more important role. The experience of the last years has shown that 
economic insights into market behaviour and its desirability, differ greatly 
according to the theory that is applied or the person who is applying it. 
Whether or not this is right, it is the perception of many lawyers in the area 
of competition law. Therefore, rules on proof often have to be decisive in 
individual cases as a kind of arbitrating factor. Also, as the law becomes 
more insecure and its application less predictable, legal security becomes a 
greater concern. 
 
Secondly, flexible and variable rules of proof, more specifically on the burden 
of proof and the standard of proof, are not a threat to the traditional legal 
concepts underlying our legal systems and the general principles of law on 
which they are based, and at the same time should limit the number of 
cases where the application of the rules achieves a result far from economic 
reality. Lawyers must acknowledge the specific nature of competition law 
that requires less rigid rules. It is submitted that the definition of a specific 
standard of proof is not a priority, nor is a stricter set of technical rules of 
proof or evidence.  
 
Such flexible and variable rules on proof require confidence in what I have 
called the X factor. They also require an institutional structure allowing a 
review court more than only a marginal review. The courts on review should 
perhaps generally be restrained when it comes to economic appraisal, but 
should exercise a full review when it comes to legal and procedural points. 
Whilst exercising that control, it is, of course, necessary that they apply the 
rules of proof as adapted to the specific competition law context, as 
discussed above. 
 
Finally, the duty to motivate and provide adequate reasoning are perhaps 
more relevant than the traditional concepts of burden of proof and standard 
of proof.  This finding is also partly based on the introduction of more 
economics into competition law. In the current state of competition law, 
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there are difficult choices to be made in every case. Motivation of a decision 
is the basis for the accountability of an authority to the undertakings 
concerned, to the policy-makers and to the legislator. It is also essential to 
permit adequate review on appeal. 
 
A pragmatic approach with workable rules and sufficient attention for 
adequate reasoning should allow efficient enforcement of competition. This 
paper proposes that this requires the legal community and the doctrine, to 
step back from the need for strict definitions and a strict procedural 
framework in which the decision-maker has little room for taking a global 
view on the proof and evidence available. It also requires economists to 
accept that procedural rules are important because they often express 
general principles of law that are at the basis of our legal system; this is 
certainly true for rules on proof. Also, the importance of adequate reasoning 
has to be recognised if competition enforcement is to be credible and socially 







Shouldn’t we know what we are protecting?  
Yes we should!* 
 
A plea for a solid and comprehensive debate about the objectives of EU 
competition law and policy   
 
This article emphasizes that, contrary to what the public debate sometimes 
might lead to believe, EU competition law has always had, and still has, 
multiple co-existing objectives.  
 
A brief overview of the different objectives is given and it is proposed that the 
growing emphasis on consumer welfare has increased the lack of clarity in 
terms of what the system is protecting and also oversimplifies the state of 
the law.  
 
An attempt is then made to demonstrate that this is not merely a theoretical 
debate and some examples are given of how the objectives have an impact on 
legislation, policy and enforcement.  
 
It is argued that a broader perspective should be taken to include some 
additional factors in the debate on objectives, also from outside the system 
itself. Some developments regarding the objectives and their interaction are 
related to more general trends in EU law and policy. Also, decentralisation 
and the current enforcement system involving member states, are relevant: 
they have e.g. an impact on the question of where and how the debate about 
the objectives of EU competition law and policy should take place and what 
its consequences will be.  
 
 
1.  The evolving objectives of EC competition policy 
 
1.1  Introduction  
 
This article aims to contribute to the debate on the objectives of EC 







*  This chapter was published in a longer version as a TILEC Discussion Paper in 
April 2009. This entirely revised version was closed end of January 2010. It was 
published in European Competition Journal (2010, 6 (2), p. 339-376. It was presented 
as a paper at the 5th ASCOLA conference in Bonn in May 2010. 
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In the first part, the evolution of the objectives of competition policy is briefly 
examined. The purpose is not to give an exhaustive historical overview but to 
show how many different objectives can be identified in relation to the 
system of EU competition law. Multiple objectives still exist they are not a 
thing of the past.  
 
In the second part, the impact of the policy objectives on legislation and 
decision-making is illustrated briefly to show that this is not merely a 
theoretical debate. Then the discussion on objectives is presented in a 
broader perspective. Some more general developments in EU law, concerns 
of governance and the current structure of competition law enforcement are 
highlighted. Some concluding remarks are finally formulated that hopefully 
help take this debate a step forward.  
 
1.2  Definitions 
 
At the outset, it is useful to reflect briefly both on the meaning of both 
“objectives” and “competition policy”. An objective is a goal pursued. The 
origin of the expression is an initiatory one: the point against which a 
strategic or technical operation is directed. It is inherent to the concept of 
objectives that they are ideals, which are not or seldom achieved. Where 
“objectives” is concerned, an approach that distinguishes between ultimate 
and intermediate goals (operational or direct) seems interesting and 
useful.287  
 
The lack of distinction between the ultimate and intermediate goals can be a 
cause of confusion. To illustrate this point some might define consumer 
welfare as the objective of competitive law whilst others might identify the 
achievement of an effective competitive process as objective. Upon a closer 
look, the protection of an effective competitive process might be the 
intermediary or instrumental goal, whereas consumer welfare can be the 
ultimate goal. Contrary to what European scholars seem sometimes to 
assume, this debate is also ongoing in the U.S.: there is no general 
consensus on what the overall objective of competition law is.288 The 
discussion is related to that on the distinction, on a temporal basis, between 
short term and long term objectives.  
 
In an OECD report of 2003, the distinction is made between public interest 
objectives, core competition objectives and a so-called grey zone.289 The core 
287  C.D. Ehlermann and L. Laudati, European Competition Annual 1997: Objectives of 
competition policy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), introduction. This publication 
demonstrates that the debate on objectives is not a new one. It contains several 
contributions on the normative foundations of competition law.  
288  See J.B. Kirkwood, and R.H. Lande, ‘The fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting 
Consumers, Not Increasing efficiency’ (2008) 84 Notre Dame Law Review 191. 
289  OECD Secretariate, ‘The Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the Optimal 
Design of a Competition Agency’ (2003) 5 OECD Journal of Competition Law and 
Policy 7. 
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competition objectives are said to be mainly promoting and protecting the 
competitive process and attaining greater economic efficiency. Public interest 
objectives seem to refer primarily to interests that are not or not solely 
economical but aim, for example at social protection or the protection of 
certain strategic economical sectors. Finally, there are a number of objectives 
that seem to fall somewhere in the grey zone between public interest 
objectives and core competition objectives. Ensuring fair competition and the 
protection of small and medium sized businesses are the most common 
examples.  
 
Are the objectives of competition law a source of law or can they be 
considered binding? This is a typically legal question. We would not usually 
think of the objectives of a legal system to be, as such, a source of law. The 
main reason is probably that they seem void of binding effect. However, 
although it is beyond the scope of this contribution to go into this issue, it 
should be said that some objectives (as discussed below) are not so different 
from (general) principles which clearly can be a source of law in Community 
law.290 Authority for the fact that objectives might have some sort of binding 
effect, can be found in the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ): 
it appears throughout various areas of EU law that the Court attaches great 
importance to the objectives expressed in or deferred from the various 
European Treaties.291 When the objectives of the Treaties or a particular 
policy are referred to by the Court and are decisive when a “lower” principle 
or rule needs to be explained, it is difficult to deny some legal status as a 
source of law to such objectives.  
 
In fact, objectives could be also considered to have a certain binding effect  
in another way. This is not so much as in creating rights and duties and 
allowing courts to evaluate the legality of specific acts in terms of  
compatibility with these objectives, but more in terms of expectations and 
accountability: the legislator and the policymaker can be expected to design 
and apply a system of legal rules in conformity with the objectives they 
proclaim to strive for and they can themselves be considered bound in that 
way.  
 
The other term to be briefly looked at in this introduction is “competition 
policy” which Motta defines as “a set of policies and laws which ensure that 
competition in the market place is not restricted in such a way as to reduce 
economic welfare”.292 In an interesting study, Dabbah also rightly 
emphasises the political dimension: “an element of politics which deals with 
public authorities’ intervention beyond certain market imperfections, such 
290  An interesting recent analysis of rights and principles in EU law: C. Hilton, ‘Rights 
and Principles in EU law: a Distinction without Foundation’ (2008) 15 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law 193.  
291  An example often cited is environmental law.  
292  M. Motta, Competition policy, Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 30. 
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as in the case of market failure”.293 The political dimension is further 
illustrated by the following interesting definition of competition policy: 
“government measures that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises and 
the structure of industry”. Here it comprises two elements: a set of policies 
that promote competition in local and national markets, such as a relaxed 
industrial policy, a liberalised trade policy, reduced controls and greater 
reliance on market forces: and competition law as such: legislation, judicial 
decisions and regulations aimed at preventing anticompetitive business 
practices.294 
 
Competition law has also been described as “applying a body of legal rules 
and standards to deal with market imperfections and restore desirable 
competitive conditions in the market.” Still according to Dabbah, a system of 
competition law is wider than competition law itself and he rightly includes 
both the law and the policy.  
 
The term system of competition law best fits the purpose of this article. It 
refers to the law and policy relating only to the regulation and enforcement of 
competition law (cartels, abuse and, to a lesser extent, merger control) and 
not the wider concept which also includes other areas such as industrial and 
trade policy but also sector (liberalisation) regulation.   
 
Since the modernisation process in EU competition law, it is fashionable to 
narrow down competition policy to a purely economic policy295 or at most an 
instrument in the broader industrial policy (discussed further below). It is 
proposed that the system of EU competition law is not only about regulating 
the economy along the lines of the free market economy principle but that it 
has always had “political” goals. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as 
Dabbah demonstrates.296 A legal system can have political objectives as long 
as this does not mean that politics play a role in the way the law is applied 
to individual cases.  
 
293  M. Dabbah, ‘Measuring a System of Competition Law: A Preliminary View’ (2000) 
21 European Competition Law Review 369.  
294  P. Mehta, S. Mitra and C. Dube, ‘Competition Policy and Consumer Policy: 
Complementarities and Conflicts in the Promotion of Consumer Welfare’, chapter 
in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) The effects of 
anti-competitive business practices on developing countries and their development 
prospects (New York and Geneva, 2008), available at UNCTAD website: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20082_en.pdf (accessed December 2008).  
295  See J. Faull and A. Nikpay, The EC law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 4.  
296  Dabbah, ‘Measuring a system of competition law’ (above n 293).  
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1.3  Competition law in the context of the Treaties: goals and 
instruments297 
 
The ultimate (economic) goal of the European Community was the 
wholesome and sustainable development of the economy: economic welfare 
within a single market. For example Article 2 of the EC Treaty added a high 
level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and 
women, growth, a high level of competitiveness and a high standard of living. 
Less obvious from the text until recently but all the more from the general 
EU policy context, is the importance of other more political goals such as 
democracy, pluralism, free enterprise and the protection of human rights.  
 
Article 2 EC Treaty was modified in 1992 by the EU Treaty (Maastricht) 
which introduced and consolidated certain objectives, such as economic and 
social cohesion and environmental protection, but also e.g. a high 
employment rate and sustainable development.298 Article 2 EC Treaty gave 
the Community three instruments to attain these higher goals: the 
establishment of the common market, the establishment of an economic and 
monetary union and flanking common policies and activities.  
 
Article 3 EC Treaty then went on to state that a competition policy as a 
common Community policy is an instrument with which to achieve these 
ultimate goals laid down in Article 2. According to Article 3 (g) EC Treaty, the 
activities of the Community shall include... “a system ensuring that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted”. In the logic of the 
Treaties, competition policy was therefore itself an instrument with which to 
achieve the intermediary goal of the common market, which in turn should 
achieve the ultimate goals laid down in Article 2 described above.  
 
Articles 4 of the EC Treaty stated that “the activities of the Member States 
and the Community shall be based on the internal market, on the common 
objectives and that they shall act in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition”. Article 98 EC Treaty reiterated this 
principle and added an interesting reference to the efficient allocation of 
resources.299 Although this last provision was part of the chapter on 
economic policy, it was formulated in a general way.  
297  The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009 and will be discussed 
later on. However, it is still relevant in this particular section to discuss first the 
situation under the EC Treaty as it was before the recent new treaties. Throughout 
this article new names and numbering will be followed as much as possible.  
298  See K. Lenaerts, P. van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union 2nd edn 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 81.  
299  The second sentence of the article read: “the Member States and the Community 
shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with 
the principles set out in Article 4. So what is the significance of this reference to 
free competition? It is not formulated as an intermediate or ultimate goal, nor as a 
policy serving these goals such as the reference to competition law contained in 
Article 3 EC”. Its function seems to be that of a guidance principle, a source of 
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The specific chapter of the EC Treaty that dealt with competition does not 
discuss specific objectives or goals, nor did its predecessors (EEC Treaty, 
ECSC Treaty), nor does the current TFEU (see further below). Therefore, the 
treaties, although defining the intermediate and ultimate goals of the 
Community, now the European Union, as a whole, and the instrumental role 
of competition policy in general, do not define the operational objectives of 
competition law further.  
 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty, now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, are fairly 
brief and broadly formulated. The drafters were, to some extent, unaware of 
the implications of the prohibitions and concepts that were used. It is 
commonly known also that the US antitrust provisions, and particularly the 
Sherman Act, were an important source of inspiration for the substantive 
provisions of the ECSC and later on the EEC Treaty provisions.300  
 
Following a systematic approach, this would imply that the competition 
provisions were to be seen entirely in accordance with the ultimate (Article 2) 
and intermediate goals (Article 3) of the Community in general, as defined in 
the introduction of the EC Treaty. It is interesting to note that the ECJ in the 
early days even defined the concept of “competition” by reference to the 
objectives of the Treaty: “workable competition is the level of competition 
necessary to attain the objectives of the Treaty”.301 It is also clear that 
throughout the important body of case-law in this area, the ECJ has 
attached great importance to Articles 2 and 3 EC (formerly EEC) and the 
instrumental role that competition policy was given.  
 
The basic provisions of European antitrust law were most likely intended to 
be implemented gradually, allowing them to evolve according to the needs of 
the interests of the Community but also of the member states: both in terms 
of the respective powers (rapports de force) of the supranational European 
level and of the Member States, as well as from the viewpoint of the 
substantive law. There is also little doubt that the goal of a unified market 
dominated the process of constructing the European competition law system 
for a long time.302 
 
According to Gerber, the former Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (now 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) were meant to be constitutional, they were brief 
and broadly perceived and they would have to be given content in 
inspiration, that is to be used and taken into account at all times by Member 
States as well as by Community institutions when they act.  
300  See also C. Jones, ‘Foundations of Competition Policy in the EU and USA: Conflict, 
Convergence, and Beyond’ in H. Ullrich (ed), The Evolution of European Competition 
Law- Whose regulation, which competition? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2006). 
301  Case C-26/76, Metro [1977] ECR 1875.  
302  For a thorough analysis, D. Gerber, Law and competition in twentieth century 
Europe, Protecting Promotheus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 347.  
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practice.303 Generally, open norms allow for more flexibility and discretion in 
the orientation of their application. The competition provisions in the basic 
treaty, now TFEU, are such norms. In that respect, it is not without 
importance that the ECJ very rarely refers to these limits as coming from the 
drafting process of the treaties.304  
 
In terms of the way the treaties, as primary source of law, deal with the 
objectives, the impact of the Lisbon Treaty will probably continue to be a 
source of worry and/or speculation in the first period after its entry into 
force.305  
 
The core provisions on cartels and abuses, now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), remain unchanged.306 
However, it is well known that the Lisbon Treaty has modified the Treaty 
when it comes to the goals of the European Union as a whole as discussed 
above.  
 
Undistorted competition is no longer listed as an objective and a way to 
achieve the higher goals through the establishment of the common market 
(now called the internal market), as it was in Article 3 under (g) EC Treaty. 
However, the Protocol on the Internal Market states that undistorted 
competition is part of the internal market.307 Therefore, indirectly, through 
the reference to the internal market in Article 3 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (hereinafter: TEU), competition policy is still present. In 
general, the list of goals of the European Union is streamlined and non-
economical goals gain importance throughout the new treaties.308 
 
The reference to the open market economy based on the principle of free 
economy in Article 4 EC also discussed above, has disappeared from the 
beginning of the Treaty. However, the reference is still present in the new 
Article 119 TFEU at the beginning of the chapter on economic and monetary 
policy in a similar way. The place in the Treaty has its significance: the 
303  Gerber, Law and competition (above n 302) 345.  
304  G. Marenco, ‘Le régime de l’exception légale et sa compatibilité avec le traité’ (2001) 
37 Cahiers de droit Européen 135 ; for a visionary analysis long before 
modernisation: I. Forrester and C. Norall, ‘The laicization of Community law : self 
help and the rule of reason : how competition law is and should be applied’ (1984) 
4 Common Market Law Review 11.  
305  The consolidated texts of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union were published in [2008] OJ C 115.  
306  Except for the replacement of “common market” by “internal market” which has 
been done throughout the treaties.  
307  Protocol 27 reads as follows: “The High Contracting Parties, Considering that the 
internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a 
system ensuring that competition is not distorted, have agreed that, to this end, the 
Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions of the Treaties, including 
under Article 352 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.”  
308  An example in the provisions on services of general economical interest, see for 
example Article 14 TFEU and Protocol 26.  
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common provisions at the beginning express the fundamental principles that 
are at the basis of the European Union legal system.  
 
Although the Court has said that the objectives cannot create rights for 
Member States or for individuals and that they constitute general objectives 
and should be read together with the treaty provisions that further 
implement them,309 the objectives and the text of Article 2 and 3 EC Treaty 
have been an important source for the interpretation of the Treaty provisions 
on competition.  
 
The possible impact of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty is 
discussed further below under 2.2.1.  
 
1.4  The different objectives of EC competition policy  
 
In the previous section, the treaty provisions and related case-law of the 
Community courts concerning the objectives of competition law, were briefly 
examined. In this section an overview is given of the different objectives that 
can be attributed to the system of EU competition law. The purpose is to 
present the objectives briefly in such a way to show that they have all 
played, and mostly still play a role, even though many of these are hardly 
ever still mentioned. Some sources of potential tension between different 
objectives are mentioned along the way.  
 
It is difficult to find a common view in literature on what the goals of EU 
competition policy have been until now, although the same elements often 
reoccur, albeit in a different order and with a different interpretation. There 
is a difference depending on whether lawyers or economists discuss the 
question. Some examples are given below to illustrate this.  
 
Bishop and Walker consider two main goals: the integration goal and the 
economic goal. In their opinion, these two goals are potentially in conflict 
with each other.310 They also draw attention to the fact that the existence of 
these dual goals is what differentiates the EU system from other 
jurisdictions, particularly the U.S. The difference with the U.S. system is 
often cited, and recent diverging views in specific cases are attributed to the 
different objectives of the European and U.S. legal system: “we protect 
competition, you protect competitors” is a famous phrase in this respect.311 
Motta assumes that economic efficiency and European market integration 
309  ECJ Case C-9/99, Echirolles Distribution [2000] ECR I-8207.  
310  S. Bishop and M. Walker, Economics of EC Competition Law: concepts, application 
and measurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) 5. 
311  K. Cseres, Competition law and consumer protection (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2005) 278; R. Whish also mentions redistribution or economic 
equity as an objective but cites only American sources in that respect: R. Whish, 
Competition law. 5th edn, (London: LexisNexis, 2003) 18.  
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are probably the main objectives of competition policy but recognizes that 
social and political reasons have been taken into account.312  
 
Monti, on the other hand, distinguishes three core aims of competition law: 
the protection of economic freedom, market integration and efficiency (in 
that order). 313 According to him, the first was in fact the primary aim that 
the drafters of the EEC Treaty had in mind,314 the idea being that economic 
efficiency is automatically the result of the freedom which competition law 
preserves. Monti also indicates the potential conflicts between the three core 
objectives but claims that EU competition law contains mechanisms for 
balancing them. Ahlborn and Padilla also identify three groups of objectives 
along the same lines: fairness goals, welfare and efficiency goals and market 
integration goals. 315  
 
1.4.1  Market integration  
 
The promotion of market integration is a key objective of Community law in 
general and was obviously the focus of competition law from the start. It is 
what makes the EU competition law system unique.  
  
The rules of competition laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU that are 
directly addressed at undertakings, are the necessary complement to the 
Treaty rules on the four freedoms. Agreements or abusive conduct can create 
obstacles to trade between Member States in a similar way to the obstacles 
caused by state measures. Competition rules (including also state aid) and 
free movement provisions form a complete set of tools with which to realize 
the integration of the markets of the different Member States. The 
Commission’s most important concern was for the integration of markets, 
and this was reflected in competition law.  
 
It would be wrong to think that other considerations such as consumer 
benefit were absent “in the old days”. The first decisions of the Commission 
and the ECJ make reference to the generic benefits of competition316 such as 
lower prices, technological progress.317 However, there seemed to have been 
a strong belief that the market integration ideal could be assumed as being 
312  M. Motta, Competition policy, theory and practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) 15. 
313  G. Monti, ‘Article 81 and public policy’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 
1057.  
314  An ordoliberal (individual freedom as an end in itself) and a neoclassical approach 
(maximalization of total welfare) are distinguished. The argument is made that the 
structure of Article 81 EC demonstrates that an ordoliberal philosophy was 
present in the minds of the drafters of the treaty at the time.  
315  Monti, ‘Article 81 and public policy’ (above n 27) 1064; C. Ahlborn and A. Padilla, 
‘From fairness to welfare: implications for the assessment of unilateral conduct 
under EC competition law’, in C. Ehlermann and M. Marquis (eds) A reformed 
approach to Article 82 EC. European Competition Law Annual(EUI) 2007 (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2008) 55.  
316  Gerber, Law and competition (above n 302) 248.  
317  ECJ Cases 54/64 & 58/64, Consten en Grundig [1966] ECR (1966) 571. 
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in the interest of consumers, so there was no need to distinguish between 
different goals.  
 
The goal of market integration is very particular to the European Union. Is it 
more of a public interest objective or a core competition objective? According 
to the definitions in the OECD study, the Treaty of Rome market integration 
objective is a public interest one.318 It is usually referred to as a political 
objective. There is certainly a tension between the (political) objective of 
market integration on the one hand and economic welfare. Motta uses the 
example of forbidding price discrimination across national borders to 
illustrate that there is generally no economic rationale to forbid such 
practices.319  
 
The focus on vertical restraints as well as the attitude towards such 
restraints were very much motivated by market integration. A strict position 
on vertical restraints, especially those that were considered to be obstacles to 
parallel (cross border) trade such as territorial protection of distributors, was 
one of the main characteristics of EU competition law for decades. The 
subsequent texts on verticals make this clear.320  
 
The area of vertical restraints where the Commissions had a fairly strict 
policy for many years, is also referred to as a typical example of possible 
tension between market integration and consumer welfare.321 In that 
respect, it will be interesting to see how the debate on the revision of the 
group exemption regulation on vertical restraints evolves.322  
 
As will be argued below, the necessity to reconcile this market integration 
objective with the currently more prominent objective of consumer welfare, is 
one of the challenges that competition law in Europe now faces. Recent case-
law has shown that this debate is very much alive: contrary to what many 
might have expected, the Court of Justice is not willing to let go of market 
integration as a key element in determining how competition law should be 
318  OECD report 2003 (above n 289).  
319  Motta, Competition Policy (above n32) 23; this conflict is also cited by Bishop and 
Walker, Economics of EC competition law (above n 292). 
320  For example: Commission Regulation (EC) No 1984/83 on Application of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements [1983] OJ L 
173/5 (one of the predecessors of Reg. 2790/1999 - Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices [1999] OJ L 336 
- and the Commission (EC) ‘On vertical restraints in EC competition policy’(Green 
Paper) COM (96) 721: analysis by Cseres, Competition law and consumer protection 
(above n 311 [271 et seq.]. 
321  Cseres, Competition law and consumer protection (above n 311) 271.  
322  The regulation expires on 31 May 2010 and the Commission has launched the 
process of consultation on possible reform. A particularly interesting analysis of 
the policy on verticals, including US developments by A. Jones, ‘Resale price 
maintenance: a debate about competition policy in Europe?’ (2009) 5 European 
Competition Journal 2009) 479. 
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applied, as the recent judgments in Sot Lelos kai Sia EE and GSK have 
shown.323 This recent case-law is discussed further under 2.2.1 below.  
 
1.4.2  Economic freedom  
 
The protection of economic freedom, which is associated mainly with 
ordoliberalism, also resurfaced recently, in the discussions about Article 102 
TFEU. In a nutshell: competition is necessary for the economic liberty of 
individuals and the economic order should protect individual economic 
freedom and control private economic power and political power. In other 
words, both strong private power as well as strong power at the (public) state 
level, are mistrusted and should be avoided. The law plays a central role by 
providing basic principles of economic conduct, based on an economic 
constitution in which individual economic freedom is the fundamental 
principle. Government can only intervene with the purpose of enforcing these 
principles, ruling out discretionary intervention in the marketplace.  
 
It would lead too far to go into the debate about how ordoliberalism shaped 
Community competition law but it seems clear that its influence is 
undisputable, even if only indirectly through German competition law.324 
This influence on the way European competition law was created and 
evolved further, has perhaps been underestimated somewhat in recent years 
or has been too easily discarded in favour of more fashionable economic 
concepts.325 
 
When debates took place some years ago about the modernisation of cartel 
law and the way in which Article 101 TFEU should evolve, thought was given 
323  ECJ Case C- 468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton [2008] ECR 2008 I-07139 (also 
called Syfait II case). The case has reactivated the debate about parallel trade in 
pharmaceutical products and the ECJ aligns itself with older case-law attaching 
great importance to parallel trade between Member States as a way of creating 
competition. It is subject of debate whether this judgment is really in favour of 
parallel trade in practice but in any case, market integration is very much present 
in the reasoning of the Court. In GSK the Court of Justice overturned the CFI’s 
reasoning, judgment of 6 October 2009, joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-
515 and 516/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and others v Commission of 
the European Communities, not yet reported.  
324  L. Gormsen, ‘The conflict between economic freedom and consumer welfare in the 
modernisation of Article 82 EC’ (2007) 3 European Competition Journal 329. She 
addresses the debate whether the protection of economic freedom on the one hand 
and the goal of consumer welfare on the other, are in conflict.  
325  See for a complete analysis: Gerber, Law and competition (above n 302). He also 
highlights how ordoliberals had a major influence by occupying important posts at 
the Commission for many years and shaping competition law at the European 
level. An interesting summary of the development of EC competition law over the 
years in A. Weitbrecht, ‘From Freiburg to Chicago – the first 50 years of European 
competition law’ (2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 8. On the influence 
of ordoliberalism, see also A. Pera, ‘Changing views of competition, economic 
analysis and EC antitrust law’ 2008 4 European Competition Journal (2008) 127. 
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to the origins and objectives of Article 81 EC and in that context, some 
attributed the wide interpretation of Article 81 (1) applying to almost all 
restrictions of competition, to the dominating objective of market integration 
and the influence of the objective of protecting economic freedom. The 
readiness with which any restriction of competition was seen as a restriction 
of competition, demonstrates the importance attached to economic freedom. 
 
The European focus on protecting the opportunities of rivals, is one of the 
factors most often cited as differentiating European and US antitrust 
regimes.326 Ordoliberal thoughts or related ideas are still part of modern EU 
competition law but the influence is wider than only coming from the 
ordoliberal school: there is a more general belief in freedom that can be 
found both in U.S. and EU law: the freedom to produce and the freedom of 
the consumer to choose. By protecting the competitive order, the state 
protects the freedom of self-responsible individuals to function in the 
market.327  
 
As mentioned before, an example of these ideas can be found in the 
discussion on Article 102 TFEU policy reforms but also in the Commission 
Guidelines on Article 81 (3) EC (now Article 101 TFEU) and in recent 
decisions.328 Clearly every agreement restricting economic freedom is no 
longer qualified as a restriction of competition, but in cartel cases, the 
presumption will exist that there is a restriction of competition that reduces 
the efficiency. The presumption can then be rebutted, or not, by analysing 
the effects of the agreement.329  
 
The protection of individual economic freedom has perhaps not been given 
the status of a general principle of law in an explicit way in the 
jurisprudence, but the Court of Justice has recognized indirectly the 
importance of safeguarding free enterprise, particularly in the context of 
Article 102 TFEU and abuse of dominance where it acknowledges that 
dominant companies may refuse to sell or licence in certain circumstances. 
326  See D. De Smet, ‘The diametrically opposed principles of US and antitrust policy’ 
(2008) 29 European Competition Law Review 356.  
327  O. Odudu, The boundaries of EC competition law, the scope of Article 81 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006)14 with e.g. a reference to Fox and Sullivan. The 
focus of ordoliberalism was very much on preventing and prohibiting monopoly 
power, see Gerber, Law and competition (above n 302) [251]; R. Van den Bergh and 
P. Camesasca, European competition Law and Economics: a comparative 
perspective, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006). 
328  For so-called restrictions “by object”, it is assumed that there shall be negative 
impact on competition, Commission (EC) ‘Guidelines on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty’ (Communication) [2004] OJ C 101/08 [97], for example at 22 
and 23; the discussion on efficiency gains takes place under Article 81 (3) EC, now 
Article 101 (3) TFEU. 
329  G. Monti, EC competition law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 52.  
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In those cases, the principle of economic freedom is balanced with the 
prohibition on abuse of dominance.330  
 
1.4.3  Economic efficiency 
 
Where EU competition law is concerned, consumer welfare and efficiency are 
often mentioned together. Efficiency is often seen as the overall, general 
objective of competition policy although it is not cited as often by the 
Commission as consumer welfare. No attempt will be made here to define 
these concepts in detail though a brief description is necessary.  
 
The reference to efficiency can mean ensuring efficient allocation of all 
resources (allocative efficiency) or the efficiency of a particular firm or 
industry in ensuring that it exploits all economies of scale and technology 
and cuts unnecessary costs (productive efficiency). Allocative and productive 
efficiency are mostly static concepts whereas dynamic efficiency also 
incorporates looking at the potential of the economy as a whole or of a firm 
or industry.331 
 
Allocative efficiency equals total welfare, distinct from consumer welfare. 
Many economists in the area of competition law, highlight the potential 
conflict between efficiency and consumer welfare. Just as is the case for 
consumer welfare described above, the term efficiency as such is, fairly new, 
and does not appear in older EC case-law. Efficiency is also increasingly 
present in merger control and in the discussions surrounding the 
enforcement of Article 82, but meaning a different thing namely arguments 
that dominant undertakings can present to justify their behaviour.332   
 
It is difficult to distinguish at present, what the role of efficiency has been 
because the Commission seems to always associate both efficiency and 
consumer welfare: “Our aim is simple: to protect competition in the market 
as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient 
allocation of resources. An effects-based approach, grounded in solid 
economics, ensures that citizens enjoy the benefits of a competitive, dynamic 
market economy” and “competition is not an end in itself but an instrument 
330  CFI Case T-41/96, Bayer/Commission [2000] ECR II-3383 with reference to the 
Court of Justice in United Brands, ECJ case 27/76, United Brands Company and 
United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities [1978] 
ECR 207. Again without referring to free enterprise or economic freedom in an 
explicit way, the ECJ attaches substantial importance to the possibility for a 
dominant firm to defend its commercial interests in the recent Sot. Lelos kai Sia 
judgment (above n 323). 
331  Monti, ‘Article 81 and public policy’ (above n 313) 45. On the role of efficiency, 
Odudu, The boundaries of EC competition law (above n 327) chapter 2 and an 
interesting analysis of Article 81 (3) from an efficiency angle, chapter 6.  
332  On possible efficiency « defences » for the different abuses that are identified, 
Guidance published on 3 December 2008 by the Commission on the enforcement 
of Article 82, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance_en.pdf.  
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for achieving consumer welfare and efficiency” (Commissioner Kroes333). 
Albeit very appealing and convincing, these type of statements, do not shed 
any real light on the views the Commission has on objectives that are 
potentially conflicting.  
 
1.4.4  Industrial policy  
  
Less discussed is the industrial policy dimension of competition enforcement 
but its relevance cannot be denied. On the one hand, it could even be said to 
have increased in recent years, or at least the relationship between 
industrial policy and competition policy has received more attention, both at 
the level of the Commission as the European policymaker, as well as in the 
literature.  
 
On the other hand, from a legal point of view, it seems difficult to assess to 
what extent competition law has been used as an instrument of industrial 
policy: this seems more self-evident in the area of state aid and dumping 
legislation where measures are at stake to protect particular industries.  
 
A possible definition of industrial policy is “picking the winners”: specific 
sectors are chosen and a strategy is built on behalf of public authorities to 
develop and support those sectors.334 This is also called vertical industrial 
policy. This type of measures, coming from Member States, are problematic 
at the European level because of the rules on state aid. Vertical action would 
then have to be devised at the European level, not discriminating between 
Member States.  
 
Industrial policy, from an economic point of view, can also be defined as a 
policy aimed at dealing with market failures in a structural way, whereas 
competition policy is about making competition on the markets work.335 One 
of the reasons why it is quite difficult to pinpoint the role of industrial policy 
objectives in competition law, is because, other than market integration and 
liberalisation of regulated sectors, it is not obvious what the industrial policy 
at the Community level actually was. Merger control is perhaps the area in 
competition law where the link with industrial policy is potentially most 
obvious.336 
333  Speech at Competition Day in London, 15 September 2005, 
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/index_2005.html.  
334  V. Curzon Price, ‘La politique européenne au XXIième siècle: reflet de l’évolution 
des idées sur le rôle des pouvoirs publics dans l’économie’, in J. Defraigne and V. 
de Moriamé (eds), Quelles politiques industrielle et sociale pour l’Europe du XXième 
siècle ? (Bruxelles : Academia Bruylant, 2008).  
335  E. de Ghellinck, La politique industrielle européenne: un concept creux in Defraigne 
and De Moriamé, Quelles politiques industrielle et sociale (above n 334) 96.  
336  By approving or disapproving future transactions, the Commission carries out a 
hypothetical exercise of imagining what the effects of a particular merger would be. 
This process involves assessing current market structure but also reflects how 
markets are considered best to be. Explicit references to industrial policy 
considerations can be found in the merger regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 
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Within the sphere of Article 101 TEU, elements of industrial policy are fairly 
difficult to identify in specific cases and the case-law of the Community 
courts does not often refer to industrial policy considerations (other than 
market integration and also the protection of SME’s, discussed elsewhere). 
One might consider, however, that the priorities that have been determined 
by the Commission over the years show that particular sectors of the 
economy are chosen, such as, for example, the automobile industry, in the 
1980’s and 1990’s. Concerted actions in the area of competition through 
secondary legislation (group exemptions for example) and harsh decisions 
against producers, simultaneously with initiatives being taken through 
internal market legislation (e.g. producer responsibility, mutual recognition 
etc) indicate considerations of industrial policy.  
 
Other than choosing and focusing on specific sectors, the way in which the 
Commission dealt with crisis cartels or horizontal agreements aimed at 
combating overcapacity in a particular sector might be mentioned as proof 
that industrial policy objectives are pursued but there are only a limited 
number of cases and there was always (and rightly so) reluctance to accept 
industrial policy issues in individual cases.337  
 
Considerations of industrial policy are not a thing of the past.338 In fact, 
European industrial policy was driven by the goal of realizing the internal 
market and eliminating obstacles to trade. In other words, industrial policy 
was market integration policy.339  
 
139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1, rec.4. 
337  A somewhat stand alone reference in the 1991 annual report: XXIst report on 
Competition Policy, at § 201 on the importance of eliminating structural 
overcapacity to allow industries to recover profitability. The few examples of 
individual decisions mostly concern cases where the Commission exempted 
restructuration agreements under Article 81 (3) EC, for example Commission 
Decision 84/380/EEC of 4 July 1984 relating to a proceeding under Article [81] of 
the EEC Treaty (IV/30.810 – Synthetic fibres) [1984] OJ 207/17, and also 
Commission Decision 94/296/EC of 29 April 1994 relating to a proceeding under 
Article [81] of the EC Treaty (IV/34.456 – Stichting Baksteen) [1994] L 131/15. For 
a recent case where a very orthodox line was followed by the ECJ showing no sign 
whatsoever of taking into account the arguments about overcapacity: ECJ Case C-
209/07, Beef Industry Development Society [2008] ECR I-08637. Is this one of the 
areas where the economical crisis and changing political views shall have their 
impact on the enforcement of Article 81 EC? The mere fact that the question now 
arises, demonstrates the principle that the interpretation and application of 
competition law can serve strategic purposes.  
338  J. Galloway, ‘The pursuit of national champions: the intersection of competition 
law and industrial policy’(2007) 28 European Competition Law Review 172.  
339  E. de Ghellinck, La politique industrielle européenne (above n 334); C. Huveneers, 
‘Politique de la concurrence, soutien ou carcan, pour la politique industrielle?’in J 




In recent years, there is clearly a new dynamic to be observed in the context 
of the so-called Lisbon Strategy. In 2002, the Commission relaunched the 
debate on the role of industrial policy.340 The focus is on achieving a 
competitive industry with priority for innovation and growth. In turn, this 
emphasis on innovation is something that can be traced since then as a 
factor that plays a role in general competition policy and individual cases 
dealt with by the Commission.  
 
The growing integration of competition policy, as a form of industrial policy, 
into other policy areas of the European Union is often emphasised.341 The 
reference to free competition in the treaty article on industrial policy, Article 
173 TFEU, is relevant here.  Competition policy is now regularly placed at 
the heart of industrial policy: “Competition policy - which above all else is 
designed to ensure the maintenance of competitive markets - is therefore 
central to an industrial policy aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of 
industry.”342 The keywords are competitiveness of the European economy 
and the creation of employment and growth.  
 
1.4.5  SME protection 
 
A specific policy objective that is also reflected in EC competition law, is the 
protection of small and medium sized enterprises. This might perhaps also 
be seen as an industrial policy objective.343 
 
The specific protection of SME could be found in secondary legislation from 
quite early on. The Commission Notice on de minimis agreements is the most 
obvious example.344 This notice was, amongst other things, an assertion of 
the importance attached to SME protection.   There is no “hard” threshold 
exempting SME from the application of Article 81 EC.345 The Commission 
340  Commission (EC), ‘Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe’(Communication) COM 
(2002) 714 final, 11 December 2002; Commission (EC), ‘Fostering structural 
change: an industrial policy for an enlarged Europe’ (Communication) COM (2004) 
274 final, 20 April 2004; Commission (EC) ‘Proactive Competition Policy for a 
Competitive Europe’ (Communication) COM (2004) 293 final, 20 april 2004. 
341  See the Communications mentioned in previous note and also Commission (EC), 
‘Some key issues in Europe’s Competitiveness – towards an integrated approach’ 
(Communication) COM (2003) 704 final, 21 November 2003 ; also the introduction 
of Commissioners Kroes to the 2007 Annual Competition Report, EC Official 
Publications, 2008, p. 3.  
342  Commissioner Kroes, Fordham, 14 September 2006; see also the 2008 edition of 
the international conference on 25 September 2008, Commissioner Kroes, via site 
DG Comp, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/ (accessed 1 March 2009).  
343  J. Galloway, ‘The pursuit of national champions’ (above n 338). 
344  The first Notice was drafted in 1970. Current version of the De Minimis Notice: 
Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably 
restrict competition under Article 81 (1) of the Treaty (de minimis) [2001] OJ C 149 
[18]. 
345  In national competition law such exceptions can exist, at least one example is 
Article (7) of the Dutch Competition Act which exempts agreements between SME’s 
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has always considered that hard-core restrictions had to be sanctionable, 
regardless of the size or importance of the undertaking in question. Amongst 
these hard-core restrictions were traditionally vertical restraints that 
restricted parallel cross border trade, which can be understood in view of the 
focus on market integration, referred to above.   
 
The current de minimis Notice provides for a framework based on market 
shares only. In the past, the de minimis regime had a double threshold: 
turnover and market share. Below certain percentages agreements are 
considered normally not to restrict competition in an appreciable way. 
Obviously, depending on the market definition, it is not excluded that SME 
have a market share exceeding the thresholds. However, agreements 
between smaller firms will be able to escape the application of Article 81 (or 
82) because they are unlikely to affect trade between Member States in an 
appreciable way.346 The de minimis Notice has therefore to be read together 
with the (new) Notice on interstate trade which reiterates the negative 
presumption for SME’s.347 This presumption is generalised in the new Notice 
because effect on trade is now quantified for all undertakings by reference to 
turnover and market share. 
 
From an economic point of view, the objective of protection of smaller 
undertakings seems to be criticized to the extent that it is potentially, be it 
not necessarily, in conflict with the objective of economic welfare.348  
 
There are not many other specific instances in secondary legislation or 
individual cases where SME protection is explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, 
the policy objective is still present in EC competition law. This is 
demonstrated not only by the two notices mentioned above but is also 
reflected in  recent policy documents where the Commission appears to 
expect a lot from SME’s in Europe in terms of innovation and employment. 
In the context of the economic crisis, the protection of SME’s is appearing 
once again in the Commission’ s public statements. 349 
that stay under a certain turnover threshold, regardless of the type of restriction at 
stake.  
346  § 3 of de minimis Notice (above n 58). The concept of SME is clearly defined in a 
quantative way by reference to Commission recommendation 96/80/EC, OJ (1996) 
L 107, p. 4. Small and medium sized undertakings are defined as undertakings 
which have fewer than 250 employees and have either a turnover not exceeding 40 
million EUR or a balance sheet total not exceeding 27 million EUR.  
347  In modernised competition law, the distinction is made more clearly between a 
minor effect on competition on the one hand and a minor effect on trade between 
Member States on the other hand. Commission Notice laying down guidelines on 
the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ 
C 101 [81, § 50]  
348  M. Motta, Competition policy, theory and practice (above n 26); Van den Bergh and 
Camesasca, European competition Law and Economics (above n 41). 
349  It appears however to be a disputed issue amongst economists whether small firms 
are more dynamic than larger firms and whether they are more conducive to 
innovation. The fact that the protection of SME is present in current policymaking 
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1.4.6 Justice, fairness and non-discrimination  
 
It is relatively self-evident for a lawyer that fairness or justice is a key driver 
in any set of legal rules and its application. To a great extent, fairness is 
certainly the fundamental idea that determines the design of procedural 
competition law. However, it is also an objective reflected in substantive law.  
 
In competition law, this might be described as granting every company the 
same opportunities on the market place, ensuring that even smaller 
companies can remain competitive, even though economically speaking they 
are weaker on the market. Fairness can come in when competition law 
protects the competitors, the customers or the consumers. Therefore there 
is, or can be, overlap between the basic ideas of economic freedom 
(protecting individual companies’  rights to competition on the market) and 
consumer protection or welfare and also with the objective of protecting 
smaller firms on the market place. The concept of fairness referred to here is 
also related to the term distributive or social justice, used mostly in 
economics.  
 
Many authors refer to fairness now as something to move away from and 
that is or should be replaced by (consumer) welfare. Fairness is sometimes 
presented as a thing of the past. This is however nor the reality in the 
current state of the law, nor desirable over the longer term. Fairness has 
been and still is one of the cornerstones of the European competition 
regime.350 
 
Fairness, from the perspective not only of the consumer but of other players 
in the market place, has a lot to do with the fundamental principle of non-
discrimination which is at the basis of most legal systems. The importance of 
this principle in law, probably explains why, even though it might not always 
be justified from a purely economical perspective, the Commission and the 
Courts remain critical of discriminatory practices, both under Article 101 
TFEU as well as under Article 102 TFEU. There is no reason why the 
fundamental objective of fairness, based to a large extent on the general 
principle of non-discrimination, should lose its place in modern competition 
law and yet it is fairly absent in public rhetoric nowadays. There is support 
in interesting sources however at an international level for the fact that 
demonstrates that it is still relevant as an objective. In the U.S. protection of 
smaller companies is also relevant, contrary to what many might assume, but 
mostly in the protection against abusive exploitation of small companies by 
companies with market power, see Kirkwood and Lande, ‘The fundamental goal of 
Antitrust’ (above n 288).  
350  The debate between Ahlborn and Padilla on the one hand and D. Zimmer on the 
other, is illustrative in this respect: D. Zimmer, On fairness and welfare: the 
objectives of competition policy, a comment on papers of previously cited authors, 
in the 2007 European Competition Annual (above n 287). Zimmer qualifies 
fairness in this context as making sure that the legal system provides for a set of 
rules guaranteeing that the legitimate expectations of market players are realised.  
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fairness should still be a concern for policymakers.351 The idea might be 
considered old-fashioned at times when the focus is on economic analysis or, 
it may be perceived as difficult to sell to the general public.  
 
1.5  What about consumers?   
 
The objective of protecting consumers is dealt with last because the growing 
emphasis on consumers is central in this paper and at the origin of many of 
the questions that are raised.  
 
1.5.1 Consumers in the Treaty and practice: before modernisation 
 
One could argue that the description of the goals at the beginning of the EEC 
Treaty and especially later in the EC Treaty refer to consumer welfare in an 
indirect way by referring to the “quality of life” in Article 2. Consumer welfare 
could be considered to follow from the general economic welfare purpose that 
was at the basis of Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty and that can now be 
found in Articles 2 and 3 of TEU.352  
 
It is incontestable that, generally speaking, consumers have always been 
part of the raison d’être of antitrust provisions in some way. In 1966, Bork 
argued for US antitrust law on the basis of a study of the legislative intent of 
the Sherman Act, that there can only be one objective and that is consumer 
welfare.353 In early yearly European Commission reports on Competition 
Policy, the interests of the consumer are mentioned.354 
 
The wording of Article 101 TFEU contains one explicit reference to 
consumers. Article 101(3) TEU requires a fair share for the consumer as one 
of the four cumulative conditions for an exception to the cartel prohibition. 
However, Vedder convincingly argues that the purpose of that provision, as 
well as the implicit references in Article 102 TFEU and the merger 
regulation, are primarily intended to make sure the benefit of a particular 
operation or agreement is passed on.355 The term “consumer” in Article 101 
351  As cited at p. 180 and 181 by J. Galloway, ‘The pursuit of national champions’ 
(above n 338).  
352  R. Nazzini, ‘Article 81 between time present and time past: a normative critique of 
“restriction of competition” in EU law’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 497.  
353  R. Bork, ‘Legislative intent of the Sherman Act’ (2006) 2 Competition Policy 
International (2006) 233, originally published in (1966) 7 Journal of Law and 
Economics.  
354  European Commission, report on Competition Policy, 1971, p. 11; report for 1976, 
p. 9: “.. aim is to ensure that business operates along competitive lines, while 
protecting the consumer by making goods and services available on the most 
favourable terms possible”, cited in Cseres, Competition law and consumer 
protection (above n 311) 241. 
355  H. Vedder,’Competition law and consumer protection: how Competition can be 
used to Protect Consumers Even better – or Not’ (2006) 17 European Business Law 
Review 83; this means passing on to others than the undertakings concerned.  
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(3) does not refer to the end user and is not the “consumer” that is the 
subject of consumer protection law.  
 
Until recently, the interpretation of Article 101 (3) TFEU was very much 
underdeveloped: as long as the Commission was exclusively competent for 
giving exemption under the old notification system, little attention was given 
to the reasoning and the actual meaning of the different conditions under 
Article 101 (3) TFEU. This was especially true for the second condition 
requiring a fair share of the benefit for the consumer.356 
 
Although Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have never been modified and no 
further references to consumer welfare were ever introduced, reference must 
made to the so-called integration provision of Article 12 TFEU  (former article 
153 (2) EC) which requires the EU and its institutions to take into account 
the protection of consumers when developing their policies in all other areas, 
therefore including competition policy.357  
 
Vedder emphasises the difference between competition law and consumer 
protection law whilst Stuyck argues that competition law is the cornerstone 
of consumer law: “EC competition law after modernisation: more than ever in 
the interests of consumers”. Stuyck highlights how he see consumer 
protection at the heart of competition policy. On the basis of a study of 
economic authors, he describes the objective of EC competition law as being 
a compromise: “the fruits of producer innovation, efficiency and skill – from 
otherwise anticompetitive activity – must be shared with the wider 
community, namely consumers”.358  
 
The main and fundamental difference between competition law and 
consumer protection law seems to be that the first protects what is seen as 
the public interest (preferably resulting in benefits for the consumers in 
general), whereas the second is destined to protect the subjective rights of 
consumers. This was very well described in the context of the OECD 
Roundtable organised in 2008 on the interface between Competition and 
Consumer policies. Both policies have different perspectives: competition 
policy approaches the market from the supply side ensuring that consumers 
have the widest possible range of choice of goods and services at the lowest 
possible price. Consumer policy approaches markets from the demand side 
ensuring that consumers are able to exercise intelligently and efficiently the 
choices that competition provides.359  
356  For an analysis see Cseres, Competition law and consumer protection (above n 311) 
252. 
357  Similar integration provisions exist for other policies, see below under 2.2.1. For a 
critical analysis of EC consumer law: G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsson, ‘EC 
consumer law, has it come of age?’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 370.  
358  J. Stuyck, ‘EC competition policy after modernisation: more than ever in the 
interest of consumers’(2005) 28 Journal of Consumer Policy 1. 
359  Consumer protection is about the right to safe products, right to redress, right to 
protection of health etc.. On the sources of conflict between the two policies, see 
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The relevance of consumer interests was already recognised, be it in different 
wording, from very early on by the Court, for example in the Consten 
Grundig judgment.360As was mentioned above, the idea was very much that 
unifying the market by eliminating obstacles to interstate trade would 
automatically benefit consumers by increasing the number of competitors on 
European markets. The concept of consumer welfare was not identified as a 
distinct goal of competition law for the larger part of the history of EC 
competition law, but that does not mean that consumers were not presumed 
to be at the heart of what competition law was all about.  
 
1.5.2  The consumer emphasis since modernisation  
 
It is common nowadays for competition authorities to emphasise consumer 
welfare as the main driver for competition policy.361 The former 
Commissioners for Competition, Mario Monti and Neelie Kroes put the 
consumer at the heart of competition policy. Philip Lowe formulated it in this 
way: “Good consumer and competition policies have one and the same goal – 
to help markets work well for consumers and for all the fair-dealing 
enterprises that serve consumers well.”362 Consumer welfare is mentioned as 
being the “ultimate objective of the Commissions intervention in the area of 
antitrust”.363 
 
Timewise, the focus on the consumer coincides with what is often called the 
move to a more economic approach and was intensified after 2004 when 
modernisation was completed with the decentralisation leading to the 
network of competition authorities.364 Procedural reform has accelerated the 
move towards a more economics-based approach: letting go of ex ante 
control by way of exemptions under Article 81 (3) EC (now Article 101 (3) 
TFEU) implies that agreements shall usually only be prohibited if they have 
Mehta, Mitra and Dube, ‘Competition policy and consumer policy’ (above n 294). 
The documents relating to the Roundtable of the OECD are accessible via 
www.oecd.org (accessed on 1 March 2009).  
360  Consten en Grundig (above n 317). 
361  The Commissions wishes to “enhance its dialogue with consumers”, see 2004 
Communication on a proactive competition policy (above n 340). In the XXIInd 
Report on Competition Policy (2002) the Commission already declares: “One of the 
main purposes of European competition policy is to promote the interests of 
consumers, that is, to ensure that consumers benefit from the wealth generated by 
the European economy”, 12.  
362  Also: Sir John Vickers, Chairman OFT, opening remarks at the European 
Competition and Consumer Day Conference, 15 September 2005, cited by H. 
Jenkins, ‘Protecting consumers: does competition help?’ (2005) 4 Competition Law 
283. It is interesting to note in her contribution that the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) is competent for enforcing both policies (competition and consumer 
protection).  
363  P. Lowe, ‘The design of competition policy institutions for the 21st century – the 
experience of the European Commission and DG Comp’ (2008) 3 Competition Policy 
Newsletter 1. 
364  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003/EC on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
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actual negative effects or are likely to have them.365 This has also been 
characterised as the “Americanisation” of the Commissions policy, the idea 
being that the Commission adopted a vision based on its own version of the 
learnings of the famous Chicago School in which consumer welfare was a 
central concept.366  
 
An interesting reference to the objectives of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can 
be found in Reg. 1/2003 in § 9 of the introduction and in Article 3 § 3. The 
provision of Article 3 Reg. 1/2003 aims at making sure national and 
Community competition law do not lead to contradictory results. Member 
States are however allowed, to implement national legislation that “protects 
other legitimate interests” provided that it is compatible with general 
principles and other provisions of Community law: “Insofar as that 
legislation pursues predominantly an objective different from that of 
protecting competition on the market, the competition authorities and courts 
may apply such legislation”.367  This provision assumes knowledge of what 
the objectives (one or more, see “predominantly”) of legislation are, both at 
the EU  level for competition as well as at the national level, for other 
sources of legislation. It is believed that this reference aims at protecting 
unfair trading practices legislation and consumer protection laws. Yet, it is 
not certain that these laws actually have a different objective and if so, to 
what extent.  
 
It is certainly true that in public statements the Commission and other 
authorities often use the terms “interests of the consumer” and “consumer 
welfare” but these concepts seem to be interchangeable. Not only can no 
straightforward conclusions be drawn from the way the concept of consumer 
welfare is used by the Commission, but also there are numerous examples of 
other objectives being mentioned, especially in relation to the Lisbon 
Strategy and the competitiveness of European industry. In other words, 
industrial policy motives have not been outdated by more “modern” 
consumer welfare considerations, on the contrary. In a similar way, 
references to the other objectives mentioned above can be found at this time. 
The guidance document on Article 101 (3) TFEU is especially illustrative in 
this respect.368  
 
365  Monti, ‘Article 81 and public policy’ (above n 315) 52.  
366  A. Weitbrecht, ‘From Freiburg to Chicago’ (above n 325).  
367  Par. 9 of the introduction and Article 3 par. 3.  
368  The guidelines seem to attempt to mention as many objectives as possible whilst 
creating the impression they are all integrated and compatible: at 13, 21 and 33; 
At 13 a catch all formula is given: “the objective of Article 81 is to protect competition 
on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources. Competition and market integration serve these ends 
since the creation and preservation of an open single market promotes an efficient 
allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefits of consumers.”  
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1.6  Evolving and multiple objectives: intermediate conclusion  
 
It is proposed that the current situation can be summarized as follows.  EU 
competition policy has multiple objectives that can be found, albeit rarely in 
an explicit way, in different sources of the law: the treaties, secondary 
legislation, the jurisprudence and policy documents. Van Den Bergh calls 
this the “multivalued tradition of European competition law”.369  
 
Although there is no clear basis for this in the establishing treaties, there 
seems to be general consensus presently that core competition objectives 
based on consumer welfare are now the main driver. In principle, the system 
of European competition law allows for the objectives to evolve and so the 
“reinvention” of the foundations and objectives of competition law and policy 
is legally not excluded.  
 
However, the other objectives discussed above are still present: market 
integration, the protection of small and medium-sized companies, aspects of 
industrial policy, efficiency, and considerations linked to fairness, non-
discrimination and integration with other Community policy objectives. 
Recent examples above have shown that these other objectives are certainly 
still relevant and some, such as market integration and industrial policy 
perhaps even more so in recent years (see also below under 2.2.1).  
 
There has not been a radical shift in objectives. If we assume there have 
always been multiple objectives, the emphasis has changed. The aim of 
competition law has probably always been to benefit the consumer, albeit in 
an indirect way. Therefore the current focus on consumers is in continuity 
with the past.  
 
However, whilst the focus on the consumer has never been greater, there is 
some doubt about what is actually meant by this. Consumer welfare, 
consumer detriment and consumer protection are all different concepts that 
are used at present and that can have a different meaning. The introduction 
of more economics in competition law has created a certain degree of 
confusion because it is often taken for granted that the consumer welfare 
concept that is now part of daily competition rhetoric is in fact the 
economical concept of consumer welfare. Furthermore, lawyers have perhaps 
also underestimated the lack of clear definition of the economic consumer 
welfare concept.    
 
2.  Why should we know what we are protecting? 
 
In this second part, the present article proposes some reasons why the 
discussion on objectives is of great importance at this time and why it is 
more than a theoretical debate. First, some perhaps less frequently 
369  R. Van den Bergh and P. Camesasca, European competition Law and Economics 
(above n 327) [39].  
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mentioned examples of how objectives have an impact on the day-to-day 
functioning of the system of competition law are given (2.1). Then we step 
outside of the system of competition law itself and propose some relevant 
factors to take into account that broaden the discussion and show the links 
between competition law on the one hand and wider EU law developments 
on the other (2.2).  
 
2.1  The impact of the objectives in practice  
 
It is quite self-evident that the objectives of a legal system influence the law 
and the general policy orientations. Several examples have already been 
given above in the description of the different objectives in section 1.4. What 
is perhaps less obvious but relevant in the near future is how objectives can 
have an impact on various other aspects of the system of competition law 
such as its institutional framework (2.1) and law enforcement in individual 
cases (2.2).  
 
2.1.1  Institutional framework 
 
Even though it has been said that a shift in objectives generally does not 
result in institutional changes370, some interesting interactions between 
objectives and institutional issues can be observed.  
 
There seems to be a relationship between the objectives of a competition 
policy and its institutional implementation, which is related to the way in 
which the objectives are formulated. It has been found that the broader the 
objectives, the greater the need for a centralised body to pursue them, and 
when the objectives are defined in a more narrow way, it is easier to transfer 
responsibilities to independent agencies or courts. Narrower objectives allow 
for deconcentration and decentralisation.371  
 
These are remarkable findings if one considers the major decentralisation 
process that took place in the EU with the entry into force of Reg. 1/2003. It 
raises the interesting question whether there is a direct link between the 
shift in objectives of EC competition law on the one hand, and the 
decentralisation of the enforcement of competition law on the other hand. 
The question has not often been put in these terms.  Usually the growing 
attention for the consumer is linked to substantive modernisation of 
competition law, meaning the increased use of economics. However, there 
might also be a relationship between the shift in objectives and institutional 
modernisation and decentralisation.  
 
Given the shift towards more emphasis on consumers, there is also the 
question whether it is a good idea to integrate the public authorities 
370  See Kirkwood and Lande, ‘The fundamental goal of Antitrust’ (above n 288). 
371  This conclusion was drawn from the different panel discussions and reports at the 
EUI conference in 1997, reflected in Ehlermann and Laudati, European 
Competition Annual 1997 (above n 287) general conclusions at p. xi.  
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responsible for compliance with consumer protection legislation with the 
competition authorities. At the level of the Commission, one could argue that 
these policies are all under the same roof, though in different directorates. 
The question is whether in certain Member States, the growing emphasis on 
consumers shall or should lead to such integration.372 There might be a 
certain tension with the requirements of independence of competition 
authorities, of course, but in terms of efficiency of the organisation of public 
authorities, the question is understandable.  
 
The growing emphasis on consumers has indeed led to changes in the 
internal organisation at the Community level within the Commission. Again, 
there are no radical changes but signs that show the shift in the objectives. 
Examples are worth mentioning the creation of the Consumer Liaison Officer 
within DG Comp and the call for a more integrated approach of Community 
policies, which implies coordination and consultation between different 
directorates of the Commission (also discussed below in 2.2.1 and 2.2.2).   
 
Furthermore, the link between the introduction of a more economically 
based approach and the consumer focus is clearly made by the Commission. 
The importance attributed to the contribution of economics and economic 
objectives is integrated in the organisational structures. The appointment of 
a Chief Economist is the clearest example of this trend.373 One of the most 
challenging issues in the near future is whether the institutional framework 
of competition law systems (including the courts) is adequate to actually 
allow for economic analysis to be performed and for economics to contribute 
in a valuable way. It is beyond this article’s scope to go into these questions 
here but the interesting debate about what Gerber calls the institutional 
embeddedness of economics, is only in a starting phase.374Similar questions 
concerning the impact of the objectives of competition law on the 
institutional structures, can be raised at the national level, including in 
372  Discussed at the OECD roundtable 2008 on the interface between consumer policy 
and competition, The documents relating to the Roundtable of the OECD are 
accessible via www.oecd.org (accessed on 1 March 2009).  
373  The Chief Economist now has a team, which is involved both in policy issues as 
well as in the daily enforcement of the competition rules (including state aid) in 
specific cases. About recent reforms: Lowe,’The design of competition policy 
institutions for the 21st century’ (above n 363) and also L. Evans, The role of 
economics on modern competition policy, Speech 26 September 2008 in Hamburg, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2008_06_en.pdf.  
374  In a very stimulating chapter entitled Competition law and the institutional 
embeddedness of economics, in: Economic theory and competition law, J. Drexhel, 
forthcoming, accessible via SSRN:  
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1306482 (accessed 1 March 
2009). He shows, amongst other things, that the fundamental differences between 
US and European court systems, make the use and role of economic analysis in 
competition cases very different and that therefore we should be more careful in 
comparing the systems and importing US experiences into Europe.  
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courts of law where the constraints on the use of economics can be 
considerable.375 
 
2.1.2 Priorities and enforcement policy  
 
The Commission is designated to ensure application of the principles laid 
down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and has far-reaching powers in this 
area, compared to other areas of EU law. It also determines the enforcement 
priorities of the competition policy. In this way there is a strong link between 
the policy objectives and the actual day-to-day application of the rules. Both 
are the responsibility of the same institution. The Commission of course 
shares the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU with national 
competition authorities and national courts but as will be discussed further 
below, the policy objectives as defined at a Community level shall be decisive 
also on a national level.  
 
The debate on Article 102 TFEU in recent years illustrates well how central 
the concern of attaining the objectives of competition law can be in shaping 
competition policy. The coexistence and possible tension of the different 
goals appears as an issue against which the debate took place about which 
way the enforcement rules on abuse of dominance should go. With regard to 
exclusionary abuses, for example, the question arises whether to apply 
Article 102 TFEU to conduct that harms only competitors or whether there 
should always be (direct) consumer harm as well.376 Requiring proof of harm 
in every case, increases the burden of authorities and claimants. Without 
going further into this subject that has generated huge amounts of 
literature, it is proposed here that this discussion shows the concrete effect 
of an objective on the shaping of a policy and, ultimately, the application of 
the law in specific cases.  
 
It also shows the difficulty of the Commission to push forward reforms when 
a clear vision on what the objectives of the system of EU competition law are, 
is lacking. The struggle clearly also has to do with staying in line with the 
case-law and the ordoliberal heritage (see above on the objective of economic 
freedom).377 The recent Guidance on Article 82 (now Article 102 TFEU) as it 
375  Even though perhaps oversimplifying the characteristics of continental court 
systems, Gerber (previous note) develops some interesting thoughts on this. See for 
an in-depth analysis of the way the legal system can deal with economic analysis, 
A. Sibony, Le juge et le raisonnement économique en droit de la concurrence, 
L.G.D.J. Lextenso editions, 2008. 
376  P. Marsden and S. Bishop: Article 82 Review: “What is your theory of harm”, 
European Competition Journal (2006) 2, p. 257. Stimulating and critical analysis 
also by A. Arpon de Mendivil de Aldama, ‘Exclusionary conducts and consumer 
welfare: effects in competition, justifications and efficiencies. What is the right 
balance?’, International antitrust law & policy; Fordham Competition Law Institute 
2008, p. p. 1-31, and P. Akman, Consumer welfare and Article 82: practice and 
rhetoric, World Competition (2009), vol. 32, no. 1, p. 71.  
377  C. Ahlborn and A.J. Padilla, cited above in note 315. On ordoliberalism, see above 
in section 1.5.2. There are clear signs of this also in recent case-law, for example 
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was finally published by the Commission has inevitably been criticized for 
not making clear choices.378 
 
One of the other subjects placed high on the agenda of the Commission 
recently is private enforcement.379The Commission has devoted considerable 
resources and effort to setting up a policy which might facilitate private 
enforcement of EC competition law, in other words: private parties, be it 
citizens or companies, suing companies in front of national courts for harm 
they have suffered due to anti-competitive behaviour.  This policy priority is 
mentioned here because it inspired by a consumer-focused approach.   
 
It is central to the private enforcement theme that harm is considered to be 
caused by anticompetitive behaviour, and that such harm should be 
repaired and the legal system should provide the instruments for such 
repair.380 However, this policy priority might also be inspired by another type 
of consumer-oriented approach. Making class actions for consumers possible 
seems, at least in the short term, a way to reconcile public opinion as with 
competition policy and European policy at a whole and it is a way of 
demonstrating the relevance for society of what the Commission and other 
competition authorities are doing. In that sense, consumer welfare as the 
main objective of the system of competition law, also acquires another 
in British Airways, ECJ 15 March 2007, case C-95/04 P, ECR (2007), p. I- 2331 
where the Court discusses discriminatory behaviour (already as such debated as 
as an abuse by economists) and states that “there is nothing to prevent 
discrimination between business partners who are in a relationship of competition 
from being regarded as being abusive as soon as the behaviour of the undertaking 
in a dominant position tends, having regard to all circumstances of the case, to 
lead to a distorsion of competition between those business partners. In such a 
situation, it can not be required in addition that proof be adduced of an actual 
quantifiable deterioration in the competitive position of the business partners 
individually” (145 of the judgment). One can add in this reasoning: “let alone that 
it is necessary to prove harm to consumers”.  
378  For example J. Killick and A. Komninos, Schizofrenia in the Commission’s Article 82 
Guidance Paper: formalism alongside increased recourse to economic analysis, GCP 
(2009) February release 1 (online magazine for global competition policy); article by 
Akman cited in note 90 above; also pessimisitc about the contribution of 
economics to competition policy so far, J. Briones, A balance of the impact of 
economic analysis on EU competition policy, World Competition (2009), vol. 32, no. 
1, p. 27. 
379  White Paper on Damages Action for Breach of Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165; R. 
van den Bergh, Schadevorderingen wegens schending van het mededingingsrecht in 
het spanningsveld tussen compensatie en optimale afschrikking, M&M (2006), p. 
143-151; C. Hodges, Competition enforcement, regulation and civil justice: what is 
the case?, CMLR (2006), p. 1381. Van den Berghe and Hodges clearly demonstrate 
the questions about the underlying motives for the focus on private enforcement 
by the Commission.  
380  Whether this is only consumer harm in the narrow sense of the word (end users, 
consumers) or all parties suffering from anticompetitive behaviour, is then a 
question to be resolved. In any case, in communicating to the general public, the 
emphasis is put on consumers.  
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meaning: making it a priority to sell the policy to consumers by showing 
direct relevance.  
 
It was said that the objectives pursued by the Commission will determine to 
a great extent the choices of priorities in its enforcement policy. This affects 
not only general policy directions but priorities can also play a role in the 
decision making practice of the Commission.  
 
Broadly speaking, setting priorities can trigger particular investigations and 
can also determine to a large extent whether a complaint is pursued or a 
case brought to its attention through the leniency programme. Where 
complaints are concerned, it is established case-law that the Commission is 
not under an obligation to pursue every case but can have regard to the 
Community interest.  It is hard to dissociate the Community interest from 
the objectives that are pursued in the context of the Community policy on 
competition.381  
 
2.1.3 Enforcement in individual cases 
 
It might seem difficult to examine how objectives actually have an impact in 
specific cases. This would require a particular type of research into the way 
in which officials or judges dealing with individual cases, are influenced by 
external factors other than the factual and legal elements of a particular 
case.382Account can only be taken of the way in which individual decisions 
are drafted and refer to general objectives. This is rarely the case.   
 
However, there are some specific aspects of enforcing the law in individual 
cases which do come to mind and which are all currently very much subject 
of debate. Without going into any detail, three examples are given of subjects 
where fundamental choices as to the interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU have been made in the past and where discussion is ongoing as to 
whether these choices are still justified. These discussions on how the law 
should be interpreted are directly linked to the evolving way enforcers and 
courts are thinking about objectives.  
 
The first is the interpretation of what is a restriction in the meaning of Article 
101(1) TFEU. It is well known that a clear choice was made in Europe to take 
a very wide view on what constitutes a restriction of competition bringing 
virtually any restriction under the treaty provisions under the influence of, 
amongst others, ordoliberal thinking, as described briefly above. Secondly, in 
381  It is consistently accepted by Community courts that complaints can be rejected 
for lack of Community interest, for example confirmation in CFI 16 January 2008, 
case T-306/05, Scippacercola, ECR (2008), p. II- 00004 (summary publication); 
also in recital 18 of Reg. 1/2003, cited in note 372; the Courts have accepted that 
choices have to be made and that this can be justified by limited resources, CFI 18 
September 1992, case T- 24/90, Automec, ECR (1992) p.II- 2223. 
382  See thoughts on this rare subject in A. Sibony, Le juge et le raisonnement 
économique en droit de la concurrence, (Paris : L.G.D.J. Lextenso editions, 2008). 
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a similar way, the concept of abuse in Article 102 was always a broad one, 
covering both exploitative and exclusionary abuses, going further than 
similar concepts in other systems of competition law.383 Finally, the burden 
of proof for parties claiming an exception on the basis of Article 81 (3) (now 
101 (3) TFEU) has always been high and the use of the mechanism of 
granting exemptions perhaps somewhat discretionary.384  
These three ways of interpreting the open norms in Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU obviously have a profound impact of how the law is enforced in 
individual cases and ultimately on the decision to sanction behaviour or not.  
 
Let us turn then finally to a particular aspect of enforcement, namely 
sanctions. Increasingly high fines at the Commission level have provoked 
criticism on sanction policy for competition infringements roar up again and 
the fines are also usually at the heart of the appeals proceedings brought 
against cartel or abuse decisions.  
 
It seems inevitable that there be a link between the objectives of competition 
policy and the way in which the policy is enforced and ultimately 
infringements are sanctioned. It would be interesting to see how the 
obligation to have more regard for the economical context in cartel cases for 
example, impacts on the calculation of the fines.385 
 
In this respect, reference can be made to an interesting statement by the 
ECJ in relation to fining policy in the Dansk Rohrindustrie judgment:  
 
“the supervisory task conferred on the Commission by Articles 85(1) and 86 
of the EC Treaty (now Article 102 TEU) not only includes the duty to 
investigate and punish individual infringements but also encompasses the 
duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply, in competition matters, 
the principles laid down by the Treaty and to guide the conduct of 
undertakings in the light of those principles” (par. 170).386  
 
383  The most obvious and most described difference being with US antitrust law.  
384  In any case, until the 2004 Notice on Article 81 (3) - Commission Notice on the 
cooperation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member States in 
the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC [2004] OJ (2004) C 101/04 - now Article 
101 (3) TFEU, there was very little guidance on how the four conditions of Article 
81 (3) were to be interpreted. Such guidance was of course not a priority given the 
fact that the Commission was the only one granting exemptions.  
385  Korsten highlights that Dutch case-law seems to be going that way and 
emphasising that the authority must also have sufficient regard for economic 
effects and context when determining the fine, case note, L. Korsten, ‘Annotatie: 
Deelname aan verboden onderling afgestemd feitelijk gedrag? Ernst van de 
overtreding’ (2007) 7 Markt & Mededinging 224.  
386  ECJ Cases C-189/02P, C-202/02P, C-205/02P to C-208/02P, C-213/02P, Dansk 
Rørindustri a.o. v Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR I-5425.  
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In the new Notice on the method of setting fines, the Commission refers to 
this statement.387  It must be seen in relation with the CFI judgment in first 
instance where it stated that the Commission may adjust at any time the 
level of fines to meet the needs of competition policy.  
 
What is meant by the “needs of competition policy” and the “ principle that 
the Treaty implies” are matters of conjecture. What seems clear in any effect, 
is that the Commission is allowed to determine fines in individual cases by 
taking into account general policy aspects such as deterrence effect. This is 
quite remarkable and it is perhaps a characteristic which distinguishes 
competition law from (some systems of) criminal law.   
 
Fining policy is also greatly determined by the qualification of what 
constitutes the most serious infringements of competition law. It must be 
assumed in a system of competition law that the qualification of “most 
serious” infringement is measured according to the objectives one wishes to 
achieve. For this reason, for many years, territorial restrictions in 
distribution agreements were blacklisted and sanctioned and the same was 
true for horizontal agreements in which competitors divided (national) 
markets.  
 
Finally, related to the sanctions is the subject of remedies which are 
increasingly used to undo the effects of anticompetitive behaviour. Research 
shows that in recent instances where remedies were imposed, the choice was 
inspired very much by the interests of consumers. In other words, the shift 
in objectives might also be demonstrated in the choice of remedies.388  
 
2.2   Market integration and consumer welfare: the larger picture  
 
It follows from the first part that the historically most important objective of 
competition law, namely market integration, seems to have become less 
prominent, at least in the view of the Commission. This trend coincides, 
timewise, with the emphasis on the interests of consumers in its various 
forms. Yet it is proposed here that the importance of market integration 
might in fact be increasing.  
 
2.2.1  Market integration and the internal market  
 
It is understandable that the focus on market integration seems less 
prominent: generally speaking major progress has been made to achieve a 
common market since the Internal Market programmes launched in the 
early 1990s. Other themes have been the driving forces of policy and 
lawmaking. The competitiveness of European industry and also consumer 
387  Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 
23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C 210/2. 
388  Examples are given by Jenkins, ‘Protecting consumers’ (above n 362); one might 
also consider the recent Microsoft case to be an example; see the CFI judgment 
Case T-201/04, [2007] ECR II-3601.  
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protection are much more prominent throughout all policy areas at present, 
not only in competition law.  
 
However, there are signs that market integration is still very much an 
objective to take into account. Recent case-law of the Court of Justice and 
the Lisbon Treaty have been mentioned above in this respect and shall be 
adressed again briefly here. A related point is the increasing pressure to 
integrate different EU  policy areas.    
 
The statement of the Court of Justice in GSK in October 2009 is very 
illustrative and shall be cited in full because of its key importance, especially 
compared to what the Court of First Instance (now General Court) had said 
in the judgment in first instance:   
 
“With respect to the Court of First Instance’s statement that, while it is 
accepted that an agreement intended to limit parallel trade must in 
principle be considered to have as its object the restriction of competition, 
that applies in so far as it may be presumed to deprive final consumers of 
the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price, the 
Court notes that neither the wording of Article 81(1) EC nor the case-law 
lend support to such a position.”   
 
The Court then goes on to say:  
 
“First of all, there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only those 
agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an 
anti-competitive object. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Court 
has held that, like other competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article 
81 EC aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, 
but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such. 
Consequently, for a finding that an agreement has an anti-competitive 
object, it is not necessary that final consumers be deprived of the 
advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price. It follows 
that, by requiring proof that the agreement entails disadvantages for final 
consumers as a prerequisite for a finding of anti-competitive object and by 
not finding that that agreement had such an object, the Court of First 
Instance committed an error of law.” 389  
 
Brevity prevents further analysis of this judgment here, but it is important to 
note that it is not a stand-alone case: there is a series of recent cases in 
which the ECJ has clearly implied that the competition regime of the EU 
pursues multiple goals and where the market integration dimension is 
clearly present.390 Whether or not the Court is merely reluctant to change, in 
any case this development shows a gap between the strong emphasis on 
389  ECJ Case GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and others v Commission of the 
European Communities (above n 323) [rec. 62, 63].  
390  The same reasoning was behind the ECJ Case C-8/08, T-mobile, not yet reported, 
as well as ECJ Csdr Syfait II (above n 323) on abuse. 
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consumers by the Commission and the position of the Court of Justice. The 
cases also show again the practical impact of the objectives discussion, 
namely the way in which it determines the legal reasoning on what is or is 
not a restriction (object or effect) and how proof should be brought and 
evaluated (see above under 2.1.2 on enforcement in individual cases).  
 
The second point to be made here has to do with the Lisbon Treaty changes: 
it is proposed that there are a number of indications that the link between 
competition and internal market has been reinforced. First, there is the 
disappearance of the reference to competition in the list of objectives, the 
only remaining references are to the internal market and the notorious 
Protocol 27 explicitly subordinates competition policy to the internal market. 
It remains to be seen whether the Court of Justice will consider this 
development as legally relevant. In the past, clearly the mention of the 
competition regime in the former Article 3 (g) EC Treaty played an important 
role in its case-law. Regardless of the influence this development might have 
on the case-law of the EU courts, it is in any case relevant as a political and 
policy development.  
 
There is also the further emphasis on the necessity to integrate policies in 
different areas of Union law. In that respect, the general obligation of the 
Union to take into account requirements of high level of employment, social 
protection, training etc. in the implementation of all its policies is 
supplemented by specific similar so-called integration provisions, for 
example in the area of environment or consumer protection.391 And whereas 
these integration provisions have moved forward to the beginning of the 
Treaty now, the reference to the principle of free market economy for other 
policies, has moved “backwards” to the specific chapter on economic and 
monetary policy (see above under 1.3).  
 
The result is that the system will have to come to terms with the fact that the 
link between competition law and the foundations of the EU as well as other 
policies the Union pursues, is a reality. Competition law might have gotten 
somewhat isolated from the rest of EU law, notably because of the far-
reaching competences of the Commission in determining and pursuing its 
policy in an independent way. Another reason might be that the shape and 
form of competition law is now at least partly determined at a national level 
where a focus on core competition objectives also seems predominant. It 
seems nevertheless that the ECJ and the Lisbon Treaty have put market 
integration, the internal market and the integration of different EU policies 
high up on the agenda.  
 
391  Article 9 (general obligation) and 11 (environment), 12 (consumers) TFEU. These 
obligations to take an integrated approach have been moved to the beginning of 
the treaty as compared to the EEC Treaty. They should at least be implemented by 
a type of impact assessment procedure when the Commission acts in the area of 
competition.  
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2.2.2  The consumers  
 
Generally speaking non-economical, non-market related issues are more 
prominent on the European agenda, even more so after the Lisbon Treaty. 
Citizenship is more prominent and citizens are consumers.  
 
The search of the EU to bridge the gap with citizens and make the EU project 
more credible and acceptable, plays a role.392 Related to this is the overall 
trend to involve stakeholders is the political and legislative process, which 
can be observed both at the national as well as at the Community level.393  
 
Consumer protection legislation has developed rapidly at the EU level, in 
areas such as electronic communication, sale at a distance, product safety 
etc.394 A high level of consumer protection has been “promoted” as an 
explicit general Community objective.  
 
It will be important in the near future to make a clear distinction at a policy 
level between the increasingly important consumer protection policy on the 
one hand, and competition policy on the other hand, their respective goals, 
and how the two areas are or should be complementary. The “consumer” 
who is being protected in both policy areas is not necessarily the same. In 
this respect, the importance of coherence between the different policy areas 
of the Community again comes into the picture: integration of the objectives 
of different policies such as internal market (including consumer protection), 
industrial policy and competition, is a priority as discussed in the previous 
section.395  
 
Another point that is made here is also that the attention to consumers is 
not a novelty that economists have brought to competition law, consumers’ 
interests were already present within the system (first part above) and there 
are many dimensions to the shift towards consumers that are linked to 
developments at the more general European level.396  This more general 
consumer focus also holds a risk: it might push to a more aggressive 
competition policy that has in mind the protection of weaker consumers or 
certain groups of consumers. Seen from this perspective, the focus on 
consumers can in fact conflict with a more economic approach to 
392  See e.g. Guilford and others, How political is Europe’s competition policy, European 
Antitrust Review 2006, p. 8 (published annually by Global Competition review).  
393  L. Senden, ‘De lidstaten en de kwaliteit van Europese wetgeving: geen 
consumenten maar co-actoren’ (2006) 54 Sociaal Economische Wetgeving 46.  
394  The former Commissioner Kuneva contributed to making consumer policies one of 
the key areas of activity of the Commission; a noteworthy recent initiative showing 
how consumer driven policy can become is the plan concerning a EU wide 
complaints classifying system to speed up policy response to failing markets, see 
press release, IP/09/1092 ‘Consumers: EU-wide complaints-classifying system to 
speed up policy response to failing markets’, 7 July 2009. 
395  See above in section 2.2.1.  
396  A cautious warning was expressed above concerning the danger of “consumerism” 
or populist approach in communication about the European political agenda.  
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competition law to the extent that the latter privileges a total welfare 
approach.   
 
2.3  Some additional reasons for a debate on objectives 
 
2.3.1  Governance: quality, efficiency, transparency and independence  
 
If we are unsure about which objectives the system of competition law 
should pursue or at least unsure about what the balance or hierarchy 
should be between all the possible objectives, this might also raise more 
governance-inspired questions. In this section some remarks are made in 
relation to the quality of legislation and policy; in the next section (2.2.2), 
some issues related to the decentralised enforcement model are highlighted.   
 
Reference is made to the risk of internal contradiction or a lack of coherence 
that might result from trying to reconcile different objectives, such as 
protecting efficiency and protecting small firms. Arguably, if there have 
always been multiple objectives, this risk will have been around since the 
beginning of EU competition law. Yet, the system seems to have arrived at a 
stage where the shifts in objectives can hinder the further development of 
competition law. Evaluating the quality of legislation requires a clear vision 
on its purpose.397 
 
Related to the quality aspect is the need for efficient policymaking and 
application of the law.398 For example, it has been said above that the goals 
or objectives of competition policy determine to a large extent what the 
priorities for enforcement are. This means that efficient allocation of 
resources of an authority requires a clear view on the objectives. In a recent 
publication, Lowe refers to the importance of efficiency at an organisational 
level and the need to focus limited resources to the most harmful 
practices.399  
 
Efficient policymaking is also about communicating clearly to the 
stakeholders what the policy and the law are about. The Commission is 
certainly aware of this and qualifies this as being the need to explain to 
citizens what the added value of its actions are. As Odudu convincingly 
argues, a clear focus on the objective that a legal rule pursues enhances the 
effectiveness of guiding the conduct of undertakings on the market. A 
397  See the remarkable speech by H. Tjeenk Willink, vice-president of Dutch Raad van 
State at the European law Conference in Stockholm, 2001, Clarity and quality in 
legislation, access:  http://www.raadvanstate.nl/publicaties/toespraken_vice-
president/ toespraak/?speech_id=17; Senden, ‘De lidstaten en de kwaliteit van 
Europese wetgeving’ (above n.393). 
398  Commission (EC) ‘European Governance’ (White Paper) COM (2001) 428 final, 27 
June 2001. And also the Commission (EC) ‘A Europe of Results – Applying 
Community Law’ (Communication) COM (2007) 502 final, 5 September 2007. 
399  P. Lowe, ‘The design of competition policy institutions for the 21st century’ (above n 
363). 
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justiciable norm requires, according to him, a unitary goal.400 A unitary goal 
is perhaps a bridge to far but clarity on the objectives of a legal system 
certainly seems essential. The importance of a focused purpose can be 
qualified as one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the history 
of competition enforcement on both sides of the Atlantic.401 
 
Also, related to quality and efficiency, a lack of a thorough debate and a clear 
position on the objectives of competition law, can also be perceived as a lack 
of transparency. The principle of transparency is one of growing importance 
in Community law. It is evolving into a general principle of Community 
law.402 
 
Finally, reference was made in the introduction above to the political 
dimension of a system of competition law and it was said that it is 
undoubtedly the case, and rightly so, that a system of competition law has 
political objectives. Political influence however within the system and with 
regards to enforcement, must of course be avoided at all cost. A strong 
stance on the objectives that the system of competition law in Europe aims 
to achieve, will also help protect competition authorities from political 
interference and contribute to their independence, and thereby perhaps 
counter certain current trends where the protection of free competition is 
called into question by public opinion. It seems worthwhile therefore also in 
that respect to invest in this debate.  
 
This very brief survey of governance-related issues is meant to substantiate 
the position that a debate and proper reflection is needed, not only at the 
academic level, and not only in the lively but small competition community. 
 
2.3.2  Taking governance a step further: the decentralised enforcement system  
 
If a thorough reflection is needed on what the objectives of EU competition 
policy are, this is especially true since the so-called modernisation which has 
resulted in a close co-operation between the 27 national competition 
400  O. Odudu, The boundaries of EC competition law (above n 327) [170]. He makes the 
argument to defend that therefore Article 101 TFEU should have one unitary goal. 
In this article it is defended that for the system of competition law as a whole, it is 
acceptable that different goals exist but there is currently not sufficient though 
about the reasons and the consequences of the conflicts this can give rise to. 
401  A clear call for focus and also a list of improper purposes, in the comprehensive 
work by K. Ewing, Competition rules for the 21st century, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2006) for example at p. 198, p. 201, p. 331.  
402  See S. Prechal, ‘Transparency: a general principle of EU law?’ in U.Bernitz, C. 
Cardner and J. Nergelius (eds.), General principles of Community law in the process 
of development (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2008). The principle of 
transparency has been recognized at the international level as applying to the 
procedures applicable for example in merger control, ICN document on guiding 
principles for merger control, as cited by Galloway, ‘The pursuit of national 
champions’ (above n 338).  
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authorities and the Commission within the network of competition 
authorities. 
 
The system set up by Reg. 1/2003 devised a number of mechanisms that 
encourage and ensure convergence, amongst other things, by giving the 
Commission the task of monitoring and supervising the application of EU 
competition law by national authorities and courts. The Commission’s role is 
justified in the regulation by the need for coherence and consistency in the 
application of the law. 
 
Different objectives can mean different implementation of rules, and that 
would be undesirable in the context of the network at the different levels 
described above: legislation, policy, enforcement. Without going into the 
discussion about whether are not there is a legal obligation to converge, it 
will suffice to observe that, in practice, strong convergence is well underway 
in terms both of substantive law and procedures.403 The same is true for 
policy and setting priorities.   
 
If one assumes here that maximal convergence is the keyword in the 
decentralised application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, the difficulties for the 
functioning of the network are twofold.  
 
When it comes to being European enforcers and taking into account the goal 
of convergence and the legal obligations in that respect, the national 
authorities are necessarily in a passive role because the Commission is 
essentially the policymaker at the EU level. The ECJ recognized this role 
before Reg. 1/2003 by stating that the Commission is responsible for 
defining and implementing the orientation of Community law.404 However, in 
implementing and applying the law, the EU and the Member States are co-
actors.405 It should also be borne in mind that national authorities and 
judges have the obligation to ensure effective and consistent application of 
EC law at all times. 
 
The situation is even more difficult if authorities or judges feel that their 
national law is not in line with EU law in this respect, or if they have to take 
into account additional (national) objectives pursued. 
 
In the current set-up, national authorities and courts depend largely on the 
Commission. The system created by Reg. 1/2003 has been qualified by many 
403  The Commission takes great pride in the remarkable level of convergence that had 
been reached in the reports published on Reg. 1/2003, Commission (EC) ‘Report 
on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003’ (Communication) COM (2009) 206 final, 
29 April 2009 and Commission (EC) ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council. Report on the functioning of Regulation 
1/2003’ (Staff Working Paper) SEC (2009) 574. 
404  ECJ Case C- 344/98 Masterfoods [2000] ECR I-11369.  
405  Expression from L. Senden, ‘De lidstaten en de kwaliteit van Europese wetgeving’ 
(above n 397). 
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commentators as essentially, a “top-down” system in which the influence of 
the Commission is more important than ever. Enforcement is left, to a great 
extent, to the national authorities, but competition policy is largely, if not 
entirely, determined by the Commission. The Commission’s position has 
been reinforced by the combination of procedural and substantial reform in 
these last years. 406  
 
The second difficulty that this article wants to draw attention to here is that 
it might be questionable whether some of the objectives pursued at the 
European level can be transposed so easily to the level of the Member States. 
To put it in another way: is it so self-evident that the objectives pursued at 
the European level (should) coincide with the objectives of Member States?  
 
There has not been much resistance on behalf of the Member States to 
accept the idea that EU objectives in this area are very similar, if not 
identical, to the objectives that national competition laws pursue. This can 
be explained most likely by, on the one hand, the focus on making the 
network work in terms of enforcement, and on the other hand, the fact that 
it was taken for granted that competition law objectives have some sort of 
universal value much determined by the fashionable purely economical 
definition of objectives.  
 
The importance of the market integration objective is of course the clearest 
example of the questions this raises. The integration of markets is a 
European political objective. Clearly, history can not be undone and 
substantial competition law has been shaped by this objective and largely 
copied in the Member States as it stood. Nevertheless, is it not a valid 
concern to know whether and how Member States have to follow orientations 
decided upon at the EU level when they are clearly inspired by market 
integration? And is there room for industrial policy at a national level; can 
competition law be used to achieve specific objectives that are closely linked 
to one member state? 
 
It might seem contrary to the trend towards more convergence to plead for a 
reflexion on how much room there is for differentiating EU policy objectives 
and national objectives. However, this point should be well understood. It is 
a question of drawing the right conclusions from a sufficiently complete 
overview of the multiple objectives that are pursued and at least questioning 
whether or not some degree of differentiation is possible and/or desirable 
between different existing competition regimes or not.407  
 
406  Monti, EC competition law (above n 329), M. De Visser, Network-based governance 
in EC law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009). On the combination of procedural and 
substantial modernisation, see D. Gerber, ‘Two forms of modernisation in 
European competition law’, 31 Fordham International Law Journal (2008) 1235.  
407  For a recent, very challenging, view on this question: D. Evans, Why different 
jurisdictions do not (and should not) adopt the same antitrust rules, draft consulted 
at SSRN (accessed 24 March 2009): http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342797.  
CHAPTER 5 
 132
The European network of competition authorities presents unique practical 
features to organise a discussion on the objectives and therefore the 
foundations of competition law, taking into account all the different legal 
traditions and systems that exist. A debate on objectives should be allowed 
to take place. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that it is not only 
the authorities of Member States that are involved but that also their 
political, economic stakeholders and academics. to allow for a sufficienty 
broad perspective. This should happen before the system is embarked in new 
adventures of major policy reforms.  
 
3.   Taking the debate forward: concluding remarks  
 
Reflection on what the objectives of the system of EU competition law are, is 
already a complex debate when it takes place within the system itself. It is 
about trying to find a proper balance between law and economics, between 
the traditional objectives that are typical to the EU competition law system 
such as market integration and the protection of small and medium sized 
firms and typically legal objectives such as economic freedom and fairness, 
and the objectives of consumer welfare and economic efficiency.   
 
This article proposes that the debate also involves more issues that merely 
those, already quite complex issues, that are inherent in the system of 
competition law as such. There are links between the shift in objectives in 
the system of competition law and more general developments, and there are 
a number of governance-related concerns to be adressed. This should be 
sufficient to justify a solid debate on how to deal with the multiple objectives 
of EU competition law, especially as the objectives of the system of 
competition have a profound impact on the law, the policy and the 
enforcement of the rules on cartels and abuse of dominance.  
 
(1) Multiple objectives are still pursued after modernisation. A new balance 
has to be found and has to be seen to be found.  
 
The system of European competition law has always had and still has 
different objectives. A unitary goal is not desirable and not realistic. The 
issue at stake in the EU is rather the co-existence of different objectives. Van 
den Bergh and Camesasca, amongst others, expressed dissatisfaction in 
2001 because a coherent discussion on the purpose of EC competition law 
was not really taking place.408 This discussion is perhaps starting to develop 
now, but still not in a very prominent way.  
 
The question of how the trade-off is made between different potentially 
conflicting objectives, is open. It seems acceptable within a legal system that 
trade-offs are to be made occasionally between different, conflicting, 
408  P. Camesasca and R. Van den Berg European Competition law and economics: 
comparative perspective 1st edn (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2001), later edition (above 
n 327)  
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objectives. However, this requires explicit recognition that such conflicts can 
exist. This is lacking for the moment at the European level. Also, it requires 
some indication about the factors that will be decisive in arbitrating 
conflicting goals, both at the policy level as at the enforcement level in 
individual cases.  
 
At present, the Commission seems to generally consider consumer welfare to 
be the primary driver of competition policy. However, the current wording of 
the treaties, the body of case-law and the political dimension of European 
integration and European policy, do not allow for such a reorientation to be 
made easily.  
 
(2) The role of market integration is probably the most important issue to be 
resolved at the European  level. 
 
The EU has a major issue to solve: what place is there still for market 
integration in the further development of competition law?   
 
The effects of the role of the market integration goal, should not be 
underestimated: it calls into question the very identity of the system of EU 
competition law as it has always existed. Yet, no major changes were made 
to the Treaties, the legislation or the Community institutional structure, 
both the Commission as well as the Community courts. The enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 EC has been partly decentralised, but this has only 
made the effects of the shift in the objectives more apparent. Perhaps 
decentralisation has also accelerated the decline of market integration as a 
goal of competition law.  
 
And now recent months have shown a revival of market integration through 
case-law and the Lisbon Treaty as it was described above. The question is 
high on the agenda.  
 
(3) Is the compromise approach a way forward? 
 
It can probably be assumed that the Commission favours a “compromise 
approach”.409 A compromise approach “harmonises the immediate consumer 
interests with the overall welfare of society by subordinating the consumer 
interest to the national interest”, but only temporarily. Consumers must at 
some stage, share meaningfully in the wealth that is created: “the fruits of 
producer innovation, efficiency and skill – from otherwise anticompetitive 
activity – must be shared with the wider community, namely consumers”.410  
 
The term “compromise approach” could be extended to mean that all 
different objectives that the EU system of competition law presently pursues, 
should be reconciled as much as possible. This should be done at the policy 
409  R. Ahdar, ‘Consumers, redistribution of income and the purpose of competition 
law’ (2002) 7 European Competition Law Review 341. 
410  Quote from Stuyck ‘EC competition policy after modernisation’ (above n 358).  
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level, ensuring sufficient transparency and in the proper procedural 
framework, involving Member States if and when necessary.   
 
Creating a hierarchy between different values or goals, would be preferable 
from a legal point of view, but shall not be possible without major changes to 
the legal framework. A clear distinction between ultimate goals and 
intermediate goals, however, would be beneficial and a first essential step 
towards creating more clarity.411 Consumer welfare can be the ultimate goal, 
but it should be defined in a sui generis way, in relation with the general 
welfare objectives of the EU. Then the question of how consumer welfare (or 
perhaps we should find another term?...) also comes into play as an 
intermediate goal can be examined, and how to reconcile it with other goals 
as much as possible. And if specific objectives conflict with each other, it 
should be clearer how the conflict is arbitrated.  
 
One question discussed above is whether we keep a strict attitude to certain 
vertical restraints because they are detrimental for the internal market even 
though not necessarily for consumers? There seems to be nothing wrong 
with that, but it should be acknowledged explicitly. Do we think consumer 
welfare, after having defined it, is so essential that consumer harm has to be 
proven in every single abuse case? Or should we rather ascertain why we 
also wish to protect competitors in some cases, without trying to avoid the 
subject of conflicting goals and making it appear as if we can do both at the 
same time. This last option seems preferable.  
 
(4) After concentrating on modernisation and policy reforms, refocusing the 
debate and going back to basics.  
 
Adopting a more economical approach should not become less credible if 
multiple values are put into balance. In fact, taking a clear stance on 
objectives and the relative importance of consumer welfare might simplify 
the work of a great many lawyers and economists active in the field of 
competition.  
 
The presence of other than purely economic factors, means that the success 
of a system of competition law should also be measured by more than just 
economic parameters. In times when competition authorities are embarking 
on exercises to measure the results that they achieve in an attempt to justify 
their existence, this is something to keep in mind. It might be a comforting 
thought for enforcers and policymakers, provided that they communicate 
better on the multiple objectives that the system pursues.   
 
Selling competition policy more as a way of protecting consumers than as a 
way of ensuring free competition and/or protecting competitors, might also 
have seemed safer in times where the free market principles underlying the 
411  According to Neven the policy pursues ultimate goals, but the intermediate goals 
are assigned to the institutions that are in charge of applying the law, EUI 1997 
(above n 287).  
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Treaty rules are less evident for some. In the longer run, it is not a good idea 
however to oversimplify the situation by referring to the consumer without 
giving it more thought what this actually means. EU competition law is in 
fact a bit like a multiple personality, fascinating but complicated. For the 
sake of its own credibility, the system should reflect on its foundations and 
do so, taking into account the new modernised framework of enforcement, 
involving all stakeholders and without being afraid of showing the multiple 













Decentralisation of competition law: sacrificing procedural 
autonomy?*   
 
Autonomy versus effectiveness: a well known conflict in EU law 
revisited and its impact on the question of future harmonisation in the 
area of enforcement of competition law  
 
Five years after its entry into force on 1 May 2004, the Commission carried 
out a first evaluation of the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 which has 
brought about significant changes in the area of competition law. One of the 
questions is whether harmonisation of procedural law in the Member States 
is necessary and/or desirable. At the same time many observers point to the 
remarkable level of convergence in the area of competition law, both in 
substantive law as well as in terms of procedural law. In a discussion about 
convergence and further harmonisation, both the well known principles of 
procedural autonomy as well as the principle of effectiveness can make their 
appearance.  
 
But is procedural autonomy still really a (satisfactory) standard to build a 
model of enforcement and what does effectiveness really require? The first 
purpose of this contribution is to analyze what the role, relevance and value 
of the principles of procedural autonomy and effectiveness could or should 
(still) be.  
 
The second purpose of this article is to look at some particularities of the 
enforcement system of competition law in the EU, and in particular at the 
mechanisms which are at the origin of the great degree of convergence.   
 
By way of conclusion, some issues will be defined which seem key for further 
harmonisation, building both on the analysis of more general EU 
developments as well as the specifics of competition law enforcement. The 
method and format of this contribution aims at combining general EU law 
developments and competition law, therefore necessarily implying that 
neither analysis can be very detailed in the context of this article but 
hopefully creating new perspectives by linking developments, to contribute to 








* This article was closed end of March 2010. At the close of the manuscript at the 
end of June 2010, it had not yet been published. 
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1.  Procedural autonomy and effectiveness: cornerstones of 
Union law enforcement?  
 
1.1  Introduction412  
 
In its first part, this article examines the current status of the principles of 
procedural autonomy and effectiveness in EU law. The purpose is to assess 
which role these principles can and should play in the debate about 
convergence and further harmonisation of procedure in the context of 
competition law, and to gain some insights in the debate on harmonisation 
by looking at a broader EU context. The method used in this article tries to 
give sufficient attention to the relationship between competition law and 
Union law in general and is therefore interactive in two directions: the 
general debate on procedural autonomy and effectiveness is approached 
from the perspective of competition law, and the other way around, the 
general developments regarding procedural autonomy and effectiveness shall 
feed into the discussion about the enforcement of competition law.  
 
In terms of defining the scope of research, two preliminary remarks are 
made. First, this article is focused on public enforcement. Obviously, private 
enforcement is also an important part of the overall enforcement of EU 
competition rules. The Commission has launched proposals to enhance 
private enforcement in the Member States.413 This development of increasing 
importance of private enforcement in competition law is also in line with a 
more general tendency, supported by case-law of the Court of Justice.414 
Hereinafter private enforcement shall only be referred to occasionally but it 
is not the central subject of this article.  
 
Secondly, the procedural autonomy of the Member States which shall be 
discussed below, is limited by two principles: equivalence and effectiveness. 
In this contribution, the focus is on effectiveness. This principle is discussed 
in a wider sense than only in its capacity of a principle limiting procedural 
412  The new numbering since the Lisbon treaty is followed, except in direct citations of 
case-law or legislation where the old numbering is used.  
413  These initiatives would possibly also involve harmonisation measures of possibly 
both substantive law (damages, causal link) and procedure (calculation, proof). For 
the status of these projects: 
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html, 
there appears to be substantial controverse both on the plans as such as well as 
on the legal basis that would be appropriate. Latest published documents: 
Commission (EC) ‘Damages Actions for breaches of the EC antitrust rules’ (White 
Paper) COM (2008) 165 and Commission (EC) ‘Accompanying the White paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ (Staff Working Paper) SEC 
(2008) 404; see T. Eilmansberger, ‘The Green Paper on damage actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules and beyond: reflections on the utility and feasability of 
stimulating private enforcement through legislative action’, (2007) 44 Common 
Market Law Review 431. 
414  See M. Tulibacka, ‘Europeanization of civil procedures: in search of a coherent 
approach’ 46 (2009) Common Market Law Review 1527.  
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autonomy. There are two main reasons why the principle of equivalence is 
largely absent hereinafter. The first is that the question underlying this 
article is if and how procedural autonomy and effectiveness -as seemingly 
opposing forces- are relevant in the discussion on further harmonisation in 
competition enforcement. The starting point is therefore that (the wider 
concept of) effectiveness is perceived as a principle which has in itself 
harmonising effects, and might also require further harmonisation. The 
second reason to be mentioned here is that equivalence seems to play but a 
limited role in the area of competition law.  The enforcement environment of 
competition law is such as to make equivalence less relevant, at least in the 
way the European courts have construed it as a limit to procedural 
autonomy: it seems relatively unlikely that an action concerning EU law 
would be more difficult before the national authorities or courts than an 
action on the basis of national law.415  
 
1.2  The principle of procedural autonomy  
 
1.2.1  Definition and relevant developments 
 
Member States are free to determine how to design and implement the 
procedural framework in which Union law is enforced in their national legal 
system. This is, in a nutshell, the principle of procedural autonomy of the 
Member States.416 The case-law of the Court is not easily understood, it has 
415  Perhaps the contrary would most likely be the case in many Member States. The 
particular enforcement system in competition law, discussed below in section 2, 
explains this: national substantive competition law is quasi identical to EU law 
and there is considerable convergence in terms of procedure. These factors 
combined with the directly applicable treaty rules and the enforcement practice at 
the EU level which serves as a model, also account for a legal environment which 
is familiar with EU law, although this might vary in Member States. Finally, the 
concept of equivalence in the case-law was developed mostly from the perspective 
of individuals invoking (substantive) rights against the state; as it shall be 
discussed in this article, for competition law, this is not the predominant 
procedural setting.  
416  It is a subject studied by many scholars from different perspectives and using 
different methods in an attempt to qualify the case-law and to apprehend its 
continuity and its scope. For this article, particular attention was given to T. 
Tridimas, ‘Enforcing Community rights in National Courts: some recent 
developments’, in C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. Skidmore (eds) The future of 
remedies in Europe (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), pp. 35-49; A. Ward, Judicial 
review and the rights of private parties, ‘chapter 4: The rights of private parties and 
Member State remedies and Procedural rules Part I: The principles of effectiveness 
and non-discrimination’ (Oxford: Oxford Universty Press, 2007); S. Prechal, ‘EC 
requirements for an effective remedy’ in J. Lonbay and A. Bondi (eds) Remedies for 
breach of EC law (Oxford: J. Wiley & Sons, 1997); C. Kakouris, ‘Do the Member 
States possess judicial procedural autonomy?’ (2007) 34 Common Market Law 
Review 1389; W. van Gerven, ‘Bridging the gap between Community and national 
laws: towards a principle of homogeneity in the field of legal remedies’ (1995) 32 
Common Market Law Review 679; W. van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and 
procedures’ 37 Common Market Law Review (2000), 501. An inspiring analysis 
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evolved at an unstable pace and it has left a number of questions open until 
this day.417 It is also probably one of the most controversial areas of the 
Courts jurisprudence because the Courts judgments have, at several 
occasions, been perceived as intrusions in the national legal systems, 
leading to heated debates.     
 
Procedure refers to the enforcement framework in which substantive law is 
invoked and enforced. In Union law, procedural law is usually perceived as 
having an ancillary role to substantive law and exists to ensure that 
substantive law can be effectively applied. On the function of procedure, the 
following description is appealing: procedure should serve as a means to the 
end of finding facts and enforcing the substantive law accurately.418 
Substantive law and procedural law are in permanent interaction. 
Procedural law has its own legitimacy or rather contributes to the legitimacy 
of the legal system in an independent way because it guarantees a number 
of fundamental principles.419 Procedural law contains the more technical 
rules that govern the exercise of rights and remedies, which make them 
enforceable. A better, broader term to use might be enforcement rules.  
    
The expression “procedural rules” in EU case-law is an autonomous concept. 
The Courts seem to give a very broad meaning to procedural rules, involving 
all substantive and organizational rules and principles being applicable to 
actions brought to obtain judicial protection.420 This explains why the 
difference between procedure and substance is not always easy to identify. It 
from a U.S. perspective on the role of procedure, Bone, R, Making effective rules: 
the need for procedure theory BU Working School of Law working paper (University 
School of Law, Boston 2008), online via: 
 http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2008.html (accessed 
on 1 March 2010).  
417  See also Craig, EU Administrative law (Oxford: OUP, 2006), chapter 21.  
418  Van Gerven, Kakouris, Prechal (above n 416); J. Delicostopoulos, ‘Towards 
European Procedural Primacy in National Legal Systems’ (2003) 9 European Law 
Journal 599: he used the expression “a venue for the realisation of rights”. Most 
definitions take the perspective of the individual; quote on the function of 
procedure taken from Bone, working paper cited in note 416.  
419  The existence of an independent judiciary, access to court, due process, equal 
treatment are values in themselves guaranteed by procedural rules. On the 
relationship between procedural rules and national legal culture, see A. 
Gerbrandy, Convergentie in het mededingingsrecht: de invloed van het EG recht op 
materiële toepassing, toegang, bewijs en toetsing bij de Nederlandse 
mededingingsbestuursrechter, bezien in het licht van effectieve rechtsbescherming 
(Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2009), for example at p. 3.  
420  See P. Haapaniemi, ‘Procedural autonomy: a misnomer?’ in L. Ervo, M. Gräns and 
A. Jokela (eds) The Europeanization of Procedural Law and the New Challenges to 
Fair trial, (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2009), at p. 94. The large scope of 
application of the Courts scrutiny has made many authors say for some time that 
procedural autonomy seems a thing of the past; see the strong opinion of judge 
Kakouris (above n 5). On the lack of precision and distinction in the European 
Courts case-law between procedural rules and remedial rules, Van Gerven, ‘of 
rights, remedies and procedures’(above n 416).  
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is not always efficient to distinguish them and the same is true for rights and 
remedies, because they are so intertwined.421  
 
Turning to procedural autonomy, the distinction between direct and indirect 
conflict of rules is helpful to understand the case-law and to clarify the 
difference between primacy and the principle of procedural autonomy.422 
Primacy comes into play when a rule of Union law is in direct conflict with a 
rule of national law. It should be noted that this could be the case both for a 
rule of substantive law as well as for a rule of procedural law.423 In such a 
case, primacy implies that the national rule, which is contrary to the Union 
rule, shall inevitably have to be set aside (disapplied).424 This could be a rule 
of law laid down in legislation, in an administrative practice or in 
jurisprudence.  
 
In the case of a national (procedural) rule that possibly hinders the effective 
application or enforcement of Union law, but in the absence of a 
corresponding rule of Union law that takes primacy over the national rule, 
the approach is more careful and the result shall be less predictable.425 In 
that scenario the principle of procedural autonomy comes into play. This 
would be the case of an indirect conflict mentioned above. In the notorious 
Rewe case the Court used the following ever recurring phrase since then:  
 
“Applying the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, it 
is for the national courts which are entrusted with ensuring the legal 
protection which citizens derive from the direct effect of the provisions of 
421  Eilmansberger used the term “symbiotic”, see T. Eilmansberger, ‘The relationship 
between rights and remedies in EC law”: in search of the missing link’ (2004) 41 
Common Market Law Review 1199 [1237]. W. van Gerven, ‘Bridging the gap’, has 
qualified the attempt to define and distinguish rights, remedies and procedure as 
almost impossible (above n 5).  
422  See R. Ortlep and M. Verhoeven, ‘De voorrangsregel versus het beginsel van 
nationale procesautonomie’ (2008) 56 SEW: tijdschrift voor Europees en 
Economisch Recht 471. Strictly speaking, primacy is not a conflict rule in a sense 
that a national rule which is not compatible with EU law is invalidated, but the 
national rule shall have to be set aside, on this distinction: S. Prechal, ‘Domestic 
legal effects on EU criminal law: variations on three themes’ in D. Obradovic and 
N. Lavranos (eds) Interface between EU law and national law. Proceedings of the 
annual Colloquium of the G.K. van Hogendorp Centre for European Constitutional 
Studies (Groningen: Europe law Publishing, 2007) pp. 335-345.  
423  Such a case shall be rarer given that there are less Union “procedural rules” as 
there are rules of material law, however the distinction is of no relevance where the 
application of primacy is concerned. Reg. 1/2003 discussed in section 2 below, 
provides for examples in competition law.  
424  On the far-reaching obligation to disapply, even in a horizontal scenario of 
directive provisions, see ECJ Case C- 555/07, Kücükdeveci, not yet reported.  
425  The doctrine of conform interpretation also comes into play in this situation: the 
national judge will always have to try to interpret and apply the national rules in 
conformity with EU law; this involves looking at the whole context of the rule in 
question, see ECJ joined cases C-397/01 and C-403/01, Pfeiffer, judgment of 5 
October 2004, [2004] ECR I-8835.  
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Community law. Accordingly, in the absence of Community rules on this 
subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to 
designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural 
conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the 
rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law, it being 
understood that such conditions cannot be less favorable that those 
relating to similar actions of a domestic nature “(rec. 5).426  
 
Apart from the caveat of equivalence expressed in the last sentence, the 
procedural autonomy is limited from the very beginning of the development 
of the case law, by effectiveness.  
 
In the same judgment the Court states that: “In the absence of such 
measures (read: Union harmonisation measures) the right conferred by 
Community law must be exercised before the national courts in accordance 
with the conditions laid down by national rules. The position would be 
different only if the conditions and time-limits made it impossible in practice to 
exercise the rights which the national courts are obliged to protect.”427 The 
Court regularly stated that the Treaty was not intended to create new 
remedies in the national courts to observe Union law,428 but nevertheless the 
creation of a new remedy can become an obligation for the courts, going 
against most common views of the division of tasks between the different 
powers in a legal system.429 
 
It is mainly through the application of the principle of effectiveness (the 
second exception to procedural autonomy) that the case-law of the Court of 
Justice evolved substantially and, in some cases, resembles a full fletched 
material screening of the national procedural rule (or absence thereof). The 
Court is willing to scrutinize any provision of a national legal system which 
426  ECJ Case C-33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Landwirtschaftskammer fûr das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989; ECJ Case C-45/76 
Comet [1976] ECR 2043.  
427  Not making it practically impossible or “rendering it excessively difficult”, refers to 
both access to court and what the Court often calls the “detailed procedural rules”, 
see for example ECJ case C-432/05, Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, at rec. 43. The 
need to take into account the whole legal context including the general principles 
underlying the procedure, at rec. 54.  
428  In the second Rewe case: ECJ Case C-158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH 
v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 1805. Recently in Unibet (above n 427) [40].  
429  ECJ Case C-213/89, Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433; see also: P. Craig (above n 6) 
[792]; similarily the Zuckerfabrik case the ECJ obliges the national judge to 
“create” interim relief: ECJ Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik 
Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v 
Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415. Reluctance however in Unibet, cited 
above in note 427: the existence of an indirect remedy can be sufficient; whereas 
in the Impact judgment (ECJ case C-268/06 Impact v Minister for Agriculture and 
Food and Others [2008] ECR I-2483) the Court goes quite far and considers that 
the existence of procedural disadvantages for an individual is sufficient to make 
the exercise of rights excessively difficult and therefore the jurisdiction of a court 
was to be enlarged. There is some tension between the two judgments.  
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might prevent Community rules from having full force and effect.430 Because of 
the substantial control that the Court is willing to undertake and the effects 
this can have on procedural law, the term judicial harmonisation is 
appropriate.431 This term shall be used and illustrated further below. 
Although there is also a line of case law, where there was clearly more 
reluctance on behalf of the Court of Justice to interfere with national 
procedural law432, it can nevertheless be said that the test applied by the 
Court of Justice to national rules of procedure has become more of a 
reasonability test or a proportionality test, or a procedural rule of reason.433 
In view of the foregoing, it is understandable that over time, the impression 
has grown that procedural autonomy is very much a relative concept.  
 
The focus in the case-law has been on making sure individuals have 
remedies to enforce their rights derived from Union law. Having a remedy 
includes having access to court to obtain a remedy. There is a clear link with 
the right to judicial protection.434 This explains why the term national 
430  ECJ Case C-106/77, Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. Effectiveness is qualified as 
being the very essence of Community law in that judgment. A clear example of the 
fact that the Court control is substantive can be found in the cases on time-delays 
and prescription, recently e.g. ECJ Case C-406/08, Uniplex, not yet reported, at 
39-43. The case-law of the Court contains the principles on which national time-
limits should be based and in the preliminary rulings, the Court often evaluates 
itself whether the time-limit is acceptable or not; see also ECJ Case C-63/08, 
Pontin, not yet reported. Similarly for sanctions, see below in the third part. Every 
enforcement rule is subject to scrutiny, this can go beyond what are perceived as 
procedural rules in a national system.  
431  The term judicial harmonisation is taken here e.g. from S. Weatherill, Cases and 
materials on EU law, seventh edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 
168, citing F. Snyder with reference to the judgment in the Comet case where the 
Court refers to “substance and form”.  
432  A remarkable analysis is made by P. Girerd, ‘Les principes d’équivalence et 
d’effectivité: encadrement ou désencadrement de l’autonomie procédurale des 
Etats membres’ (2002) 38 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 75, where he argues 
that the Courts’ reluctance can be observed in particular in cases where setting 
aside a particular national rule or practice would have financial consequences for 
the member state, at p. 94 and following. The judgment in Van der Weerd, is often 
referred to as being a more careful judgment in terms of interference with national 
law, ECJ Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 Van der Weerd [2006] ECR I-4233. 
433  W. Eijsbouts, J. Jans and F. Vogelaar, Europees recht; algemeen deel (Groningen: 
Europa Law Publishing, 2009), p. 329, S. Prechal, ‘Community law in national 
courts: the lessons from van Schijndel’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 681; 
J. Engström, ‘National courts obligation to apply Community law ex officio – the 
Court showing new respect for party autonomy and national procedural 
autonomy?’ (2008) 1 Review of European and Administrative Law 67.  
434  The same focus on remedies and judicial protection for individuals can be found in 
the judgment in the area of competition law when it comes to « material » remedies, 
namely the availability of damages : ECJ Case C-453/99, Courage [2001] ECR I-
6297; ECJ Joined Cases C-295/04 until C-298/04, Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619; 
the Commission found support in these judgments for its plans to encourage 
private enforcement, cited in note 413 above. On the use of the principle of 
effective judicial protection to justify intrusion in national procedural law, W. 
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remedial autonomy is also sometimes used.435 However, this gives too 
narrow an impression of the full scope of the Courts’ case law: procedures 
provide for a framework for the exercise of actions leading to remedies but 
also include many more rules not strictly related to the exercise of action for 
remedies.436  
 
After this brief discussion of the concept and its evolution, the question to 
turn to now is what the status, role and purpose of the principle of 
procedural autonomy is in the EU legal system so as to determine what 
relevance it should be given in the particular area of competition law.  
 
1.2.2  Status, role and purpose  
 
Primacy (or supremacy) of Union law is said to be a constitutional 
principle.437 But what is the status of procedural autonomy?438 The principle 
is not laid down in the treaties as such. It appears in the case-law of the 
Court of Justice.439 Is procedural autonomy a basic principle of Union law, a 
foundational principle or is it more an expression of the doctrine of residual 
competences? The nature of the principle can evolve due to political and 
other developments: for example, the rise of the principle of subsidiarity.440  
 
Geursen, ‘Handhaving van het objectieve gemeenschapsrecht via het 
effectiviteitsbeginsel vs. subjectieve rechtsbescherming via het nationaalrechtelijk 
verbod op reformation in peius’ (2009) 4 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 
131. The focus on the individual judicial protection is apparent in a number of the 
recent landmark cases cited above: ECJ Case C-432/05, Unibet (above n 16) and 
ECJ Case C-268/06 Impact (above n 18). See also: Case C-426/05, Tele 2 
telecommunication gmbh [2008] ECR I- 685. 
435  For example P. Craig, EU Administrative law, cited in note 417 for distinction 
between procedure and remedies; also van Gerven, ‘Bridging the gap’ (above n 
416).  
436  Based on the definitions by W. van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’ 
(above n 416) [502]. 
437  The denomination “constitutional” might now have a slightly different meaning 
since the Constitutional Treaty and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
which seems to attempt to deconstitutionalize EC law. However, there is no reason 
to believe that the Court would retreat from such fundamental principles as the 
primacy of Union law. Above primacy and procedural autonomy were presented as 
two ways to deal with a conflict between EU law and national law.  
438  There seems to be considerably less attention in doctrine for the meaning of the 
concept of procedural autonomy than for the extent to which the “exceptions” of 
equivalence and effectiveness have allowed the Court to “interfere” with national 
procedural law.  
439  P. Haapaniemi traces it back to doctrine in the 70’s, (above n 420). 
440  The 1997 Protocol 30 to the EC Treaty on the application of subsidiarity and 
proportionality states that “While respecting Community law, care should be taken 
to respect well established national arrangements and the organization and working 
of the Member States’ legal systems”. The new protocol 2 to the Treaty of Lisbon on 
the same subject however, is much shorter and does not contain this statement 
anymore. 
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It is argued that procedural autonomy is, first of all, merely the consequence 
of the decentralized system which characterizes Union law. Procedural 
autonomy is not a principle of law, nor is it a norm.441 It does not allow for 
the compatibility of lower rules to be assessed. It seems more to be a 
standard which the Court refers to but without situating it as such in the 
Union legal order.442 It is a standard or an organizational or institutional 
principle, without necessarily being a general principle of law. It is therefore 
part of what the Court has called “the general principles on which the 
institutional system of the Community is based and which govern the relations 
between the Community and the Member States”.443 Taking a very pragmatic 
view: it was necessary to emphasize procedural autonomy because, in 
general, there was no enforcement structure, nor a set of enforcement rules, 
at the European level. Emphasizing the importance of national rules and the 
role of national judges, was a way (the only way) to maximalize the 
effectiveness of enforcement. 444   
 
As it appears clearly from the quotes above, reference is almost always made 
by the Courts to the phrase: “in the absence of Union law, it is up to member 
states”. This resembles the description of a competence of a residual nature: 
as long as no Union rules exist, the Member States can act. It does seem 
more appropriate to use the term procedural competence445: a national 
competence that can be exercised dependant on the pre-existence or not of 
Union rules.  
 
441  The idea that is expressed here is mostly based on the idea that procedural 
autonomy does not appear to be a source of law or a source of legal obligations in 
itself. The purpose is not to minimalize the political or organizational significance 
of the principle of procedural autonomy.  
442  B. de Witte describes well that the ECJ uses the term principle in different 
meanings, both for legal rules having a basis in the Treaty, for general principles of 
law or for more political or organizational principles, see B. de Witte, ‘Institutional 
principles: a special category of general principles of EC law’ in U. Bernitz and J. 
Nergelius (eds.), General Principles of European Community Law (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 143-159. On the meaning of the term 
“principle”, also O. Wiklund and J. Bengoetxea, General Constitutional Principles of 
Community Law, in the same book.  
443  The concept of institutional principles is described by B. de Witte, ‘Institutional 
Principles’ (above n 412); Delicostopoulos, ‘Towards European Procedural Primacy’ 
(above n 418): he considers national procedural competence in the Courts case-law 
to be a standard.  
444  On the intrinsic limits of a system based on decentralised application: E. Dubout, 
‘Le contentieux de la troisième génération ou l’incomplétude du système 
jurisdictionnel communautaire’, (2007) 43 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 
427.  
445  Van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’ (above n 416) and 
Delicostopoulos, ‘Towards European Procedural Primacy’ (above n 418). 
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The term national procedural competence is also more adequate, in view of 
primacy or supremacy of European law:446 there are a number of instances 
where national rules or acts shall be set aside on the basis of primacy of the 
law and in which there will be no question of national procedural 
autonomy.447  
 
The recurring phrase “in the absence of Community law/harmonisation 
measures, it is up to the member states..”, seen in the perspective of the 
current state of EU law, confirms that the perspective to be taken is not so 
much one of autonomy but of the division of competences between the EU 
and the Member States. Procedural autonomy as an expression of the 
residual competence of Member States, fits with the new description of 
competences that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced: the principle of 
conferral of powers has been reinforced and appears clearly and prominently 
from the new treaties.448 As it will appear below in the next section, the 
particularity of competition law in this respect is that the division of 
competences (in terms of enforcement) between the EU and the Member 
States was different from the start and also that, now since the Lisbon 
Treaty, it is one of the few areas of exclusive competence of the Union.  
 
It is a natural evolution that the more substantial the impact EU law has 
had throughout the years, the more procedural autonomy is eroded through 
judicial harmonisation (examples below in section 2) and more and more 
legislative harmonisation.449 Where the possibilities of legislative 
harmonisation of procedure at the EU level is concerned, clearly the recent 
446  Prechal, ‘EC requirements for an effective remedy’ (above n 416); Van Gerven, ‘of 
rights, remedies and procedures’ (above n 416); Delicostopoulos, ‘Towards 
European Procedural Primacy’ (above n 418).  
447  This is also due to the broad sense that the ECJ has given to the notion of 
procedural rules. Example of burden of proof, discussed also below under 2.3.2, 
the example of damages case law; example given by Delicostopoulos on the articles 
in Reg. 1/2003 about compliance to decisions by national judges. Many examples 
of procedural harmonisation in Eilmansberger, ‘The Green Paper on damage 
actions’ (above n 413). 
448  Article 5 TEU: “The limits of the Union competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. Also noteworthy in this respect: protocol 2 on subsidiarity and 
proportionality and protocol 25 on the exercise of shared competence, emphasizing 
the limits on the EU competences; on the division of competences in this respect, 
R. van Ooik, ‘The European Court of Justice and the division of competence in the 
EU’, in D. Obradovic and N. Lavranos (eds) Interface between EU law and national 
law.Proceedings of the annual Colloquium of the G.K. van Hogendorp Centre for 
European Constitutional Studies (Groningen: Europe law Publishing, 2007). Any 
competence not attributed to the Union, remains with the Member States: this can 
be seen as another way of giving the same message as the one given by the Court 
in Rewe.  
449  See also as discussed by M. Tulibacka, ‘Europeanization of civil procedures’ (above 
n 414).  
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case-law of the EU courts provides opportunities for pushing forward the 
adoption of enforcement rules at the EU level.450  
 
The principle of procedural autonomy is presented here as a necessary 
organizational standard on the one hand, and as an expression of the 
Member States residual competence on the other hand. A remaining 
question is then what (other) purpose it serves. Procedural autonomy is not 
the one and only standard for the enforcement of EU law anymore. 451 Are 
there nevertheless compelling reasons to preserve as much national 
autonomy as possible in any case (in casu in the area of the enforcement of 
competition law), thereby accepting a certain level of divergence amongst the 
Member States? A very brief answer is given, from a strictly legal perspective.   
 
It would seem that national procedural autonomy in general does not protect 
an (another) objective Union interest as such. The arguments that are 
generally made to favor procedural autonomy and therefore oppose the 
Courts intrusions on it, include the close relationship between procedure 
and cultural and social roots of a legal system, legal certainty, conferred 
powers, proportionality and subsidiarity.452 Many of these are principles 
enshrined in the Union legal order and therefore their protection would be in 
the Union interest.453 Arguments are usually inspired not so much by an 
450  ECJ Case C-176/03, Commission/Council [2005] ECR I-7879 and ECJ Case C-
440/05, Commission/Council [2007] ECR I-9097. Simplifying: the Court supports 
the idea of implied powers: if the adoption of rules on sanctions is a necessary 
measure for combatting serious environmental offences, then these rules might be 
adopted on the basis of the legal basis allowing for measures of environmental 
protection (the basis therefore for substantive harmonisation). These judgments 
were rendered in the context of a discussion of the right legal basis, discussed 
briefly below for competition enforcement under 3.3.  
451  This might seem a controversial point of view because the ECJ still performs lip 
service to the principle of procedural autonomy but even the Lisbon Treaty and its 
protocols discussed before, which are perceived as containing more emphasis on 
the Members States’ role and a rebalancing of the relationship between EU and 
Member States, has not consecrated the principle explicitly. It is acknowlegded 
that this view might be influenced by the perspective of competition law where 
procedural autonomy seems a thing of the past, see hereinafter. This impression is 
reinforced by the fact that in recent important cases concerning proof issues in 
competition law, no mention of procedural autonomy is made by the ECJ, see ECJ 
Joined Cases C-295/04 until C-298/04 Manfredi (above n 23) and case C-8/08, T-
mobile, not yet reported.  
452  See Delicostopoulos, ‘Towards European Procedural Primacy’ (above n 418) and C. 
Kilpatrick, ‘The future of remedies in Europe’, in C. Kilpatrick and others (above n 
416); Placing the erosion of national procedural law in a more global perspective: 
G. Della Cananea, ‘Beyond the State: the Europeanization and Globalization of 
Procedural Administrative law’ (2003) 9 European Public Law 563. On link between 
law and culture, discussion and references in Gerbrandy, Convergentie in het 
mededingingsrecht (above n 419) [79], also in her article ‘Procedural convergence in 
competition law: Towards a spontaneous ius commune’(2009) 2 Review of 
European and Administrative Law 105.  
453  In developing the general principles of Union law as an important source of law, 
the Court has drawn intensively on the constitutional traditions of the Member 
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analysis of the raisons d’être of procedural autonomy (and therefore 
procedural divergence) but often rather constitute criticism on the alleged 
activism of the Court of Justice in this area. Although many of the (often 
non-legal) concerns are valid, it is unclear which purpose the principle or 
procedural autonomy serves as such from a purely legal point of view, or, to 
put it in another way, why divergence, as a result of autonomy, should be 
protected.454   
 
1.3  Effectiveness  
 
1.3.1  Definition and relevant developments 
 
The principle of effectiveness as a limit to procedural autonomy was already 
discussed in the previous section. Some more thoughts will be developed 
about the principle and its scope more in general, again to allow for better 
assessing what its significance should be when reflecting on the need for 
further harmonisation in the field of competition law. The starting point is 
the common (mis)use of effectiveness as an argument to defend more 
convergence and more harmonisation in procedural competition law. Is this 
in line with the way the concept has developed generally?   
 
The principle of effectiveness is clearly of essential importance for the 
functioning of the European legal order and it is generally acknowledged that 
its importance in the case-law of the Court has increased over the last 
years.455 Effectiveness is often considered to be a general principle of Union 
law; one can wonder however if its scope is sufficiently clear to actually give 
it that status (see below). It is not, as many other principles given that status 
by the Court, common to most domestic legal systems of the Member States 
as such or derived from national systems by the Courts. This has to do with 
the fact that it is very much linked to the specific characteristics of Union 
law: enforcement of Union law is dependant on decentralised application 
through the existing structures in the Member States.  
 
The focus of its application has been on the national level. Effectiveness 
works in two ways: it is a way of shaping the enforcement of the law but also 
a way of measuring its enforcement.456  
States. A good example of how a general principle in procedural law of Member 
States is given the status of general principle of EU law by the Court (application of 
more lenient sanction), judment in Berlusconi (below n 492).  
454  Legal certainty is of course also a general principle of Union law, and obviously it 
is conceivable to argue that procedural divergence can lead to a decrease in legal 
certainty. However, if that were the argument, it would plead in favor of 
harmonisation at the EU level in an appropriate and foreseeable way.  
455  The distinction between procedural and substantive effectiveness is discussed by 
F. Snyder in his authoritative article ‘The effectiveness of European Community 
Law: institutions, processes, tools and techniques’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 
19; also M. Accetto and S. Zleptnig, ‘The principle of effectiveness: rethinking its 
role in Community law’ (2005) 11 European Public Law 375 [377]. 
456  Accetto and Zleptnig, ‘The principle of effectiveness’ (above n 455) [379]. 
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The relationship between effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial 
protection is obvious but not easy to qualify.457 It appears already from the 
brief discussion above that the principle of effective judicial protection has 
enhanced the development and the scope of the Courts case-law in relation 
to national procedural law. The protection of the individual’ access to a court 
has been a central point of attention. Whereas it is often presented the other 
way around (effectiveness as simply a specific application of the right to 
(effective) judicial protection458), the approach in this article, from the 
perspective of procedure, is that effectiveness goes much beyond effective 
judicial protection. In short: effectiveness is about implementation, 
enforcement and compliance of Union law.459 If we add on the broader, non-
legal connotations of effectiveness, the formula would be “implementation, 
enforcement, impact and compliance.”460 Effectiveness as a broader concept, 
can also mean fulfilling the objectives of the European Union. 
 
1.3.2  Status, role and significance  
 
The principle of effectiveness is easily invoked but difficult to apprehend. 
Part of the confusion surrounding it is due to the question of the legal basis 
of the principle. If effectiveness is a general principle of law, this question 
becomes less important but even that status is unclear. Reference is often 
made to Article 10 EC Treaty (now Article 4 (3) TEU: the duty of loyalty of 
Member States). The obligation for Member States to create an efficient 
system of legal remedies (Article 19 (1) TEU) follows up on the duty to 
cooperate and from that perspective effectiveness, or more exactly effective 
judicial protection, is related to the principles laid down in the treaties 
mentioned before. There is a relationship also with Articles 6 and 13 ECHR 
and the EU Charter on fundamental rights in that same perspective of 
protecting rights of individuals.461 
 
457  See S. Prechal, ‘EC requirements for an effective remedy’ (above n 416). Part of the 
confusion comes from the fact that the Court sometimes uses both as 
interchangeable, for example in Safalero, the Court examines a national rule 
directly on the basis of effective judicial protection without even mentioning 
effectiveness, Case C-13/01 Safalero Srl v Prefetto di Genova [2003] ECR I-08679 
[49-50].  
458  Perhaps it is a question of perspective: from the perspective of individual judicial 
protection, that right encompasses more than only effectiveness; but from the 
perspective of procedure as a whole (more than only access and remedies for 
individuals), effectiveness is the broader principle.  
459  Accetto and Zleptnig, ‘The principle of effectiveness’ (above n 455). 
460  Expression used by Snyder, ‘The effectiveness of European Community Law’ (above 
n 455). 
461  Article 47 of the Charter on fundamental rights: it describes the right to an 
effective remedy; see also P. Oliver, ‘Le règlement 1/2003 et les principes 
d’efficacité et d’équivalence’ (2007) 41 Cahiers de droit européen 351 [356]. For a 
recent mention of the link to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR in an area related to 
competition, ECJ Cases C-317 to 320/08, Alassini and others, not yet reported.  
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It can be argued that this is only part of the story because the provisions 
cited above only cover certain aspects of effectiveness, namely the most 
visible (or most controversial) ones focusing on individual effective judicial 
protection.462 Even though the case-law might concern primarily the private 
enforcement of Union law by individuals463, the scope is broader: 
effectiveness is a general principle that goes beyond the obligations laid 
down in Article 4 (3) TEU and the requirements of individual judicial 
protection.  
 
Snyder has distinguished at least seven types of effectiveness: the enactment 
of Union policy through Union legislation, the application of Union rules by 
Member States, the implementation of directives and other legislation into 
national law or administrative practices, the use of Union law by individuals 
that orient their behaviour in relation to Union law, litigation in national 
course on the basis of Union law, and enforcement of Union law by national 
courts and authorities.464 These are all ways of optimalizing the enforcement 
of the law.  
 
Effectiveness of Union law is realized through a complex interaction of 
legislation, case-law and policy and both at the Union and at the national 
level. Effectiveness is about structures, about optimalizing the institutional 
balance, especially in a federal or supranational system. Decentralisation 
and centralisation forces are part of every legal systems’ search for 
effectiveness.465 These forces also explain to a large extent the developments 
in competition law discussed below: decentralisation of enforcement as a 
way to make enforcement more effective.   Effectiveness is therefore also 
about efficiency, the efficiency of a legal system, in this case the Union legal 
order.466  
 
Two further specific questions about the role and significance of effectiveness 
shall be adressed here. They are inspired by the debate on further 
harmonisation in competition law and the answers should contribute to this 
debate (third part below). The first is whether effectiveness also comprises 
effective enforcement of the state against the individual and the second 
whether effectiveness requires uniformity (the latter is discussed below in 
1.3.3).  
 
462  The unsatisfactory nature of these legal basis, also argued by Eilmansberger ‘The 
relationship between rights and remedies in EC law’ (above n 421). 
463  Kilpatrick, ‘The future of remedies in Europe’ (above n 452). 
464  Snyder, ‘The effectiveness of European Community Law’ (above n 455) [25-26].  
465  Snyder, ‘The effectiveness of European Community Law’ (above n 455) and for an 
interesting description of this search in another area of law, see B. Keirsblick, ‘The 
limits of consumer law in Europe’, in E. Claes, W. Devroe and B. Keirsblick (eds) 
Facing the limits of the law (Berlin: Springer, 2009).  
466  The EU is a comprehensive and distinct legal order, ECJ Case C-50/00P UPA 
[2002] ECR I-6677; see K. Lenaerts, ‘The rule of law and the coherence of the 
judicial system of the European Union’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 
1625. 
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Effective enforcement is not always about enforcing the rights an individual 
derives from EU law against the state or another individual but enforcement 
can necessitate actions by the state against the individual. If effectiveness is 
a broad principle as proposed above, it should include this dimension. 
However, given the focus on effective judicial protection and the doubts 
about how both concepts relate to each other, it is not clear how and to what 
extent effectiveness comprises effective enforcement in the above sense. 
There are very few examples of cases where the Court has dealt with the 
dimension of effective enforcement against individuals.467 The question is 
crucial because in competition law rules are enforced against undertakings 
and infringements are sanctioned. The enforcement rules that are potentially 
the subject of harmonisation (see below) also include rules that do not 
protect rights of individuals or provide remedies. Their application might be 
to the detriment of individuals or affect them negatively. It is argued here 
that effectiveness as a broad concept which is meant to contribute to 
fulfilling the objectives of the European Union, should logically include this 
specific dimension of effective enforcement. Nevertheless, these aspects are 
underdeveloped in the current state of the law and there is no clear basis in 
the ECJ’s case-law to defend this.         
 
1.3.3  Does effectiveness require uniformity and/or convergence?  
 
A second question of interest here is if the principle of effectiveness actually 
requires convergence, or even uniformity of procedural law? As one author 
has pointed out, competition specialists, many of which support and call for 
harmonisation of procedural law468, might overestimate the case-law on 
effectiveness.469  
 
The scope of application of effectiveness is unclear in the area of procedural 
law and the case-law discussed above is so open-ended that virtually any 
rule of procedural law seems potentially subject to being an obstacle to the 
467  There is the area of state aid that could provide some indications: when the Court 
insists that procedural rules should be interpreted in such a way as to allow 
maximum chances to oblige undertakings to reimburse illegal state aid, this could 
be seen as an example of effective enforcement having an impact on procedural law 
for the sake of efficient enforcement against individuals. However, the setting is 
specific: because effective judicial protection shall also be the objective of the 
intervention of the national judge who shall often intervene and have to order 
reimbursement at the demand of a competitor, for an overview of the far-reaching 
responsibilities of judges in this respect, Comission Notice on the enforcement of 
state aid law by national courts [2009] OJ C 85/1. It is only for sanctions that the 
CJEU seems to have dealt with this dimension (see on this case-law below 2.3.1) to 
the extent that the basis principles for sanctions have been set out but that does 
not allow us to answer the question whether the Court would require a procedural 
rule to be overruled for the sake of effectiveness if the result affects the individual 
undertaking negatively.  
468  See hereinafter about the recent reports on Reg. 1/2003, in section 2.4.  
469  P. Oliver, ‘Le règlement 1/2003’ (above n 461) [353].  
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effet utile of Union law.470 The potential scope is therefore enormous. The 
Courts approach has been labelled as selectively deferent but the criteria for 
the selectivity are not very clear.471 What is clear is that the focal point of the 
case-law on effectiveness has been on creating standing and remedies to 
make sure individuals can invoke Union law at a national level.  
 
However, there are no convincing arguments to claim that effectiveness goes 
so far as to require uniformity of national procedural law. Effectiveness was 
developed as a limit to national procedural autonomy which is the standard 
by which enforcement of Union law was organised. If effective application 
were to require uniformity in procedural rules, large parts of Union law 
would simply be totally inefficient. Even in those areas where the Treaties 
provide for harmonisation of national measures for the accomplishment of 
the internal market, the purpose is not unifying the law. Harmonisation is 
not equal to uniformization. On the contrary, the case-law of the Courts 
shows that it is sometimes best to accept some divergence for the sake of 
allowing national rules to be applied if there are general principles such as 
legal certainty at stake. 472 The principle of effectiveness, even in its broadest 
meaning, cannot be said to require uniformity.473 
 
If effectiveness does not require uniformity of procedural law, can it be said 
to require convergence? This is an even more difficult question. If the 
difference between procedural rules causes an individual’s legal position to 
be substantially different from one Member States to another, this seems 
problematic. When one thinks of a concrete example in the area of 
competition law, it might appear wrong that in Member State A the 
prescription period for cartel investigations is five years whereas in Member 
State B an authority might be able to go back ten years in time. This 
impression shall exist even more if an example is taken in the area of 
sanctions: imagine if the same infringement were to be punishable in 
Member State A with a sanction going up to maximum 5 % of a company 
turnover, whereas in Member State B, the fine can go to maximum 10 % 
turnover and the personnel of the company can be imprisoned. This type of 
divergence is currently a reality.  
 
From the perspective of the individual market player, the absence of a level 
playing field and equal procedural conditions in the different Member States, 
470  A. Ward, Judicial review and the rights of private parties (above n 416) [193]. 
471  T. Tridimas, ‘Enforcing Community rights in National Courts’ (above n 416). 
472  M. Tulibacka calls this the “bottom up” approach where the Court does not pose 
hard rules for national judges but encourages mutual trust and recognition (above 
n 414). Her analysis concerns private enforcement but it is based on the ECJ’s 
case-law related also to administrative procedures, e.g. ECJ Case C-455/08, 
European Commission v Ireland. not yet reported. 
473  Van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’ (above n 416) defends that it 
would be best for rights to be determined equally for all citizens across Europe by 
the EU legislature; uniformity is required where the constitutive conditions for 
remedies are concerned; however for the form and extent of the remedy, it is not 
realistic to abandon national competence.  
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might be an obstacle to trade and might create barriers to trade. It is fair to 
say however that this is quite an indirect relationship with the internal 
market; it is certainly not self-evident in view of the case law.474 In any case, 
this perspective is relevant mostly where the individual is on the demanding 
side (exercising rights), for example when he is a complainant before an 
authority or when he notifies an agreement or requests leniency. Related to 
the absence of a level-playing field is an argument based on equal treatment 
and non-discrimination. It does not seem right that rules would be different 
and therefore companies in a similar situation might be treated differently 
without being able to choose themselves in which jurisdiction their case is 
dealt with. The examples above (prescription and sanctions) appeal to this 
type of reasoning.   
 
However, strictly speaking, the effectiveness of the enforcement of EU 
(antitrust) law is not at stake when the procedural law of two Member States 
is different. This would be the case if in a particular case the enforcement 
rules were such as to render the application of competition rules very 
difficult, or if they are not equivalent to the rules applicable to similar 
national cases. Equivalence between the laws of different Member States is 
not part of the test of effectiveness (effet utile) of Union law, even in its most 
intrusive form (see above).  
 
The purpose here is not to minimalize the negative effects of divergence 
between procedural laws in the Member States but merely to show that the 
principle of effectiveness of Union law cannot serve so easily as an argument 
to condemn divergence and push for convergence or harmonisation.  
 
The arguments above however do bring the principle of equivalence back into 
the picture, of which it was said in the introduction that is is not the primary 
focus of this article. Another type of equivalence appears here: not the 
equivalence of the case-law of the ECJ which has to do with coherence 
within the domestic law system (comparing claims based on national law 
and EU law)475 but coherence and consistency of the enforcement of EU law 
throughout the EU, making sure undertakings are treated equally in the 
Member States. The Court sometimes refers to equivalence in this way in 
relation to the importance of uniform interpretation.476 This type of 
474  We refer here to the judgment in Case C-412/97 Fenocchio [1999] ECR I-3845. The 
Court stated very categorically in relation to an Italian rule (rec. 11): “It is true that 
the effect of the national provision is to subject traders to different procedural rules 
according to whether they supply goods within the Member State concerned or 
export them to other Member States. However, the possibility that nationals would 
therefore hesitate to sell goods to purchasers established in other Member States is 
too uncertain and indirect for that national provision to be regarded as liable to 
hinder trade between Member States”. And in this case there was a difference 
within the same Member State.  
475  The principle is very much (still or again) present in recent cases on procedural 
autonomy, for example ECJ Case C-445/06, Danske Slagterier, not yet reported. 
476  See in Tele2 (above n 434) [26].  
CHAPTER 6 
 154
equivalence resembles what one would expect in a perfectly integrated 
market.  
 
1.4  Intermediate conclusion on procedural autonomy and 
effectiveness  
 
This overview shows that neither the principle of procedural autonomy, nor 
the principle of effectiveness are clear-cut concepts that can be readily 
applied. Their scope and definition are subject to discussion and they are 
evolving concepts. In a discussion on harmonisation there shall not be a 
simple choice between one or the other, they are not clearly opposite forces 
either. Procedural autonomy is a standard which is generally under pressure 
in EU law, especially when it comes to standing and remedies for 
individuals. Effectiveness potentially has a large scope of application but its 
boundaries are unclear. It is unlikely that effectiveness can be construed to 
require uniformity of procedural law and it is too straightforward to claim 
that procedural divergence is in itself a problem in view of the principle of 
effectiveness as it stands now. 
 
2.  The enforcement model of EU competition law  
 
The discussion above already integrated some developments and examples 
from the area of competition law.  Now, before addressing the question of 
further harmonisation, the relevant context of the enforcement of 
competition law shall be discussed. The following features of the relevant 
legal environment shall be highlighted in that respect: the different layers of 
enforcement, the existing mechanisms of convergence and harmonisation 
and the recent evaluation of Reg. 1/2003 which has put the question of 
further harmonisation on the agenda again.  
 
2.1  Division of tasks, competences and layers of enforcement   
 
Both the prohibition on cartels and restrictive agreements in Article 101 
TFEU (former 81 EC) and the prohibition on the abuse of dominant 
provisions in Article 102 TFEU (former 82 EC) are directly applicable and 
therefore enforceable in private litigation before the national judge.477 It is 
equally well known that Reg. 17 of the Council (1962) enabled the 
Commission to enforce Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty (85 and 86 EEC at the 
time) in individual cases and sanction the undertakings responsible for the 
infringements.478 The Council also laid down the framework for the 
investigative and decision-making procedure that the Commission was to 
follow. In 2004, Reg. 1/2003 replaced Reg. 17 and consolidated a number of 
477  ECJ Case 13/6, Bosch [1962] ECR 93. With the exception of course of the third 
paragraph of Article 85 (the exception with four conditions) EEC (now 101 TFEU) 
for which, on the basis of Reg. 17/62 only the Commission was competent.  
478  Council Regulation (EEC) No 17 (First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty) [1959-62] OJ Spec Ed 87. 
DECENTRALISATION OF COMPETITION LAW: SACRIFICING PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY?
155 
rules concerning the procedural framework at the level of the Commission 
whilst also extending its investigative powers.479  
 
Reg. 1/2003 is most well known for the decentralisation of enforcement of 
competition law, bringing in the picture the third player in the field of the 
enforcement of EU competition law, the national competition authorities.480 
On the basis of Article 35 of the regulation, each Member state designated 
the institution that is to be considered as “national competition authority” 
and responsible for the application of Article 81 and 82 EC “in such a way 
that the provisions of this regulation are effectively complied with”.  
 
The simultaneous enforcement through private enforcement and public 
enforcement, and, in particular, the existence of a strong enforcement 
agency with important powers at the European level, is characteristic for this 
area of Union law. The decentralisation of this enforcement by using the 
parallel competences of the Commission on the one hand, and the national 
competition authorities that now exist in all Member States on the other 
hand, is also a typical feature in terms of enforcement.  
 
The point to keep in mind here is therefore that we are dealing with 
enforcement of a set of directly applicable rules in a multi-layer context: the 
different levels of enforcement complement each other but also reinforce 
each other: the procedures in front of the Commission, the authorities and 
the courts each have specific features but they all have the power to 
establish infringements by individuals to EU competition rules and to 
sanction such an infringement in some way or another. In other words, 
enforcement of EU competition rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) is not 
solely in the hands of the national judge; he or she is much less the premier 
juge communautaire in that sense.481  
479  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003/EC on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. For an 
analysis of the network based ECN enforcement model from a governance 
perspective, see M. de Visser, Network-based governance in EC law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009); on the background of the reform and its impact: C. Ehlermann, 
‘The modernisation of EC antitrust policy: a legal and cultural revolution’ (2000) 37 
Common Market Law Review 537.  
480  More and more observers have since then rightly pointed out that the so-called 
decentralisation also carries in it a number of centralising elements giving the 
Commission a more prominent role than ever in determining competition policy. 
This is in fact already clear from the text of the regulation itself; recital 34 is 
striking in that respect: “The principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty, as they have been applied by Reg. 17, have given a central role to the Union 
bodies. This central role should be retained, whilst associating the Member States 
more closely with the application of Union competition rules. “ 
481  According to recital 7 of Reg. 1/2003 the role of the national courts complements 
that of the competition authorities of the Member States when deciding disputes 
between private individuals. The complementary character here refers mostly to 
the fact that one of the main differences of private and public enforcement is that 
the judge can also protect subjective rights and award damages, something 
competition authorities, acting in the public interest, can generally not do.  
CHAPTER 6 
 156
2.2   Convergence mechanisms   
 
The terms convergence and harmonisation can cover a variety of situations. 
Convergence is used here to qualify a relatively spontaneous process, 
stimulated by various forms of cooperation between the Member States and 
with the Union institutions. Convergence can be triggered by direct or 
indirect pressure but it is not so much a directed process.  
 
In this area specifically, convergence at a procedural level is stimulated by 
the similarity of the material rules that are being enforced: the prohibition on 
cartels and abuse of dominant position, the control on concentrations. This 
similarity enhances spontaneous convergence due to the interaction between 
substance and procedure.482  
 
For the sake of this contribution, harmonisation refers to a process which is 
more directed and follows an intervention either by the Courts formulating 
legal principles that are binding on Member States, or an intervention by the 
legislator. In other words, the term is used in a broader way than the strict 
legal definition which refers to a particular instrument of legislation designed 
and used at the level of the European Union, following specific procedures 
that are laid down in the treaties.   
 
It is clear that defined in this way, the difference between harmonisation and 
convergence is nuanced.  The two terms are used especially to indicate the 
difference in origin of the process and the degree of spontaneity: convergence 
is a “bottom up” process, whereas, harmonisation is a “top down” process: 
the origin might be legislation but also other explicit initiatives taken at the 
European level, e.g. by the Commission, or by judgment rendered by the 
Courts. The “bottom up” aspect of convergence is what possibly differentiates 
this development from convergence in other areas such as for example in 
civil law where there can be a horizontal movement,483 bringing the law of 
Member States closer together but without going towards an existing model 
(see below, this is different in competition law, 2.2.1). 
 
Two related mechanisms of convergence specific to competition shall be 
briefly discussed: convergence towards the Commission model of 
enforcement and convergence due to the existence and the activities of the 
ECN network. Both are reinforced by the fact that the Member States made a 
482  Gerbrandy, Convergentie in het mededingingsrecht (above n 413), containing a 
detailed study of convergence in Dutch administrative law in the area of 
competition law; also in her article cited in note 452 on the way towards a 
procedural ius commune.  
483  On the attempts to develop a ius commune, often based on a comparative 
approach searching for underlying common or general principles, Gerbrandy, 
Convergentie in het mededingingsrecht (above n 419) and Tulibacka, 
‘Europeanization of civil procedures’ (above n 416). 
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choice to align their national substantive law to EU law, which then often 
supposes the support for maximal convergence in practice.484 
 
2.2.1  Convergence as a result of the specific role of the Commission 
 
As it was said above, the area of competition law is one of the few areas 
where enforcement is not left entirely to the legal systems of the Member 
States but where the Commission itself has important operational powers.485 
In fact, the Commission is the most important enforcer of competition rules 
in the EU, even more so since decentralisation. Enforcement is based on 
parallel competences of the Commission, the national judges and the 
national authorities but the features of the system are such that the 
Commission not only takes the lead in high profile cases but also supervises 
national enforcement.  
 
From this perspective, competition law enforcement was, from the beginning, 
an exception to the general enforcement framework in Union law, which was 
based on decentralized enforcement. Procedural autonomy was not the (only) 
standard for the organization of enforcement. Apart from the national judge 
who was under the same obligations to ensure direct effect and effectiveness 
as in other areas, there was a central enforcement body with its own set of 
procedural rules.486 The division of competences in this area of law is 
different in terms of enforcement and now also clearly specific in terms of 
competences: reference is made to Article 3 TFEU: competition law has been 
included in the (short) list of exclusive competences of the Union. This 
exclusive competence can be seen to reinforce the role of the Commission.  
 
The tendency of national systems to converge towards the enforcement 
model of the Commission’s procedures then seems logical and natural. There 
is usually an explicit choice on behalf of the national legislator not only to 
adopt a national competition law similar or identical to the relevant EU 
provisions, but often also a desire to align the further interpretation and 
enforcement of the national law to the EU practice. The result is often 
convergence of national institutional structures and procedural rules going 
towards the “Commission model”. This can be through adoption of national 
legislation, or by way of case-law of the national courts, who, when in doubt, 
interpret national rules in line of the EU enforcement system. 
484  On the explicit choice of the Dutch legislator to align its law, its interpretation and 
application to the EU model, see Gerbrandy, Convergentie in het mededingingsrecht 
(above n 413); also F. Vogelaar on the margin that remains for national rules or 
policy, ‘Interface: EC and Dutch competition law’, in D. Obradovic and N. Lavranos 
Interface between EU law and national law (above n 422) [187-201].  
485  The term operational powers is taken from J.A.E. Vervaele, The Europeanisation of 
Criminal law and the Criminal law dimension of European integration, research 
paper (College of Europe, 2005, Brussels) accessible via 
 http://www.coleurop.be/template.asp?pagename=lawpapers (accessed on 1 March 
2010).  
486  See M. Tulibacka, ‘Europeanization of civil procedures’ (above n 414).  
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2.2.2  Convergence through the network of competition authorities 
 
One of the great novelties of Reg.1/2003 was the creation of the ECN 
network. It is in itself a very important source of convergence. The mere fact 
of the existence of the network and the exchanges between authorities it 
implies, is already a trigger for convergence.487  
 
Attention is drawn specifically also to more explicit “quasi legislative” 
initiatives taken in this respect. The ECN model program for leniency is the 
best example.488 The work inside the network creates involvement of the 
Member States, but of course in a specific way: the Member States are 
represented by their competition authorities, even though in some cases the 
government is involved directly or indirectly. The work is carried out without 
the involvement of the Union legislator, or the national legislators. These last 
institutions might be involved in a later stage if and when an initiative to 
change the (formal) national legislation is necessary as a consequence of the 
work done inside ECN.  
 
2.3  Harmonisation mechanisms  
 
In the enforcement system of competition law as it stands today, there are a 
number of different mechanisms of harmonisation that can be identified and 
that should not be underestimated. Judicial harmonisation is briefly 
situated first and is of course not unique to competition law; secondly some 
remarks shall be made about the harmonising effects of Regulation 1/2003.  
 
2.3.1  Judicial harmonisation: different forms and different actors  
 
Judicial harmonisation of procedural law takes place by way of case law. A 
perhaps less controversial term for the same phenomenon would be the 
regulating effect of the Courts case law.489 In this particular context, this 
case-law does not only originate in the ECJ in Luxemburg but there is 
487  See M. de Visser, Network-based governance in EC law (above n 479), on the 
network also the thorough study by S. Brammer, Cooperation between national 
competition agencies in the enforcement of EC competition law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2009).  
488  The model program was designed within the network, then published, and after a 
few years an evaluation was recently carried out to measure the degree of 
convergence, see for status, DG Comp website:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html (accessed on 1 March 
2010). It was no surprise that many Member States chose not only to adopt a form 
of leniency containing similar if not identical terms as the model program but that 
also many chose to use the format also used by the Commission, namely soft law 
(notice, communications etc. ). The model program was drafted in such a way that 
it could just be copied and translated.  
489  This term is used by J. Vervaele, The Europeanisation of Criminal law (above n 
485).  
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definitely also the influence of the ECHR and its judgments in the area of fair 
trial and due process.490 Some categories shall be distinguished very briefly.  
 
First of all, there is the case-law of the ECJ based on effectiveness, discussed 
briefly above (sections 1.2. and 1.3). This case-law has had an effect both on 
institutional aspects as well as on actual procedural rules, especially 
regarding access to court and remedies, but also time-delays and 
jurisdiction, the obligation to raise arguments ex officio etc.491 
 
A clear example of the case-law based on effectiveness is related to 
sanctions. In an area like competition law where fines can be very 
substantial, this case-law is crucial so it will be discussed a bit further. 
When it comes to sanctions, the Courts general case-law on effectiveness, 
provides for broad principles: sanctions for infringement of Union law should 
be effective, dissuasive and proportionate.492 In the context of public 
enforcement, there is no doubt that these general principles have been 
incorporated into the practice of the Commission and endorsed in the 
General Court’s (formerly the Court of First Instance) and the ECJ’s case-law 
on fines.493 Moreover, even if certain Member States have not yet adopted 
specific guidelines for the calculation of fines, the requirements of “effective, 
dissuasive and proportionate” sanctions will usually be applied by national 
authorities. If they are not laid down in legislation, guidelines or national soft 
law equivalents, they simply apply by way of the case-law of the EU Courts. 
This is one of the clearest examples of the judicial harmonisation.  
 
There is an additional reason why the case-law of the CJEU has considerable 
impact in the area of sanctions. Whilst sometimes leaving quite some margin 
to the Commission in terms of its substantive analysis of a restrictive 
practice, the Courts use their full jurisdiction when it comes to fines (Article 
261 TFEU) and there is substantial case-law on fining practices, especially at 
490  Van Gerven distinguishes europeanization and communautarization of procedural 
law; the first including the influence of the ECHR and the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in that respect; Van Gerven, ‘Bridging the gap’ (above n 416). 
491  In the pending case VEBIC, ECJ case C-439/08, VEBIC, a Belgian preliminary 
reference concerning the role of the NCA in appeal proceedings, OJ 2008, C 
313/19, institutional autonomy is at stake: the ECJ shall have to decide how far 
the application of the principle of effectiveness can lead.  
492  See Prechal, ‘EC requirements for an effective remedy’ (above n 416); see also ECJ 
cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02, Berlusconi [2008] ECR I-3565, where 
the Court discussed the principle of the retroactive application of the more lenient 
penalty. The principle having been consecrated as a general principle of EU law, is 
thus part of the legal rules applying, in a uniform way, to all authorities fining an 
infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  
493  See the most recent guidelines on the calculation of fines: Commission Guidelines 
on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 
[2006] OJ C 210/2; extensive case-law on fines in the last years at the level of the 
CFI confirming these principles, some references in section 3.5 of the guidelines.  
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the level of the General Court.494 Combined with the voluntary convergence 
of the Member States to follow the European model discussed above, this 
case-law can have harmonising effects.   
 
It is self-evident however, that broadly formulated principles set the scene for 
the calculation of fines and are binding both on national judges and on 
competition authorities but are not capable by themselves to create sufficient 
transparency on the method of calculation, all the different factors to take 
into account and the final result. Therefore these examples show the impact 
of the Courts case-law but also its limits. In practice, there appear to be 
substantial differences amongst Member States, both in terms of methods of 
calculation and procedure, as well as in terms of the actual result, the actual 
fine.495  
 
The case-law of the Courts has also had a substantial impact on national 
procedural law, on the basis of the right to effective judicial protection. The 
subjects include the rights of complainants, the right of access to file, the 
right to a hearing, the duty to motivate etc.496 The harmonising effect of 
these principles is inevitable and comes from cumulated sources of law: 
national law, the ECHR, EU law.497 This is again a strong example of judicial 
harmonisation. Large parts of procedural rules have been harmonised 
without any formal harmonisation taking place.  
 
Last but not least, attention should be drawn to the case-law emphasizing 
consistency and uniform application of EU law, and more specifically the 
494  See for some important recent cases at the level of the General Court: T-174/05, 
Elf Aquitane not yet reported, on the same day: T-175/05, Akzo Nobel and Arkema, 
not yet published: in all these cases the role of fundamental rights and principles 
developed in the case-law is very clear; (more rare) a judgment of the ECJ: ECJ 
Cases C-322/07 P, C-327/07 P and C-338/07 P, Bolloré and others not yet 
reported.  
495  This point is elaborated because the subject of sanctions is one of the most 
important subjects of divergence identified in the reports on Reg. 1 for further 
convergence or harmonisation, see below in section 2.4.  
496  It would lead to far in this article to give an extensive overview of the vast amount 
of case law, reference is made to overview of antitrust procedure in: L. Ortiz 
Branco, EC competition procedure (Oxford: OUP, 2006), C. Kerse and N. Khan, EC 
antitrust procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005).  
497  Access to the investigation file for the plaintiff (subject of the investigation) is an 
example: derived from Article 6 ECHR, recognized in the case-law of the European 
Courts, laid down in guidelines of the Commission and now consolidated in Reg. 
1/2003 and following regulations (more specifically Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ L 123/18). 
Procedural law in the 27 Member States and at the EU level contain the same rule. 
Only the technicalities of the access might still be different. This example also 
shows the links between competition law and other areas of law where the rights of 
plaintiffs shall be construed on the basis of the same case law, such as for 
example criminal law. On this point, overview by Kerse and Khan, EC Antitrust 
procedure (above n 496) [214].  
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obligation for courts and authorities to interpret their procedural law in 
conformity with EU law as much as they possibly can when they are dealing 
with the application of EU law: this is a powerful mechanism which can be 
at the basis of the movement towards convergence described under 2.2.498   
 
2.3.2  Harmonisation by legislation: Reg.1   
 
Whether or not the term harmonisation is appropriate when a regulation is 
used, it is clear that Regulation 1/2003 itself contains a number of 
provisions that can be considered equivalent to harmonisation measures, in 
the sense that national laws are approximated, or rather, even uniformized. 
Disputes about the implementation like in the context of directives are 
avoided; the harmonising effect is stronger because regulations are binding 
in their entirety and transposition measures are not required. 
 
If we turn now to the two key concepts analyzed above in part 1, Regulation 
1/2003 contains frequent direct or indirect references to effectiveness, but 
no explicit mention of procedural autonomy. There is however a statement in 
rec. 34 referring to subsidiarity and proportionality: “… this regulation does 
not beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objective, which to allow 
the Community competition rules to be applied effectively”.  
 
There are a few examples of references to the Member States competence in 
the area of procedure but not many.  The clearest and most explicit, 
reference is, interestingly, related to the institutional structure of the 
national competition authorities.499 In recital 35 of the regulation:  
 
“In order to attain a proper enforcement of Community competition law, 
Member States should designate and empower authorities to apply Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty as public enforcers. They should be able to 
designate administrative as well as judicial authorities to carry out the 
various functions conferred upon competition authorities in this regulation. 
This regulation recognises the wide variation which exists in the public 
enforcement systems of the Member States. …”  
 
This phrase acknowledges institutional divergence (“recognizes”) but not 
more than that. It is not a statement recalling procedural autonomy; it 
expresses more an acknowledgment of a factual situation which can be the 
subject of further evolution. The underlying assumption at the time of the 
adoption of the regulation that naturally more convergence would occur in 
498  The message coming from the EU Court that EU-conform interpretation is a 
general obligation under EU law, can reinforce legislators, courts and authorities 
in their ‘spontaneous’ will to converge, and in the same movement procedure in 
national cases, can be influenced.  
499  The idea was already expressed above that there is more reluctance to interfere 
with institutional autonomy than with procedural autonomy. On this distinction, 
Kakouris, note 416 above.  
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this respect, is now confirmed by the reports of the Commission on the 
functioning of the regulation (see under the next session).500   
 
There are a number of provisions in the regulation that directly or indirectly 
touch on national procedures. Three different examples shall be given: it is 
not an exhaustive overview but the examples are chosen because they each 
illustrate a different type of intervention in national procedural law.  
 
First, Article 2 of Reg. 1/2003 which lays down a rule on the burden of 
proof. It is clearly formulated as a rule that should apply in any proceedings 
related to Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU, be it before the courts, before 
national competition authorities, in a Commission investigation or before the 
Union courts.501 Such an explicit rule of procedure formulating a basic 
principle which impacts the whole course of proceedings, is 
remarkable.502Although it is difficult to reconstruct the discussions about 
this, it is likely that this article was fairly uncontroversial because the rule it 
formulates is a long established one in Union law and in the majority, if not 
all, legal systems of the Member States (actori incumbit probatio). Therefore 
it merely consolidates a pre-existing rule “common to the traditions of all 
Member States”. Also, because it is a pre-existing rule, most Member States 
will not have felt it was necessary to take measures for modifying theirs laws 
to incorporate it. Nevertheless, as a precedent of pure and simple 
harmonisation of procedural law its importance cannot be underestimated.  
 
500  This assumption at the time of the regulation that convergence of procedural laws 
was to occur, appears clearly from the discussions at the EUI conference of 2002: 
proceedings published in C. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds) European 
Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the EU Network of Competition 
Authorities (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); see the contribution of C. Gauer, ‘Does 
effectiveness of the EU network of competition authorities require a certain degree 
of harmonisation of national procedures and sanctions?’, also a noted call for 
convergence from the Economic and Social Committee in its opinion, Opinion of 
the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, 
(EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 (“Regulation implementing Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty”) [2001] OJ 155/73; F. Vogelaar observes a conscious choice 
of the Community institutions to have no top down harmonisation but to wait for a 
bottom up approximation of the laws (above n 484).  
501  Article 2 reads as follows: In any national or Community proceedings for the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the burden of proving an infringement 
of Article 81(1) or of Article 82 of the Treaty shall rest on the party or the authority 
alleging the infringement. The burden of proof is then reversed for the exception of 
Article 81(3): The undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that 
paragraph are met.  
502  Reference should be made again here to the relationship between substance and 
procedure; it is far from clear that the rule on the burden of proof is only a rule of 
procedure, see also: L. Parret, ‘Sense and nonsense of rules on proof in cartel 
cases’ (2008) 4 European Competition Journal 169.  
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Another instance where the regulation intervenes in procedural law in a 
direct way is by the creation of the amicus curiae system. On the basis of 
Article 15 of the Regulation, the Commission, and national authorities can 
intervene in proceedings before national courts.503 This system again implies 
both consequences for the procedural rules governing private enforcement 
(how and when can they intervene) as well as for the rules on public 
enforcement (how and when does the national authority intervene).504  
 
Thirdly, Article 16 of the regulation can be cited: both national judges as well 
as national competition authorities, are obliged to ensure that do not take 
decisions that are contrary to a decision taken by the Commission on the 
same facts. The obligation to avoid conflicting decisions is justified by 
reference to the principles of legal certainty and uniform application of Union 
law.505 This provision can have serious procedural implications. For 
example, it might require setting aside important rules of procedure (be it for 
the judge or authority) to avoid giving a decision or to stay proceedings. In 
most legal systems, it is hardly imaginable that a court would refuse to 
render a decision on the merits when it has been asked to do so by a 
claimant. For an authority, it might also sometimes be questionable whether 
the mere fact that the Commission has taken a decision would be sufficient 
statement of reasons for its own decision.    
 
These three examples each show, in three different ways, how the regulation 
has an impact on national procedural law. The first (burden of proof) by 
regulating directly and imposing a specific rule which does not require 
further implementation; the second (amicus curiae) by creating a specific 
procedural modality, new to most legal systems and most probably requiring 
modifications of national law to make the effective application possible;506 
the third (avoiding conflicting decisions) is the most vague in terms of its 
procedural implications but has the potential to conflict with existing 
procedural rules both for courts or for authorities, as the examples above 
indicate.  
 
We can finally further illustrate this by one more remarkable example in the 
regulation. Article 3 §2 basically states that the application of national 
503  The possibility for a national court to ask the Commissions assistance is also 
confirmed but already existed and was promoted by a Commission Notice on 
cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty of 1993 [1993] OJ C 39/6, now replaced by a new 
Commission Notice on the cooperation between the Commission and the courts of 
the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC [2004] OJ (2004) 
C 101/04. The possibility to ask for assistance is much less radical in terms of 
interference with procedural law because it is up to the court to assess the 
possibility, the necessity and the modalities to do so.  
504  The Commission declared from the beginning that it would make scarce use of this 
possibility, perhaps also because of the controversial nature of it.  
505  Recital 22 of the regulation. 
506  Or alternatively requiring the judge to set aside any procedural rule hindering an 
amicus curiae intervention on the basis of effectiveness?  
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competition law cannot lead to a different result than the application of the 
corresponding EU provisions. Although strictly speaking this provision only 
concerns the result/outcome of a case, it seems to be given a much broader 
meaning. It is significant that the Commission itself calls it the “convergence 
rule”, the idea being that not only the result should be similar but the 
reasoning leading to the result and the modalities of application should be 
consistent.507 According to the Commission in its Communication, this is a 
question of primacy of European law. If that were the case, it seems that 
there is hardly any margin left for differences between national and EU law 
enforcement.  
 
2.4  The current situation and the call for more convergence  
 
The purpose of the previous sections (2.2 and 2.3) was not to give a detailed 
overview of which provisions are more or less harmonised508 but to show the 
variety of mechanisms that have an impact on the enforcement of EU 
competition rules today. Some of these mechanisms exist in various forms in 
all areas of EU law (judicial harmonisation by the Courts for example), 
others are more typical for competition law (the various forms of convergence 
related to the role of the Commission and the network).  
 
As it was provided for by the regulation itself, the Commission undertook a 
first evaluation of the application of Reg.1/2003 and prepared reports for the 
Council and the European Parliament.509 There is a strong emphasis on 
institutional and procedural convergence in the reports, even implying that 
convergence of procedures was the objective of the regulation.   
 
First, when it comes to the institutional framework for the implementation of 
EU competition rules, the Commission notes that although the regulation 
does not compel Member States to adopt a specific framework and 
“accomodates diversity”, many Member States have reinforced or reviewed 
their enforcement structures to “optimise their effectiveness”.510  
 
507  Report Reg. 1/2003, cited below, par 156 is remarkable and perhaps partly more 
wishful thinking than entirely in line with the case-law described above. According 
to the Commission, conduct to which Article 101 TFEU is not applicable, cannot 
be forbidden by national law; but if EU law is not applicable, how exactly can 
primacy come into play?...  
508  This type of comparative study would be very comprehensive but immensely useful 
in view of further harmonisation; some work will be done within ECN and by the 
Commission, as announced in the reports.  
509  Commission (EC) ‘Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003’ 
(Communication) COM (2009) 206 final, 29 April 2009 and the Commission (EC) 
‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council. 
Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003’ (Staff Working Paper) SEC (2009) 
574.  
510  Communication (n 509 above) [33-35]. This is further substantiated in the Staff 
Working paper, Chapter 5.1.2. entitled Evolving Structure of National Competition 
Authorities (above n 509) [58]. 
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Again, there is no mention of procedural autonomy as a principle to be 
protected as such. It is emphasized that in five years there has been a 
significant degree of evolution in enforcement structures with a movement to 
a system of one administrative authority investigating and deciding cases, in 
other words a system that resembles the Commission model.511 It is 
interesting to note that, apparently, the differences in institutional structure 
of the national competition authorities have not raised any particular issues 
in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.512 In other words, the 
(remaining) institutional divergence is not identified as a major problem.  
 
Secondly, when it comes to procedural rules, the reports start by qualifying 
the system set up by Reg. 1 as one where (pre-existing) substantive 
coherence is reconciled with procedural divergence and all in all the system 
is considered a success.513 Just as in the case of the institutional framework, 
the Commission then emphasises the “unprecedented degree of voluntary 
convergence” that has occurred.514 The tone is different here when 
divergence is discussed. A number of subjects of divergence are identified as 
subjects for further examination and reflection.515 Subjects mentioned 
include516 fines, criminal sanctions, liability of undertakings or associations, 
succession of undertakings, prescription periods, standard of proof, types of 
decisions and the possibility to set priorities. According to the Commission 
stakeholders have placed a “strong call for further harmonisation of 
procedures in the ECN”.517 In particular, different rules on sanctions seem to 
be an important source of concern, and in addition to the list mentioned 
above, other procedural subjects such as deadlines and the admissibility of 
evidence are mentioned.  
 
It appears from the above that the reports definitely seem to be more careful 
in their wording when it comes to institutional divergence/convergence than 
when it comes to procedural rules. Where these last rules are concerned, the 
Commission clearly announces that work will be undertaken in the ECN to 
explore how further convergence can be promoted and in which areas. 
 
511  Par. 193 for an overview of the Member States and their current systems. In par. 
54 the Commission explicitly states that the majority of the Member States have 
chosen the Commission model.  
512  The Commission does refer to the case of VEBIC, case C-439/08 (above n 481). 
513  Communication (above n 509) [ 31], Staff Working Paper (above n 509) [200].  
514  Overview in Staff Working Paper (above n 509) [202]. Examples include leniency 
practice where convergence was stimulated by the ECN Model program, the 
introduction of inspections in private premises, sector enquiries and commitment 
decisions. 
515  Communication (above n 509) [33], Staff Working Paper (above n 509) [200]. The 
Staff Working Paper indicates that the still existing divergences should not be 
underestimated and concern important procedural issues that may influence the 
outcome of individual cases. 
516  Staff Working Paper (above n 509) [203-207]. 
517  Id. [206].  
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3.  The question of further harmonisation  
 
The analysis of the relevance of the principles of procedural autonomy and 
effectiveness (section 1) and the description of some of the particularities of 
the existing system of enforcement of competition law (section 2) are 
intended as a contribution to the debate on whether or not further 
harmonisation of procedural competition law should be undertaken and if 
so, how. Based on these two parts, the question of further harmonisation of 
procedure (or enforcement rules) shall now be adressed. The following 
subquestions shall be briefly introduced: is harmonisation is actually 
required by virtue of the principle of effectiveness (3.1); is such 
harmonisation desirable (3.2); if so, would there be a legal basis for such 
harmonisation (3.3) and, finally by way of conclusion, if it is undertaken how 
should it be done and which are the essential issues that should be 
addressed (3.4).  The current situation is a particular one, simplifying 
somewhat: substantive EU and national law are identical and national 
procedural law has undergone considerable influence through various 
European mechanisms of convergence and harmonisation: these 
mechanisms are interrelated and they reinforce each other.   
 
3.1  Does effectiveness require harmonisation in a legal sense?   
 
If one presupposes that a solid legal basis could be found for harmonisation 
by Union legislation (see section 3.3. below), the question is whether 
effectiveness requires such a harmonisation.  
 
Eilmansberger argues that there are no general principles of law that require 
the creation of specific legal remedies.518 Is this reasoning valid in general for 
procedural rules? It was carefully suggested above that in any case 
effectiveness does not require uniformity or even convergence as such (above 
under section 1.3.3); some examples from the area of competition law were 
given. The answer therefore to the question whether further harmonisation is 
legally required is that, although the effectiveness of Union law might be 
endangered in one or the other specific national case by the application of a 
specific rule, it is far from evident that the principle requires that procedural 
law in the Member States be (further) harmonized. Arguments based on 
effectiveness are often made in competition circles but it is submitted that 
they require careful (re-)consideration. It is not a given fact that the current 
level of procedural divergence endangers the principle of effectiveness as it 
has been developed in the case-law so far.  
 
518  Eilmansberger, ‘The relationship between rights and remedies in EC law’ (above n 
421): he mentions consistency, uniformity, loyalty, effectiveness.  
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3.2  Is harmonisation otherwise necessary or desirable?  
 
It follows from the above that the starting point for answering this question 
is the following. The scope for harmonisation is determined by the different 
mechanisms of convergence and harmonisation described above in section 2. 
Otherwise resumed: the primacy of EU law (e.g. for the subjects regulated in 
Reg. 1/2003, see section 2.3.2), the harmonising effects of the case-law 
(section 2.3.1) and the more or less spontaneous convergence mechanisms 
(section 2.2), shall determine how much scope is left for harmonisation by 
legislation.  
 
The first consideration here is a very pragmatic one: further harmonisation 
simply seems to be the continuation of a natural process. As it was 
described above, the adoption and the recent evaluation of Reg. 1/2003 
demonstrate this: the remaining subjects of divergence seem now to be the 
few exceptions to the rule (in terms of quantity) and they might as well be 
taken away. The tendency towards convergence is so strong that it also 
seems almost counterintuitive to put a halt to this development.  
 
Harmonisation not only seems natural (in which ever form) but can indeed 
also be desirable from a viewpoint of equality and equivalence, effective 
enforcement, and consistency and coherence of EU and national law.   
 
We should be sensitive to the fact that in this area of law, the legal subjects 
(the undertakings concerned) are subject to sanctions, both at the EU level 
and at the level of the 27 Member States. In other words, there is 
enforcement at different levels, possibly simultaneously, also at the level of 
the courts including possible damage claims. In an environment where 
undertakings are subject to important sanctions, in some Member States 
even criminal sanctions, procedural divergence can be more problematic 
than in other areas of law.  
 
This is reinforced, again, by the fact that the substantive rules that are 
applied are very similar, if not almost identical when the different levels of 
enforcement are compared. More so, the difference between cases where 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are applied, and those where only national law 
shall be applied, is hardly perceivable for the individual undertakings.  For 
the acceptance and the credibility of the system, this can make procedural 
divergence more problematic from the viewpoint of the individual legal 
subject.519 For the sake of equality and equivalence (see above in section 
1.3.3), there is a case to be made for further harmonisation aiming 
specifically at the remaining procedural divergence affecting legal subjects.  
 
519  Reg. 1/2003 (above n 479) recognizes that the difference in the type of sanctions 
can modulate procedure, see for example in Article 12 §3 where it is said that 
exchange of information between authorities is only possible if the legal protection 
of the undertaking is similar in both jurisdictions.  
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In extension, in terms of consistency and from a viewpoint of efficient 
enforcement, cooperation within the network and with the Commission can 
be optimalized if rules are brought even closer together. It makes sense to 
minimalize the impact of different procedural rules in different jurisdictions 
and to give all authorities the same tools. A broad concept of effectiveness 
was proposed in section 1.3 above. Such a concept includes effective 
enforcement and efficiency. From that perspective, even though effectiveness 
was said not to strictly require harmonisation, it can be an objective to strive 
for.  
 
Finally, related to the need for consistency which protects both the 
individuals legal position and the effectiveness of the enforcement system as 
such, is the need for coherence. Internal coherence within the system of 
competition enforcement is the most obvious and most discussed: between 
the EU and the national systems of competition law and amongst national 
systems.  However, there is also external coherence: even though it has 
specific features, enforcement of competition law should not be isolated from 
other areas of EU law. There are already considerable links to other areas of 
law, for example through the process of judicial harmonisation described 
above. This need for coherence also becomes apparent in private 
enforcement: interaction with (general) procedural law and other types of 
legal rules may be applicable in the same case (contract law, tort law etc). 
Private enforcement and public enforcement are partly alternative routes to 
achieve the same result, namely establishing an infringement of competition 
rules, and in terms of coherence it is not optimal that the procedural context 
be too different.  
 
3.3  Would there be a legal basis?  
 
The present analysis would not be complete without briefly addressing the 
question of legal basis. Before doing so, it is recalled (see above under 2.2.1 
and on competences under 1.2.2) that since the Lisbon Treaty, the 
establishment of competition rules is one of the areas of exclusive 
competence mentioned in Article 3 TFEU. This means, according to Article 5 
(3) TEU, that the principle of subsidiarity does not come into play here as 
long as the EU measures are in line with the description of the exclusive 
area of competence. This development can also be seen as a reinforcement of 
the EU level of enforcement, and of the particular situation of competition 
law. The exclusive nature of the competence might have an impact on any 
future discussion on the possible legal basis for harmonisation.520 
 
520  Reference is made to the Courts judgment in Commission/Council, cited above in 
note 39: if the competence is exclusive, does it mean that the competence to 
harmonise procedure shall be more easily assumed (implied powers)? See also 
Eilmansberger, ‘The Green Paper on damage actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules and beyond’ (above n 413) on the legal basis for the Commission plans to 
take legislative initiatives in the area of private enforcement.  
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A distinction can be made between a specific legal basis and general legal 
basis.521 The most obvious specific legal basis would seem to be Article 103 
TFEU (former Article 83 EC). This provision allows for Council regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 
(former 81 and 82 EC).  
 
The subjects of the regulations mentioned in Article 103 TFEU however seem 
to be limited by the Treaty text: reference is made (“in particular”) to the 
enforcement and policy at the European level, in other words at the level 
where the Commission operates. Article 103 TFEU refers to compliance, 
detailed rules for the application of 101(3) (former 81 (3)) as well as defining 
the scope of application of the prohibitions in Articles 101 and 102 as well as 
the respective functions of the Commission and the European courts. Also, 
reference is made to the relationship between national laws and the 
competition provisions of the Treaty.522 This provision was used as a legal 
basis for Reg. 1/2003 discussed above.  
 
Harmonising national law, even in cases where there is interstate effect, does 
not seem to fall within the subjects described in the treaty provision. 
However, it has been argued that, certainly given the evolution towards 
shared enforcement with the national competition authorities, that this 
provision could serve as a basis to lay down a common procedure for the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.523  
 
In any case, the use of this provision as a legal basis shall be limited to the 
application of the EU antitrust provisions and limited to the enforcement by 
authorities, rather than also covering private enforcement in courts.524 Such 
a measure might very well also result in spillover effects in to the law 
applicable in “national cases”, given the convergence mechanisms already in 
place and described above. In fact, the desired result might be to harmonize 
national law in a more general way; the likeliness that this shall be the effect 
is significant given the advantages of consistency between enforcement in 
purely national cases and cases involving interstate effect dealt with by the 
same authorities.  
 
521  W. van Gerven, ‘Over codificatie, convergentie en algemene beginselen in een 
meergelaagd privaatrecht’ (2008) 56 SEW: Tijdschrift voor Europees en Economisch 
Recht 414.  
522  A) to E) of Article 103 TEU (unchanged since the first text of the EEC Treaty).  
523  See S. Brammer, Cooperation between national competition agencies (above n 487). 
If the form of a directive is chosen, the result of the harmonisation in terms of 
remaining divergence will depend very much on the type of harmonisation as well 
as on the way the directive is implemented in the Member States. The use of this 
legal basis for Reg. 1/2003 without formal opposition from institutions or Member 
States is a relevant precedent. According to Eilmansberger the list of subjects in 
Article 103 (former 83) is not exhaustive: Eilmansberger, ‘The Green Paper on 
damage actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules and beyond’ (above n 413). 
524  For matters concerning private enforcement, Article 81 TFEU (65 EC) dealing with 
judicial cooperation in civil matters, is an option.  
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The specific legal basis might be supplemented by the flexibility clause of 
Article 352 TFEU which allows for measures to be adopted if they are 
necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties. A combination 
of legal basis in this way was used to adopt the merger regulation but the 
downside is that its use requires unanimity.525  
 
A so-called general legal basis could be considered a safer option and one 
that might allow also to cover a wider scope of rules such as procedure 
relating to courts. The most obvious provision would then be Article 114 
TFEU (former Article 95 EC) which allows for measures for the 
approximating of national laws which have their object the establishment of 
the internal market as described in Article 26 TFEU.526 But here again, the 
interstate aspect can be an obstacle. The current state of competition law 
allows for some cases that are seemingly national to be construed as having 
interstate effect in order to fall within the scope of application of the EU 
competition rules, but nevertheless there are still real national, regional or 
local cases of course, to which national competition law is applied. The link 
with the internal market referred to in Article 114 TFEU will then be difficult 
to argue.527 The use of this article would require the willingness of the 
Member States, supported at the EU level, to go beyond rules applicable to 
cross-border situations.  This route seems less adequate than the use of the 
competition-specific provisions mentioned above.  
 
The question of legal basis deserves a more thorough examination but is not 
the purpose of this article. It should not be an obstacle based on the very 
brief examination above. The difficulty of finding a solid legal basis shall 
depend very much on the scope of the harmonisation that is undertaken.528 
In a way it might be argued that in competition law, there are so many 
mechanisms in play that have led to harmonisation and convergence, that it 
might seem unnecessarily burdensome to embark in formal harmonisation. 
Using (more) soft law instruments might lead the way to more “spontaneous 
525  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 
24/1. There is a little point of doubt: competition is no longer mentioned as an 
objective of the Union (Article 3 TEU) but only appears in an indirect way through 
the reference to the internal market and Protocol 27. Apart from that, it seems that 
the scope of this clause is larger than before (wording of Article 352 TFEU as 
opposed to 308 EC).  
526  This article was used for the directive on the enforcement of IP rights, which is said 
to clearly have an impact on cases of a domestic nature, comments in M. 
Tulibacka, ‘Europeanization of civil procedures’ (above n 414).  
527  See S. Brammer, Cooperation between national competition agencies (above n 487).  
528  There is the aspect of the presence of cross border effects, discussed in this section 
but also the combination of procedure in public enforcement and in private 
enforcement: it seems unlikely that both could be covered by the same 
harmonisation measures in view of this brief overview of legal basis, see note 521 
above also. The difficulties that have occurred in materializing the plans on actions 
for damages at the EU level also illustrated how difficult especially harmonisation 
of aspects of private enforcement shall be (above n 413).  
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convergence” and that might simply be sufficient. On the other hand, the 
counterarguments for such a way forward are democratic legitimacy, the 
institutional balance, the division of competences between the EU and 
Member States and e.g. the fact that further harmonisation of procedure 
would have implications far beyond competition enforcement and should 
involve more stakeholders than only competition authorities. It is clear from 
the broader EU perspective529 that a correct implementation of the division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States and the involvement of 
national parliaments are precisely considerations that are of concern in the 
post Lisbon era. 
 
3.4  By way of conclusion: defining the issues  
 
The following remarks draw on the analysis above, contain some conclusions 
whilst defining at the same time the issues which could or should be the 
subject of further research.  
 
(1) Procedural autonomy is not an obstacle to further harmonisation and, in 
the present state of the law, effectiveness of EU law cannot be said to require 
it.  
 
Procedural autonomy has but limited value as an argument for those who 
oppose further harmonisation. The strong convergence and harmonisation 
trends already present in the public enforcement system of competition law 
reinforce the pressure that the principle of procedural autonomy already 
encounters in general. At the same time, effectiveness should not be 
overrated in the present state of the law.  
 
(2) Further harmonisation would be a natural development and it can have 
its benefits especially in terms of consistency and coherence of EU law.  
 
There is no urgent need for harmonisation measures, nor is there a stringent 
legal requirement to undertake them. The question is more whether political, 
economic and policy considerations require harmonisation of remedies and 
procedures at this time and if so, in what form.530 It is argued here that 
further harmonisation would be a desirable objective to strive for, provided it 
takes into account a number of important issues both in terms of the object 
and the method: the five points mentioned here by way of a conclusion 
attempt to define some of these issues. From a political and policy point of 
view in the area of competition law, it makes sense that procedure should 
reflect the unity in substantive law.  
 
Legislative harmonisation would be an interesting experiment in Union law, 
especially because it would be the end of a process instead of the beginning: 
529  See above in section 1.2.2 on procedural autonomy and competence; on the role of 
national parliaments: protocol 1 to the Lisbon treaty. 
530  Kilpatrick, ‘The future of remedies in Europe’ (above n 416). 
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it would complete a process already well underway through convergence and 
soft harmonisation and fill in the gaps that remain.  
 
(3) It will only be useful if it addresses the remaining points of divergence 
which can be perceived as problematic for individuals and/or for the 
enforcement system.  
 
The objective should be to do away with the remaining sources of divergence 
between the Member States that are identified as problematic, be it from a 
legal, a political or economic point of view. The recent reports published by 
the Commission are a starting point of a stock taking exercise that should 
allow determining which procedural rules are subject to problematic 
divergence. A broader EU perspective shows that it cannot be assumed that 
any divergence is problematic. The preparation of harmonisation will require 
a clear definition of procedure, in itself already a difficult exercise as was 
shown above.   
 
(4) It shall have to take various forms to be effective because divergence 
takes various forms. 
 
Harmonisation of the institutional structures and the procedural rules that 
authorities apply, will most likely not be able to address the current level of 
divergence alone.  The recent evaluation of Reg. 1 illustrates that the 
divergence concerns enforcement rules in a broad sense but also exceeds 
procedure.  The area of sanctions (often referred to above and for which the 
call for harmonisation seems strong) covers procedure, substance and policy, 
without the boundaries being very clear.  
 
A combination of instruments shall be the right way forward: formal 
harmonisation with a solid legal basis (for the approximation of actual rules 
of law) combined with further convergence possibly using soft harmonisation 
(for policy issues).  Judicial harmonisation will continue to develop general 
principles and from time to time, harmonize a specific aspect of procedure, 
but it is of course inappropriate to systematically deal with procedural 
divergence. It is also unpredictable as it evolves mostly at the irregular pace 
of preliminary ruling cases that are brought by national courts. The 
particularities of competition enforcement and the high degree of 
convergence that already exists, most likely also influence the type of 
legislative harmonisation possible: minimum standards would not make 
sense for most subjects because they have already been attained.  
 
(5) Spillover effects and external coherence require a comprehensive 
approach and harmonisation should involve stakeholders. 
 
EU and national competition law and policy are totally intertwined. This does 
not only complicate the possibilities to use EU instruments of harmonisation 
in the absence of interstate effect. Also, harmonising procedure in EU 
competition proceedings at the national level, shall de facto mean 
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harmonising all procedures of public competition enforcement (spillover 
effects). Competition authorities are well aware of this, but perhaps 
legislators and policymakers at the national level, do not always realize this 
particular situation and its consequences for national autonomy. 
 
The network of authorities should not be the only forum where further 
harmonisation is discussed, especially if it concerns actual procedural rules, 
that are bound to have either direct or indirect spillover effects into national 
cases and into private enforcement in the courts. The general strong 
tendency towards convergence within the network cannot replace the 
involvement of stakeholders in the Member States and the involvement of the 
legislator, be it at the EU level (Council, European Parliament) or at the 
national level (government, parliaments). The need for external coherence 
argued above, also makes it clear that further harmonisation should be 






Side effects of the modernisation of EU competition law 
 
Modernisation as a challenge to the enforcement system of EU 
competition law and EU law in general    
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The different articles brought together in this book all concern the impact of 
the so-called modernisation on the enforcement system of EU competition 
law.531  
 
Several aspects of the enforcement system are covered. One contribution 
concerns the impact of modernisation on the legal system as such and 
focuses on the confusion concerning the objectives that the system aims to 
achieve.532 Other articles address issues of competences and applicable law 
(i.e. the interstate clause533 and the division of tasks between the national 
and the EU level534) and effective procedures. 535 Finally, this book also deals 
with issues of proof536 and adequate judicial protection and access to 
court.537  
 
Recapitulating what has been said on modernisation in most of the 
preceding chapters, this term covers two aspects: on the one hand, 
substantive modernisation, meaning (oversimplifying) the introduction of a 
more economics or an effects-based approach, and, on the other hand, 
decentralisation based on the structure put into place by Reg. 1/2003, the 
institutional framework for applying EU competition rules. The bottom line of 
the decentralisation exercise was to achieve a higher level of involvement of 
national authorities and national judges in the enforcement of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. Again oversimplifying, in this final chapter this aspect of 
531  In all chapters (except perhaps chapter 5 on objectives) the focus is on the cartel 
prohibition of Article 101 TFEU, but the common thoughts brought together in this 
chapter take a more general approach and can often apply for both cartels and 
abuse of dominance cases. The area of merger control is not part of the research 
covered in this book for two reasons Firstly, because it was not the subject of 
modernisation as such and secondly because the enforcement of merger control 
regulations has specific features which distinguish it from the enforcement of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Examples are: it is an a priori control system taking a 
forward-looking approach, whereas competition rules focus on existing behaviour. 
In addition, the division of competences and the jurisdictional organization are 
substantively different. 
532  Chapter 5. 
533  Chapter 3.
534  Chapter 6. 
535  Chapter 6.
536  Chapter 5 and 3.
537  Chapter 2. 
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modernisation will also be referred to as decentralisation. The purpose of 
this decentralisation was not only to move away from a centralised 
enforcement system and to allow capacity to be freed at the level of the 
Commission, but it is assumed also to have been aimed at increasing and 
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the enforcement system as a 
whole.538 
 
This chapter will set out with a summary of the conclusions drawn in the 
different articles which are, where appropriate, supplemented with a brief 
update of relevant developments since the initial publication of the 
articles/chapters (sub-section 7.2).539 
 
Following these summaries and conclusions, the four themes which are 
present in all or some of the chapters will be highlighted in a horizontal 
approach in sub-section 7.3. These themes are: 
 
(1) The relationship between competition law and the internal market 
(2) Substantive modernisation as a challenge to the enforcement system 
(3) Modernisation from an organizational perspective: the complicated 
relationship between decentralisation, convergence and consistency 
(4) Modernisation as a challenge to the system of judicial protection.  
 
The four themes contribute towards an overall coherence between the 
individual chapters. As it shall appear, these themes overlap to a certain 
extent, thus reinforcing the interconnection between the different 
contributions and demonstrating how the themes addressed in the 
individual chapters build on the same ideas. For every one of these themes, 
some suggestions and critical remarks for the future shall be formulated. 
 
Finally, in a third, short section of this chapter, a more theoretical issue will 
be presented as a final roundup (sub-section 7.4). It is present in the 
background of all of the different articles, but was never (or not yet) the 
538  The study leading to chapter 6 showed that there is relatively little to be found on 
the goal of effectiveness that one can presume to be underlying the modernisation 
process. It was suggested that there is definitely a link between effectiveness and 
decentralisation, but it is unclear how certain mechanisms in Reg.1/2003 are 
justified by the goal of effectiveness. It was also suggested that the question of the 
relationship between effectiveness and effective enforcement is underdeveloped 
because the focus has been on effective judicial protection. Effectiveness requires 
both effective enforcement as well as effective judicial protection and yet these can 
be conflicting values. See chapter 6, e.g. p. 151.
539  As it was indicated in the introduction (chapter 1 above), the different articles are 
reproduced in the exact form in which they were published. Therefore, they were 
not updated. The purpose of these conclusions is not to provide for an exhaustive 
update but some more recent developments can be highlighted, to the extent that 
it allows to make the common themes more apparent and that it allows to 
harmonize the different pieces. The updates shall be presented in an as neutral 
way as possible in the first part, more personal observations will be integrated in 
the parts that follows (section 3). 
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actual focus of attention: the relationship and the interaction between 
substantive law and procedural law. In a way, this issue expresses the 
overarching single subject of this thesis.  
 
2.  Key conclusions of the five chapters and some updates 
 
For every chapter the conclusions shall be recalled below and some more 
recent relevant developments shall be added, either because they confirm the 
conclusions drawn in the past or because they shed new light on them.540  
 
2.1  Chapter 2: Judicial protection after modernisation 
 
The article in the first chapter addressed modernisation in the sense of 
decentralisation, from the perspective of judicial protection and access to the 
court. In European law, the years before the entry into force of Reg. 1/2003 
(on 1 May 2004) were characterized by heated debates on a private party’s 
right to access the EU Courts. In particular, there was an upsurge of - 
mostly - criticism against the restricted access to the courts for individuals 
in direct appeals, which was at the heart of the Court of First Instance’s (now 
General Court) daring judgment in the famous Jégo Quéré case and the 
Court of Justice’s response in UPA.541  
 
The state of the law in relation to an individual’s right to have access to the 
European Courts was considered unsatisfactory by many authors, and 
rightly so, in view of the development of the principle of judicial protection 
and the case-law of those Courts which continuously stressed the 
responsibility of national judges to ensure judicial protection at a national 
level. The restrictive attitude of the Court of Justice in the area of the 
admissibility of direct appeals on the one hand, seems in contrast and 
difficult to reconcile with the pressure on national courts in respect ensuring 
adequate judicial protection and access to court. Against that background, 
the novelties brought by Reg. 1/2003 were examined. 
 
The conclusion, in 2005, was that it was exaggerated to state that the new 
decentralized system of enforcement created by that Regulation, in its own 
right, caused major issues of judicial protection. However, certain features of 
the new enforcement system designed by Reg. 1/2003 were considered to 
add to the pre-existing worries in respect of individual judicial protection. A 
number of new types of formal and informal Commission decisions were 
discussed and it was established that it was unclear if these decisions were 
challengeable in the light of the European Courts’ jurisprudence. Amongst 
others, the increasing use of soft law instruments by the Commission was 
pinpointed as relevant in that respect. Therefore, some new worries 
540  As Chapters 5 and 6 were written and/or revised more recently, they were not 
updated.
541 For a brief overview and references, chapter 2, p. 9 and following.
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regarding the level of judicial protection of individuals surfaced as a side 
effect of modernisation. 
 
Since the publication of this article in 2005, two different developments are 
worth mentioning briefly. First, the further evolution of the issue of access to 
courts for individuals in general, both in view of the case-law as well as 
recent modifications to the EC Treaty (now the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU, hereinafter: TFEU). Secondly, the question should be addressed 
whether there are any cases that concern those aspects of access to the 
European court mentioned in the article.  
 
First, in terms of access to the EU Courts, in particular the admissibility 
requirements for individuals, it is well-known that the Constitutional Treaty 
which was still cited in the article contained in Chapter 2, never saw the 
light. However, the Lisbon Treaty has modified the relevant provision on 
direct appeals for individuals, be it in a different way than was proposed 
before. The well-known requirement of “direct and individual concern” stays 
for all acts, but Article 263 (4) TFEU has opened the possibility for private 
parties to instigate proceedings against “regulatory acts which are of direct 
concern and do not entail implementing measures”.542 As far as known, this 
new phrase has not yet lead to particular attempts of private parties in the 
wider area of competition law, to broaden the scope of admissible cases in 
areas where their application would not have been admissible under the 
former treaty text. Another relevant change that came with the Lisbon 
Treaty, is the fact that the Charter on Human Rights is now binding and that 
the perspective of the accession of the EU to the ECHR has been created.543 
This reinforces the status of principles such as the right to effective judicial 
protection, laid down in Article 47 of the Charter, and makes it binding upon 
the EU institutions.  
 
The overview in chapter 2 identified not only the restrictive case-law on 
“individual concern” for acts of a general nature as a problem in terms of 
access to court, but also the combination with the case law that deals with 
which acts can be subject to appeal proceedings.544 In particular, doubts 
were raised with regards the case-law on the question when an act can be 
considered a definitive position or binding act taken by the Commission.  
 
542 The existing categories remained: acts addressed to the applicant or acts which are 
of direct and individual concern. The impact for the area of competition shall be 
discussed under the fourth theme, see sub-section 3.4 below. 
543 Article 6 TEU (Treaty on European Union). The right to effective judicial protection 
is laid down in the Charter, Article 47. It was referred to by the General Court in 
Jégo Quéré, see in chapter 2 above, at p. 9.
544 Where acts of a general nature are concerned, the challengeability of soft law 
instruments was mentioned in chapter 2 and this might fall within the new 
category for general acts in Article 263 (4) TFEU. The standard of review was also 
identified as a potential factor of insufficient judicial protection. See further 3.4 
below for the question of how access to the court can be improved and what other 
factors contribute to the lack of judicial protection. 
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Even though it appears as though the Courts always take a functional 
approach, disregarding the form of an act, and only considering whether the 
legal position of the individual was affected by an act of a general nature just 
like it would have been if it had been a decision,545 chapter 2 nevertheless 
shows that there is reluctance to allow appeal proceedings against actions 
(“prises de position”) of the Commission, that do not constitute final 
decisions.546 Recent cases might give rise to some speculation, but there 
have not been any cases to really test whether, in the modernized 
enforcement system, the Court would be willing to take on cases where there 
is perhaps not yet a final decision of the Commission on the merits, but 
where the rights of parties are affected as if is was a final decision.547  
 
The second question that emerges a few years after the entry into force of 
Reg.1/2003 and the publication of the article in chapter 2 is whether cases 
have appeared that would actually demonstrate an insufficiency in 
individual judicial protection along the lines suggested. For the moment it 
seems as though the worries expressed in chapter 2 with respect to access to 
court have not materialized into many cases that would confirm that there is 
a problem from a viewpoint of individual judicial protection. In the comments 
on the system of Reg. 1/2003 these last years, the focus (of worry) has been 
on the so-called re-allocation decisions: decisions by which a case within the 
network goes from one authority to another, either a national competition 
authority or the Commission.548  
545  A few interesting precedents are described in chapter 2, at p. 25. 
546 This line of case-law has also been considered an obstacle to effective judicial 
protection by S. Brammer, ‘Cooperation between national competition agencies in 
the enforcement of EC competition law’ (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), see for 
example at p. 212 and following. 
547  An example of the willingness to disregard the form of an action when dealing with 
admissibilty: a judgment of the General Court of 21 May 2010 about state aid, 
cases T-425/04, T-450/04 and T-456/04, France, France Télécom and 
others/Commission, see rec. 126-134 and 212-222. The Court is prepared to 
subject oral declarations to the direct appeal; there is only mention of the phrase 
“[acte destiné à produire des effets juridiques”]. There is an interesting case 
pending concerning a request for information by the Commission addressed to 
Slovak Telekom (this is not a new instrument of investigation, but interesting 
because it would not seem to qualify as an act open to appeal under traditional 
case law) see cases T-458/09 and T-171/10, Slovak Telekom/Commission, [2010] 
OJ C 11/36; the Court will also have to deal with cases concerning a decision 
ordering an inspection (not a decision on the merits either), but Article 20 of Reg. 
1/2003 provides explicitly for the possibility of review in such a case, an example 
in cases T-135/09, Nexans/Commission, and T-140/09, [2010] OJ C141/48 and 
50. The appeal is based entirely on infringement of fundamental rights. 
548 An extensive study of these types of decisions and cooperation between  
competition authorities in S. Brammer, cited above in n 546, amongst the many 
articles about this issue, an interesting analysis by M. van der Woude, ‘Exchange 
of information within the ECN: scope and limits’,  and other contributions in D. 
Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu, cited above in chapter 6, n 500 also W. Wils, 
‘Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement’ (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), in 
particular for example at p. 73 and following. The focus on re-allocation decisions 
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One particularly relevant aspect following from the evaluation reports on the 
functioning of Reg.1/2003 is that the number of potentially controversial 
decisions (in view of what was discussed in chapter 2) and the use of certain 
new instruments of enforcement have been quite limited in practice.549 As it 
has been pointed out by many commentators, the largely informal way in 
which the network operates in practice, has much to do with this. 
 
2.2  Chapter 3: Intrastate equals interstate; the particularities of the 
role of the interstate requirement in competition law   
 
The requirement of ‘effect on interstate trade’ exists for all rules pertaining to 
the internal market, including free movement rules as well as competition 
rules. However, it seems that the interstate criterion plays a different role in 
competition law and has also evolved differently. Has the interstate criterion 
also become less important over time in competition law?550 Perhaps, but in 
a different way than elsewhere in EU law. 
 
An overview first showed that the interstate clause was interpreted in a 
broad sense by the Commission and that the EU Courts supported this 
is most probably inspired by the fact that most practitioners feel the lack of 
transparency most when it comes to cases changing forum. Also, it most probably 
translates the impression that it really does matter where a case is dealt with in 
the eyes of the business community even though the same rules are applied. In 
chapter 2 however, more types of more or less decisions were mentioned as 
potentially raising questions of judicial protection. 
549 The following examples can be mentioned: 13 commitments decisions (Article 9 
Reg.1) of which one was challenged at the General Court without issues of 
admissibility (judgment in appeal of the ECJ very recently, case C-441/07 P, 
Commission/Alrosa, 30 June 2010, interesting for other points below), p. 33 of the 
Staff Working paper, no use yet of the new decision of “finding of inapplicability” 
(Article 10), no actual use of the new notice on giving “guidance”, see p. 17 of the 
Staff Working Paper. The amicus curiae system (Article 15) allowing the 
Commission to intervene has been scarcely used. When it comes to the sensitive 
area of information exchange and reallocation of cases, it seems as though 
cooperation is mostly of an informal nature which makes it difficult to measure 
frequency, but also for companies to assess when decisions are actually being 
taken. In terms of who is best placed to take on a case, the only major case so far 
in which an attempt was made to challenge the fact that Commission took on a 
case instead of a national authority, was Case T-339/04, France Télécom/ 
Commission, [2007] ECR II-521. Relevant here was that this point could be raised 
in the context of an appeal against a decision ordering an inspection, for which 
admissibility is not an issue. In this way the aspect of allocation was addressed as 
a kind of “plea of illegality” (Article 277 TFEU) in the context of a dispute 
concerning another decision (ordering the inspection). The very reduced number of 
instances of re-allocation also appeared from a number of the national reports 
presented at the FIDE conference of 2008, see for example the Dutch, French and 
Italian reports in H.F. Koeck and M.M Karollus (eds) The modernisation of 
European Competition law – Initial experiences with Regulation 1/2003, FIDE XXIII 
Congress Linz 2008 (Vienna: Nomos, 2008). 
550  The general assumption of the book in which the article was published was that 
the interstate requirement became less central in EU internal market law. 
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interpretation. As a result, it was relatively easy to qualify a seemingly 
national case as having interstate effect. In general, not much attention was 
given by the Commission to the reasoning to substantiate this condition in 
Article 81 (1) EC (now Article 101 (3) TFEU). From a policy perspective, this 
allowed the Commission to pursue national cases, to set an example (making 
the law) from a substantive point of view, and also to fill the enforcement gap 
in many Member States where competition authorities did not (yet) exist.551  
 
The requirement of effect on trade between Member States was often said to 
be both a substantive and a jurisdictional criterion. Where the last 
dimension is concerned, the article defends the position that jurisdictional is 
in fact not an optimal term, because it is not so much about who is 
competent to apply a rule, but about which law applies. This is clearly the 
case after the entry into force of Reg.1/2003. The regulation introduces a 
unique rule in this respect: in the presence of effect on interstate trade, EU 
law does not precede over national law, but judges and authorities are 
required to apply them in parallel.552 The obligation of parallel application is 
supplemented with a series of provisions destined to ensure convergence of 
application.553 In terms of the substantive condition, the article explains how 
the Commission has set out its views on the requirement of effect on 
interstate trade in the new guidelines that were published along with Reg. 
1/2003. The Commission advocates a more quantitative and economical 
approach to the interstate clause.  
 
It was argued that the guidelines have certainly not made it easier for 
national authorities and national courts to establish whether interstate trade 
is affected. And yet, because of the obligations laid down in Reg. 1/2003, 
now this exercise has to be undertaken with great care in every national 
case. One might think that given the fact that national competition laws are 
mostly identical to EU law, there might be reluctance to assume effect on 
interstate trade as readily as in the past. However, given the difficulty of the 
factual and economic assessment required in the Commission’s 
guidelines,554 the desire to follow the EU and the obligations of Reg. 1/2003, 
551  The enforcement gap was also due to a very low level of private enforcement, see 
references in Chapter 6 on reports and plans of the Commission in that respect. 
552 The feature which makes this a unique system is that the rules that are to be 
applied in parallel are mostly very similar, if not identical. On this point also 
Chapter 6 on harmonisation mechanisms. It would require empirical data that 
compare cases where only national law is applied on the one hand, and cases 
where both are applied on the other, but the impression is that in many Member 
States the authorities determine whether there is effect on interstate trade as if it 
were a formal requirement to be checked, and then proceed in conducting one 
single substantive assessment of the behaviour for which it makes no difference 
whether there is effect on trade.  
553  These mechanisms are also the subject of chapter 6. 
554 The idea being that in terms of stating reasons, it would be more difficult to 
“justify” not assuming effect on interstate trade, also vis-à-vis the Commission, 
than to simply assume (potential) interstate trade).
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it was proposed that there is more incentive to simply apply national and EU 
law in parallel.  
 
The conclusion was drawn that it is hardly relevant anymore for the legal 
assessment of anticompetitive behaviour whether or not there is effect on 
interstate trade. The result is the same. Contrary to other areas of EU law, 
national and EU law have not been brought closer through the “fading away” 
of the interstate effect clause nor by direct harmonisation, but through the 
particular kind of harmonisation that characterizes competition law. It is not 
only top down harmonisation by which EU law (sometimes in the form of 
case-law) replaces national law, but also a variety of other convergence 
mechanisms having harmonising effects. Finally, it was argued that the 
requirement of effect on interstate trade should become much more a 
jurisdictional criterion with a role to play in the allocation of cases in the 
new, decentralized enforcement system. It was also proposed that there 
could be a more important role for the concept of Community (now Union) 
interest. 
 
Since the publication of this article in 2006, no major developments seem to 
have taken place in relation to the interstate criterion. Where the 
jurisprudence of the Courts is concerned, there does not seem to be any real 
change and there are little or no signs that the Courts require a higher and 
more economical threshold to determine whether interstate trade is affected. 
The Courts also still fully support the idea that in a seemingly national cartel 
it is perfectly possible for interstate trade to be affected.555  
 
Turning to the role and function of the requirement of interstate trade effect, 
the first years of application of Reg. 1/2003 confirm that the requirement 
constitutes a substantive condition of EU competition law but, foremost, it 
now functions as a factor of convergence556 together with the convergence 
555 For an example of the classical case law still being the standard: the Manfredi 
case, case C-295/04, judgment of 13 July 2006, [2006] ECR I-6619, see at rec. 42-
52. There is no mention of the Commission guidelines. More recently also an  
important judgment in a case concerning a “national” cartel in Austria, ECJ Cases 
125/07 P, C-133/07 P, C-135/07 P and C-137/07 P (Lombard club), not yet 
reported. The Commission reports on Reg. 1/2003 state that the guidelines remain 
valid, and there has been no significant change in the interpretation of the 
interstate trade criterion, reports cited above at p. 164, n 509, Staff Working 
Paper, at par. 145.
556 This is touched on in chapter 6: the obligation for parallel application in Article 3 
has created a single legal standard and this is recognized openly by the 
Commission in the Communication from the Commission to the EP and the 
Council, containing a report on the functioning of Reg. 1/2003, also cited at p. 
164, see par. 21 and in the Staff Working Paper cited above in the same note, at 
par. 141. In that way, the obligation to apply in a parallel way is much more 
efficient in terms of harmonisation than a primacy rule could ever have been: 
primacy would have set the national rule aside; parallel application de facto obliges 
the national rule to be the same. The combination of the interstate trade criterion 
and Article 3 of the regulation are very important factors of convergence.
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rule in Article 3 Reg. 1/2003. It also has a key function in terms of 
enforcement and procedure, namely that it triggers the various mechanisms 
of cooperation (and supervision by the Commission) laid down in Reg. 
1/2003.557 It is therefore, as proposed in chapter 3, not a jurisdictional 
criterion in the traditional legal sense of division of competences,558 nor does 
it determine which law applies (national – EU) in the sense that the 
application of one would exclude the other. When there is interstate effect, 
EU law and national law can both be applied559 and the national authorities 
and courts become EU enforcers in the system set up by the regulation. 
 
Finally, the concept of Community interest, for which it was suggested in 
chapter 3 that it might be developed as a relevant factor for the allocation of 
cases, seems to have remained relevant mostly in the area of complaints and 
priority setting by the Commission.560 There seem to be no signs that it 
functions as a criterion for case allocation.  
 
2.3  Chapter 4: Sense and nonsense of rules on proof in cartel cases; 
How to reconcile a more economics-based approach to 
competition law with more attention for rules on proof?  
 
Modernisation is characterized by more use of economic analysis and more 
attention for economic reality in the legal assessment of cartel behaviour. At 
the same time there is growing attention for issues of proof, both before the 
authorities or judges, as well as in the review courts. The burden of proof, 
the standard of proof and the standard for judicial review are much 
discussed subjects in recent case-law and doctrine. There seems to be a 
contradiction between both tendencies: more economics and yet more 
pressure for, typically legal, rules on proof. Is there too much focus on proof 
as a side effect of modernisation?  
 
This article highlighted the relevance of proof issues in cartel cases and 
discussed the key concepts, such as standard of proof, but also the use of 
certain legal instruments in proof such as presumptions. Some recent 
developments impacting on proof are discussed. This is all done from the 
557 This is an interesting feature of the interstate trade clause in competition law and 
one which is believed quite unique when compared to other areas of EU law: 
instead of differentiating between national law and EU law, it triggers cooperation 
and mechanisms and obligations for authorities and courts regulated by Reg. 
1/2003, see chapter 6. Comparison with the other areas covered in the book in 
which the article appeared, confirms this.
558 The General Court explicitly endorsed the fact that the Commission always stays 
competent to deal with a case, even when a national authority is dealing with it; it 
is said that Regulation 1/2003 has not established a division of competences, 
judgment in France Télécom/Commission, n 547 above.
559 In theory, the application of national law is optional in case of effect on interstate 
trade, Member States are said to be free to choose parallel application or only EU 
law as the legal basis for a decision, Staff Working Paper mentioned above, at par. 
152. 
560  Staff Working Paper mentioned above in n 509, at par. 119-120. 
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perspective of having to convince non-lawyers why proof rules are important. 
For that reason, attention is also drawn to the X factor; to demonstrate that 
proof is not a mathematical or scientific exercise, but that it is all about 
conviction and conviction depends, to some extent, on the persons 
involved.561 
 
Finally, based on these considerations, a pragmatic view on proof is 
proposed allowing for flexibility and differentiation. This requires lawyers to 
accept a system which is not too rigid and adapted to the specifics of 
competition law. As a counterpart, it requires economists to realize that most 
rules on proof reflect fundamental principles underlying the legal system and 
are much more than merely technical obstacles. There should not 
necessarily be a contradiction between a more economics-based approach 
and rules on proof provided the suggestions in the article are followed. It is 
also argued that there is another very important principle in this respect and 
that is the duty to state adequate reasoning. At the end of the day, solid 
reasoning protects the rights of parties, it ensures accountability and it 
allows for efficient judicial review.  
 
In terms of the issues of proof discussed in this article, attention can be 
drawn to at least one case in which the Court of Justice has rendered 
judgment since the publication of the article in chapter 4.562 In the 
important judgment T-Mobile, the Court had to address two basic types of 
issues that are relevant here. First, is it (still) appropriate to consider that in 
the presence of an anti-competitive object, no proof of anti-competitive effect 
is necessary?563 Much perhaps to the regret of the referring court, the Court 
affirmed its traditional case law on this point, namely that no real proof of 
effects is needed for certain hard restrictions for which the anti-competitive 
object has been established.564 
561 See chapter 4 at p. 86.
562 The case already mentioned as pending above in chapter 4, ECJ Case C-8/08, T-
Mobile and others, [2009] ECR I-04529.
563 The CBB used this case to launch an invitation to the Court to validate its own 
case law whereby there is strong pressure on the Dutch competition authority NMa 
to translate a more economic approach in more solid proof of effects in all cases, 
even in “object” cases. See in chapter 4 at p. 74 above. 
564 See at rec. 28-29. Along these lines also in an abuse case, Wanadoo: ECJ Case C-
202/07 P, judgment of 2 April 2009, [2009] ECR I-2369, and the judgment in GSK 
discussed also in chapter 5, see at p. 125, where clearly the Court confirms the 
existence of a category of serious breaches of Article 101 TFEU where no extensive 
demonstration of effects is required to be able to sanction them. Of course there is 
some schizophrenia in relation to this case-law: whilst realising that it might not 
be so “modern” to discard the need to prove effects in the market and to continue 
the use of presumptions, it should be clear to most lawyers concerned that 
effective enforcement would become quite difficult, if not impossible, if a total 
market based and case to case approach were required in cartel and abuse cases. 
This is related to what was called the “proof paradox” in chapter 4, see at p. 71.
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Second, are the presumptions that apply in that context565 a matter of 
(substantive) EU law, or rather of (procedural) national law?566 In this 
context it is not only relevant that the Court clearly confirmed the use of 
presumptions as an instrument of proof, as discussed in chapter 4, but also 
that the Court did not want to allow the risk that proof would depend on 
differences in national (procedural) law. It, therefore, basically stated that 
the definition and modalities of the presumptions used to establish 
concerted practices are a question of EU law because they are part of the 
application of the prohibition of Article 101 TFEU.567  
 
This judgment and an increasing number of recent judgments, especially at 
the level of the General Court, show that the law of proof in competition law 
is currently being constructed at the EU level and at quite a rapid pace.568  
  
2.4  Chapter 5: Shouldn’t we know what we are protecting? Yes, we 
should! A plea for a solid and comprehensive debate about the 
objectives of EU competition law and policy  
 
Modernisation has had another side effect, namely a consumer welfare 
focused public message on behalf of e.g. the Commission, at most evolving 
towards a mixed “discours” created by the reference to other objectives of the 
EU competition law system, for example competitiveness or market 
integration. This article examines the objectives of the EU system, describes 
the variety of objectives that have always been present and shows that they 
still are in the system at this time. The overview can (hopes to) surprise in 
565 Notably the presumption of a causal link between meetings that take place, on the 
one hand, and the behaviour in the market, on the other hand, see also in chapter 
4, at p. 80.
566 This question is an excellent demonstration of the fact that for proof issues the 
difference between substance and procedure is difficult to make. The question is 
also quite relevant in view of what was discussed in chapter 6, how much 
autonomy is left for the Member States? 
567 See at rec. 51-52. The result of this reasoning is that proof is seen as an integral 
part of substantive law, rather than as being part of procedural law. This is quite a 
far-reaching statement by the Court. 
568 A whole body of case-law is growing with attention for many details in 
requirements of proof. It is not always clear where the General Court draws 
inspiration from when it makes the law. There is a lot of common sense involved 
and a key role for general principles of law, as was already said in chapter 4 and 
chapter 6. For an extensive recent overview of some of the main issues, F. Castillo 
de la Torre, ‘Evidence, Proof and Judicial review in cartel cases’, World Competition 
(2009) 4 p. 505. For a pragmatic view, along the lines of the article in chapter 4, E. 
Gippini-Fournier, ‘The elusive standard of proof’ (2010) 33 World Competition 187. 
It is one of the clearest examples of judicial harmonisation, see chapter 6. It also 
demonstrates the increasing interest for this legal subject. In the area of merger 
control there have also been a number of much discussed cases, for some 
comments see P. Szilagyi, ‘The ECJ has spoken: where do we stand on standard on 
proof in merger control’, (2008) European Competition Law Review 12, p. 726. The 
question whether to differentiate between the standard of proof in merger cases 
and in cartel and abuse cases, is still relevant, see at p. 85 above.
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two ways: on the one hand, by showing that in “old times” consumer welfare 
was already quite present in the case-law of the EU courts and is therefore 
not so new; and, on the other hand, it is demonstrated that despite general 
belief, there are clear signs that the legal system is resisting a too strong 
focus on consumer welfare. Examples are given from the case-law and the 
new Lisbon Treaty. 
 
The article goes on to show that a discussion on objectives really matters 
and is relevant in practice. The objectives have their impact on policy and on 
the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Consequently, other factors 
from outside the area of competition law, that might have played a role in the 
emphasis on consumers, are discussed in the article. Finally, some other 
reasons are presented to argue why a debate on the objectives of competition 
law and policy is necessary. They include governance related issues, 
coherence and the decentralized enforcement structure created by Reg. 
1/2003. This brings us back to the other aspect of modernisation, the 
decentralisation of enforcement. 
 
2.5  Chapter 6: Decentralisation of competition law: sacrificing 
procedural autonomy?; Autonomy versus effectiveness: a well 
known conflict in EU law revisited and its impact on the question 
of further harmonisation in the area of enforcement of 
competition law 
 
The last chapter builds on the decentralized enforcement structure where 
the previous chapter ended. Whether or not it was intended, somewhere 
along the way in the modernisation process, Member States have lost most 
of their autonomy when it comes to competition law and policy. This 
happened quite some time ago for substantive law and seems well under way 
for procedural law. Effectiveness is the keyword. This is the premise that was 
the starting point for the last article in this collection. The purpose of the 
article is to contribute to the ongoing debate on the need for further 
harmonisation of procedure in EU competition law. 
 
The different convergence mechanisms which have put pressure on 
autonomy in competition law are described, but first the principles of 
procedural autonomy and effectiveness in general EU law are assessed 
critically. Neither the one nor the other is easily understood, even though 
easily invoked. The article takes the position that neither provide for a 
conclusive answer to the question whether further harmonisation of 
procedural competition law should be undertaken and if so, to what extent. 
 
It was concluded that there is no legal or urgent need to harmonize 
procedural competition law. However, the article recognizes that there might 
be reasons, such as consistency, coherence and the principle of non-
discrimination, which can argue in favour of harmonisation. If undertaken, it 
would have to be done, however, on the basis of a comprehensive stock 
taking of the actual problematic differences that still exist. Given the high 
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degree of convergence, harmonisation would also have to be much more 
detailed than formulating minimum standards. Moreover many of the 
subjects for which divergence is claimed to be an issue not only concern 
procedural law, but also the boundary of procedural and substantive law 
and/or the boundary between law and policy.569 
 
3.  Common themes in a future-oriented perspective 
 
There are a number of common themes that can be found throughout the 
different articles, be it to a larger or a lesser extent. Four themes are 
identified here as they cross cut the chapters. At the same time, it is 
proposed that these are important subjects for the further development of 
competition law, more in particular its enforcement. The different themes 
overlap to some extent, underlining in fact their interconnectedness. They 
are presented by way of conclusion including some observations or 
suggestions from a future-oriented perspective. 
 
3.1  The relationship between competition law and the internal 
market 
 
In chapter 5, the relationship between competition law and the internal 
market was studied from the perspective of the objectives. Attention was 
drawn to the fact that within the basic treaties, the competition rules were 
always part of the rules on the internal market and instrumental to the 
achievement of that internal market.570 A second element, one that clearly 
demonstrates the relationship between competition law and EU law in a 
more general sense, is the obligation for the EU to integrate different policies; 
an obligation that is advocated more strongly than ever since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty.571 In chapter 5 some recent case-law was cited to 
argue that, regardless of what the policy directions of the Commission might 
be, the Court of Justice is not letting market integration go as a factor of 
569 In chapter 4 it appears clearly that proof issues can be on the border of substance 
and procedure and in chapter 6, the example of fines and fining policy is given as 
one of the clearest examples where law, law enforcement and policy are combined.
570 Chapter 6. It was somewhat surprising to see how low key, if not practically 
absent, competition policy is in the Monti report on the internal market recently 
presented to President Barroso (‘A new strategy for the single market – At the 
service of Europe’s economy and society’, presented on 9 May 2010, l
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/expertises/visitor-programs/mario_monti/ 
index_en.htm), last accessed on 30 June 2010.  The fact that former Competition 
Commissioner Mario Monti was asked to draw up this report shows in itself how 
important market integration still is. 
571 Chapter 6, e.g. at p. 126. More emphasis on the integration of different policies at 
the EU level might well be, as such, a strategy to better complete the internal 
market and increase the efficiency, the quality and the coherence of EU legislation 
and policy. For an attempt to imagine what the concrete effects of the integration 
clauses can have for the area of competition, see J. Steenbergen, ‘Het 
mededingingsbeleid en het verdrag van Lissabon’, in: De Europese Unie na het 
Verdrag van Lissabon (Deventer: Kluwer, 2009). 
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importance in the area of competition.572 When we compare EU competition 
law to other non-European systems, market integration is also what makes 
the EU unique. It was argued that in the near future competition law and 
policy has to come to terms with market integration: its (remaining) role in 
the shaping of EU competition law has to be redefined. This can allow, at 
least in part, going beyond the differences between the Commission and the 
Courts that were referred to in chapter 5.573 
 
In chapter 3 the interstate effect clause was examined. The requirement that 
the trade between Member States is affected in order for EU law to apply, is 
common to e.g. the provisions on free movement as well as competition. It 
determines the scope of application of EU law. Public barriers to trade and 
private barriers to trade can both be a hindrance to the internal market 
objective. 
 
Another point that competition rules and other rules establishing the 
internal market have in common, appears from the chapters above. Certain 
questions raised in chapter 5, such as the stronger emphasis on non-
economical values and objectives in the basic treaties, are common to all 
rules aiming at the establishment and the promotion of the internal market. 
Balancing non-economic considerations, public policy objectives and more 
economically inspired considerations is not an exclusive worry for the world 
of competition law. It is a broad debate that has been relaunched and that 
shall undoubtedly lead to ongoing debate in literature. The same can be said 
for the preoccupation with the consumer that was also highlighted in 
chapter 5: it is a more general feature of the current development of EU 
law.574 
 
572 Not only the Court, but see also the Opinion of Advocate general Kokott in the T-
Mobile case discussed above, see n 562 above. From a more general point of view it 
is not a good thing for the legal system that there is a perceived gap between the 
Commission, the General Court and the Court of Justice that lasts too long, and it 
is not good for the Court of Justice and some of its Advocate Generals to be 
perceived as clinging on to the past; which is not necessarily the right way to 
explain this case law, see below at the end of sub-section 3.2. 
573 It has to be observed that regardless the debate on their economic soundness and 
regardless of developments in the US, a number of vertical restraints have been 
kept in the list of hardcore restrictions in the new block exemption regulation, 
Regulation 330/2010, [2010] OJ L 102/1, on this debate see in chapter 4 at p. 73 
and in chapter 5 on objectives e.g. at p. 104. Whether this is to be seen as a sign 
that market integration is still prominent, or rather that the value of having a list 
of hard core restrictions for the sake of legal certainty prevailed, is an open 
question. A combination of both is most likely the explanation. The recent 
judgments in which the Court defended a strict attitude against measures 
impeding parallel imports for the sake of market integration, must have played a 
role, see chapter 5, p. 124 and following.
574 See in chapter 5 where it was argued that the consumer-driven policy in 
competition law can be explained by more than only the introduction of more 
economics. 
SIDE EFFECTS OF THE MODERNISATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW
189 
Here, in this chapter and building on the previous ones, two further points 
concerning the relationship between competition law and the internal market 
are addressed. 
 
The first point that appears from the chapters above concerns an interesting 
element of divergence between developments in the area of competition and 
developments elsewhere in EU law. The increased application of EU law to 
internal situations in other areas is often controversial both from a political 
as well as from a legal point of view.575 It is also mostly the result of the 
case-law of the Court of Justice, which adds, according to some 
commentators, to its controversial nature.576 This is quite different in 
competition law: the “expansion” of EU competition law into the national 
legal orders is the result of different mechanisms of convergence and 
harmonisation in which the Commission plays a strong and stimulating role, 
and for which there is generally large support in the Member States.577 In 
other words, the expansion of EU law and the spill over effects in internal 
situations (meaning cases with no effect on interstate trade), is not a 
scenario of a confrontation between EU law and national law. The origins, 
the key actors and the evolution of this process of expansion are of a 
different nature in the area of competition law as opposed to the broader 
area of the internal market and the free movement provisions. 
 
A second, more future-oriented point touching on competition law and policy 
and the internal market concerns the possibility of using EU (formal) 
harmonisation instruments in the area of competition. Chapter 6 contains a 
brief discussion of the question whether there would be a legal basis for 
further harmonisation of enforcement issues at the EU level.578 There is a 
clear connection with the subject dealt with in this section, namely the 
stronger the link between competition law and the internal market, the more 
acceptable the use of the provisions in the Treaty that allow for 
harmonisation in the context of the internal market might be.579  
 
The combined effect of a number of factors is interesting to explore in this 
respect: first, the explicit exclusive competence of the Union in the area of 
575 This is the subject of the book in which chapter 3 appeared in 2006, see the 
contribution by B. Drijber, at p. 191, expressing serious doubts about case-law in 
the areas of free movement and public procurement in which the Court expands 
principles of the Treaty or laid down in directives, to (purely?) national situations. 
576 See also on judicial harmonisation in chapter 6 at p. 158 and following.
577  The Court can be considered to support these developments, but is not primarily 
responsible for it in this area. 
578  Chapter 6 at p. 166 The term enforcement issues is used here because the study 
in Chapter 6 showed that in fact remaining divergence is said to concern not only 
subjects that are clearly procedural, but also borderline subjects, such as proof, 
and subjects that also have an important policy component, such as sanctions. 
579 In particular, the general legal basis in Article 114 TFEU. See in comparison on the 
possible legal basis for introducing prison sanctions at the EU level, W. Wils, 
Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust enforcement (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2008), at p. 197. 
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competition law and policy, as laid down in Article 3 (1) TFEU, and, second, 
the strong link that is made between competition law and policy and the 
internal market in the protocol discussed in chapter 5.580  
 
Moreover, one could refer to the case-law of the EU Court to argue that the 
less relevant the interstate trade clause is for the application of the material 
rule (in this case, for example Article 101 TFEU), the less relevant it should 
also be to determine whether the legal basis for harmonisation may be 
used.581 Finally, it seems as though the Court attaches considerable 
importance to the objectives of harmonisation measures when it evaluates if 
the right choice of legal basis has been made.582 So, reinstating the objective 
of market integration, or in any case accepting to a certain extent the 
instrumental role of competition law with a view of establishing/completing 
the internal market, seems worthwhile as a strategy to give future 
harmonisation measures or other initiatives a solid legal foundation. The 
case law can then provide interesting perspectives. This also holds true if 
there should be willingness to adopt formal harmonisation in the area of 
sanctions, which was highlighted in chapter 6 as one of the areas were 
divergence is perceived as problematic. 
 
Now why does it seem somewhat conservative to highlight the relationship 
between competition law and policy and the internal market? This 
impression can indeed exist if one looks at the system of competition law 
from within. This is most probably because, for a number of reasons, 
competition law and policy have been alienated from the internal market.583 
One of the reasons is the particular enforcement structure in this area of EU 
law and the role of the Commission, as opposed to other areas of law. 
Through the central role given to the Commission from the very start of the 
EEC, the strong mandate from the Council and substantial powers to 
sanction, competition law could develop itself autonomously. The 
580 At p. 101 above. On the relation with the nature of the competence, the Court has 
accepted that rules on sanctions were adopted as an implied competence, ancillary 
to the main competence to take measures of e.g. environmental protection in the 
famous Commission/Council judgments, Case C-176/03, [2005] ECR I-7879, and 
Case C-440/05, [2007] ECR I-9097. It follows from Article 4 TFEU that 
environment is a shared competence. Can it then, a fortiori, be accepted that 
sanctions are harmonized in relation to competition infringements because Article 
3 attributes an exclusive competence to the Union in this area? 
581 This links back to the “fading out” of interstate trade effect as a differentiating 
factor between EU law and national law, as discussed in chapter 3. Reference is 
made to the ‘Tobacco case’, ECJ Case C-491/01, [2002] ECR I-11453. 
582 Establishing what the main objectives are, is part of the exercise to determine 
which, one or several, legal basis in the treaty should be used. See also ECJ Case 
C-338/01, [2004] ECR I-4829.
583  The focus on consumer welfare and the influence of economics is, of course, one of 
the main reasons why market integration got somewhat pushed into the 
background. Another reason is probably the general impression that market 
integration has been achieved to a large extent. Both these factors were discussed 
in chapter 5. 
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introduction of national competition laws that are quasi-identical to the 
corresponding provisions at the EU level and also the setting up of the 
network of NCA’s, certainly contribute to the independent existence of 
competition law and the fact that the link with the internal market can seem 
something distant in history.584 And yet, we tried to show it is nevertheless 
part of reality. 
 
3.2  Substantive modernisation as a challenge to the enforcement 
system  
 
Others have commented that there appears to be a general shift in focus 
from substantive issues to institutional and enforcement issues in the area 
of EU competition law. This is most probably a natural evolution of a 
relatively young area of the law moving to a more mature system. 
Throughout the chapters above, it was argued that the growing attention for 
more procedural issues is also a result of substantive modernisation and 
bringing in more economics.585 
 
In recent years, the coexistence of law and economics has lead to a vast 
amount of literature. The relationship between law and economics in the 
field of competition, is often perceived and presented as a struggle.  
 
“Economists and lawyers do not often see eye to eye. They are divided by 
the boundaries of their respective disciplines. Although most of the time 
they happily lead separate lives, occasional contacts are not always 
friction-free. Lawyers, for example, bemoan the ‘pollution’ of their discipline 
by economists who favour the introduction of cost-benefit criteria in legal 
decisions, while economists find incomprehensible court rulings that 
appear to disregard obvious, in their eyes, economic facts. “586 
 
584 On the convergence through the adoption of national laws, see chapter 3 and 
chapter 6. The purpose is clearly not to defend a return to the past and a denial of 
the evolution of competition law over the last two decades. It is to draw attention to 
the importance of the link between competition law and the internal market: 
redefining this relationship will help progress the system. 
585 Examples: in chapter 3 on interstate: the introduction of a more quantitative and 
economical analysis for measuring effect on interstate trade requires more data 
and makes application of this condition more difficult; in chapter 4: more 
economic analysis raises questions of proof and challenges lawyers to accept 
flexibility; in chapter 5: bringing in the input of economics and the concepts of 
consumer welfare has troubled our vision on what the system aims to protect and 
also challenges us to adapt our enforcement system.
586 P. Nicolaides, ‘An Essay on Economics and the Competition Law of the European 
Community’, (2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 7. 
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A second quote:  
 
“There is no sense in attempting to define the relevant market without first 
identifying what has been done in contravention of the law..”587 
 
Is there a reason for the court to intervene? Has wrong been done? Is there a 
problem that should be resolved? The latter quote represents the words of a 
judge describing in a very simple and honest way how the legal process shall 
often naturally deal with a competition case, as with any case in any area of 
the law.588  
 
Competition law and policy are (hopefully) now beyond the phase described 
in the first quote above, which is one of confrontation and tension. However, 
the intuition at the heart of the second quote, is probably still close to reality 
in many enforcement cases, especially in the area of cartels and abuse of 
dominance.589 Nevertheless, the impression exists that over the last years 
minds have significantly evolved and the second quote is now probably less 
shocking for some than it was a few years ago.590 On the legal side, it is good 
that there is some more consciousness, albeit slowly, of the fact that the 
introduction of a more economics based approach also presents other 
challenges to the legal system than the obvious benefits it offers. And, on the 
economic side, contrary to what is sometimes believed, there are most 
certainly signs of a rather realistic attitude to what economics can offer to 
the practical enforcement of the rules on competition. 
587 Famous quote paraphrased and often cited from Judge J. Deane at par. 5 of his 
opinion in case Queensland Wire industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Ltd (Star 
Picket Fence Post case), judgment of 8 February 1989, High Court of Australia, 
accessible via internet: www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1989/6.html (last 
accessed 1 September 2010). Another quote from the following paragraph in the 
judgment expresses well how many lawyers will see the the process of market 
analysis: “The identification of relevant markets involves value judgments about 
which there is some room for legitimate differences of opinion”. 
588 Reference is made here to the formula of the “X factor” as well, at p. 86 in chapter 
4. This was proposed simply to draw attention to the human factor involved. The 
idea that every legal decision should achieve justice and fairness was also 
expressed in chapter 6. To some extent the discussion on the balance between 
economical and non-economical considerations that was touched upon under 3.1 
above and which is present in chapter 5, is related to this as well.
589 Although not based on any empirical evidence, it is believed that this is especially 
true for courts and less so for specialised agencies, but that would depend very 
much on the institutional setting. 
590 Shocking for many lawyers who embraced with (too) great enthusiasm the more 
economic approach and shocking for economists who found the legal process too 
formal, abstract and difficult to understand.
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At the risk of making either too simple or too controversial a statement here, 
it is argued that at the end of the day the legal system is a result of 
fundamental choices in terms of what it wants to protect and it is based on a 
series of general principles of law for which there is a broad consensus in 
society.591 In that respect, economics can and should be a factor of 
importance at the different levels of designing the system: the objectives, the 
policy orientations, the legislative process and the enforcement of the law.592 
More than ever, there is agreement that the rules should be based on sound 
economic principles. But economics shall mostly be instrumental (for 
example helping design better rules, a better assessment of the right facts, 
defining markets, predicting (the probability of) effects593) and not decisive in 
itself.594  
 
The previous remarks were of a more general nature and concerned the way 
the system as a whole is developing towards the optimal coexistence of law 
and economics. Two more specific, related observations are made in that 
respect, drawing from the preceding chapters and research and experience 
over the last years. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter it was observed that substantive 
modernisation has also brought more attention to typically legal issues. This 
is also demonstrated in the context of what, upon appearance, seem to be 
discussions on the substance. Recent discussions on new policy 
orientations, such as how the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU should 
evolve, provide good examples. Even if everyone agrees that it would be 
appropriate to include efficiencies into the legal assessment of the behaviour 
of a dominant undertaking, there is no clear view on or proposal establishing 
591 The importance of general principles of law was emphasized in chapter 4 on proof 
and also follows from the discussion of judicial harmonisation in chapter 6. 
General principles of law have a universal character and have been an important 
factor of convergence of procedural law, because they represent higher values that 
many jurisdictions share. Based on practical experience it must be noted that 
these fundamental principles, such as equality, non discrimination and fairness, 
offer a valuable perspective to explain technical legal issues to economists who are 
used to a more universal approach.
592  The exercise undertaken in chapter 5 tries to demonstrate the impact of a move 
towards more economics on the different levels of the legal system, seen from the 
perspective of the objectives. 
593 But even the definition of the relevant market in a cartel or abuse case is to a large 
extent a legal exercise, although it should be based on solid analysis, if the data 
are available. It resembles the traditional legal tool of “qualification of facts”. 
594 “Competition law is still law and it needs the legal mind and the common sense of a 
judge to interpret those rules and to apply them to a concrete set of facts “ (quote 
from S. Norberg, cited by B. Vesterdorf, ‘Economics in court: reflections on the role 
of judges in assessing economic theories and evidence in the modernised 
competition regime’ in Liber Amicorum in honour of Sven Norberg, A European for all 
seasons (Brussels: Bruylant, 2006), at p. 530. I would add: in a given procedural 




who is responsible and how efficiencies can or should be proven.595 The 
same might be said for a concept like consumer harm: we do not really know 
what it means and what its role is as a requirement in a given case.596 
 
And yet without finding a way for the procedural framework to adapt to a 
(substantive) concept that is to become part of the application of a legal 
norm (prohibition or exception) in a given case, there will not be any real 
relevance for efficiencies or for other newly advocated concepts.597 This can 
lead to frustration and disappointment and it is an unsatisfactory situation: 
if there is agreement that substantive assessment should evolve, it makes 
sense for such a choice to have an impact on enforcement.598 New 
substantive concepts, if we think they should be part of the legal assessment 
of behaviour, should be fitted into the procedural framework. Often, as 
demonstrated by the examples in the area of Article 102 TFEU, this boils 
down to issues of proof. Chapter 4 dealt with proof issues in cartel cases and 
demonstrates how substantive modernisation has an impact on the design 
and the interpretation of proof concepts such as burden of proof and 
standard of proof. The focus on proof is also a way for lawyers to translate 
new (economical) substantive issues into concepts they are more familiar 
with. 
 
595 On the confusion surrounding the concept of consumer welfare and consumer 
harm, see chapter 5. 
596 In chapter 4 the example of vertical agreements was also given: whether or not it 
still makes sense to maintain a ban on vertical price resale maintenance is really a 
question whether this is economically justified, but it is also very much linked to 
the question whether we want to keep a list of hard core restriction to provide legal 
certainty and to what extent we use presumptions. The fact that a sui generis 
procedure exists at the Commission level with a bit of influence from different legal 
traditions makes these subjects difficult. For verticals, in the meantime, the new 
block exemption was adopted that presents very little change for the former one, 
see Commission regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices, (2010) OJ L 102/1.
597  In this respect the idea that could be the subject of further comparative research 
(different jurisdictions, but especially different areas of law) is whether a legal 
system is more resistant to accommodate new or economical concepts in the 
context of the assessment of facts, when the assessment can lead to substantial 
sanctions. The feeling exists that this would seem to be the case. This more 
general question is related to the question of the standard of proof and whether it 
should be stricter according to the type of sanctions, see in chapter 4, at p. 89.
598  It is believed that a lot of the criticism of the Commission in recent cases and on 
the guidance paper on abuse are inspired by a disappointment in the fact that the 
Commission has recently claimed that it now wants to follow a more economical 
approach, but it is felt by some not do so in practice. This is possibly also related 
to the fact that not enough thought is given to the procedural and legal 
implications of introducing economical concepts. It would be understandable that 
this also leads to frustration of economists that see little effects of their 
contributions in the daily enforcement practice. 
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The point about integrating new substantive developments into the legal 
system and into the procedural framework of cases, can also be illustrated 
by the discussion of the interstate clause in chapter 3. The new Guidelines 
on the interpretation of effect on interstate trade promote a more economic 
approach to this condition in Article 101 (1) TFEU.599 It is a relatively non-
contested reorientation because of its form: an existing and well-known 
concept in the Treaty is used but reinterpreted, reoriented by the 
Commission, subject to the approval by the Courts. A general and open 
norm such as Article 101 (1) allows for dynamic interpretation in this way.600 
The impact on the system is of a different nature when compared to 
introducing new concepts such as efficiencies or consumer harm as an 
economic concept.  
 
From an institutional perspective, similar remarks can be made. In order for 
modernisation to have an impact in a proper way, it has to be studied how 
not only procedural, but also institutional structures have to be adapted.601 
For the time being, reflection on what has been called the institutional 
embeddedness of economics,602 is insufficient and in a relatively preliminary 
stage. The question in which way the institutional format should best be 
adapted to the introduction of more economics, is relevant both for the 
enforcement level, as well as for the level of judicial review (see below in 3.4). 
 
Linking this back to the chapters above, it is proposed that this relation 
between substantive modernisation and the procedural and institutional 
framework, can also offer an alternative explanation or another insight in 
599 See guidelines cited at p. 41, n 157.  Interstate trade is quantified, in a similar way 
as was also done for the condition “restriction” where the criterium of 
appreciability was introduced in the form of thresholds and a de minimis regime, 
see the Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance, cited above in n 
159. 
600  See in chapter 5, at p. 123  The discussion on the interstate trade clause also 
illustrates a more general point made at several occasions which is the impact of 
procedure on substance. In practice, the interstate clause has not really given rise 
to much interpretation problems and it appears that effect on interstate trade is 
just as easily assumed as before without too much economic analysis. It is 
proposed that this is because the effects of Reg. 1/2003 is such that it does not 
matter much whether or not EU competition law is applied or only national 
competition law (chapter 3 and summary above under 2.2).  If at some point the 
parallel application or single application should be said to matter, for example in 
view of which sanctions are possible, then the interpretation and analysis of the 
effect on interstate trade shall become an issue again, see cases pending on ne bis 
in idem, below in n 626
601 In chapter 5 examples were given of how the Commission has made some changes 
that reflect the growing importance attached to economics and also to consumers, 
see in chapter 5 at p. 119.
602 A term taken from D. Gerber, cited above in chapter 5, published now in Economic 
theory and Competition law, J. Drexl, L. Idot and J. Monéger (eds) (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2009). Merely appointing more economists in the competition 
authorities is clearly not enough or not adequate. Their role in the decision-making 
process needs to be defined. 
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some of the recent judgments of the Court of Justice that were discussed. It 
might be formulated in this way: recent judgments like GSK603 and T-
Mobile,604 in which the Court is said to be reluctant to go for a more effects-
based approach in cartel cases, might not be so much the Court resisting 
change and (substantive) modernisation.605 Rather, it might be the Court 
sending the message that the procedural framework cannot cope with too 
much emphasis on effects until it is clearer how this will affect effective 
enforcement, the burden and standard of proof and the rights and duties of 
parties.  
 
3.3.  Modernisation from an organisational perspective: the 
complicated relationship between decentralisation, convergence 
and consistency 
 
The different mechanisms of harmonisation and convergence, both with 
regards to substantive as well as procedural law, were mentioned or 
discussed in every one of the previous chapters.606 This also appears from 
the conclusions as summarized in section 7.1. above.  
 
One characteristic that is certainly remarkable in EU competition law is the 
position of the Commission.607 The policy driving and lawmaking role of the 
603 Above in chapter 5 at p. 125, n 323 and 389.
604 Above, see n  562.
605  Another recent case referred to in this respect is the Wanadoo case, case C-202/07 
P, cited above in n 564, rec. 103-113. Again in that case, the Court does not follow 
the arguments of the parties asking for a more economic and case-specific 
approach in an abuse case. It is even common practice to present the Court of 
Justice as conservative and form based, on the one hand, and the Commission 
and the General Court to be more susceptible to an effects-based approach, on the 
other hand. Quote: “So, the introduction of a more economic approach did not 
trigger a revolution after all”, E. Loozen, ‘The application of a more economic 
approach to restrictions by object: no revolution after all, T Mobile Netherlands’, 
(2010) 4 European Competition Law Review 146. The suggestion made here can 
provide a (partial) alternative explanation for the perceived gap between the case 
law and the enforcement practice. In T-Mobile, the Court (as well as the referring 
Dutch court) focused on typically legal concepts, such as the use of presumptions 
and the concept of causality. By doing so, the Court does provide for an answer to 
the question whether in particular markets collusion can be assumed when certain 
information is exchanged. 
606 In chapter 2 from the perspective of judicial protection; in chapter 3 in substantive 
terms to explain why the law applied in national or transborder cases is virtually 
the same; also in chapter 3 a critical note on centralised “top down” convergence 
when it comes to policy; in chapter 5 attention was also drawn to the existence of 
convergence of law and policy as a reason why a debate on objectives is necessary 
and will also have an important impact at the national level; chapter 6 contains 
the most elaborate perspective on convergence and harmonisation and the way 
forward.
607  See also under 3.1. above on the difference with other areas and the link with the 
internal market.
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Commission in this area608 is combined with an essential role in the actual 
enforcement of the law at the EU level and the supervisory role within the 
network of competition authorities. The actual enforcement of the law in 
individual cases has an impact on national enforcement in at least two ways: 
by setting an example and creating a precedent in terms of substance, but 
also by following a certain procedure in the course of the investigation, when 
deciding a case and, finally, when imposing a sanction.609 
 
It is fair to say that the combination of powers and the exercise thereof, 
together with the support from the Member States through the network, give 
the Commission a strong and important position in this area of law. Many 
authors have also argued that the case-law of the Courts supports the 
guiding role of the Commission.610 The central role of an EU institution in 
shaping the law and its enforcement in this way is one of the key elements 
that explain the mechanisms of harmonisation and convergence mentioned 
before. The term decentralisation still feels somewhat misleading; it is more a 
question of a multitude of enforcers driven by the EU level. 
 
As a matter of realism, the basis of further reflection on how best to improve 
the enforcement system of EU competition law in the future, should take 
into account its present features as described in more detail in chapter 6: 
substantive law that is largely harmonized, the various mechanisms of 
harmonisation and convergence and a unique enforcement system with 
strong and visible enforcement at the EU level and simultaneous 
enforcement of the same rules (and their national equivalents) at the 
national level by specialized agencies. This all operates alongside the 
national judge who is, of course, also called, as elsewhere in EU law, to play 
his role of primary enforcer of EU law in private litigation.611 To complete this 
picture: it seems to be a given fact that little controversy exists at the 
608 Using classical instruments, such as proposals of legislation like in other areas of 
law, although always in the form of regulations (block exemption regulations for 
example) which already makes a difference, but also frequent use of soft law 
instruments.
609  See chapter 6 for harmonisation and convergence at a procedural level in this 
respect. The impact of the enforcement practice at the EU level well exceeds cases 
where EU law is applied due to precisely the convergence that has already taken 
place in terms of substance.
610  Reference is usually made to the judgment in Masterfoods, Case C-344/98, 
judgment of 14 December 2000, [2005] ECR I-11369. Article 85 EC, now 105 
TFEU, is often cited where it says that the Commission shall ensure the 
application of the “principles laid down in Article 101 and 102”. On the role of the 
Commission in the network, see A. Schaub, ‘The Commission’s position within the 
network’ in: D. Ehlermann and I. Antanasiu, cited above in n 500 p. 237. 
611 As it was briefly mentioned in chapter 6, the Commission would like to see more 
private enforcement, but the plans to take initiatives have some trouble 
progressing; the resistance to harmonising rules concerning damage actions is 
said to be important. This confirms what will be said below about how 




Member State level about the expansion of EU law into national cases and 
that there is strong support for convergence. 
 
There is one point, however, where some reluctance should be expressed 
with regards to the strong and partly “top down” driven convergence. This is 
precisely the point when it comes to institutional structures and procedural 
law.  
 
Not so much the will or even the need to either converge, or actually 
harmonise, is called into question. Rather, serious thought and doubt is 
justified whether we really want the convergence process to take the 
Commission (institutional) model as the example.612 It is defended that it is 
not a given fact that the Commission procedure and the Commission 
institutional framework as a competition authority, should be the end 
objective of further convergence, let alone of formal harmonisation.613 In fact, 
it is submitted that the natural or somewhat stimulated movement of 
convergence towards the Commission model should be halted to privilege 
first a more fundamental reflection on the institutional framework at the EU 
level. This includes both the role of the Commission and judicial review of its 
decisions (this point will also be addressed in the next section).  
 
A second observation, again inspired by the attempt to approach this area of 
the law from a broader perspective, is that it is difficult to understand why 
there is such an emphasis on (if not to say obsession with) consistency and 
uniform application in competition law. With emphasis it is meant also that 
there is large consensus that the need for consistency is a justification for 
far-reaching consistency mechanisms of various sorts, as introduced by Reg. 
612 An unresolved question which was triggered by research is whether convergence in 
substance and convergence of procedure are concepts or phenomena with 
characteristic differences. When it comes to convergence and divergence, there is 
also a risk that chapters 3 and 6 and these conclusions are interpreted as 
opposing convergence. This would be a wrong impression. Rather, in different ways 
the question was explored if divergence is necessarily a bad thing and why the 
system so strongly wants to do away with it. It is also a call for defining more 
accurately what problematic divergence is, why (for example because of 
effectiveness or not, see chapter 6) that is so and which divergence is not 
problematic. Accepting that not all divergence is bad, see P. Larouche and F. 
Chirico, ‘Divergence, Functionalism, and the Economics of Convergence’, in: The 
coherence of EU law – The search for unity in divergence concepts, S. Prechal and B. 
van Roermond (eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
613 This is all the more so because the Staff Working Paper frequently referred to 
above, explicitly states that institutional divergence has not been mentioned in the 
public consultation as problematic, contrary to procedural divergence and great 
differences in terms of resources of competition authorities. Cited above at p. 164, 
at par. 194. The Commission should therefore not create the impression, directly 
or indirectly, that institutional divergence is a major issue because given the 
authority it has in the network, this will stimulate spontaneous or quasi-
spontaneous convergence which will naturally take the Commission system as an 
example. This is especially valid in the light of the important criticism on its own 
system.
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1/2003. This great focus on consistency is wide-spread and not only present 
at the EU institutional level, but also in doctrine. And yet, decentralized 
application and enforcement is the very essence of the general enforcement 
system for EU law as it has always existed.614 Not to say that it is the best 
system, but no convincing arguments were found in the preparation of the 
different articles, why there is either more danger for inconsistent 
application in competition law than elsewhere in EU law, or, alternatively, 
why competition law inherently has characteristics that make consistency 
more important.615  
 
This observation is not an expression of criticism of the Commission, nor 
does it presuppose that there is no problem of inconsistent application in the 
practice of the 27 Member States. It merely expresses authentic surprise and 
perhaps frustration at not having established exactly why consistency is felt 
to be such an issue in the area of competition law, but even more so, how 
such a high level of consensus was reached as to justify, at the legislative 
and political level that consistency requires particular mechanisms that put 
serious pressure on procedural autonomy.616 It is proposed that, from a 
purely legal point of view, it is far from sure that the concept of consistency 
is a valid justification as such for measures aiming at furthering convergence 
614 Is monopoly of enforcement a guarantee for consistency? The principle that 
consistency is an essential principle in the development of a legal system is of 
course strongly supported. The question at a theoretical level is from which point 
on (systemic) consistency is challenged by diverging individual decisions at a 
certain level. On methods of consistency in the network era, see M. de Visser,  
cited above,  in n 479. In EU law the doctrine of consistent application has mainly 
been advocated in areas where it can serve to compensate the absence of directly 
applicable rules, it is also referred to then as indirect effect of EU law, see D. 
Chalmers, C. Hadjiemmanuil, G. Monti and A. Tomkins, European Union law 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2006), p. 381. In competition law, the key provisions 
are directly applicable and a centralised enforcement system with specific features 
highlighted above, was in place since the very beginning. 
615 In chapter 6 the question was asked whether effectiveness requires uniformity. To 
take an example from one of the mechanisms that Reg. 1/2003 contains to 
“ensure consistency”: would one feel the need to allow the Commission to intervene 
directly in front of an agency applying directly applicable rules on the safety for 
workers, or pollution or agricultural quota, so as to tell the agency or even the 
court (see the mechanism contained in Article 15 Reg. 1/2003 discussed in 
Chapter 6) what the right way to apply the law is? Is a “false negative” (an 
agreement wrongfully qualified as non-restrictive) so much worse then leaving 
environmental pollution unpunished because a judge misinterprets a directive? 
There are always partial justifications for one or the other specific aspects (fines 
are high, authorities cannot use the preliminary procedure etc.), but none are 
satisfactory to explain the important, perhaps disproportionate, concern for 
consistency when compared to other areas of the law.
616 An “issue” also mentioned as being perceived as a justification for the creation of a 
number of specific mechanisms like the one mentioned as an example in the 
previous note. Also, allowing it to be one of the main arguments mentioned by 
those who favour of (formal) procedural harmonisation. At par. 261 of the Staff 
Working Paper cited above (p. 164) it is stated yet again, that the stakeholders 
themselves ask for stronger mechanisms of consistency.
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between national enforcement systems. Clearly, there are underlying worries 
about inconsistencies that provide a basis for a large consensus in this 
respect both in the legal community as well as in the political arena. In any 
case, from a broader EU perspective, it is worthwhile looking at the area of 
competition law to see whether it can serve as an example to design or 
reorganise the enforcement of other EU rules.  
 
These last two points taken together617 can also be seen as an encourage-
ment for the Commission to invest further resources in reflecting on 
divergence in terms of procedure and institutions as well as the actual 
inconsistencies and their origins. Work in this area is underway in the 
network, as announced in the 2009 reports on Reg.1/2003, often cited 
above.  When it comes to what the optimal institutional model is for 
enforcing the law at the EU level, it is perhaps a delicate exercise for the 
Commission itself, at least in public, to formulate alternatives. That is why 
the European Parliament, national stakeholders and academics (and not 
only in competition circles) should take an interest in these issues.  
 
A final point about consistency, convergence and divergence is the difficult 
question relating to whether, and if so, how much, divergence is still 
acceptable or even desirable amongst Member States.618 More in particular, 
does it not follow from the reasons behind substantive modernisation that 
there must still be room for Member States to take into account specific 
national issues? The question here is limited to substantive law:619 modern 
competition law requires taking into account economic reality. It seems self-
evident that markets are still very different and economic and other market-
oriented national policies in 27 countries are not the same. Is it to be 
reconciled with a more economic approach that there is no room for 
diverging results in terms of enforcement or for diverging policies (for 
example in determining priorities)? If, in principle, the feeling exists that 
there must be some room for national and market specific considerations to 
come into play, it is totally unclear in the present system how this should 
best be organized.620 It is so contrary to the wide-spread belief in 
617 The necessary caution in terms of what the model of enforcement is that we are 
evolving to, on the one hand, and limits of consistency as a legal basis, on the 
other hand. Chapter 6 also expresses the need for stocktaking of actual remaining 
divergence.
618  In all the chapters above the assumption has been that there is no or hardly any 
divergence in terms of substantive law, more substantial divergence is usually 
assumed to exist in terms of procedure. It was then questioned in several chapters 
what this means for policymaking.
619 Whether it is also worth protecting divergence for the sake of the different cultural 
and historical roots of legal systems, was briefly touched on in chapter 5 and is 
more a concern for procedural harmonisation.
620 Again, the assumption is that, at least amongst the authorities there is no 
apparent desire to diverge, which does not mean that for political, legal or 
economical reasons there should not be some room for national priorities. The 
question is really whether it is only about applying the law to different facts 
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convergence that it even seems delicate to draw attention to this point. And 
yet, the questions do seem logical in view of the very essence of the more 
economical approach to competition law.621 
 
3.4.  Modernisation as a challenge to the system of judicial protection 
 
In the article in chapter 2 (written and published in 2005), doubts were 
expressed regarding the question whether the EU legal system, especially 
from the perspective of the standing of individuals before the Courts, was 
well adapted to the developments in competition law. The expectation was 
that the creation of the decentralized system could give rise to some new 
problems because a series of new types of decisions, possibly affecting the 
rights of individuals, would be created. 622 The different articles in this thesis 
also try to convey the general idea that there is little (judicial) control at all 
on the coordinating and supervisory role that the Commission has been 
given within the network. This is all the more so when there is not even a 
formal or informal decision that could (possibly) be challenged. That is why 
not only soft law instruments were mentioned, but also Commission 
interventions e.g. in proceedings in national courts, decisions to undertake 
sector investigations etc. 
 
Given the extent to which worries were expressed at the time of the entry 
into force of the regulation, one might have expected that the activities of the 
new enforcement system would have inevitably lead to litigation before the 
national courts, attempts of direct appeals in Luxemburg to test the standing 
conditions, or preliminary questions on judicial protection to the Court of 
Justice. Nevertheless, as far as known, six years after the entry into force of 
Regulation 1/2003, there has not been a run to the courts to challenge 
(different markets with different economical policies) or should this difference in 
markets also result in divergence in policy or even the law?
621 The great degree of convergence will also make it difficult for stakeholders to 
accept remaining or new divergence at some point if this is not discussed publicly. 
This is already the case: it is argued that the call for more convergence can be 
explained by this: the more convergence there is, the less the remaining divergence 
seems acceptable for legal subjects.
622  A number of examples are recalled here: decisions to exchange information 
amongst authorities, the reallocation of a case by the Commission (to a national 
authority), the lack of decision on a request for guidance, new decisions such as 
decisions with structural remedies, finding of inapplicability, request in the context 
of sector inquiries but also interventions before the national judge. See chapter 2 
and figures mentioned in n 17 above. Some worries are still repeated even though, 
in practice, not many problematic cases seem to have occurred, see several papers 
made by working groups in the context of the public consultation in 2009, 
presented at a conference organized by the GCLC Center of the College of Bruges, 
the presentations are accessible at: 
http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=gclcfifthannual_docs (accessed 
last on 25 June 2010). The comments of stakeholders in the consultation, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/closed.html (accessed last 25 
June 2010); papers forthcoming in D. Waelbroeck and M. Merola (eds), Towards 
the optimal enforcement of Competition rules in Europe, 2010. 
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decisions taken within the network, at whichever level. However, it is too 
early to draw conclusions. It takes time for all those concerned to adapt to a 
new enforcement system and it takes time for the individual companies in 
the market to evaluate in reality whether there are indeed certain actions 
within the network, and more in particular by the Commission, that they feel 
they should be able to challenge because their rights are affected.623 It is also 
quite relevant that there have simply been very few “new” types of decisions 
as qualified in chapter 2.624 
 
The Commission has expressed its overall satisfaction with the functioning 
of the enforcement system that the regulation has set up. The lack of 
litigation challenging its basic principles can be perceived as a factor 
contributing to this success.625 Slowly interesting cases are now appearing in 
relation to the network, but, as far as known, not in relation to the 
challengeability of Commission acts which was the subject of chapter 2.626 
These cases are mostly references concerning preliminary questions 
regarding the functioning of the network and various aspects of Reg.1/2003, 
showing that national judges are prepared to play their role in addressing 
difficult questions when confronted with them in specific litigation, either 
opposing private parties, or in the context of an appeal against a decision of 
a national authority. 
 
623   The absence of cases pending before the Court is of course a dangerous parameter 
to measure whether there is a real problem in terms of judicial protection; it might 
very well depend on the cost-benefit analysis of companies to invest in bringing 
cases “of principle” to the Court whilst they are, for example, themselves still 
subject of investigations. One opportunity to test the case law on appealable acts 
might be in a case where an appeal was brought against a request for information 
by the Commission, see above n 547. The case does not address a new type of 
decision following modernisation though.
624 An attempt to guess which acts would be open to appeal and which would not, see 
overview in C.S. Kerse and N. Khan, EC Antitrust procedure, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2005, fifth edition), at p. 475-476. 
625 The low amount of decisions of the Commission within the network (but also 
generally few re-allocation decisions reported for national authorities) might also 
be a good illustration of another trend which is a general decrease in formal 
decisions. First, many commentators indeed refer to the fact that coordination and 
cooperation within the network involves many informal contacts, and second, in 
general there might be a certain trend to more informal competition policy 
involving advocacy and even settlements. 
626 Some examples are given of interesting cases that cannot be discussed in detail 
here concerning a new question raised by Reg.1: the Belgian pending case VEBIC 
on the question whether authorities should be involved in appeal decisions against 
their decisions, see above at p. 159, n 491; a Czech case on ne bis in idem and 
parallel application, case C-17/10, [2010] OJ C 100/14; a German reference on 
access to files and information exchange, Case C-360/09, [2009] OJ C 297/18, 
and, on the competences of NCA’s under the regulation, a Polish reference, Case 
C-375/09, [2009] OJ C 297/19. The lack of cases confirmed in the reports for the 
FIDE 2008, n 549.
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With the benefit of hindsight, part of the worries expressed by many 
commentators at the time, were perhaps inspired by the fear of what is new 
and a sense of mistrust at the idea that e.g. authorities amongst themselves 
would discuss and allocate cases in a system that is perceived as non-
transparent for the outside world.627 
 
And yet, the absence of notorious cases challenging the potential 
shortcomings of the system of judicial protection anno 2010 does not alter 
the strong belief at all, that any decision which affects the rights of parties in 
a substantial way should be subject to judicial review at the appropriate 
level and through an effective process.  
 
Taking the perspective of accountability628 and taking into account the 
network of competition authorities, first a remark about the national level.  
 
If there is a decision at stake for which the national authority is accountable, 
judicial review should be situated at a national level.629 However, if there is 
one area where there is little or no spontaneous harmonisation, it is the 
scope and organisation of judicial review of decisions of competition 
authorities in the Member States. The different mechanisms of 
harmonisation discussed in chapter 6 hardly touch on this subject. 
Modernisation in terms of enforcement has concentrated on the authorities, 
their cooperation and how they can ensure efficient and consistent 
application of EU competition rules.630 However, amongst the parameters 
that can be used to measure adequate judicial protection and effective 
enforcement is, of course, also the judicial review of decisions of competition 
authorities.631 This important component of the overall enforcement system 
627  The Commission also suggests this explanation on the basis of the reactions of 
stakeholders after the consultation on the functioning of the regulation, see for 
example in par. 214 of the Staff Working Paper cited above at p. 177 in n 98. It is 
plausible to the extent that the legal community tends to focus very much on legal 
certainty and the combination of substantive modernisation, the abolishment of 
the notification system and the creation of the network were many new factors all 
introduced at once. I believe that, including myself at the time chapter 2 was 
written, this is a valid explanation to a certain extent and that now generally there 
is less fear of the problems that can arise within the network and views are more 
moderate.  Some commentators still pinpoint many deficiencies in the system of 
the network however, see S. Brammer, cited above in n 546.
628 See chapter 5 on governance inspired reasons to reflect on goals of competition 
law, where this approach is also used, at p. 128 and following. 
629  This does seem obvious, but is not really so: more evolutionary scenarios are 
possible; it is worth mentioning that even EU institutions have already, somewhat 
timidly, called for a European appeal level, EcoSoc opinion, see at p. 162, n 500.
630  See chapter 6 on the extent to which Regulation 1 has in fact harmonized 
enforcement. Also, there is guidance for national judges in the form of a 
Commission Notice, cited e.g. above on p. 17, n 39  and of the course the Courts’ 
case-law, but this is aimed mostly at national courts in general and usually deals 
with private litigation.
631  These aspects cannot be elaborated on further in these conclusions but sufficient 
and reliable empirical data on the functioning of the national judiciary in public 
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is a source of divergence, a potential obstacle to effective enforcement and a 
potential issue in terms of equal access to court amongst the Member States. 
It is really time to address this delicate aspect of enforcement in some 
way.632 The contrast between the degree of convergence and consistency at 
the first level (authorities) on the one hand, and the total diversity of 
procedures once the stage of appeals is reached on the other hand, is 
striking.  
 
In turn, if the responsibility for the decision affecting the legal position of the 
individual can be attributed to the Commission, the EU courts come into 
play. 
 
Whilst modernising substantive law and decentralizing enforcement, the 
judicial system has not been subject to much change from the perspective of 
competition law. Over the last years, on the other hand, the pressure on 
national judges has continuously increased in terms of judicial protection.633 
As it was mentioned already in Chapter 2, this trend shows a lack of balance 
between the obligations of national judges to protect the rights of parties, on 
the one hand, and the level of individual judicial protection that exists at the 
EU level, on the other hand.  
 
enforcement is necessary. It is clear that it is a delicate exercise in view of the 
independence of the judiciary. However, the courts responsible for appeal 
procedures carry the responsibilities described by the Court of Justice in terms of 
uniform application, consistency and judicial protection. They definitely are part of 
the system of enforcement of competition law and yet are not part of it in many 
ways. It is also a well-know fact that in many jurisdictions the appeal courts are 
very critical of the decisions and policy of the authorities. These aspects of 
enforcement are uncoordinated, not harmonised and relatively difficult to discern, 
but yet may have implications in practice.
632 The suggestion made above in the previous section, that the Commission should 
envisage work in mapping out sources of divergence, could lead to a White or 
Green Paper on the subject, see a cautious remark on courts in the 2009 reports, 
cited above on p. 164 n 509, at par. 270. Also for example the Italian report at 
FIDE 2004, see D. Cahill (ed), The modernisation of Eu competition law 
enforcement in the EU, FIDE 2004 reports (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 305.  
633 This has been discussed extensively elsewhere for general EU law, see A. Ward, 
Judicial review and the rights of private parties in EU law, cited above in n 416 at 
p. 139, chapter 6 of the book; often reference is made to “double standards”. In the 
area of competition law just one supplementary reference here to the Opinion of 
Advocate General Mengozzi in VEBIC who has no hesitation to oblige a national 
judge to adopt a far-reaching interpretation of procedural law for the sake of 
effectiveness of EU competition law; he explicitly mentions that at some point the 
legislation will have to change, but in the meanwhile, the judge should adopt an 
interpretation contra legem (and contrary to the explicit intentions of the Belgian 
legislator) if necessary. See above in n  491, Opinion of 25 March 2010. Whether or 
not the Court follows the Opinion is less relevant here, but the Opinion shows very 
well how minds have evolved in terms of the heavy responsibilities of national 
judges. 
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The system of judicial protection at the EU level does not seem optimally 
adapted to the modernised era: neither from the general perspective of 
judicial protection, nor from the viewpoint of developments in competition 
law enforcement. The Lisbon Treaty which has taken the place that was 
initially allotted to the Constitutional Treaty still referred to in chapter 2, has 
not fundamentally altered that view. Whether or not the new wording of 
Article 263 TFEU will widen access to the European Courts is still an open 
question at this time.634 But fundamentally, this is not really the main issue 
in competition law. It is not only about a more liberal interpretation of 
admissibility requirements in relation to the requirement of ‘individual 
concern’, there are other factors that contribute to the insufficiency of the 
system.  
 
When it comes to admissibility, both the uncertainty about the individual 
concern of applicants but also the restrictive case-law on preparatory acts 
was mentioned above.635 Furthermore, other factors also appeared such as 
mainly the slow process of judicial review and the relatively passive role of 
the Courts when it comes to instructing cases.636 In other words, there is 
more reason for concern than only the issues raised most often by 
practioners, namely case allocation decisions within the network and 
information exchanges between authorities, and the lack of standing to 
challenge them. The Court system simply has not evolved sufficiently over 
the years to keep up with developments both in competition law as well as in 
judicial protection.637 
 
When it comes to judicial review at the request of individuals,638 the purpose 
should be, on the one hand, optimising the structure in view of the more 
economic approach,639 whilst, on the other hand, ensuring adequate judicial 
634 But chapter 2 and the brief discussion above in section 2.1, already show that the 
issue in the area of competition law is not always the seemingly regulatory nature 
of the act. Rather, the challenge still lies in the individual and/or direct effect and 
in the definitive nature of an act. 
635 The case-law on preparatory acts or non definitive acts not open to appeal, can be 
an obstacle because the general idea seems to be that many acts performed within 
the network by the Commission would fall within this category, .. As was said 
above, the focus has been on re-allocation decisions but more decisions were dealt 
with in chapter 2 and many of the questions raised there are still valid.
636 Chapter 2 and 4. See also provocative and interesting comments by P. Marsden, 
‘Checks and balances: EU competition law and the rule of law’ (2009) Competition 
Law International 24. 
637 Clearly the purpose is not to fall into the trap of what Chalmers calls the “lazy 
assumption” of lawyers that every denial of locus standi to an individual amounts 
to a lack of judicial protection, cited above in n 614, see at p. 434. The claims here 
are not new, but there are a number of factors that, taken together should lead to 
a reform of the system. 
638 When it comes to the supervisory role of the Commission in the network, chapters 
5 and 6 also suggest more involvement of stakeholders at a national and EU level, 
to increase accountability.
639 For the phase at the Commission, this aspect was already partly discussed in 
section 3.2 above and in the chapters mentioned there. In chapters 4 and 5 some 
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protection.640 Both require sufficient flexibility of process and full respect of 
fundamental rights. Reconciling, on the one hand, the efficiency of the 
process and an outcome which is as sound as possible from an economic 
perspective, whilst, on the other hand, trying to achieve a sufficient degree of 
effective judicial protection, is probably just about the biggest challenge for 
competition law enforcement in the near future and this challenge is also 
one the Courts should take up.641 
 
Possible solutions at the Court level have been discussed elsewhere and can 
range from relatively minor changes642 to more revolutionary ones.643 In 
terms of access to the court and the need to ensure accountability of the 
Commission, also in playing its role in the network as discussed above, 
serious thought might be given to the creation of a specialized EU 
Competition Tribunal.644  
 
This Tribunal should be willing to review, in fast track procedure if 
necessary, all acts for which the Commission is responsible and that affect 
the rights of private parties in a substantial way.645 The (older) case law 
hints were given about the impact that more economics should have for judges and 
the difficulties this can imply.
640 This resumes the overall challenge competition law is confronted with since 
modernisation, see W. Kerber, ‘Should competition law promote efficiency? Some 
reflections of an economist on the normative foundations of competition law’, in: 
Economic theory and competition law, cited above in n 605.
641 As competition law continues to develop and enforcement becomes more effective 
and visible, the procedural questions are more and more at the heart of every case. 
Both the general pressure on authorities and courts in terms of ensuring adequate 
judicial protection and ensuring due process, but also substantive developments 
are responsible for this, as shown throughout this book. For a very interesting 
analysis in this respect, A. Louvaris, ‘A brief overview of some conflicts between 
economic efficiency and efffectiveness of the administrative or judicial process in 
competition law’  in J. Drexl, L.  Idot, J. Monéger (eds), Economic theory and 
competition law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009). 
642  Integrating economists in the process somehow or merely taking a more active 
approach to proof and standard of review as suggested is minimalistic in the sense 
that it does not require structural institutional reforms.    
643 Such as forsaking the exclusive competence of the EU courts to examine the 
legality of the Commission actions, on the one hand, or the creation of 
decentralised courts or setting up decentralised courts in all Member States, or for 
certain larger regions, on the other hand. An overview of various ideas on the 
reform of the judicial architecture, in  D. Chalmers and others, cited above in n 
614 p. 122 and following and 303 and following. Debates on the judicial 
architecture of the EU have often focused on the preliminary rulings. Obviously, if 
structural reforms were to be envisaged for competition cases, they have to be seen 
in the light of the general structure and workload of the Courts. 
644 Former President of the Court of First Instance (General Court) Bo Vesterdorf has 
pleaded for such a reform as well, see for example in the contribution cited above 
in n 594, at p. 511. 
645 It is clear that the length of procedures and the great reluctance of the Courts in 
general to award relief in interlocutory proceedings (Article 278, 279 TFEU, these 
cases are practically non-existent) are two additional elements that contribute to 
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should be reviewed, a less rigid approach to admissibility should be seriously 
considered in such a way as to cover the two lines of case law discussed 
above: the obstacle of ‘individual concern’ and the obstacle of what 
constitutes a challengeable binding act.646 Either this is done by 
differentiating competition law from other areas of European law647 or rather 
by a more general “revirement de jurisprudence” on behalf of the Courts. It 
should be possible to have sufficient regard to the content and effects of a 
decision taken by the Commission in the current enforcement framework: in 
some cases parties will be able to prove that a decision (whether or not it is 
technically a final decision) has substantial impact on their legal position.648 
In such a case, review must be possible. Such a solution would necessarily 
involve a case-to-case approach and the outcome of review might not be 
foreseeable until a body of case-law will have been built. However, the 
possibility must exist to challenge certain decisions for which, in any case, 
an action at a national level shall not exist because the responsibilty for the 
decision lies with the Commission.649  
 
At least as important as issues of access to court, it is proposed that the 
review system should present the necessary procedural flexibility when it 
comes to dealing with economical assessment.650 Reviewing judges should be 
equipped and willing to review factual and economical appraisal if necessary 
the insufficiency of the system. Would it be accepted in the legal systems of many 
Member States that urgent measures are de facto never taken by the competent 
court, for example suspending a cartel decision imposing a fine? Fast track 
procedures (or expedited procedures) have existed for a number of years, but seem 
to be scarcely used. 
646 The criterion proposed by Advocate General Jacobs was a good basis: any measure 
that has, or is liable to have, a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the 
individual, Opinion cited above at p. 9, n 16. One might add “or on his legal 
position”. Introducing and developing a criterion like that could cover many of the 
worries in relation to access to court and combine the two lines of case law 
mentioned here.
647  This can be justified because competition law, state aid and dumping have always 
been treated somewhat differently by the Court in the past when it came to 
admissibility, see for a recent overview and comparison with access to court in 
competition cases in the Netherlands, A. Gerbrandy, cited at p. 140, n 419 e.g. at 
p. 141 and following. 
648 It can not be excluded that a re-allocation decision can have an impact on the 
position of an undertaking, it will be up to them to demonstrate substantive 
impact in fact or in law, but not to forget the other types of decisions mentioned in 
chapter 2. 
649  Regardless of whether one agrees with the outcome of the case and whether 
regulations should be challengable, it is felt that the judgment in UPA (cited above 
in n 20) was particularly unstaisfactory where the Court referred to indirect 
possibilities to challenge a Community act at the national level, as if it were an 
alternative for a direct challenge before the Community (now EU) judges. Every 
level should take its responsibility in the system. 
650 See the interesting ideas of B. Vesterdorf based on his experience at the Court, on 
how to adapt procedures to competition cases, cited above in n 594 but also in n 
25 in chapter 2. 
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and in an active way.651 There is also substantial distance and room for 
manoeuvre between marginal review, on the one hand, and leaving no 
discretion to the Commission at the risk of taking the place of the enforcer, 
on the other. The right balance between full review and marginal review is 
still yet to be found.  
 
The creation of a specialized tribunal does not actually require such major 
changes in terms of institutional setup: the creation of specialised courts 
was already possible and has been made easier652 and the Statute of the 
Court, which deals with procedure, can also be modified more easily since 
the Lisbon Treaty.653 The other suggestions made above are a question of 
policy reorientation by the Courts.  
 
It is certainly true that these very brief critical remarks in the context of a 
conclusion do not provide for an easy-to-use blueprint for a future 
redesigned enforcement system. This was not the subject of a specific article 
although judicial protection and the EU court system have always been a 
source of concern. The belief that the EU judicial system needs a change is 
confirmed by the study underlying the different articles. 
 
It is proposed that the matter needs to be approached in a comprehensive 
way: from the perspective of individual judicial protection and the procedural 
framework, both at the level of the Commission and the EU courts, are to be 
evaluated together.654 Recently, an upsurge of serious criticism on the 
651 See about the passive role of the Courts in that context already in 2001 article 
with G. van der Wal, in Europees bewijsrecht: een verkenning, cited above in 
chapter 4, above in n 229. Without even considering radical changes of the 
enforcement system that might be feasible in the longer term, it should be 
considered how the instruction of cases could be more active in terms of calling 
witnesses or organizing confrontation on economical data and analysis. Of course, 
if the Commission itself should consider important changes to its institutional 
structure towards a more judicial one, the comprehensive approach to 
enforcement would require it to take that into account when redesigning the 
judicial review component: maybe in such a case, for example, a more marginal 
review of facts and data might be accepted, see below on the need for a 
comprehensive approach. 
652 Article 257 TFEU. It no longer requires unanimity in the Council since the Lisbon 
Treaty. For a view doubting the usefulness of a new Court, the report of the House 
of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Session 2006-2007 accessible via: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/75/7506
.htm. 
653  Article 281 TFEU: the Court can request that modification and unanimity in the 
Council is no longer required. There is substantial room for further improvement 
here as well: the Courts should be able now to organize their procedures more 
autonomously and in a more flexible way. See for some comments on changes 
since Lisbon, L. Parret, ‘En wat met de rechtsbescherming? Het Verdrag van 
Lissabon en de communautaire rechter’ in: De Europese Unie na het Verdrag van 
Lissabon (Deventer: Kluwer, 2009). 
654 In fact this also means including the third level, the appeal on points of law at the 
Court of Justice after the appeal at the General Court.
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Commission system can be heard again.655 The main focus of attention is the 
fact that the Commission is simultaneously investigator and decision-
maker.656 This much publicized debate falls well outside the present 
conclusions. The point to be made here is that the two levels of enforcement 
are to be evaluated together when the overall level of individual judicial 
protection is assessed.657 A proposal by which, for example, some minor 
changes are made to the institutional format of the Commission might be 
more acceptable if the system of judicial review is substantially reinforced. 
Vice versa, if some of the insufficiencies of the Court system remain in place 
and no changes occur at that level, a more thorough reform of Commission 
procedures might be called for.658 It is not a question of simply 
communicating vessels, but of two levels that are part of one and the same 
enforcement system. 
 
Recalling the mindset described in the introduction (namely a consistent 
questioning if and how competition differs from general EU law and how it 
interacts with the rest of the legal system) the question might be: why should 
there be a different judicial system or why should the existing judicial 
655 The public consultation organised after five years of functioning of Reg. 1/2003 
was the opportunity for the market to react and the recent substantially high fines 
are often referred to as the reasons for criticism on the Commission’s procedures 
and institutional structures.
656 Most comments focus on the deficiencies of the Commission’s procedures, but the 
Courts’ responsibilities should not be neglected. In the reports on the functioning 
of Regulation 1/2003 the Commission addresses some sources of criticism on its 
own system and refutes them, cited above see p. 164, e.g. at par. 51 and 125. 
Some fierce criticism is found in papers presented at the GCLC conference 
mentioned above in n 88. For two different perspectives: A. Riley, ‘The 
modernisation of EU anti-cartel enforcement: will the Commission grasp the 
opportunity’ (2010) European Competition Law Review 191, and W. Wils, ‘The 
increased level of EC antitrust fines, judicial review and the European Convention 
of Human Rights’, (2010) 33 World Competition 5.  If ever criminal sanctions would 
become possible at the EU level, this would again have a profound impact on 
institutional choices: if the General Court would then always be the one imposing 
the fine, it could presumably not be the appeal judge at the same time. 
657 Whilst clearly differentiating between the national and EU level, the idea expressed 
here is, however, a very different one than the one expressed by the Court in the 
UPA judgment, often cited above, see p. 10, n 20 where the Court seemed to have 
said that the possibilities the individual has at a national level and at the EU level 
should be taken together. Unless very revolutionary changes would be made, such 
as making the Commission accountable in front of national judges, quod non, both 
levels should be differentiated and each should achieve its own acceptable level of 
judicial protection.
658 A very recent case (Grand Chamber judgment) gives rise to some pessimism at first 
sight, in the sense that it is so categorical on the limited review that the General 
Court should carry out when it reviews Commission decisions, pushing the 
General Court in a very passive role and leaving substantial leeway for the 
Commission, judgment of 29 June 2010, Case C-441/07 P. Irrespective of whether 
the General Court did or did not make a wrong assessment in this case, this line of 




system be adapted to competition law?659 At the EU level, the answer lies in 
the modernisation and the important changes that the law has undergone, 
the specific roles that the Commission plays in terms of enforcement and in 
the network, combined with, finally, the evolving requirements of effective 
judicial protection.  
 
4.  Post scriptum: the relationship between substantive and 
procedural law and the interaction between competition 
law and EU law in general   
 
From a theoretical perspective, the key issue that appears from this book is 
the relationship and the interaction between substantive law and procedural 
law. Although it was never as such the focus of attention in a seperate way, 
it appeared more and more clearly when the project was undertaken to 
compile a book by bringing together different articles on competition law 
enforcement. Together, they hopefully demonstrate the clear existence of 
interaction between substantive law and procedural law and the idea that 
every substantive development should include an equal amount of thought 
on procedural implications and vice versa. Procedure might be instrumental 
to substance, but the two are strongly linked.  
 
How to adapt the institutional structure in an optimal way to ensure the 
application of new rules and how will new enforcement rules affect the law 
that is applied? This question could be part of a standard impact assessment 
test when new legislation or policy initiatives are envisaged. The area of 
competition law presents an interesting opportunity to take this issue 
forward at an EU level because of a number of characteristics described 
above. It also presents many examples illustrating how intertwined 
procedure and substance are. In fact, modernisation as defined in the 
introduction of this thesis, comprising both decentralisation and substantive 
modernisation, is in itself the best example of how procedure and substance 
are linked. Regulation 1/2003 might have been about decentralising or 
reforming enforcement but it is also about adapting the system to 
substantive reform.  
 
At the same time, whilst ascertaining that interaction is a reality, the thesis 
shows the need for more fundamental research into this issue. This research 
could contribute towards optimising enforcement structures and, thus, be 
useful beyond the field of competition law. 
 
Other than the fact that this general proposition on the existence of 
interaction between substantive and procedural law, goes beyond the area of 
659 The essence of the remarks on the judicial protection system are the objectives 
that a reform should achieve: a more active and more rapid process, more 
flexibility and a wider access to court for review of Commission actions. The 
suggestion of a separate tribunal was made but is not the focus point: these 
objectives can be achieved by another type of institutional reform within the 
Courts. 
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competition law enforcement, the different side effects discussed in the 
chapters above, are presented together in the title of this compilation as a 
challenge to the enforcement system of competition law, but also as a 
challenge to the enforcement of EU law in general.  
 
The first reason for that is the strong belief that EU competition law is very 
much part of EU law regardless of the fairly autonomous way it seems to 
have developed recently. Enforcement of competition law has its own 
characteristics but it is inevitably the enforcement of EU law, with a role for 
the EU institutions and a role for the national judges, all bound by primary 
and secondary EU legislation. There is therefore inevitably interaction 
between EU law and competition law. The first common theme identified 
above (the relationship between competition law and the internal market, 
sub-section 3.1) is already in itself sufficient illustration of the interaction 
between competition law and EU law in general.  
 
The argument was made at several occasions that competition specialists 
should not underestimate the fact that competition law is part of EU law. 
Vice versa, by presenting the side effects of modernisation as a challenge to 
the enforcement of EU law in general, the purpose is to state that it is 
worthwhile in many respects for non-competition lawyers to take an interest 
in these side effects because they can shed a light on more general 
enforcement issues. The title which aims at broadening the scope of the 
challenge is meant to trigger interest in that respect.  
 
The impact of developments within competition law on EU law in general is 
more or less important or direct depending on the subject. The points which 
were raised in relation to the impact of substantive reform on procedure 
(second common theme above, sub-section 3.2) are of a general nature, for 
example the difficulty that a legal system has to integrate non-legal concepts. 
These points show, amongst other things, the importance of a clear 
definition of concepts and the evaluation of how they fit into the procedural 
framework within which the law is enforced.  
 
From the perspective of the optimal integration of EU law into national legal 
orders, the experiences described under the next common theme 
(relationship between decentralisation, convergence and consistency, sub-
section 3.3 but also the networking aspects of the enforcement system) 
should also provide for an interesting source of inspiration in a more general 
way. The use of a large variety of convergence mechanisms outside of the 
traditional harmonisation instruments and the results that this has 
achieved, are worth examining. Finally, the doubts about the system of 
judicial protection that were expressed above (the last common theme, sub-
section 3.4) are evidently also related to the broader issue of how the system 
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Neveneffecten van de modernisering van  
EU mededingingsrecht 
Modernisering als een uitdaging voor het 
handhavingssysteem van het  
Europese mededingingsrecht en van het  
Europees recht in het algemeen 
 
In dit proefschrift worden vijf artikelen bij elkaar gebracht die geschreven 
werden tussen 2005 en 2010. De titel  “Neveneffecten van de modernisering-
modernisering als een uitdaging voor het handhavingssysteem van Europees 
mededingingsrecht en Europees recht in het algemeen” formuleert het 
onderwerp van alle verschillende artikels.  
 
Voor alle artikelen geldt dat ze opgenomen werden in de vorm waarin ze 
werden gepubliceerd. Dat heeft voor gevolg dat de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 
nog de oude nummering van de verdragen vermelden. Om die reden werd 
hierna een tabel opgenomen waarin enkele belangrijke corresponderende 
artikelen worden weergegeven. Hoofdstuk 6 werd nog niet gepubliceerd op 
het moment van het afronden van het manuscript voor dit proefschrift.  
 
Voor ingewijden in het mededingingsrecht is de term modernisering bekend, 
althans veelvuldig gebruikt. In dit kader past het eerst om aan te geven wat 
hiermee word bedoeld. Modernisering dekt een combinatie van verschillende 
ontwikkelingen die in  de afgelopen jaren plaats hebben gevonden in het 
Europese mededingingsrecht en die zowel een materiële (inhoudelijke) 
component als ook meer procedurele en institutionele component hebben. 
Dit proefschrift raakt aan beide componenten, meer bepaald vanuit het 
perspectief van de handhaving van het recht. Het samenbrengen van de 
verschillende artikelen vanuit dit perspectief toont aan dat beide aspecten 
van de modernisering met elkaar verband houden.  
 
Met inhoudelijke modernisering wordt een proces bedoeld dat, kort gezegd, 
neerkomt op een meer economische benadering van het mededingingsrecht. 
Meer aandacht voor economische analyse en de marktomstandigheden maar 
ook meer samenwerking tussen juristen en economen. De andere component 
van modernisering doelt, kort gezegd, op een proces van decentralisering dat 
in gang werd gezet door Verordening 1/2003 van 16 december 2002 van de 
Raad. In het bijzonder ziet deze decentralisering op een grotere betrokken-
heid van nationale rechters en ook nationale mededingings-autoriteiten in de 
handhaving van Europees mededingingsrecht. 
 
De term neveneffecten werd gekozen omdat er in de verschillende stukken 
onderwerpen aan bod komen die niet als zodanig de inhoud of de doelstelling 
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van de modernisering waren maar die zich gaandeweg voordeden als 
neveneffecten. Het gaat om de volgende onderwerpen: problemen van 
individuele rechstbescherming door nieuwsoortige beslissingen die de 
Commissie kan nemen (hoofdstuk 2), de veranderende rol van de interstate-
lijkheid als voorwaarde voor de toepassing van de mededingingsregels 
(hoofdstuk 3), de toegenomen aandacht voor de bewijsproblematiek  
(hoofdstuk 4), de verwarring rondom de doelstellingen die het mededingings-
recht beoogt na te streven (hoofdstuk 5), en de trend naar verdere 
harmonisering van het (nationale) procesrecht in mededingingszaken.    
 
De gemeenschappelijke aanpak in al de artikelen is dat wordt gekozen voor 
voor een bredere perspectief vanuit het Europese recht. De keuze op zich al 
van de onderwerpen kan door dit bredere perspectief verklaard worden. 
Daaraan ligt de overtuiging ten grondslag dat het mededingingsrecht, 
ondanks zijn zelfstandige ontwikkeling in de afgelopen jaren, integraal deel 
uitmaakt van het bredere Europees recht en daarmee verbonden is. Het kan 
interessant zijn voor niet–mededingingsjuristen om een aantal van de 
neveneffecten die hier worden beschreven, te bestuderen met het oog op het 
verder ontwikkelen van handhavingsmechanismen elders in het Europese 
recht. Omgekeerd wordt er ook in verschillende onderdelen op gewezen dat 
mededingingsjuristen er voor moeten waken om niet uit het oog te verliezen 
dat het mededingingsrecht deel uitmaakt van de bredere Europeesrechtelijke 
context. 
 
Het eerste artikel dat in de bundel is opgenomen, betreft rechtsbescherming 
en meer bepaald toegang tot de rechter voor individuele ondernemingen. De 
vraag die wordt behandeld is of het handhavingssysteem zoals het opgezet is 
door Verordening 1/2003 bijdraagt tot een gebrek aan rechtsbescherming 
zoals dat op andere terreinen in het EU recht was gesignaleerd in de jaren 
voorafgaand aan het artikel (2005). Het artikel concludeert dat het 
overdreven zou zijn om te stellen dat het nieuwe gedecentraliseerde systeem 
op poten gezet door de Verordening, op zichzelf belangrijke problemen van 
rechtsbescherming veroorzaakt. Echter, er zijn bepaalde kenmerken van het 
nieuwe systeem die wel reeds eerder bestaande zorgen versterken. Het gaat 
met name om een reeks nieuwe soorten formele en informele Commissie 
beschikkingen waarvan het onduidelijk is of ze kunnen worden 
aangevochten voor het Hof in een rechtstreeks beroep (artikel 263 VWEU). In 
de conclusies in hoofdstuk 7 van dit proefschrift (onderdeel 2.1) wordt 
gewezen op enkele ontwikkelingen die sinds 2005 hebben plaats gevonden. 
Eerst met betrekking tot het belang van het beginsel van adequate 
rechtsbescherming, en verder wordt bezien of zich sinds 2005 al zaken 
hebben voorgedaan waaruit kan worden afgeleid of het Hof  van Justitie 
bereid zou zijn om haar rechtspraak met betrekking tot rechtstreekse 
beroepen door individuele ondernemingen, bij te stellen. Die vraag wordt 
voorlopig negatief beantwoord maar er wordt gesteld dat het te vroeg is om 




In hoofdstuk 3 is een artikel vervat dat gepubliceerd werd in 2006 en dat 
handelt over het vereiste van de interstatelijkheid. Net zoals de bepalingen 
inzake vrij verkeer, is het voor de toepassing van zowel artikel 101 VWEU als 
102 VWEU vereist dat de handel tussen lidstaten wordt beïnvloed door de 
gedragingen die aan de orde zijn. Het uitgangspunt in het artikel is de vraag 
of in het mededingingsrecht het vereiste van interstatelijkheid ook in belang 
afneemt zoals dat elders in het Europese recht het geval lijkt te zijn. In het 
artikel wordt een overzicht gegeven van de wijze waarop de interstatelijkheid 
wordt geïnterpreteerd door de Commissie en in de rechtspraak. In het 
algemeen moet gezegd dat de drempel voor het aannemen van interstatelijk 
effect niet hoog ligt. Dit is eigenlijk niet anders sinds de Commissie in 
nieuwe richtsnoeren in 2004 haar zienswijze publiceerde over hoe met dit 
vereiste moet worden omgegaan. De conclusie van het onderzoek in 
hoofdstuk 3 is dat het voor de juridische analyse van concurrentiebeperkend 
gedrag nauwelijks uitmaakt of er al dan niet invloed is op de interstatelijke 
handel. Het resultaat is immers hetzelfde omdat de materiële bepalingen van 
het nationale en het Europese recht doorgaans identiek zijn. In tegenstelling 
tot andere onderdelen van het Europees recht, zijn nationaal en Europees 
recht niet dichterbij gebracht doordat de interstatelijkheid aan belang 
afnam, maar door specifieke harmonisatiemechanismen die typisch zijn voor 
het mededingingsrecht (ze komen ook meer uitvoerig aan bod in hoofdstuk 
6). Derhalve maakt het voor de toepassing van het recht niet uit of er sprake 
is van beïnvloeding van de handel tussen lidstaten of niet.  
 
Uit de aanvullingen die in hoofdstuk 7 worden gegeven met betrekking tot de 
ontwikkelingen die zich voordeden sinds 2006 (in onderdeel 2.2), blijkt dat er 
aan deze situatie niet veel is gewijzigd. Meer dan ooit is de voorwaarde van 
interstatelijk effect zelf een factor van convergentie geworden en speelt deze 
voorwaarde een belangrijke rol bij het bepalen van de regels die nationale 
rechters en autoriteiten moeten toepassen. Immers, door de werking van 
artikel 3 van Verordening 1/2003 moeten bij interstatelijk effect, zowel de  
nationale verbodsbepalingen (de nationale tegenhangers van de artikelen 
101 en 102 VWEU) als de Europese verbodsbepalingen samen worden 
toegepast zoals reeds in hoofdstuk 3 werd beschreven. Vanaf dat moment, 
treden er verder een aantal bepalingen in werking die voor nationale rechters 
en nationale autoriteiten belangrijke verplichtingen inhouden, zoals 
bijvoorbeeld het voorleggen door autoriteiten van hun ontwerpbeslissingen 
aan de Commissie en de algemene verplichting om ten allen tijde 
tegenstrijdige beslissingen te vermijden. De vereiste van interstatelijkheid 
heeft dan ook een hele eigen functie binnen het mededingingsrecht. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een artikel weergegeven dat handelt over een typisch 
juridisch onderwerp, namelijk bewijs. De toegenomen aandacht voor 
bewijsproblemen en vraagstukken wordt ook gezien als een neveneffect van 
modernisering. Er lijkt op het eerste gezicht een tegenstelling te bestaan 
tussen een meer economische aanpak enerzijds en meer aandacht voor 
traditioneel juridische onderwerpen zoals bewijs. In het artikel wordt 
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gepoogd om aan te geven dat er van dergelijke tegenstelling echter geen 
sprake is.  
 
Vanuit zowel een breder Europees perspectief (bijvoorbeeld algemene 
rechtsbeginselen) alsook vanuit de context van een toegenomen samen-
werking met economen, wordt ingegaan op een aantal bewijsvraagstukken in 
kartelzaken en worden twee kernbegrippen gesitueerd: de bewijsstandaard 
en de bewijslast. Een eerder pragmatische kijk op bewijs wordt voorgesteld. 
Deze aanpak vereist dat juristen aanvaarden om te functioneren in een 
systeem dat voldoende flexibel en gedifferentieerd kan zijn om zich aan te 
passen aan de specifieke kenmerken van het mededingingsrecht. Langs de 
andere kant, vereist de voorgestelde aanpak dat de economen goed begrijpen 
dat de meeste regels inzake bewijs in feite de uitdrukking zijn van 
fundamentele rechtsbeginselen die aan de basis liggen van ons rechts-
systeem en dus niet alleen moeten worden gezien als technische obstakels in 
een kartelzaak. In het artikel wordt ook gewezen op het (onderschatte) belang 
van de motiveringsplicht. Aangezien de meer economische benadering er 
vaak toe leidt dat bij de toepassing van de mededingingsregels keuzes 
moeten worden gemaakt, wordt het belang van een goede redenering en 
motivering alleen maar groter. Een degelijke motivering beschermt immers 
de rechten van partijen en zorgt voor  “accountability”. Het laat bovendien 
ook toe dat beslissingen het onderwerp kunnen zijn van rechtsmiddelen. In 
de conclusies wordt er nog op één belangrijke zaak die gewezen is sinds het 
publiceren van het artikel. Het gaat meer bepaald om het arrest T-Mobile van 
het Hof van Justitie. Verder wordt gesteld dat de grote stroom van zaken die 
in de afgelopen jaren handelen over de bewijsproblematiek aantonen dat dit 
inderdaad één van de voornaamste actuele vraagstukken in het mede-
dingingsrecht is.  
 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt ingegaan op een ander fenomeen dat als een 
neveneffect van modernisering wordt aangemerkt. Het gaat namelijk om de 
nadruk die door de Commissie (daarin gevolgd door de meeste concurrentie-
autoriteiten) wordt gelegd op de consument en het consumentenbelang, en 
de verwarring die dat veroorzaakt over de doelstellingen van het Europese 
mededingingsrecht. In dit artikel (gepubliceerd in 2009 als discussiestuk en 
in herziene versie in 2010 als artikel) worden de doelstellingen van het 
Europese mededingingsrecht bekeken. De bedoeling is om aan te tonen dat 
er, ondanks de huidige sterke nadruk op de consument, altijd een reeks van 
verschillende doelstellingen zijn geweest in het systeem van het Europese 
mededingingsrecht. Het overzicht wil in twee richtingen inzicht verschaffen: 
langs de ene kant door aan te tonen dat ook in vroegere tijden de consument 
al centraal stond met name in de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie, en, 
anderzijds, door aan te tonen dat het systeem van EU mededingingsrecht 
onterecht gereduceerd wordt door de te sterke nadruk op het 
consumentenbelang omdat er een reeks andere doelstellingen zijn die eigen 
zijn aan het Europese mededingingsrecht. Meer nog, recente rechtspraak 
alsook de nieuwe bepalingen van het Verdrag van Lissabon worden 
aangehaald om aan te geven dat andere doelstellingen van het mede-
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
219 
dingingsrecht zoals de marktintegratie, meer dan ooit aanwezig zijn. 
Vervolgens probeert het artikel aan te tonen dat een discussie over de 
doelstellingen van het mededingingsrecht meer is dan alleen een 
theoretische discussie over de normatieve grondslagen van het recht. De 
doelstellingen hebben wel degelijk hun concrete impact, zowel op beleid als 
op de uitlegging en de handhaving van het recht. Verder wordt er vanuit een 
breder perspectief aandacht gevraagd voor factoren buiten het 
mededingingsrecht die ook mede hebben geleid tot de huidige nadruk op de 
consument. Met andere woorden, de ‘consumer focus’ is niet alleen toe te 
schrijven aan de meer economische aanpak of aan de voornamere rol die 
economen thans spelen. Tenslotte worden een aantal redenen opgesomd 
waarom een debat over de doelstellingen belangrijk is. Het gaat ondermeer 
om zogenaamde ‘governance’ argumenten alsook om de coherentie en de 
goede werking van het gedecentraliseerde handhavingssysteem dat werd 
opgezet door Verordening 1/2003. Er wordt gepleit voor de erkenning van de 
veelzijdige persoonlijkheid van het mededingingsrecht en gewaarschuwd voor 
de verenging van de publieke boodschap tot het consumentenbelang, niet in 
het minst omdat er nog te veel onduidelijkheid bestaat over wat het 
nastreven van het consumentenbelang inhoudt.  
 
Tenslotte gaat het artikel in hoofdstuk 6 verder op de decentraliserings-
aspecten van de modernisering. Het uitgangspunt is de sterke convergentie 
of harmonisering die plaatsgevonden heeft tussen het nationale en het 
Europese mededingingsrecht in de afgelopen jaren. Voor wat betreft het 
materiële recht is dit al veel langer aan de gang (dit werd ook kort 
beschreven in eerdere hoofdstukken, 2 en 3). Voor wat betreft procedure is 
er thans een debat ontstaan over de opportuniteit van verdere harmonisering 
van het nationale procesrecht (met name in de publieke handhaving) en het 
wegnemen van de laatste verschillen die bestaan tussen de handhavings-
processen in de verschillende lidstaten. Een debat is wellicht zelfs een 
verkeerde term, aangezien er een grote consensus lijkt te bestaan dat verdere 
harmonisering nodig is, zowel in de markt als bij de autoriteiten. Hierbij 
wordt zeer regelmatig het effectiviteitsbeginsel aangehaald. Daartegenover 
wordt dan het beginsel van procesautonomie geplaatst. De tegenstelling 
tussen beiden is in het Europese recht wel bekend.  
 
De bedoeling van het artikel is om na te gaan wat de huidige stand van het 
recht nu eigenlijk is ten aanzien van deze beide belangrijke beginselen. 
Vervolgens kan dan worden nagegaan welke hun waarde is als argument 
voor of tegen verdere harmonisering van het procesrecht in 
mededingingszaken. Het artikel beoogt tegelijkertijd een actuele kijk op 
effectiviteit en procesautonomie te bieden door de bril van het 
mededingingsrecht, als ook tegelijkertijd deze beginselen dan terug te 
plaatsen in het huidige debat en enkele gedachten te vormen over de 
noodzaak of opportuniteit van verdere harmonisering. De uitkomst is een 
genuanceerde beschouwing dat noch effectiviteit noch procesautonomie 
doorslaggevende waarde hebben als het gaat over harmonisering van 
nationaal procesrecht. Het mededingingsrecht wordt gekenmerkt door een 
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dermate sterke trend naar convergentie dat het echter natuurlijk lijkt om 
naar harmonisering te streven. Het is aannemelijk dat ook de coherentie en 
de consistente toepassing van het recht er wel bij zouden kunnen varen. Er 
is voldoende aandacht nodig voor de wijze waarop dit gebeurt: na een 
accurate inventaris van waar nu nog divergentie bestaat die echt 
problematisch is en die door harmonisering kan worden opgelost, en met 
voldoende betrokkenheid van stakeholders, niet alleen in de wereld van het 
mededingingsrecht.  
 
Hoofdstuk 7 valt uiteen in twee delen. Eerst worden de conclusies van de 
verschillende artikelen samengevat en voor de oudere artikelen worden kort 
enkele nieuwe meer recente ontwikkelingen aangehaald (die hierboven in de 
samenvatting reeds zijn geïntegreerd). In het tweede, uitvoerige, onderdeel 
wordt de samenhang tussen de verschillende stukken aangetoond aan de 
hand van vier gemeenschappelijke thema’s. Deze thema’s komen in mindere 
of meerdere mate voor in al de verschillende artikelen. De bespreking ervan 
laat ook toe om een aantal opmerkingen en aanbevelingen naar de toekomst 
toe te formuleren. 
 
Het gaat om de volgende thema’s:  
(1) de relatie tussen mededingingsrecht en de interne markt 
(2) materiële modernisering (meer economische benadering) als een uit-
daging voor het handhavingssysteem  
(3) modernisering vanuit een organisatorisch perspectief: de ingewik-
kelde relatie tussen decentralisering, convergentie en consistentie 
(4) modernisering als een uitdaging voor het systeem van rechts-
bescherming.  
 
De belangrijkste opmerkingen die bij elk van die thema’s aanbod komen, 
kunnen als volgt kort worden samengevat.  
 
(1) De relatie tussen mededingingsrecht en de interne markt 
 
In hoofdstuk 5 werd het verband aangetoond aan de hand van de discussie 
van de doelstellingen waarbij werd aangegeven dat met name de rol van de 
marktintegratie (als typische EU doelstelling) moet worden ge(her)definieerd 
in het mededingingsrecht. Uit het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 3 
(interstatelijkheid) blijkt ook duidelijk het verband tussen het mededingings-
recht en de regels inzake de interne markt. Ook het debat over de plaats van 
niet-economische belangen bij de invulling van de verbodsbepalingen is een 
gemeenschappelijk kenmerk van de mededingingsvoorschriften en de 
(andere) regels inzake de interne markt. Het verband tussen beiden kan ook 
een interessante factor zijn in de discussie rond de mogelijke rechtsbasis 
voor verdere (formele) harmonisering van procesrecht (hoofdstuk 6). In 
hoofdstuk 7 wordt onder dit thema ook nog een verschilpunt besproken dat 
blijkt uit de verschillende artikelen: de relatie tussen nationaal recht en EU 
recht is anders geëvolueerd in het mededingingsrecht dan elders. De 
bestudering van dit verschil is de moeite waard vanuit een brede 
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Europeesrechtelijke context en kan inzichten brengen in de integratie van 
het Europese recht in de nationale rechtsorde meer in het algemeen. 
  
(2) Materiële modernisering (meer economische benadering) als een 
uitdaging voor het handhavingssysteem  
 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden enkele algemene beschouwingen ontwikkeld over het 
samengaan van recht en economie in het mededingingsrecht. Modernisering 
heeft het zoeken naar een optimale co-existentie noodzakelijk gemaakt. Er 
wordt aangegeven dat er duidelijk een evolutie is in de zoektocht naar een 
optimaal samenwerken tussen juristen en economen.  
 
Het belang van de economische inbreng wordt erkend, maar moet steeds 
worden gezien in de context van een rechtssysteem dat gebaseerd is op 
rechtsbeginselen en dat het recht toepast en handhaaft in een specifieke 
procedurele context. Hoofdstuk 5 over de doelstellingen belichtte de 
verwarring die kan ontstaan zijn door de “consumer focus” die wordt 
geïdentificeerd met meer economische inbreng. Hoofdstuk 4 probeerde 
vanuit de context van samenwerking tussen juristen en economen, enkele 
basisbegrippen uit het bewijsrecht te bespreken.  
 
Een belangrijke vaststelling is dat de inhoudelijke modernisering, doorgaans 
de meer economische benadering genoemd, vraagstukken op de voorgrond 
heeft gebracht die raken aan het procedurele kader waarin het 
mededingingsrecht wordt toegepast. De interactie tussen het introduceren 
van nieuwe materiële beginselen enerzijds, en het procesrecht anderzijds, 
mag niet worden onderschat. Inhoud en procedure zijn nauw met elkaar 
verbonden. Het komt vaak neer op bewijsvragen, zoals de recente discussie 
rond de heroriëntering van het beleid inzake misbruik van machtspositie 
aantoont. In hoofdstuk 7 worden nog enkele voorbeelden gegeven. Als we 
willen dat het mededingingsrecht inhoudelijke evolueert, moeten nieuwe 
(economische) concepten worden ingebed in het bestaande juridische kader.  
 
 
(3) Modernisering vanuit een organisatorisch perspectief: de inge-
wikkelde relatie tussen decentralisering, convergentie en 
consistentie 
 
Het handhavingssysteem van het Europese mededingingsrecht kent 
bijzondere kenmerken waarbij een grote mate van convergentie van materieel 
recht, procesrecht en beleid de kern vormen. Ook de centrale en sterke 
positie van de Commissie is een uniek gegeven. Deze aspecten komen in elk 
van de artikelen aan bod, vaak vanuit een andere insteek belicht. Noch de 
convergentie als zodanig, noch de rol van de Commissie wordt in de 
verschillende hoofdstukken fundamenteel in vraag gesteld. Wel wordt 
gewezen op de vragen die ze oproept (bijvoorbeeld rechtsbescherming in 




Als het gaat om convergentie worden hier en daar ook wel kritische 
bedenkingen geplaatst bij de rechtvaardigingen die juridisch worden aange-
grepen om verdere convergentie te “stimuleren”: het effectiviteitsbeginsel 
(hoofdstuk 6) bijvoorbeeld. In hoofdstuk 7 wordt daaraan toegevoegd dat ook 
de voortdurende verwijzing naar consistente toepassing van het mede-
dingingsrecht wellicht niet helemaal op zijn plaats is. Decentrale handhaving 
is voor alle domeinen van het EU recht in principe het uitgangpunt en de 
vrees voor inconsistente toepassing van het recht lijkt overdreven. In de 
praktijk moet echter worden vastgesteld dat er een zeer brede consensus is 
die aan consistentie dermate belang hecht dat het een draagvlak creeërde 
voor verregaande convergentiemechanismen, zoals deze neergelegd in Vo. 
1/2003 (binnen het netwerk van autoriteiten, nader besproken in hoofdstuk 
2 en 6).  
 
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat op dit ook nog een waarschuwing: op institutioneel vlak 
moet er voldoende besef zijn dat het handhavingsmodel van de Commissie 
zeker niet noodzakelijk het model is waarnaar de verdere convergentie moet 
streven. Het verband tussen inhoud van het recht, het procesrecht en het 
institutioneel model waarbinnen men handhaaft, zorgt ervoor dat nu eerst 
moet worden gekeken naar de optimale institutionele structuur van een 
autoriteit in plaats van verder de convergentie van nationale procesregels na 
te streven. Immers, de natuurlijke neiging van de convergentiebeweging lijkt 
te zijn om toe te werken naar het Europese model. Gelet op de groeiende 
vragen over de verenigbaarheid van het Commissiemodel met fundamentele 
beginselen, is dat echter geen evidente zaak.  
 
Tenslotte wordt nog de vraag gesteld of de convergentie niet zo ver is 
doorgeschoten dat er een zekere tegenstrijd ontstaat met de modernisering. 
De meer decentrale toepassing van het mededingingsrecht zou moeten 
toelaten om makkelijker de meer economische benadering toe te passen, 
dichter bij de markt en de concrete marktspelers in een lidstaat. Nochtans 
lijkt er minder ruimte dan ooit tevoren voor eigen beleid. Zoals gezegd lijken 
de lidstaten daar weinig bezwaren tegen te hebben en is de convergentie 
gestoeld op grote consensus, maar toch lijkt dit vragen op te roepen want de 
markten en de economieën van de lidstaten zijn alles behalve even homogeen 
als de regels die erop worden toegepast. De vraag is of het juridisch kader 
voldoende ruimte laat voor differentiëring naargelang de economische 
realiteit. Het stellen van de vraag lijkt al in te gaan tegen de algemene 
overtuiging dat het nationaal en het Europees niveau in alle opzichten op 
elkaar moeten worden afgestemd.  
 
(4) Modernisering als een uitdaging voor het systeem van rechts-
bescherming.  
 
Het laatste thema dat wordt besproken in hoofdstuk 7 komt terug op het 
onderwerp van het eerste hoofdstuk. Het bevat een vrij fundamentele kritiek 
op het systeem van rechtsbescherming. Daarbij wordt vooral ingegaan op de 
rol van de Europese rechter, het Hof van Justitie en het Gerecht die in het 
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huidige EU systeem als enigen kunnen instaan voor rechterlijke controle op 
de handelingen van de Commissie als mededingingsautoriteit. In 
verschillende hoofdstukken kwam nochtans tot uiting hoe centraal de rol 
van de Commissie is.  
 
Eerst wordt toch een korte maar erg belangrijke opmerking gemaakt over de 
nationale rechter: wanneer de nationale autoriteiten handelen binnen het 
netwerk van autoriteiten, moet hij instaan voor rechtsbescherming. Echter, 
in tegenstelling tot het niveau van de autoriteiten, lijkt van convergentie 
nauwelijks sprake op het niveau van de rechters die in de publieke 
handhaving opereren, vooral als beroepsrechters. Noch in Vo. 1/2003, noch 
in recente initiatieven van de Commissie heeft men het heikele punt van de 
harmonisering en convergentie in het gerechtelijke apparaat durven 
aansnijden. Nochtans is het van belang ook hier aandacht aan te besteden.   
 
Het wordt erkend dat er zich klaarblijkelijk nog weinig zaken hebben 
voorgedaan waarin tot uiting kwam dat het systeem van rechtsbescherming 
op Europees niveau faalt. Een belangrijke vaststelling is echter dat er zich 
überhaupt erg weinig (formele) beslissingen hebben voorgedaan van de types 
die in hoofdstuk 2 werden besproken. Toch zijn er voldoende redenen om te 
besluiten dat de rol van de Europese rechter als mede-handhaver onvol-
doende mee is geëvolueerd met de ontwikkelingen inzake effectieve rechts-
bescherming maar ook met de inhoudelijke evoluties in het  mededingings-
recht.  In hoofdstuk 7 wordt benadrukt dat het niet enkel gaat om proble-
men die verband houden met de ontvankelijkheid van individuele nietig-
heidsberoepen tegen beslissingen waarbij zaken worden verdeeld onder de 
autoriteiten, ook al is dit het onderwerp dat meestal de meeste aandacht 
krijgt.  
 
Er is ook de gevestigde rechtspraak die alleen beroepen toelaat tegen 
zogenaamde definitieve beslissingen, de snelheid (het gebrek eraan) van het 
systeem, het gebrek aan flexibiliteit in de procedures alsmede de relatief 
passieve opstelling van het Hof en het Gerecht als het om bewijs, feiten en 
marktanalyse gaat. De roep naar een hervorming van het systeem wordt 
ondersteund en de oprichting van een Mededingingstribunaal kan een 
oplossing bieden. De eigen kenmerken van het mededingingrecht vergen een 
eigen benadering. De doelstellingen van een hervorming moeten precies 
toelaten om een voldoende rechterlijke controle te hebben op alle hande-
lingen die de belangen van een individuele onderneming op substantiële 
wijze raken zonder overdreven formele benadering. De handelingen van de 
Commissie kunnen immers alleen in Luxemburg worden getoetst. Verder 
moet de rechters actiever kunnen zijn en moet bekeken worden hoe de meer 
economische benadering moet vertaald worden naar de rechtsgang voor het 
Hof en het Gerecht. Daarbij is van belang dat er een globale benadering 
komt: de handhaving door de Commissie en door de (beroeps)rechter vormen 




Dit proefschrift wordt afgesloten met een post scriptum. Daarin wordt eerst 
uitgedrukt dat bij het samenstellen van de bundel met artikelen, duidelijk 
werd dat de interactie tussen materieel recht en procesrecht als een rode 
draad door het proefschrift heen loopt. De modernisering van het EU 
mededingingsrecht, met zijn inhoudelijke en zijn procedurele component, die 
doorgaans afzonderlijk behandeld worden, is daar op zich al een illustratie 
van. Er zijn veel voorbeelden aan bod gekomen van de wijze waarop proce-
dure en inhoud op elkaar inspelen. Daarmee is ook aangegeven dat dit een 
onderwerp is dat, op meer theoretisch vlak verder onderzoek verdient. Ten 
tweede wordt terug aangeknoopt bij de inleiding en de titel van het 
proefschrift waarin het verband tussen het mededingingsrecht en het 
bredere EU recht wordt uitgedrukt. Enkele voorbeelden worden opnieuw 
gegeven waaruit dit verband moet blijken en de hoop wordt uitgedrukt dat 
daarmee niet alleen mededingingsjuristen aangespoord zijn om de bredere 
context niet uit het oog te verliezen maar hopelijk ook omgekeerd enige 
interesse kan gewekt worden voor de beschreven neveneffecten buiten de 
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Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation 
of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text 
with EEA relevance) 
  
 
Official Journal L 001, 04/01/2003 P. 0001 - 0025 
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular 
Article 83 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(1), 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(2), 




(1) In order to establish a system which ensures that competition in the common 
market is not distorted, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty must be applied effectively 
and uniformly in the Community. Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First 
Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82(4) of the Treaty(5), has allowed a 
Community competition policy to develop that has helped to disseminate a 
competition culture within the Community. In the light of experience, however, that 
Regulation should now be replaced by legislation designed to meet the challenges of an 
integrated market and a future enlargement of the Community. 
 
(2) In particular, there is a need to rethink the arrangements for applying the 
exception from the prohibition on agreements, which restrict competition, laid down in 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty. Under Article 83(2)(b) of the Treaty, account must be taken 
in this regard of the need to ensure effective supervision, on the one hand, and to 
simplify administration to the greatest possible extent, on the other. 
 
(3) The centralised scheme set up by Regulation No 17 no longer secures a balance 
between those two objectives. It hampers application of the Community competition 
rules by the courts and competition authorities of the Member States, and the system 
of notification it involves prevents the Commission from concentrating its resources on 
curbing the most serious infringements. It also imposes considerable costs on 
undertakings. 
 
(4) The present system should therefore be replaced by a directly applicable exception 
system in which the competition authorities and courts of the Member States have the 
power to apply not only Article 81(1) and Article 82 of the Treaty, which have direct 
applicability by virtue of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, but also Article 81(3) of the Treaty. 
 
(5) In order to ensure an effective enforcement of the Community competition rules 
and at the same time the respect of fundamental rights of defence, this Regulation 
should regulate the burden of proof under Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. It should 
be for the party or the authority alleging an infringement of Article 81(1) and Article 82 
of the Treaty to prove the existence thereof to the required legal standard. It should be 
for the undertaking or association of undertakings invoking the benefit of a defence 
against a finding of an infringement to demonstrate to the required legal standard that 
the conditions for applying such defence are satisfied. This Regulation affects neither 
national rules on the standard of proof nor obligations of competition authorities and 
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courts of the Member States to ascertain the relevant facts of a case, provided that 
such rules and obligations are compatible with general principles of Community law. 
 
(6) In order to ensure that the Community competition rules are applied effectively, the 
competition authorities of the Member States should be associated more closely with 
their application. To this end, they should be empowered to apply Community law. 
 
(7) National courts have an essential part to play in applying the Community 
competition rules. When deciding disputes between private individuals, they protect 
the subjective rights under Community law, for example by awarding damages to the 
victims of infringements. The role of the national courts here complements that of the 
competition authorities of the Member States. They should therefore be allowed to 
apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in full. 
 
(8) In order to ensure the effective enforcement of the Community competition rules 
and the proper functioning of the cooperation mechanisms contained in this 
Regulation, it is necessary to oblige the competition authorities and courts of the 
Member States to also apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty where they apply 
national competition law to agreements and practices which may affect trade between 
Member States. In order to create a level playing field for agreements, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices within the internal market, it is 
also necessary to determine pursuant to Article 83(2)(e) of the Treaty the relationship 
between national laws and Community competition law. To that effect it is necessary 
to provide that the application of national competition laws to agreements, decisions 
or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty may not lead to 
the prohibition of such agreements, decisions and concerted practices if they are not 
also prohibited under Community competition law. The notions of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices are autonomous concepts of Community 
competition law covering the coordination of behaviour of undertakings on the market 
as interpreted by the Community Courts. Member States should not under this 
Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national 
competition laws which prohibit or impose sanctions on unilateral conduct engaged in 
by undertakings. These stricter national laws may include provisions which prohibit or 
impose sanctions on abusive behaviour toward economically dependent undertakings. 
Furthermore, this Regulation does not apply to national laws which impose criminal 
sanctions on natural persons except to the extent that such sanctions are the means 
whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced. 
 
(9) Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty have as their objective the protection of 
competition on the market. This Regulation, which is adopted for the implementation 
of these Treaty provisions, does not preclude Member States from implementing on 
their territory national legislation, which protects other legitimate interests provided 
that such legislation is compatible with general principles and other provisions of 
Community law. In so far as such national legislation pursues predominantly an 
objective different from that of protecting competition on the market, the competition 
authorities and courts of the Member States may apply such legislation on their 
territory. Accordingly, Member States may under this Regulation implement on their 
territory national legislation that prohibits or imposes sanctions on acts of unfair 
trading practice, be they unilateral or contractual. Such legislation pursues a specific 
objective, irrespective of the actual or presumed effects of such acts on competition on 
the market. This is particularly the case of legislation which prohibits undertakings 
from imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain from them 




(10) Regulations such as 19/65/EEC(6), (EEC) No 2821/71(7), (EEC) No 3976/87(8), 
(EEC) No 1534/91(9), or (EEC) No 479/92(10) empower the Commission to apply 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty by Regulation to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices. In the areas defined by such 
Regulations, the Commission has adopted and may continue to adopt so called "block" 
exemption Regulations by which it declares Article 81(1) of the Treaty inapplicable to 
categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices. Where agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices to which such Regulations apply nonetheless have 
effects that are incompatible with Article 81(3) of the Treaty, the Commission and the 
competition authorities of the Member States should have the power to withdraw in a 
particular case the benefit of the block exemption Regulation. 
 
(11) For it to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty are applied, the Commission 
should be able to address decisions to undertakings or associations of undertakings 
for the purpose of bringing to an end infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
Provided there is a legitimate interest in doing so, the Commission should also be able 
to adopt decisions which find that an infringement has been committed in the past 
even if it does not impose a fine. This Regulation should also make explicit provision 
for the Commission's power to adopt decisions ordering interim measures, which has 
been acknowledged by the Court of Justice. 
 
(12) This Regulation should make explicit provision for the Commission's power to 
impose any remedy, whether behavioural or structural, which is necessary to bring 
the infringement effectively to an end, having regard to the principle of proportionality. 
Structural remedies should only be imposed either where there is no equally effective 
behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more 
burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. Changes to 
the structure of an undertaking as it existed before the infringement was committed 
would only be proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated 
infringement that derives from the very structure of the undertaking. 
 
(13) Where, in the course of proceedings which might lead to an agreement or practice 
being prohibited, undertakings offer the Commission commitments such as to meet its 
concerns, the Commission should be able to adopt decisions which make those 
commitments binding on the undertakings concerned. Commitment decisions should 
find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission without 
concluding whether or not there has been or still is an infringement. Commitment 
decisions are without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities and courts of 
the Member States to make such a finding and decide upon the case. Commitment 
decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine. 
 
(14) In exceptional cases where the public interest of the Community so requires, it 
may also be expedient for the Commission to adopt a decision of a declaratory nature 
finding that the prohibition in Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty does not apply, 
with a view to clarifying the law and ensuring its consistent application throughout 
the Community, in particular with regard to new types of agreements or practices that 
have not been settled in the existing case-law and administrative practice. 
 
(15) The Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States should 
form together a network of public authorities applying the Community competition 
rules in close cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary to set up arrangements for 
information and consultation. Further modalities for the cooperation within the 
network will be laid down and revised by the Commission, in close cooperation with 
the Member States. 
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(16) Notwithstanding any national provision to the contrary, the exchange of 
information and the use of such information in evidence should be allowed between 
the members of the network even where the information is confidential. This 
information may be used for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty as well 
as for the parallel application of national competition law, provided that the latter 
application relates to the same case and does not lead to a different outcome. When 
the information exchanged is used by the receiving authority to impose sanctions on 
undertakings, there should be no other limit to the use of the information than the 
obligation to use it for the purpose for which it was collected given the fact that the 
sanctions imposed on undertakings are of the same type in all systems. The rights of 
defence enjoyed by undertakings in the various systems can be considered as 
sufficiently equivalent. However, as regards natural persons, they may be subject to 
substantially different types of sanctions across the various systems. Where that is the 
case, it is necessary to ensure that information can only be used if it has been 
collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of defence 
of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving authority. 
 
(17) If the competition rules are to be applied consistently and, at the same time, the 
network is to be managed in the best possible way, it is essential to retain the rule 
that the competition authorities of the Member States are automatically relieved of 
their competence if the Commission initiates its own proceedings. Where a competition 
authority of a Member State is already acting on a case and the Commission intends 
to initiate proceedings, it should endeavour to do so as soon as possible. Before 
initiating proceedings, the Commission should consult the national authority 
concerned. 
 
(18) To ensure that cases are dealt with by the most appropriate authorities within the 
network, a general provision should be laid down allowing a competition authority to 
suspend or close a case on the ground that another authority is dealing with it or has 
already dealt with it, the objective being that each case should be handled by a single 
authority. This provision should not prevent the Commission from rejecting a 
complaint for lack of Community interest, as the case-law of the Court of Justice has 
acknowledged it may do, even if no other competition authority has indicated its 
intention of dealing with the case. 
 
(19) The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions set up 
by Regulation No 17 has functioned in a very satisfactory manner. It will fit well into 
the new system of decentralised application. It is necessary, therefore, to build upon 
the rules laid down by Regulation No 17, while improving the effectiveness of the 
organisational arrangements. To this end, it would be expedient to allow opinions to 
be delivered by written procedure. The Advisory Committee should also be able to act 
as a forum for discussing cases that are being handled by the competition authorities 
of the Member States, so as to help safeguard the consistent application of the 
Community competition rules. 
 
(20) The Advisory Committee should be composed of representatives of the competition 
authorities of the Member States. For meetings in which general issues are being 
discussed, Member States should be able to appoint an additional representative. This 
is without prejudice to members of the Committee being assisted by other experts 
from the Member States. 
 
(21) Consistency in the application of the competition rules also requires that 
arrangements be established for cooperation between the courts of the Member States 
and the Commission. This is relevant for all courts of the Member States that apply 
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Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, whether applying these rules in lawsuits between 
private parties, acting as public enforcers or as review courts. In particular, national 
courts should be able to ask the Commission for information or for its opinion on 
points concerning the application of Community competition law. The Commission 
and the competition authorities of the Member States should also be able to submit 
written or oral observations to courts called upon to apply Article 81 or Article 82 of 
the Treaty. These observations should be submitted within the framework of national 
procedural rules and practices including those safeguarding the rights of the parties. 
Steps should therefore be taken to ensure that the Commission and the competition 
authorities of the Member States are kept sufficiently well informed of proceedings 
before national courts. 
 
(22) In order to ensure compliance with the principles of legal certainty and the 
uniform application of the Community competition rules in a system of parallel 
powers, conflicting decisions must be avoided. It is therefore necessary to clarify, in 
accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice, the effects of Commission 
decisions and proceedings on courts and competition authorities of the Member 
States. Commitment decisions adopted by the Commission do not affect the power of 
the courts and the competition authorities of the Member States to apply Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty. 
 
(23) The Commission should be empowered throughout the Community to require 
such information to be supplied as is necessary to detect any agreement, decision or 
concerted practice prohibited by Article 81 of the Treaty or any abuse of a dominant 
position prohibited by Article 82 of the Treaty. When complying with a decision of the 
Commission, undertakings cannot be forced to admit that they have committed an 
infringement, but they are in any event obliged to answer factual questions and to 
provide documents, even if this information may be used to establish against them or 
against another undertaking the existence of an infringement. 
 
(24) The Commission should also be empowered to undertake such inspections as are 
necessary to detect any agreement, decision or concerted practice prohibited by Article 
81 of the Treaty or any abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 82 of the 
Treaty. The competition authorities of the Member States should cooperate actively in 
the exercise of these powers. 
 
(25) The detection of infringements of the competition rules is growing ever more 
difficult, and, in order to protect competition effectively, the Commission's powers of 
investigation need to be supplemented. The Commission should in particular be 
empowered to interview any persons who may be in possession of useful information 
and to record the statements made. In the course of an inspection, officials authorised 
by the Commission should be empowered to affix seals for the period of time necessary 
for the inspection. Seals should normally not be affixed for more than 72 hours. 
Officials authorised by the Commission should also be empowered to ask for any 
information relevant to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection. 
 
(26) Experience has shown that there are cases where business records are kept in the 
homes of directors or other people working for an undertaking. In order to safeguard 
the effectiveness of inspections, therefore, officials and other persons authorised by 
the Commission should be empowered to enter any premises where business records 
may be kept, including private homes. However, the exercise of this latter power 
should be subject to the authorisation of the judicial authority. 
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(27) Without prejudice to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is useful to set out the 
scope of the control that the national judicial authority may carry out when it 
authorises, as foreseen by national law including as a precautionary measure, 
assistance from law enforcement authorities in order to overcome possible opposition 
on the part of the undertaking or the execution of the decision to carry out inspections 
in non-business premises. It results from the case-law that the national judicial 
authority may in particular ask the Commission for further information which it needs 
to carry out its control and in the absence of which it could refuse the authorisation. 
The case-law also confirms the competence of the national courts to control the 
application of national rules governing the implementation of coercive measures. 
 
(28) In order to help the competition authorities of the Member States to apply Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty effectively, it is expedient to enable them to assist one another 
by carrying out inspections and other fact-finding measures. 
 
(29) Compliance with Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and the fulfilment of the 
obligations imposed on undertakings and associations of undertakings under this 
Regulation should be enforceable by means of fines and periodic penalty payments. To 
that end, appropriate levels of fine should also be laid down for infringements of the 
procedural rules. 
 
(30) In order to ensure effective recovery of fines imposed on associations of 
undertakings for infringements that they have committed, it is necessary to lay down 
the conditions on which the Commission may require payment of the fine from the 
members of the association where the association is not solvent. In doing so, the 
Commission should have regard to the relative size of the undertakings belonging to 
the association and in particular to the situation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Payment of the fine by one or several members of an association is 
without prejudice to rules of national law that provide for recovery of the amount paid 
from other members of the association. 
 
(31) The rules on periods of limitation for the imposition of fines and periodic penalty 
payments were laid down in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74(11), which also 
concerns penalties in the field of transport. In a system of parallel powers, the acts, 
which may interrupt a limitation period, should include procedural steps taken 
independently by the competition authority of a Member State. To clarify the legal 
framework, Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 should therefore be amended to prevent it 
applying to matters covered by this Regulation, and this Regulation should include 
provisions on periods of limitation. 
 
(32) The undertakings concerned should be accorded the right to be heard by the 
Commission, third parties whose interests may be affected by a decision should be 
given the opportunity of submitting their observations beforehand, and the decisions 
taken should be widely publicised. While ensuring the rights of defence of the 
undertakings concerned, in particular, the right of access to the file, it is essential that 
business secrets be protected. The confidentiality of information exchanged in the 
network should likewise be safeguarded. 
 
(33) Since all decisions taken by the Commission under this Regulation are subject to 
review by the Court of Justice in accordance with the Treaty, the Court of Justice 
should, in accordance with Article 229 thereof be given unlimited jurisdiction in 





(34) The principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, as they have been 
applied by Regulation No 17, have given a central role to the Community bodies. This 
central role should be retained, whilst associating the Member States more closely 
with the application of the Community competition rules. In accordance with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, this 
Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objective, 
which is to allow the Community competition rules to be applied effectively. 
 
(35) In order to attain a proper enforcement of Community competition law, Member 
States should designate and empower authorities to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty as public enforcers. They should be able to designate administrative as well as 
judicial authorities to carry out the various functions conferred upon competition 
authorities in this Regulation. This Regulation recognises the wide variation which 
exists in the public enforcement systems of Member States. The effects of Article 11(6) 
of this Regulation should apply to all competition authorities. As an exception to this 
general rule, where a prosecuting authority brings a case before a separate judicial 
authority, Article 11(6) should apply to the prosecuting authority subject to the 
conditions in Article 35(4) of this Regulation. Where these conditions are not fulfilled, 
the general rule should apply. In any case, Article 11(6) should not apply to courts 
insofar as they are acting as review courts. 
 
(36) As the case-law has made it clear that the competition rules apply to transport, 
that sector should be made subject to the procedural provisions of this Regulation. 
Council Regulation No 141 of 26 November 1962 exempting transport from the 
application of Regulation No 17(12) should therefore be repealed and Regulations 
(EEC) No 1017/68(13), (EEC) No 4056/86(14) and (EEC) No 3975/87(15) should be 
amended in order to delete the specific procedural provisions they contain. 
 
(37) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Accordingly, this Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those 
rights and principles. 
 
(38) Legal certainty for undertakings operating under the Community competition 
rules contributes to the promotion of innovation and investment. Where cases give rise 
to genuine uncertainty because they present novel or unresolved questions for the 
application of these rules, individual undertakings may wish to seek informal 
guidance from the Commission. This Regulation is without prejudice to the ability of 
the Commission to issue such informal guidance, 
 
 






Application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty 
 
1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty 
which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall be prohibited, no 
prior decision to that effect being required. 
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2. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty 
which satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall not be prohibited, no 
prior decision to that effect being required. 
3. The abuse of a dominant position referred to in Article 82 of the Treaty shall be 
prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required. 
 
Article 2 
Burden of proof 
 
In any national or Community proceedings for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) or of Article 82 of the 
Treaty shall rest on the party or the authority alleging the infringement. The 
undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of Article 81(3) of the 




Relationship between Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and  
national competition laws 
 
1. Where the competition authorities of the Member States or national courts apply 
national competition law to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or 
concerted practices within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty which may affect 
trade between Member States within the meaning of that provision, they shall also 
apply Article 81 of the Treaty to such agreements, decisions or concerted practices. 
Where the competition authorities of the Member States or national courts apply 
national competition law to any abuse prohibited by Article 82 of the Treaty, they shall 
also apply Article 82 of the Treaty. 
2. The application of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of 
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States but which do not restrict competition within 
the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty, or which fulfil the conditions of Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty or which are covered by a Regulation for the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty. Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting 
and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction 
unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. 
3. Without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of Community law, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 do not apply when the competition authorities and the courts of 
the Member States apply national merger control laws nor do they preclude the 
application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective 






Powers of the Commission 
 
For the purpose of applying Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the Commission shall 





Powers of the competition authorities of the Member States 
 
The competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power to apply 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in individual cases. For this purpose, acting on their 
own initiative or on a complaint, they may take the following decisions: 
- requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, 
- ordering interim measures, 
- accepting commitments, 
- imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in their 
national law. 
Where on the basis of the information in their possession the conditions for 
prohibition are not met they may likewise decide that there are no grounds for action 
on their part. 
 
Article 6 
Powers of the national courts 
 






Finding and termination of infringement 
 
1. Where the Commission, acting on a complaint or on its own initiative, finds that 
there is an infringement of Article 81 or of Article 82 of the Treaty, it may by decision 
require the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned to bring such 
infringement to an end. For this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural or 
structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and 
necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. Structural remedies can only 
be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any 
equally effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking 
concerned than the structural remedy. If the Commission has a legitimate interest in 
doing so, it may also find that an infringement has been committed in the past. 
2. Those entitled to lodge a complaint for the purposes of paragraph 1 are natural or 





1. In cases of urgency due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to 
competition, the Commission, acting on its own initiative may by decision, on the 
basis of a prima facie finding of infringement, order interim measures. 
2. A decision under paragraph 1 shall apply for a specified period of time and may be 





1. Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement 
be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the 
concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the 
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Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the undertakings. 
Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude that there 
are no longer grounds for action by the Commission. 
2. The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen the proceedings: 
(a) where there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision 
was based; 
(b) where the undertakings concerned act contrary to their commitments; or 
(c) where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information 
provided by the parties. 
 
Article 10 
Finding of inapplicability 
 
Where the Community public interest relating to the application of Articles 81 and 82 
of the Treaty so requires, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, may by decision 
find that Article 81 of the Treaty is not applicable to an agreement, a decision by an 
association of undertakings or a concerted practice, either because the conditions of 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty are not fulfilled, or because the conditions of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty are satisfied. 







Cooperation between the Commission and the competition  
authorities of the Member States 
 
1. The Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States shall apply 
the Community competition rules in close cooperation. 
2. The Commission shall transmit to the competition authorities of the Member States 
copies of the most important documents it has collected with a view to applying 
Articles 7, 8, 9, 10 and Article 29(1). At the request of the competition authority of a 
Member State, the Commission shall provide it with a copy of other existing 
documents necessary for the assessment of the case. 
3. The competition authorities of the Member States shall, when acting under Article 
81 or Article 82 of the Treaty, inform the Commission in writing before or without 
delay after commencing the first formal investigative measure. This information may 
also be made available to the competition authorities of the other Member States. 
4. No later than 30 days before the adoption of a decision requiring that an 
infringement be brought to an end, accepting commitments or withdrawing the benefit 
of a block exemption Regulation, the competition authorities of the Member States 
shall inform the Commission. To that effect, they shall provide the Commission with a 
summary of the case, the envisaged decision or, in the absence thereof, any other 
document indicating the proposed course of action. This information may also be 
made available to the competition authorities of the other Member States. At the 
request of the Commission, the acting competition authority shall make available to 
the Commission other documents it holds which are necessary for the assessment of 
the case. The information supplied to the Commission may be made available to the 
competition authorities of the other Member States. National competition authorities 
may also exchange between themselves information necessary for the assessment of a 
case that they are dealing with under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. 
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5. The competition authorities of the Member States may consult the Commission on 
any case involving the application of Community law. 
6. The initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision 
under Chapter III shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of 
their competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. If a competition authority 
of a Member State is already acting on a case, the Commission shall only initiate 
proceedings after consulting with that national competition authority. 
 
Article 12 
Exchange of information 
 
1. For the purpose of applying Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty the Commission and 
the competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power to provide one 
another with and use in evidence any matter of fact or of law, including confidential 
information. 
2. Information exchanged shall only be used in evidence for the purpose of applying 
Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty and in respect of the subject-matter for which it 
was collected by the transmitting authority. However, where national competition law 
is applied in the same case and in parallel to Community competition law and does 
not lead to a different outcome, information exchanged under this Article may also be 
used for the application of national competition law. 
3. Information exchanged pursuant to paragraph 1 can only be used in evidence to 
impose sanctions on natural persons where: 
- the law of the transmitting authority foresees sanctions of a similar kind in relation 
to an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty or, in the absence thereof, 
- the information has been collected in a way which respects the same level of 
protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the 
national rules of the receiving authority. However, in this case, the information 
exchanged cannot be used by the receiving authority to impose custodial sanctions. 
 
Article 13 
Suspension or termination of proceedings 
 
1. Where competition authorities of two or more Member States have received a 
complaint or are acting on their own initiative under Article 81 or Article 82 of the 
Treaty against the same agreement, decision of an association or practice, the fact that 
one authority is dealing with the case shall be sufficient grounds for the others to 
suspend the proceedings before them or to reject the complaint. The Commission may 
likewise reject a complaint on the ground that a competition authority of a Member 
State is dealing with the case. 
2. Where a competition authority of a Member State or the Commission has received a 
complaint against an agreement, decision of an association or practice which has 





1. The Commission shall consult an Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and 
Dominant Positions prior to the taking of any decision under Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 23, 
Article 24(2) and Article 29(1). 
2. For the discussion of individual cases, the Advisory Committee shall be composed of 
representatives of the competition authorities of the Member States. For meetings in 
which issues other than individual cases are being discussed, an additional Member 
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State representative competent in competition matters may be appointed. 
Representatives may, if unable to attend, be replaced by other representatives. 
3. The consultation may take place at a meeting convened and chaired by the 
Commission, held not earlier than 14 days after dispatch of the notice convening it, 
together with a summary of the case, an indication of the most important documents 
and a preliminary draft decision. In respect of decisions pursuant to Article 8, the 
meeting may be held seven days after the dispatch of the operative part of a draft 
decision. Where the Commission dispatches a notice convening the meeting which 
gives a shorter period of notice than those specified above, the meeting may take place 
on the proposed date in the absence of an objection by any Member State. The 
Advisory Committee shall deliver a written opinion on the Commission's preliminary 
draft decision. It may deliver an opinion even if some members are absent and are not 
represented. At the request of one or several members, the positions stated in the 
opinion shall be reasoned. 
4. Consultation may also take place by written procedure. However, if any Member 
State so requests, the Commission shall convene a meeting. In case of written 
procedure, the Commission shall determine a time-limit of not less than 14 days 
within which the Member States are to put forward their observations for circulation 
to all other Member States. In case of decisions to be taken pursuant to Article 8, the 
time-limit of 14 days is replaced by seven days. Where the Commission determines a 
time-limit for the written procedure which is shorter than those specified above, the 
proposed time-limit shall be applicable in the absence of an objection by any Member 
State. 
5. The Commission shall take the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the 
Advisory Committee. It shall inform the Committee of the manner in which its opinion 
has been taken into account. 
6. Where the Advisory Committee delivers a written opinion, this opinion shall be 
appended to the draft decision. If the Advisory Committee recommends publication of 
the opinion, the Commission shall carry out such publication taking into account the 
legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
7. At the request of a competition authority of a Member State, the Commission shall 
include on the agenda of the Advisory Committee cases that are being dealt with by a 
competition authority of a Member State under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. 
The Commission may also do so on its own initiative. In either case, the Commission 
shall inform the competition authority concerned. 
A request may in particular be made by a competition authority of a Member State in 
respect of a case where the Commission intends to initiate proceedings with the effect 
of Article 11(6). 
The Advisory Committee shall not issue opinions on cases dealt with by competition 
authorities of the Member States. The Advisory Committee may also discuss general 
issues of Community competition law. 
 
Article 15 
Cooperation with national courts 
 
1. In proceedings for the application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty, courts of 
the Member States may ask the Commission to transmit to them information in its 
possession or its opinion on questions concerning the application of the Community 
competition rules. 
2. Member States shall forward to the Commission a copy of any written judgment of 
national courts deciding on the application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. 
Such copy shall be forwarded without delay after the full written judgment is notified 
to the parties. 
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3. Competition authorities of the Member States, acting on their own initiative, may 
submit written observations to the national courts of their Member State on issues 
relating to the application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. With the permission 
of the court in question, they may also submit oral observations to the national courts 
of their Member State. Where the coherent application of Article 81 or Article 82 of the 
Treaty so requires, the Commission, acting on its own initiative, may submit written 
observations to courts of the Member States. With the permission of the court in 
question, it may also make oral observations. 
For the purpose of the preparation of their observations only, the competition 
authorities of the Member States and the Commission may request the relevant court 
of the Member State to transmit or ensure the transmission to them of any documents 
necessary for the assessment of the case. 
4. This Article is without prejudice to wider powers to make observations before courts 




Uniform application of Community competition law 
 
1. When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 81 or 
Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they 
cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. 
They must also avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision 
contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the 
national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. This 
obligation is without prejudice to the rights and obligations under Article 234 of the 
Treaty. 
2. When competition authorities of the Member States rule on agreements, decisions 
or practices under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the subject 
of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions which would run counter to the 
decision adopted by the Commission. 
 
CHAPTER V 
POWERS OF INVESTIGATION 
 
Article 17 
Investigations into sectors of the economy and into types of agreements 
 
1. Where the trend of trade between Member States, the rigidity of prices or other 
circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or distorted within the 
common market, the Commission may conduct its inquiry into a particular sector of 
the economy or into a particular type of agreements across various sectors. In the 
course of that inquiry, the Commission may request the undertakings or associations 
of undertakings concerned to supply the information necessary for giving effect to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and may carry out any inspections necessary for that 
purpose. 
The Commission may in particular request the undertakings or associations of 
undertakings concerned to communicate to it all agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices. 
The Commission may publish a report on the results of its inquiry into particular 
sectors of the economy or particular types of agreements across various sectors and 
invite comments from interested parties. 
2. Articles 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 and 24 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
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Article 18 
Requests for information 
 
1. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission 
may, by simple request or by decision, require undertakings and associations of 
undertakings to provide all necessary information. 
2. When sending a simple request for information to an undertaking or association of 
undertakings, the Commission shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the 
request, specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which the 
information is to be provided, and the penalties provided for in Article 23 for supplying 
incorrect or misleading information. 
3. Where the Commission requires undertakings and associations of undertakings to 
supply information by decision, it shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the 
request, specify what information is required and fix the time-limit within which it is 
to be provided. It shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 23 and 
indicate or impose the penalties provided for in Article 24. It shall further indicate the 
right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. 
4. The owners of the undertakings or their representatives and, in the case of legal 
persons, companies or firms, or associations having no legal personality, the persons 
authorised to represent them by law or by their constitution shall supply the 
information requested on behalf of the undertaking or the association of undertakings 
concerned. Lawyers duly authorised to act may supply the information on behalf of 
their clients. The latter shall remain fully responsible if the information supplied is 
incomplete, incorrect or misleading. 
5. The Commission shall without delay forward a copy of the simple request or of the 
decision to the competition authority of the Member State in whose territory the seat 
of the undertaking or association of undertakings is situated and the competition 
authority of the Member State whose territory is affected. 
6. At the request of the Commission the governments and competition authorities of 
the Member States shall provide the Commission with all necessary information to 
carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation. 
 
Article 19 
Power to take statements 
 
1. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission 
may interview any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the 
purpose of collecting information relating to the subject-matter of an investigation. 
2. Where an interview pursuant to paragraph 1 is conducted in the premises of an 
undertaking, the Commission shall inform the competition authority of the Member 
State in whose territory the interview takes place. If so requested by the competition 
authority of that Member State, its officials may assist the officials and other 
accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to conduct the interview. 
 
Article 20 
The Commission's powers of inspection 
 
1. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission 
may conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings and associations of 
undertakings. 
2. The officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to 
conduct an inspection are empowered: 
(a) to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings and 
associations of undertakings; 
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(b) to examine the books and other records related to the business, irrespective of the 
medium on which they are stored; 
(c) to take or obtain in any form copies of or extracts from such books or records; 
(d) to seal any business premises and books or records for the period and to the extent 
necessary for the inspection; 
(e) to ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking or association of 
undertakings for explanations on facts or documents relating to the subject-matter 
and purpose of the inspection and to record the answers. 
3. The officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to 
conduct an inspection shall exercise their powers upon production of a written 
authorisation specifying the subject matter and purpose of the inspection and the 
penalties provided for in Article 23 in case the production of the required books or 
other records related to the business is incomplete or where the answers to questions 
asked under paragraph 2 of the present Article are incorrect or misleading. In good 
time before the inspection, the Commission shall give notice of the inspection to the 
competition authority of the Member State in whose territory it is to be conducted. 
4. Undertakings and associations of undertakings are required to submit to 
inspections ordered by decision of the Commission. The decision shall specify the 
subject matter and purpose of the inspection, appoint the date on which it is to begin 
and indicate the penalties provided for in Articles 23 and 24 and the right to have the 
decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. The Commission shall take such decisions 
after consulting the competition authority of the Member State in whose territory the 
inspection is to be conducted. 
5. Officials of as well as those authorised or appointed by the competition authority of 
the Member State in whose territory the inspection is to be conducted shall, at the 
request of that authority or of the Commission, actively assist the officials and other 
accompanying persons authorised by the Commission. To this end, they shall enjoy 
the powers specified in paragraph 2. 
6. Where the officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission 
find that an undertaking opposes an inspection ordered pursuant to this Article, the 
Member State concerned shall afford them the necessary assistance, requesting where 
appropriate the assistance of the police or of an equivalent enforcement authority, so 
as to enable them to conduct their inspection. 
7. If the assistance provided for in paragraph 6 requires authorisation from a judicial 
authority according to national rules, such authorisation shall be applied for. Such 
authorisation may also be applied for as a precautionary measure. 
8. Where authorisation as referred to in paragraph 7 is applied for, the national 
judicial authority shall control that the Commission decision is authentic and that the 
coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the 
subject matter of the inspection. In its control of the proportionality of the coercive 
measures, the national judicial authority may ask the Commission, directly or through 
the Member State competition authority, for detailed explanations in particular on the 
grounds the Commission has for suspecting infringement of Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty, as well as on the seriousness of the suspected infringement and on the nature 
of the involvement of the undertaking concerned. However, the national judicial 
authority may not call into question the necessity for the inspection nor demand that 
it be provided with the information in the Commission's file. The lawfulness of the 
Commission decision shall be subject to review only by the Court of Justice. 
 
Article 21 
Inspection of other premises 
 
1. If a reasonable suspicion exists that books or other records related to the business 
and to the subject-matter of the inspection, which may be relevant to prove a serious 
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violation of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty, are being kept in any other premises, 
land and means of transport, including the homes of directors, managers and other 
members of staff of the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned, the 
Commission can by decision order an inspection to be conducted in such other 
premises, land and means of transport. 
2. The decision shall specify the subject matter and purpose of the inspection, appoint 
the date on which it is to begin and indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by 
the Court of Justice. It shall in particular state the reasons that have led the 
Commission to conclude that a suspicion in the sense of paragraph 1 exists. The 
Commission shall take such decisions after consulting the competition authority of 
the Member State in whose territory the inspection is to be conducted. 
3. A decision adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 cannot be executed without prior 
authorisation from the national judicial authority of the Member State concerned. The 
national judicial authority shall control that the Commission decision is authentic and 
that the coercive measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard 
in particular to the seriousness of the suspected infringement, to the importance of 
the evidence sought, to the involvement of the undertaking concerned and to the 
reasonable likelihood that business books and records relating to the subject matter of 
the inspection are kept in the premises for which the authorisation is requested. The 
national judicial authority may ask the Commission, directly or through the Member 
State competition authority, for detailed explanations on those elements which are 
necessary to allow its control of the proportionality of the coercive measures 
envisaged. 
However, the national judicial authority may not call into question the necessity for 
the inspection nor demand that it be provided with information in the Commission's 
file. The lawfulness of the Commission decision shall be subject to review only by the 
Court of Justice. 
4. The officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to 
conduct an inspection ordered in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall 




Investigations by competition authorities of Member States 
 
1. The competition authority of a Member State may in its own territory carry out any 
inspection or other fact-finding measure under its national law on behalf and for the 
account of the competition authority of another Member State in order to establish 
whether there has been an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty. Any 
exchange and use of the information collected shall be carried out in accordance with 
Article 12. 
2. At the request of the Commission, the competition authorities of the Member States 
shall undertake the inspections which the Commission considers to be necessary 
under Article 20(1) or which it has ordered by decision pursuant to Article 20(4). The 
officials of the competition authorities of the Member States who are responsible for 
conducting these inspections as well as those authorised or appointed by them shall 
exercise their powers in accordance with their national law. 
If so requested by the Commission or by the competition authority of the Member 
State in whose territory the inspection is to be conducted, officials and other 











1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings and associations of 
undertakings fines not exceeding 1 % of the total turnover in the preceding business 
year where, intentionally or negligently: 
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in response to a request made 
pursuant to Article 17 or Article 18(2); 
(b) in response to a request made by decision adopted pursuant to Article 17 or Article 
18(3), they supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or do not supply 
information within the required time-limit; 
(c) they produce the required books or other records related to the business in 
incomplete form during inspections under Article 20 or refuse to submit to inspections 
ordered by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 20(4); 
(d) in response to a question asked in accordance with Article 20(2)(e), 
- they give an incorrect or misleading answer, 
- they fail to rectify within a time-limit set by the Commission an incorrect, incomplete 
or misleading answer given by a member of staff, or 
- they fail or refuse to provide a complete answer on facts relating to the subject-
matter and purpose of an inspection ordered by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 
20(4); 
(e) seals affixed in accordance with Article 20(2)(d) by officials or other accompanying 
persons authorised by the Commission have been broken. 
2. The Commission may by decision impose fines on undertakings and associations of 
undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently: 
(a) they infringe Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty; or 
(b) they contravene a decision ordering interim measures under Article 8; or 
(c) they fail to comply with a commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to 
Article 9. 
For each undertaking and association of undertakings participating in the 
infringement, the fine shall not exceed 10 % of its total turnover in the preceding 
business year. 
Where the infringement of an association relates to the activities of its members, the 
fine shall not exceed 10 % of the sum of the total turnover of each member active on 
the market affected by the infringement of the association. 
3. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the 
duration of the infringement. 
4. When a fine is imposed on an association of undertakings taking account of the 
turnover of its members and the association is not solvent, the association is obliged 
to call for contributions from its members to cover the amount of the fine. 
Where such contributions have not been made to the association within a time-limit 
fixed by the Commission, the Commission may require payment of the fine directly by 
any of the undertakings whose representatives were members of the decision-making 
bodies concerned of the association. 
After the Commission has required payment under the second subparagraph, where 
necessary to ensure full payment of the fine, the Commission may require payment of 
the balance by any of the members of the association which were active on the market 
on which the infringement occurred. 
However, the Commission shall not require payment under the second or the third 
subparagraph from undertakings which show that they have not implemented the 
infringing decision of the association and either were not aware of its existence or have 
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actively distanced themselves from it before the Commission started investigating the 
case. 
The financial liability of each undertaking in respect of the payment of the fine shall 
not exceed 10 % of its total turnover in the preceding business year. 




Periodic penalty payments 
 
1. The Commission may, by decision, impose on undertakings or associations of 
undertakings periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 % of the average daily 
turnover in the preceding business year per day and calculated from the date 
appointed by the decision, in order to compel them: 
(a) to put an end to an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty, in 
accordance with a decision taken pursuant to Article 7; 
(b) to comply with a decision ordering interim measures taken pursuant to Article 8; 
(c) to comply with a commitment made binding by a decision pursuant to Article 9; 
(d) to supply complete and correct information which it has requested by decision 
taken pursuant to Article 17 or Article 18(3); 
(e) to submit to an inspection which it has ordered by decision taken pursuant to 
Article 20(4). 
2. Where the undertakings or associations of undertakings have satisfied the 
obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the 
Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payment at a figure 







Limitation periods for the imposition of penalties 
 
1. The powers conferred on the Commission by Articles 23 and 24 shall be subject to 
the following limitation periods: 
(a) three years in the case of infringements of provisions concerning requests for 
information or the conduct of inspections; 
(b) five years in the case of all other infringements. 
2. Time shall begin to run on the day on which the infringement is committed. 
However, in the case of continuing or repeated infringements, time shall begin to run 
on the day on which the infringement ceases. 
3. Any action taken by the Commission or by the competition authority of a Member 
State for the purpose of the investigation or proceedings in respect of an infringement 
shall interrupt the limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty 
payments. The limitation period shall be interrupted with effect from the date on 
which the action is notified to at least one undertaking or association of undertakings 
which has participated in the infringement. Actions which interrupt the running of the 
period shall include in particular the following: 
(a) written requests for information by the Commission or by the competition authority 
of a Member State; 
(b) written authorisations to conduct inspections issued to its officials by the 
Commission or by the competition authority of a Member State; 
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(c) the initiation of proceedings by the Commission or by the competition authority of a 
Member State; 
(d) notification of the statement of objections of the Commission or of the competition 
authority of a Member State. 
4. The interruption of the limitation period shall apply for all the undertakings or 
associations of undertakings which have participated in the infringement. 
5. Each interruption shall start time running afresh. However, the limitation period 
shall expire at the latest on the day on which a period equal to twice the limitation 
period has elapsed without the Commission having imposed a fine or a periodic 
penalty payment. That period shall be extended by the time during which limitation is 
suspended pursuant to paragraph 6. 
6. The limitation period for the imposition of fines or periodic penalty payments shall 
be suspended for as long as the decision of the Commission is the subject of 
proceedings pending before the Court of Justice. 
 
Article 26 
Limitation period for the enforcement of penalties 
 
1. The power of the Commission to enforce decisions taken pursuant to Articles 23 
and 24 shall be subject to a limitation period of five years. 
2. Time shall begin to run on the day on which the decision becomes final. 
3. The limitation period for the enforcement of penalties shall be interrupted: 
(a) by notification of a decision varying the original amount of the fine or periodic 
penalty payment or refusing an application for variation; 
(b) by any action of the Commission or of a Member State, acting at the request of the 
Commission, designed to enforce payment of the fine or periodic penalty payment. 
4. Each interruption shall start time running afresh. 
5. The limitation period for the enforcement of penalties shall be suspended for so long 
as: 
(a) time to pay is allowed; 




HEARINGS AND PROFESSIONAL SECRECY 
 
Article 27 
Hearing of the parties, complainants and others 
 
1. Before taking decisions as provided for in Articles 7, 8, 23 and Article 24(2), the 
Commission shall give the undertakings or associations of undertakings which are the 
subject of the proceedings conducted by the Commission the opportunity of being 
heard on the matters to which the Commission has taken objection. The Commission 
shall base its decisions only on objections on which the parties concerned have been 
able to comment. Complainants shall be associated closely with the proceedings. 
2. The rights of defence of the parties concerned shall be fully respected in the 
proceedings. They shall be entitled to have access to the Commission's file, subject to 
the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. The 
right of access to the file shall not extend to confidential information and internal 
documents of the Commission or the competition authorities of the Member States. In 
particular, the right of access shall not extend to correspondence between the 
Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States, or between the 
latter, including documents drawn up pursuant to Articles 11 and 14. Nothing in this 
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paragraph shall prevent the Commission from disclosing and using information 
necessary to prove an infringement. 
3. If the Commission considers it necessary, it may also hear other natural or legal 
persons. Applications to be heard on the part of such persons shall, where they show 
a sufficient interest, be granted. The competition authorities of the Member States 
may also ask the Commission to hear other natural or legal persons. 
4. Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision pursuant to Article 9 or Article 
10, it shall publish a concise summary of the case and the main content of the 
commitments or of the proposed course of action. Interested third parties may submit 
their observations within a time limit which is fixed by the Commission in its 
publication and which may not be less than one month. Publication shall have regard 





1. Without prejudice to Articles 12 and 15, information collected pursuant to Articles 
17 to 22 shall be used only for the purpose for which it was acquired. 
2. Without prejudice to the exchange and to the use of information foreseen in Articles 
11, 12, 14, 15 and 27, the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member 
States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the supervision of 
these authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities of the 
Member States shall not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them 
pursuant to this Regulation and of the kind covered by the obligation of professional 
secrecy. This obligation also applies to all representatives and experts of Member 






Withdrawal in individual cases 
 
1. Where the Commission, empowered by a Council Regulation, such as Regulations 
19/65/EEC, (EEC) No 2821/71, (EEC) No 3976/87, (EEC) No 1534/91 or (EEC) No 
479/92, to apply Article 81(3) of the Treaty by regulation, has declared Article 81(1) of 
the Treaty inapplicable to certain categories of agreements, decisions by associations 
of undertakings or concerted practices, it may, acting on its own initiative or on a 
complaint, withdraw the benefit of such an exemption Regulation when it finds that in 
any particular case an agreement, decision or concerted practice to which the 
exemption Regulation applies has certain effects which are incompatible with Article 
81(3) of the Treaty. 
2. Where, in any particular case, agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices to which a Commission Regulation referred to in 
paragraph 1 applies have effects which are incompatible with Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty in the territory of a Member State, or in a part thereof, which has all the 
characteristics of a distinct geographic market, the competition authority of that 









Publication of decisions 
 
1. The Commission shall publish the decisions, which it takes pursuant to Articles 7 
to 10, 23 and 24. 
2. The publication shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the 
decision, including any penalties imposed. It shall have regard to the legitimate 
interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
 
Article 31 
Review by the Court of Justice 
 
The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the 
Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce or 





This Regulation shall not apply to: 
(a) international tramp vessel services as defined in Article 1(3)(a) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 4056/86; 
(b) a maritime transport service that takes place exclusively between ports in one and 
the same Member State as foreseen in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86; 





1. The Commission shall be authorised to take such measures as may be appropriate 
in order to apply this Regulation. The measures may concern, inter alia: 
(a) the form, content and other details of complaints lodged pursuant to Article 7 and 
the procedure for rejecting complaints; 
(b) the practical arrangements for the exchange of information and consultations 
provided for in Article 11; 
(c) the practical arrangements for the hearings provided for in Article 27. 
2. Before the adoption of any measures pursuant to paragraph 1, the Commission 
shall publish a draft thereof and invite all interested parties to submit their comments 
within the time-limit it lays down, which may not be less than one month. Before 
publishing a draft measure and before adopting it, the Commission shall consult the 
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions. 
 
CHAPTER XI 





1. Applications made to the Commission under Article 2 of Regulation No 17, 
notifications made under Articles 4 and 5 of that Regulation and the corresponding 
applications and notifications made under Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 
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4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 shall lapse as from the date of application of this 
Regulation. 
2. Procedural steps taken under Regulation No 17 and Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, 
(EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 shall continue to have effect for the 
purposes of applying this Regulation. 
 
Article 35 
Designation of competition authorities of Member States 
 
1. The Member States shall designate the competition authority or authorities 
responsible for the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty in such a way that 
the provisions of this regulation are effectively complied with. The measures necessary 
to empower those authorities to apply those Articles shall be taken before 1 May 2004. 
The authorities designated may include courts. 
2. When enforcement of Community competition law is entrusted to national 
administrative and judicial authorities, the Member States may allocate different 
powers and functions to those different national authorities, whether administrative or 
judicial. 
3. The effects of Article 11(6) apply to the authorities designated by the Member States 
including courts that exercise functions regarding the preparation and the adoption of 
the types of decisions foreseen in Article 5. The effects of Article 11(6) do not extend to 
courts insofar as they act as review courts in respect of the types of decisions foreseen 
in Article 5. 
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, in the Member States where, for the adoption of 
certain types of decisions foreseen in Article 5, an authority brings an action before a 
judicial authority that is separate and different from the prosecuting authority and 
provided that the terms of this paragraph are complied with, the effects of Article 11(6) 
shall be limited to the authority prosecuting the case which shall withdraw its claim 
before the judicial authority when the Commission opens proceedings and this 
withdrawal shall bring the national proceedings effectively to an end. 
 
Article 36 
Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 
 
Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 is amended as follows: 
1. Article 2 is repealed; 
2. in Article 3(1), the words "The prohibition laid down in Article 2" are replaced by the 
words "The prohibition in Article 81(1) of the Treaty"; 
3. Article 4 is amended as follows: 
(a) In paragraph 1, the words "The agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
referred to in Article 2" are replaced by the words "Agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices pursuant to Article 81(1) of the Treaty"; 
(b) Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 
"2. If the implementation of any agreement, decision or concerted practice covered by 
paragraph 1 has, in a given case, effects which are incompatible with the requirements 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, undertakings or associations of undertakings may be 
required to make such effects cease." 
4. Articles 5 to 29 are repealed with the exception of Article 13(3) which continues to 
apply to decisions adopted pursuant to Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 prior 
to the date of application of this Regulation until the date of expiration of those 
decisions; 





Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 
 
In Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74, the following Article is inserted: 
"Article 7a 
Exclusion 
This Regulation shall not apply to measures taken under Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty(16)." 
 
Article 38 
Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 
 
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 is amended as follows: 
1. Article 7 is amended as follows: 
(a) Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 
"1. Breach of an obligation 
Where the persons concerned are in breach of an obligation which, pursuant to Article 
5, attaches to the exemption provided for in Article 3, the Commission may, in order to 
put an end to such breach and under the conditions laid down in Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty(17) adopt a decision that 
either prohibits them from carrying out or requires them to perform certain specific 
acts, or withdraws the benefit of the block exemption which they enjoyed." 
(b) Paragraph 2 is amended as follows: 
(i) In point (a), the words "under the conditions laid down in Section II" are replaced by 
the words "under the conditions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003"; 
(ii) The second sentence of the second subparagraph of point (c)(i) is replaced by the 
following: 
"At the same time it shall decide, in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003, whether to accept commitments offered by the undertakings concerned with a 
view, inter alia, to obtaining access to the market for non-conference lines." 
2. Article 8 is amended as follows: 
(a) Paragraph 1 is deleted. 
(b) In paragraph 2 the words "pursuant to Article 10" are replaced by the words 
"pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1/2003". 
(c) Paragraph 3 is deleted; 
3. Article 9 is amended as follows: 
(a) In paragraph 1, the words "Advisory Committee referred to in Article 15" are 
replaced by the words "Advisory Committee referred to in Article 14 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003"; 
(b) In paragraph 2, the words "Advisory Committee as referred to in Article 15" are 
replaced by the words "Advisory Committee referred to in Article 14 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003"; 
4. Articles 10 to 25 are repealed with the exception of Article 13(3) which continues to 
apply to decisions adopted pursuant to Article 81(3) of the Treaty prior to the date of 
application of this Regulation until the date of expiration of those decisions; 
5. in Article 26, the words "the form, content and other details of complaints pursuant 
to Article 10, applications pursuant to Article 12 and the hearings provided for in 
Article 23(1) and (2)" are deleted. 
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Article 39 
Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 
 
Articles 3 to 19 of Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 are repealed with the exception of 
Article 6(3) which continues to apply to decisions adopted pursuant to Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty prior to the date of application of this Regulation until the date of expiration 
of those decisions. 
 
Article 40 
Amendment of Regulations No 19/65/EEC, (EEC) No 2821/71 and (EEC)  
No 1534/91 
 
Article 7 of Regulation No 19/65/EEC, Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 2821/71 and 
Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 1534/91 are repealed. 
 
Article 41 
Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 
 
Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 is amended as follows: 
1. Article 6 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 6 
The Commission shall consult the Advisory Committee referred to in Article 14 of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty(18) before 
publishing a draft Regulation and before adopting a Regulation." 
2. Article 7 is repealed. 
 
Article 42 
Amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 479/92 
 
Regulation (EEC) No 479/92 is amended as follows: 
1. Article 5 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 5 
Before publishing the draft Regulation and before adopting the Regulation, the 
Commission shall consult the Advisory Committee referred to in Article 14 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty(19)." 
2. Article 6 is repealed. 
 
Article 43 
Repeal of Regulations No 17 and No 141 
 
1. Regulation No 17 is repealed with the exception of Article 8(3) which continues to 
apply to decisions adopted pursuant to Article 81(3) of the Treaty prior to the date of 
application of this Regulation until the date of expiration of those decisions. 
2. Regulation No 141 is repealed. 






Report on the application of the present Regulation 
 
Five years from the date of application of this Regulation, the Commission shall report 
to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of this Regulation, in 
particular on the application of Article 11(6) and Article 17. 
On the basis of this report, the Commission shall assess whether it is appropriate to 
propose to the Council a revision of this Regulation. 
 
Article 45 
Entry into force 
 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following that of its publication 
in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
 
It shall apply from 1 May 2004. 
 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States. 
 
Done at Brussels, 16 December 2002. 
 
For the Council 
 
The President 
M. Fischer Boel 
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